Search

This paper explores the relationship between crisis and experience, concentrating on 'excentric positionality' in relation to the shared world, as presented in the work of Helmuth Plessner. A by-product of the 1920s Weimar Germany, Plessner's philosophical anthropology, it is argued, presents us with a forgotten blueprint for transitive and compositional approaches to the social world. Instead of the familiar 'crisis of experience' used to diagnose 'what has gone wrong', it allows us to re-learn how to work with 'the experience of crisis' itself. The latter holds the key to a different type of approach based on 'xeno-communication'. This type of communication utilizes the productive potential of crisis in its uncertainty and hesitation before a decision, showing a way to extend and enlarge experience itself. Cultivation of these 'excentric' dynamics in turn suggests new 'excentric methodologies' based on a more flexible fit between concepts and the worlds they are meant to describe. 'Excentric methodologies' constitute a type of experience-based, analytical response to the shared world. They work with phenomena across spaces and problems, analytically utilizing their joint emergence from the fundamental imbalance and discontinuity characteristic of the human environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article calls for a rethinking of critical sociology. Representing classical critical sociology, the Bourdieusian paradigm illustrated domination, but its negative foundation removed actors' power, privileging sociological knowledge as capable of identifying (social) transcendental categories of thought. Latour's constructivism challenged this privilege, giving actors the political power of aggregating collectives around their common concerns at the cost of emphasizing domination and critique. We propose a critical approach that evades a transcendental perspective reliant on pure negation, producing a more positive critical sociology founded on processualist phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives, principally Merleau-Ponty and Dewey. Actors and researchers can collectively ruminate on their perspectives and concerns to challenge power structures and transform their worlds. At the center of this is the social-mien, a creative reimagination of habitus. A brief discussion of the protests and scholarship surrounding the Notre-Dame-des-Landes activists' practice of democracy highlights the utility of the approach and serves as a model for future application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Stuart Hall's reading of Louis Althusser's main theoretical works. Since the early 1970s, Hall has undertaken a critical confrontation with Althusser's 'structural Marxism', rescuing those useful concepts to think cultural difference and identity, without failing to criticize his 'superstructuralist' interpretation of Marx. However, what Hall will retain as Althusser's most important contribution is, above all, his theory of ideology. In this context, I follow an idea formulated by Hall that could be read as summarizing the theoretical and political scope of Althusser's contribution to Cultural Studies: 'he enabled me to live in and with difference'. By complicating classical interpretations schemes in the Marxist tradition, Hall's Althusser may be read as a 'thinker of difference' who opens up a whole research program to reconsider class conflicts as traversed (or 'overdetermined') by gender, racial or colonial conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article questions the place of the child in the metaphysics and imaginary of Western colonization, racialization, and decolonization. In the last chapter of The Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon, children appear not only as victims but also as a problem for which Fanon struggles to account as a theorist of decolonization as much as a psychiatric practitioner. Through a reading of one of the cases, this article interrogates the ways in which colonization attempts to infantilize colonized populations while erasing childhood, and the ways in which decolonization meets colonization by regarding childhood in the end as a misfortune. The work of decolonization, to proceed, thus would demand us to rethink childhood, and in doing so break free of Western metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article shows that Habermas's modernism and Lyotard's postmodernism are not as antithetical as they are often taken to be. First, we argue that Habermas is not a strong foundationalist concerned with identifying universal rules for language, as postmodern critiques have often interpreted him. Instead, he develops a social pragmatics in which the communicative use of language is the fundamental presupposition of any meaningful interaction. Second, we argue that Lyotard is not a relativist who denies any universal linguistic structure. Instead, he claims that language involves a universal element of dissensus that cannot be subordinated to consensus. Third, we show that neither does Habermas defend a new version of the kind of philosophy of history characteristic of the Enlightenment, nor is Lyotard a historical relativist, but instead they both seek alternatives to these positions. The conclusion calls for more nuance in the interpretation of both perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with exploring the idea of places as providing persons with nourishment. This version of person-place relations is displayed in a paper by McHugh and, in provocative fashion, in Michel Serres's analysis of the human condition as a parasitic one. Unlike McHugh, Serres combines his analysis of parasites with a concern that principled actors may be insufficiently attached to places. His views are revealed in his interpretations of works by Molière and Plato. By reinterpreting these works, I try to suggest that Serres's well-founded scepticism as to the level of commitment of principled actors to the places that, as he rightly points out, are nourishing them, may not apply to the sub-set of principled actors who deserve to be called particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the arguments used by members of two convict-descendant societies in embracing their convict ancestry. The data are taken from interviews that I conducted in 1999. In the main, respondents were involved in genealogy prior to discovering their or their spouses' convict ancestry. Respondents effectively countered ancestral stigma by making two kinds of argument. In the first, they recast ancestral convicts as: objects of quasi-professional interest; nation-builders; a minority within a multicultural society; collectibles; and embodying 'interesting stories'. The second type of argument forwarded more particularized treatments of convict ancestors by: minimizing the gravity of their offences; temporally distancing descendants from them; empathizing with them; and claiming their redemption. I offer some concluding thoughts on the sociology of memory and the place of genealogical memory workers within the family. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to present regret, an emotion to which sociologists so far have paid little attention, as having great sociological significance. First, it reviews recent research in social psychology and economics which cast anticipated regret as playing a major role in human decision-making. Second, it suggests a regret-based interpretation of the sunk-cost fallacy. Such an interpretation points to the need of a specifically sociological perspective on regret, calling attention to the cultural and institutional framings of regret-arousing events. The article further argues that secular changes in the types of regret imposed on individuals are paralleled by the spread of various forms of coping with it and that anticipated regret is responsible for both commitment to a chosen life-course and for sudden changes in it. The article ends with discussing the relationship between instrumental and moral regret, as well as the general implications of regret as a phenomenon for sociological understanding of rationality and human action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing a racialized gendered lens, we explore the perceptions of status threat and victimhood among a sample of White Americans following the 2016 presidential election. Specifically, we draw upon such theoretical and empirical work to frame our analyses of the associations between perceptions of a white "victim" ideology and anti-Black Lives Matter (BLM) sentiments and how such associations may be conditioned by support for Trump and holding patriarchal gender normative beliefs. We propose that the BLM movement may be perceived as a "threat" to many White Americans. Furthermore, we believe Whites' anti-BLM sentiments will be enhanced by support for Trump, given his racist, misogynistic, xenophobic, and oppressive tendencies. Moreover, we believe that these associations will differ based on gender and beliefs in patriarchal gender norms, as White men and women are likely to feel status threat in varied ways. Mix support for our propositions and complex gendered differences are revealed. Implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses an interdisciplinary communication-theoretical perspective to evaluate the impact on the self of acute communicative complexity. Here, complexity is seen as a factor of the contingency (or risk) which is embedded in constructions which social actors make in a multifaceted social environment. Without recourse to transcendental models, the aim here is to examine the references of the self and its relationship with cognitive autonomy (as distinct from social freedom). Such referentiality and autonomy are contingent in the sense that they differ in each actor and in each environment. This cognitive autonomy must also he located in an environment with reference to other actors. Meaning is conceptualized as a temporarily stabilized social semantic which is 'constructed' by means of communications between cognitively autonomous actors in an environment known as society but without contact with an objective world 'beyond' it. Such contingent communications cannot establish direct 'contact' with a putatively stable reality or horizon common to all, but operate by means of complex fictions which are in turn temporarily constructed and require constant revalidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This interview explores the key themes and ideas in Daniel Chernilo's recent book Debating Humanity: Towards a Philosophical Sociology (2017). It is a hugely ambitious book that tackles a range of questions around the notion of humanity and the category of the human. Drawing on a wide range of thinkers, the book pushes at a number of far-reaching issues, problems and questions concerning humanity. It's a rich text that develops themes that are likely to be of interest across the social sciences and humanities, not least because it tackles some of the most difficult and crucial questions that face social theory today. The interview was conducted in October 2017. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insofar as research into intergenerational social mobility and its mediation via education has had any theoretical context, this has been provided by the functionalist theory of industrial and post-industrial society. However, the inadequacies of this theory have become increasingly apparent, and rather little appeal to it is now in fact made. Yet no alternative body of theory has emerged. I propose that in developing the micro-level theory that is needed, sociologists could, with advantage, adapt to their own purposes theories originating in the economics of labour markets and, in particular, three theories in some degree deviating from mainstream human capital theory: screening and signalling theory; job competition theory; and incentive-enhancing preference theory. In this way, explanations for findings going contrary to expectations under the functionalist theory can be advanced that can already be provided with some degree of empirical support and that will be readily open to further testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent revival of Gabriel Tarde’s distinctive approach to the study of human interaction raises the issue of the possible reasons for his fall into oblivion, particularly given his prominence during his lifetime as an intellectual competitor of equal standing with the pioneering sociologist Émile Durkheim in the first years of the 20th century. This problem calls for an exploration of those central ideas and qualities of Tarde’s work that may once have compromised his legacy and that now provide some explanation of his revival. Consistent with Tarde’s ideas about human interaction, or ‘inter-subjectivity’, the reception of his legacy has been shaped by the forces of imitation and opinion, acting on a changeable, persuadable public. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Survey and laboratory studies provide support for the self-regulation of prejudice, but it is unclear whether people similarly self-regulate in "real life." Using a phenomenological approach, 153 non-Black participants recalled racial experiences in which they responded in ways they later wished had been different. Participants internally motivated to control prejudice reported discrepancies regardless of their external motivation, but even participants low on internal motivation reported prejudice-related discrepancies if they were externally motivated. Content analysis results are presented to summarize participants' discrepancy experiences. Also, most participants' discrepancies produced negative self-directed affect and the self-regulation of prejudice in the future. Findings suggest that self-regulation generalizes beyond the laboratory and occurs even among people who are not internally motivated to control their prejudice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal motivation to behave nonprejudiced reduces automatic and controlled prejudice. The present studies examined the impact of internal motivation to behave nonprejudiced on reactions to one's failure to behave nonprejudiced. In Study 1 higher levels of internal motivation led to more negative self-directed affect when failing to behave nonprejudiced, but not when failing in other domains. In Study 2 higher levels of internal motivation led to less prejudice after failure to behave nonprejudiced, but not in a non-failure condition. These findings suggest that failure to behave nonprejudiced plays a key role for highly internally motivated individuals in learning to regulate prejudice successfully. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generalized trust, or trust in strangers, has been traced to a wide range of societal benefits. But generalized trust is not sustainable in the absence of widespread generalized trustworthiness, that is, the tendency for strangers to honor trust extended to them. While there has been much work on the origins and consequences of generalized trust, surprisingly little research has addressed the antecedents of generalized trustworthiness. We argue that generalized trustworthiness is negatively affected by prior exposure to a ubiquitous extrinsic motivator of trustworthy behavior, contracts. Specifically, drawing on classic social psychological research on the overjustification effect, we argue that actors previously constrained by contracts will attribute their own 'trustworthy' behavior in those interactions to the contract itself. According to overjustification arguments, this misattribution should lead to a decrease in intrinsic motivations to act trustworthily in interactions where the actor is not constrained by the contract. Results of a new experiment support this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often assumed that habits Constitute an important Component in human behavior. However, since the beginning of the century many sociologists have overlooked their role in explaining behavior. In this article we are testing empirically the completeness of an economic model made by Stigler and Becker to explain the effect of habit on behavior in a new context. According to the model habits are economically efficient in many cases. However, when an individual is faced with a permanent change in the environment, behavior is not determined by habits, but by the amount invested in information on the best options. We collected data from a field experiment on travel-mode choice with an intervention program to change the behavior of people moving to a new town. The intervention included information on available public transportation. Habit was measured by the subject's judgments of the likelihood that using public transport will take place in different kinds of Situations. Theory was confirmed by the empirical data: there was no effect of habits on behavior in the new context. People in the intervention group used public transportation more often. However, search for information prior to the move had no effect. Some socio-economic variables had an additional effect on behavior in contrast to theory. People with a car at their disposal and those with higher education used the car more often. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author analyses the different ways in which the concept of ‘culture’ is currently deployed in the sociology of punishment. Using a distinction first developed by W.H. Sewell Jr, he distinguishes two usages of the concept-culture as an analytical dimension of social relations (‘the cultural’) and culture as a collective entity (‘a culture’). The theoretical issues and problems entailed in these two usages are discussed and several pragmatic solutions proposed. The author argues that analytical accounts of ‘the cultural’ shoutd be regarded as artificial (though necessary) abstractions. Descriptive ethnography, discourse analysis and textual explication ought to be viewed as components of historical or sociological explanation, not as substitutes for explanatory analysis. The author argues for the integration of cultural analysis into the explanatory project of a multi-dimensional sociology of punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution ('change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution ('change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]