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How, and when, does it become possible to conceptualize a truly planetary crisis? The Cold War nuclear arms race installed one powerful concept of planetary crisis in American culture. The science enabling the US nuclear arsenal, however, also produced unintended byproducts: notably, a radical new investment in the earth sciences. Cold War nuclear science ultimately produced not only bombs, but also a new understanding of the earth as biosphere. Thus, the image of planetary crisis in the US was increasingly doubled during the Cold War - the immediacy of nuclear threat matched by concerns about rapid environmental change and the cumulative effects of industrial civilization on a fragile biosphere. This paper examines the evolution of (and competition between) two ideas of planetary crisis since 1945: nuclear war and climate change. In doing so, the paper offers an alternative history of the nuclear age and considers the US national security implications of a shift in the definition of planetary crisis from warring states to a warming biosphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public health in the United States and Western Europe has long been allied with national security and international commerce. During the 1990s, American virologists and public health experts capitalized on this historical association, arguing that 'emerging diseases' presented a threat to American political and economic interests. This paper investigates these arguments, which I call the 'emerging diseases worldview', and compares it to colonial-era ideologies of medicine and public health. Three points of comparison are emphasized: the mapping of space and relative importance of territoriality; the increasing emphasis on information and commodity exchange networks; and the transition from metaphors of conversion and a 'civilizing mission', to integration and international development. Although colonial and postcolonial ideologies of global health remain deeply intertwined, significant differences are becoming apparent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poor economic performance in the Soviet Union has led to a view in the West that Soviet leaders might seek an accommodation with the US which would allow them to transfer resources to the civilian economy. The economy has been characterized by declining growth in population, capital and productivity. Economic evidence suggests that defence priority has adversely affected economic performance by attracting a disproportionate share of resources and, in protecting military producers from the worst aspects of central planning, by imposing the systemic burden on the civilian economy. Econometric investigation by Western economists shows that the benefit in terms of higher economic growth from substantial decline in the growth of military expenditures is quite small, due to the inefficiency of the civilian investment process. An arms limitation is unlikely to yield a substantial transfer of R & D resources. A more fruitful source of economic benefit is likely to be the relaxation of restrictions on civilian enterprise. The military view of economic reform is likely to be ambivalent. It recognizes the need for a strong modern economy but is probably reluctant to yield its priority status. The international sector offers little prospect of relief. The East Europeans have their own economic problems and the Reagan administration has tightened its control on exports of technology which might at the margin ease the Soviet economic constraint. The resource saving from an arms agreement alone is unlikely to be sufficient to avoid the need for a fundamental re-assessment of policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The foreign military relations of Thailand and the Philippines are analysed against a hypothesis of military dependency. Attempts by both countries to diversify their military supplies have so far not had any significant effects. Both countries are highly dependent especially upon the US. Their individual profiles differ, however. Thailand has received more US security assistance than has the Philippines. At the same time the Philippines has been financially favored by way of relatively more grant assistance and financial support. The main explanation given is that this is a way for the US to 'pay for' the base rights. This direct linkage between the US bases and assistance might be a complicating factor in the negotiations concerning the future of the bases. A 'compromise' rather than a 'refusal' policy is therefore seen as the most likely outcome for the near future after 1991. In the long run, however, several factors become important, such as the development of national and international tension, war, and the possible creation of 'cooperative forces' between the US and Third World countries. US training support might in the long run become one of the most important factors shaping future military dependency upon the US and of keeping security perceptions in these countries 'aligned' with American interpretations. This will put severe stress particularly upon those governments trying to change their defense policy away from foreign military dependency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines militarization in contemporary Japan, as most saliently manifest in increases in military spending and the buildup of military might, by focusing on the erosion of anti-militaristic principles. This includes the broader interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which now permits certain 'offensive weaponry' and 'collective defense' type arrangements; the weakening of the 'three non-nuclear principles', which are not effective against port calls by US vessels laden with Tomahawk missiles and other nuclear-capable weapons; the relaxation of the ban on the export of defense-related technology, which from 1983 onwards makes an exception of exports to the United States; and the scrapping of the '1% ceiling' on military expenditures in the 1987 budget, which put an end to an important barrier to increases in military spending. The erosion of these principles has been facilitated by external factors -- American pressure, the Soviet military buildup in the region, and the decline in Asian criticism of Japan's military presence -- as well as by internal factors -- a greater acceptance of the Self Defense Forces and the US-Japan Security Treaty on the part of the opposition parties as well as the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]