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This paper investigates two forms of property as a social phenomenon and finds the Property Right Paradigm of economics to be wrongly conceived. Introducing new formulations for property reveals that private and communal property are frequently found together. When they are, as the scope of one increases the scope of the other shrinks. We examine how property rights are embedded in social exchange experiments. Calling on game theory, we find that communal property relations and private property relations contain exactly the same social dilemma. Furthermore, absent enforced rights, no property exists. Property comes to exist through socially producing its rights and we show that production must be coercive. We link our new theory of property to Robѐ's analysis of property and power in contemporary society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frequently applications of game theory assume, but do not show, that games are contained in social structures. The new analysis offered here uncovers games embedded in structures by attributing strategies to some positions and deriving the pay-off matrices for others. As structures vary so do the games embedded in them. All strong power structures contain prisoners' dilemma games for at least some range of pay-offs while some contain a chain of prisoners' dilemma games linked by defections. As a result, the development of interpersonal power in strong power structures is produced by free-riding of those low in power. Examples of other types of structures are given and other games are found that do not contain defection chains. Issues of dynamics including rates of change of power and coalition formation as a condition of countervailing power are addressed. New experiments offer support for central formulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article responds to Barry Markovsky's critique of the paper "Games and Structures" written by the present authors and appeared in a previous issue of "Rationality and Society." The author relates that their paper introduces a new method, strategic analysis which attributes parametric rationality to some positions in order to derive games for others. Most strikingly, when high power positions are parametrically rational, low power positions play a virtual prisoners dilemma (P/D) game. The game is virtual because low power positions are not directly connected to each other. Nevertheless, the structure plus the parametric rationality of the high power position links activity such that low power players' cooperation and defection are related in a P/D pay-off matrix. The paper includes a general proof that all strong power structures contain P/D games for at least some range of settlements. Examples of other kinds of structures are given and it is shown that they do not contain P/D games. As shown in the paper, because defection is Pareto suboptimal, when peripheral players defect, they gain less with the benefit going to the high power positions with which they are exchanging. That benefit is the power exercise.