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In January and February 2023, the University of Luxembourg hosted a series of four online seminars on Frank Michelman's then just recently published book Constitutional Essentials (CE), a book which in Frank's own words aimed to work out the implications of Rawls' theory of political liberalism for constitutional theory and debates between constitutional lawyers regarding a number of constantly recurring questions of constitutional law. Eleven of the invited contributions to the four seminars (presentations of 15–20 minutes) plus one additional contribution by Silje Langvatn, are now collected in this special issue of Philosophy & Social Criticism, followed by a response by Michelman. This introduction to the discussions between Michelman and his interlocutors begins with a brief synopsis of some of the key lines of argument that Michelman develops in CE and then moves on to survey all the arguments offered in response. The last section takes a briefly look at Michelman's replies to these responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the ontological configuration and political appropriation of difference in modern, capitalist societies. Against fragmented accounts of difference, it is examined the evolution from situations of wide socio-spatial diversity to the gradual instrumentalisation and selective hierarchisation of those elements of difference that can be inserted in market-based relations, whilst the majority of differences are ignored and disregarded. The instrumentalisation of difference under capitalism – the reduction of extended socio-spatial difference to the interests and priorities of the stronger segments of society who emphasise their distinctive features in the attempt to exert power and control over those considered inferior and subordinate – has more than just an impact on social or interpersonal relations but constitutes an active worldmaking force that operates, primarily, via the promotion of indifference. The analysis is informed by the Hegelian framework of consciousness and reason that is based on what the German philosopher calls the laws of experience accumulated through social interaction. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit can, therefore, move social theory forward to a critical interrogation of lived and contested differences. The instrumentalised metabolism of difference, following Hegelian metaphysics, is basically the result of self-estrangement and externalisation of the self, not because of self-serving interests but exactly because of its incompleteness and the need to be actualised in the other, who is also incomplete. Likewise, all particulars are moments actualised in the universal, which is also a changeable moment of itself. Thought the negation of otherness, followed by a negation of the negation, difference can be then embraced in its entirety, as it remains a central explanatory concept for social criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The immanent approach adopted by most contemporary representatives of the Critical Theory tradition has generally the purpose of offering a foundation for social criticism that, without relying exclusively on explicit or factually accepted principles, avoids both the potential arbitrariness of subjective judgment and the appeal to transcendent criteria. However, this project has not yet paid much attention to the socio-epistemic elements related to the intersubjective praxis of criticism. Based on this concern, I intend to explore the possibility of immanent criticism by using the epistemic category of dissonance. I will begin by showing how Davidson's notion of irrationality can overcome the problematic separation between healthy and pathological behavior found in Festinger's classical theory of cognitive dissonance and serve as an indicator of epistemic contradictions that can lead to social change. Thereafter, I will explain the link between these approaches and both Brandom's inferential semantics and Honneth's normative reconstruction. At the end of the first part, I expect to show an articulated picture of how dissonance can serve as a key for the analysis of inconsistencies present both in the belief systems and in the institutions and practices that constitute forms of life. In the second part, I will reconstruct three possible objections to this comprehensive approach in relation to the role of the individual in processes of social criticism and to the notions of progress and rationality that the approach adopts. I will analyze here what kind of meta-criterion is necessary to overcome the discomfort generated by the experience of dissonance so that it leads to social change. Taking up the Hegelian-Pragmatist idea of accumulation of experiences, I will argue that such a meta-criterion refers to the possibility of gathering and using available and non-endogenous socio-epistemic resources that allow reconfiguring the foundations of the questioned form of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relations between self-esteem and competition. Self-esteem is a very important good and competition is a widespread phenomenon. They are commonly linked, as people often seek self-esteem through success in competition. Although competition in fact generates valuable consequences and can to some extent foster self-esteem, empirical research suggests that competition has a strong tendency to undermine self-esteem. To be sure, competition is not the source of all problematic deficits in self-esteem, and it can arise for, or undercut goods other than self-esteem. But the relation between competition and access to self-esteem is still significant, and it is worth asking how we might foster a desirable distribution of the latter in the face of difficulties created by the former. That is the question addressed in this paper. The approach I propose neither recommends self-denial nor the uncritical celebration of the rat race. It charts instead a solidaristic path to support the social conditions of the self-esteem of each individual. The paper proceeds as follows. I start, in section 2, by clarifying key concepts involved in the discussion. In section 3, I identify ten mechanisms that support individuals' self-esteem and impose limits on competition. I focus, in particular, on the challenges faced by people in their practices of work. In section 4, I outline prudential and moral arguments to justify the use of the proposed mechanisms. Section 5 concludes with remarks on the role of social criticism in the processes of change implementing the mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that the problem of normative foundations is insoluble. I discuss how and why the apparent problem arose, particularly within the Frankfurt School. Then, I describe various theories of normative foundations and the criticisms that such theories have faced, such as ethno- and andro-centrism, imperialism, and the failure to fulfill their own aims. I make my main argument by way of an analogy: theories of knowledge have wrestled with the question of whether a "given"' could act as a certain foundation for knowledge. The conclusion is often that no given can function in that way, because the given, which supposedly does not require justification, is therefore necessarily unable to justify knowledge. For similar reasons, I argue, nothing can function as a normative foundation for a critical social theory, because any such normative foundation would have to both stand in no need of normative justification but also justify normative social criticism. I conclude by suggesting that more recent critical theory that does not focus on normative foundations can be understood as justifying their critique by appeal to what people do actually want, rather than what they should rationally want. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While philosophy has been defined as a critical endeavour since Plato, the critical potential of rhetoric has been mostly overlooked. In recent years, critique itself – as a means of enlightenment and emancipation – has come under attack. While there have been various attempts to renew and strengthen critical theory and practice, rhetoric has not yet played a part in these attempts. Addressing this lacuna, the article argues that rhetoric can function as a critical force within philosophy. The rhetorical perspective confronts the claim to rational discourse and universal knowledge with the contingency of philosophical languages, means of representation, and social practices. Moreover, it allows us to think of critique as an activity of a subject that is at the same time constituted and transformed by it. This opens up the possibility of a rhetorical philosophizing that meets its critical standards by taking into account both the conditions of its own speaking and what it must exclude as its 'other' in order to function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rorty understands pragmatism in philosophy and social science, literature and art, to be intertwined with the political project of changing the world. Achieving Our Country, together with a lecture on the 150th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, has become Rorty's political testament. Rorty understands the leftist American project as the incomplete one of all those who fight for a classless society of boundless diversity (1). At the centre of Achieving Our Country is the tragic division between old and new, social and cultural Left (2). Rorty's patriotism is progressive and cosmopolitan (3). The American project can only be realized if the Left breaks the hegemony of the political Right (4). For that, America must be understood as a utopia that makes itself the avant-garde of global political, economic, social and cultural change (5). This utopia can be realized only by a new kind of unity between leftist centres in the university and leftist organizational power in the rest of society. In this respect, America could become a model for the rest of the world again (6). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Its aim was to examine objective patterns of intergenerational social mobility in Britain, showing that there was an increase in absolute mobility rates as well as significant shifts in the class structure over time ([9]). It critically examines a wide-ranging political debate about social mobility in the United Kingdom, particularly focusing on the agenda of the Social Mobility Commission and corporate firms' strategies of recruiting graduates from different social backgrounds. How does social mobility affect lay perceptions of inequalities in contemporary societies? To this end, all of the articles discuss subjective experiences of social mobility, but with three different emphases: critical notions of social mobilities and inequalities, intersectional perspectives of social mobility, and educational social mobilities, or experiences of social mobilities situated in educational settings. [Extracted from the article]

In this article, I argue for the necessary organicism of immanent critique and the resulting limits and applicability of immanent critique as elaborated in Rahel Jaeggi's account of Lebensformen. Through a historical review of the problem of natural purposiveness between Kant, Schelling and Hegel, I show that the notion of immanent critique that Hegel produced, and Jaeggi adopts, was an intrinsically organic notion. With this conceptual connection, I demonstrate that Jaeggi's elaboration of Lebensformen is consistent with this organicism, but also explicate how this property limits critique where the criterion is the long-term stability of Lebensformen. Aligning the organicism of immanent critique with similar projects of social criticism citing the organic, namely eco-Marxism and cybernetics, I show that the cases of capitalism and bureaucracy are not practically vulnerable to immanent critique without supplement. I conclude by suggesting further research requires articulating a hybrid external-immanent form of criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism is dedicated to James Bernauer, S.J. on the occasion of his retirement from full-time teaching. It contains original essays from Bernauer's students, friends, and fellow travelers that were commissioned for the purpose of commemorating this occasion. These essays provide readers with an opportunity to reflect upon Bernauer's contributions to fields of academic inquiry as diverse as Arendt and Foucault studies, the philosophy of religion, and Holocaust studies. Since our purpose was to honor the life and work of James Bernauer, and not simply comment on it, the contributors to this volume have each attempted to develop and extend, rather than simply rehash and recapitulate, the concerns they find articulated in Bernauer's publications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, a series of key social, political and economic events has placed the critique of capitalism very much on the theoretical agenda. Responding to these developments, many have begun to express the need for a rapprochement between social criticism and the critique of political economy. The present essay represents a contribution to the recovery of the project that was once synonymous with critical theory itself via a critical engagement with the early writings of Jürgen Habermas. Not only is Habermas' explicit engagement with the critique of political economy among the most substantial to be found within the mainstream tradition of critical theory, his early social-theoretical insights into the emergent 'primacy of the political' in late capitalism can be taken as representative of a number of broader trends in late-20th-century thought which sought to go beyond the premises and categories of Marx's economic works. Simply put, no reappraisal of the relationship between critical theory and the critique of political economy can succeed, I submit, without taking seriously Habermas's path-breaking and wide-ranging innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explain the paradoxical finding that socio-economically vulnerable groups express more economic, moral and social criticism of the welfare state. As these groups generally benefit more from the welfare state and hold more egalitarian world views, their stronger criticism cannot be explained by the traditional frameworks of self-interest and ideology. As an alternative, we highlight the importance of social experiences of resentment as a source of discontent with welfare state performance. Our contribution argues that the dissatisfaction is embedded in a broader welfare populist critique that pits the hard-working people against the deceitful elite and welfare abusers. This welfare populism emerges from experiences of resentment related to the restructuring of group positions in the process of modernization. We differentiate between three types of discontent: economic status insecurity, group relative deprivation and social distrust. By applying structural equation modelling, we test whether resentful experiences mediate the relationship between the social structural position and welfare state criticism. Results indicate that relative deprivation consistently leads to more economic, moral and social criticism. Social distrust, moreover, stimulates a higher level of moral criticism. This study illustrates that resentment is indeed an important element for understanding the paradoxical relationship between social class and welfare state criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How might Roland Barthes' posthumously published account of the Neutral invite us to rethink the very activity of cultural analysis? How did Barthes the cultural critic change when, towards the end of his career, he described and desired Neutral Life? Cultural criticism has often taken Barthes' early semiological work as a guide, but this essay examines how we might need to reorient ourselves as critics, shift our stance, learn to look and live differently in the light of Barthes' later focus on the Neutral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction presents the articles contained in this special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism on the topic of populism. It does so by placing them in the field of discussions that the standard conception of populism as 'illliberal democracy' has stimulated in many areas of the populism-research that was produced in response to the recent increase in populist governments in established constitutional democracies world-wide. Following the methodological canon of studies in the field, it presents the individual contributions roughly in three segments according to leading questions they focus on. In each segment, the introduction attempts to indicate the degree to which the articles depart and provide reasons for departing from the initial standard conception and thereby point to new relevant directions for further work. The first segment (articles 1. -4.) consists of essays that take on the definitional and empirical question of what and where populism is, and which varieties of it there are. The second segment (articles 5. -8.) presents new work focusing on the diagnostic question of what conditions and institutional conditions enable contemporary populism in established liberal constitutional representative democracies. They thus also aim at explaining or at least providing insight into the structures on the supply side (party politics) that make populism popular as an 'outsider option'. The third and largest segment (essays 9. -15.) comprises essays that present various approaches to answering the therapeutic question what democratic political systems and societies can do to confront, absorb or internalize the lessons from populist challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies that have engaged parasport broadcasting, particularly through a narrative lens, have almost exclusively relied on textual and/or content analysis of the Paralympic Games as the source of cultural critique. We know far less about the decisions taken inside Paralympic broadcasters that have led to such representations. In this study – based on interviews with senior production and promotion staff at the United Kingdom's Paralympic broadcaster, Channel 4 – we provide the first detailed examination of mediated parasport from this vantage point. We explore the use of promotional devices such as athletes' backstories – the 'Hollywood treatment' – to both hook audiences and serve as a vehicle for achieving its social enterprise mandate to change public attitudes towards disability. In so doing, we reveal myriad tensions that coalesce around representing the Paralympics, with respect to the efforts made to balance the competing goals of key stakeholders and a stated desire to make the Paralympics both a commercial and socially progressive success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this article is to lay the foundations of a theory of grotesque transparency that looks into the aesthetics of ‘ocular politics’. Inspired by Ramón del Valle-Inclán’s definition of the esperpento – a grotesque representation of the hero – this interpretative schema uncovers the rhetorical, narrative and iconic mechanisms that constitute a form of political communication that creates the illusion of total affective disclosure. We tested the premises of this theory by studying a public performance of the now-deceased Venezuela President Hugo Chávez where discursive genres overlap (presidential speech, comic soundbites and preacher’s homily), dissolving the ‘truth’ in an ‘excess of transparency’, and also performing a function of social criticism through desecration of institutional formalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of how meaning serves to sustain dominance has been part of the programme of a critique of ideology from the outset. If ideology makes the meaning of the social world and its interpretations decontested, a main task of the critique of ideology is to show their contestability. I would like to reconsider the value of metaphor within this programme and claim that metaphors are noteworthy devices for the critique of ideology due to their ability to undermine ideological incontestability: by calling into question its consistency, by exploring other possible interpretations and by enriching its univocal character, that is, through evoking a new way of seeing social reality, metaphors manage to disclose the contestability of the social world and its interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticising someone’s conduct is a disaffiliative action that can attract recipient objections, particularly in the form of defensive detailing by which the recipient volunteers extenuating circumstances that undermine the criticism. In Therapeutic Community (TC) meetings for clients with drug addiction, support staff regularly criticise clients’ behaviours that violate therapeutic principles or norms of conduct. This study examines cases where, rather than criticising a client’s behaviour directly, TC staff members do so indirectly through an anecdote: a case illustrating the inappropriateness of the type of conduct of which the client’s behaviour is an instantiation. TC staff members design the anecdote to convey a principle or norm of conduct which the client has putatively violated, and they systematically pursue endorsement of that principle by the client. By constructing the anecdote as an exemplary case, distanced from the individual client’s personal experience, TC staff members make it an empirically unverifiable, self-evident, and therefore hard to challenge, illustration of a norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we analyse chronic pain narratives on Flickr and Tumblr. We focus on how, by incorporating visual and multimodal elements, chronic pain expressions in social media significantly extend and challenge the logic, function and effects of traditional ‘illness narratives’. We examine a sample of images and blogs related to chronic pain and formulate a typology of chronic pain expressions on these sites. Flickr brings a form of narrative immediacy, making the pain experience visible, eliciting empathy and marking chronicity. Tumblr lends itself to more networked forms of interaction through the circulation of multimodal memes, and support communities are built through humour and social criticism. We argue that new forms of mediation and social media dynamics transform pain narratives. This has implications for our understandings of the forms and formats of pain communication and offers new possibilities for communicating pain within and beyond clinical contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Henri Desroche (1961), one could write an entire history of religion as ‘the mother of social resignation’ or, with equal justification, as ‘the mother of social protest’. Desroche’s apt observation summarizes the topic of this essay, which deals with the oppositional and the culturally adapted communities and movements in the recent history of the Christian churches, focusing particularly on their relationship with social inequalities. Taking a perspective strongly influenced by Max Weber’s sociology of religion, it discusses the ‘religious ideas’ that have guided, and continue to guide, the actions of various Christian churches and groups in societies marked by social inequality. Theoretically, this essay argues that the social positioning of church groups and movements is heavily dependent on the cognitive content of religious beliefs. The contrasting cases it cites show the fruitfulness of such an analytical approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes that the foundations of Hegel’s contribution to social criticism are compatible with, and enriched by, his meta-theology. His social critique is grounded in his belief that normative ideas – and especially the idea of freedom – are necessarily experiential and historical. Often regarded as a recipe for an authoritarian reconciliation with the status quo, Hegel’s philosophy has been dismissed by some unsympathetic commentators from the left as inimical to the task of social criticism. Much of the reason for this has been the opinion that his systematic approach to philosophy is one underpinned by either a highly unorthodox theism or, more commonly, pantheism. Even scholars who wish to defend Hegel as a social critic have tended to abandon or at least massively downplay his meta-theology. In this article, I argue that it is precisely the emphasis on his original theo-metaphysics that offers a powerful and relevant contribution to social criticism. Hegel then becomes an important contributor, from the tradition of social criticism, to the growing trend in academia and wider society of rethinking the relationship between the religious and the secular, known as post-secularism. The proposition at the centre of his system – that human history and society are necessary moments in the process of divine self-understanding – is not new. But the specifics of Hegel’s concept of God that I am proposing – and, moreover, their implications for his political thought – are new. I propose that Hegel was neither a theist nor a pantheist but, rather, a dialectical panentheist. According to panentheism, God is neither straightforwardly transcendent to nature and history (theism) nor immanently identifiable with nature and history (pantheism), but rather is dynamically and dialectically immanent in the ongoing processes of self-transcendence that are nature and history. If such an interpretation of Hegel’s system is valid then the proposition that his political thought is an exercise in dialectical panentheistic theology is one that is worth making and defending because it has important things to say about his social critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arts and cultural journalism have been found in numerous debates during recent decades to struggle in the midst of a crisis. This article traces the recorded discourse of professionalism that considers cultural journalism to be in a state of decline. A literature review on academic research and contributions in public debates provides an insight into the ‘crisis talk’ of the last two decades and unveils general controversies in the development of the professional culture of cultural journalism. By mapping the discourse in terms of the unfavourable directions that the development of cultural journalism has moved in, the analysis constructs a model for the future research of this specialized branch of journalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special double issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism focuses on the sources of pluralism. The introduction will summarize and present the contents of this issue in 4 sections: (1) on the origins of pluralism (Richard Bernstein, Ulrich Preuß, Rajeev Bhargava, Ramin Jahanbegloo); (2) on the development of pluralism (Alessandro Ferrara, Julian Baggini, Paolo Costa, Maurizio Ferraris); (3) pluralism in Turkey (Murat Borovalı and Cemil Boyraz, Markus Dressler, İlay Romain Örs and Ömer Turan, Cengiz Aktar); (4) and pluralism within Islam (Khaled Abou El Fadl, Syafiq Hasyim, Saskia Schäfer, Volker Kaul). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This introduction outlines the core debates in the 8-piece symposium dedicated to critically engaging Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice. Among these is whether the establishment communities that are Sen’s primary interlocutors could ever be allies in the projects of freedom and social transformation that he so powerfully elucidated and the relationship of general theories of justice to the choice of some empirical examples over those that emerge from the places in the global South where conditions of self-determination for citizens are most lacking. While asking whether we need a political ideal beyond justice, the richness of the articles and Sen’s very substantive reply are testament to his profound contribution both to scholarship and as a model alternative to the often unjust and ungenerous character of the contemporary academy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his book Das Recht der Freiheit (2011), Axel Honneth develops a theory of social justice that incorporates negative, reflexive and social forms of freedom as well as the institutional conditions necessary for their reproduction. This account enables the identification of social pathologies or systemic normative deficits that frustrate individual efforts to relate their actions reflexively to a normative order and inhibits their ability to recognize the freedom of others as a condition of their own. In this article I utilize Honneth’s theory in the diagnosis of a contemporary social pathology, which impedes social recognition and thereby contributes to social injustice. I argue that this particular social pathology – associated with the Second Amendment right to bear arms – has given rise to a pernicious form of subjectivity, which I call self-defensive. I conclude with some remarks concerning what this application reveals about the strengths and weaknesses of Honneth’s account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deliberative democracy’s approach with its emphasis on a multidimensional conception of freedom is very well suited to offer a sophisticated and critical account of freedom of speech in the democratic public sphere. Nevertheless, it has rarely engaged other competing free speech theories in order to offer a valuable social critique of other ways of thinking about freedom of expression. This article tries to fill this gap by critically engaging Robert Post’s theory of freedom of speech based on democratic self-government. On Post’s account, the key to effective democratic self-government is political autonomy, which he reduces to negative liberty and formal equality. I argue that this reduction creates serious problems. A purely procedural account of democracy makes it difficult to politicize new issues in the public sphere and also makes a dominant discourse resistant to contestation. Further, given his theory, Post does not have enough normative resources to offer an account of public justification, which would expand effective political liberty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author argues that the interpretation of Machiavelli’s political theory is to be prominently a republican one, escaping its commonly simplified and stereotypical interpretations, which reduce his theoretical legacy to so-called ‘Machiavellianism’. The article claims that while elements of ‘Machiavellianism’ do exist in all of his books (especially in The Prince), they do not define the core line and purpose of Machiavelli’s political theory. This article presents how Machiavelli followed the legacy of republican Rome and of the medieval and Renaissance city-republics of Italy (including Florence) in developing his republican conception. Furthermore, it is argued that the theory of the humours – used as a basis of his interpretation of republican tradition – resulted in the anticipation of modern liberal republicanism in Machiavelli’s legacy. His statements that conflicts of interests among different humours/classes/estates were not only unavoidable, but were also useful in enacting good laws, did anticipate modern pluralism. The author argues that the theory of the humours served Machiavelli as the core background he used in differentiating the main forms of political orders: monarchy/principality, republic and lizenzia (institutionally, a republic, but effectively, an imbalanced quasi-aristocratic rule). The criterion Machiavelli used was the quality of relations existent among those humours, in the sense that only the republic secured the satisfaction of the needs and interests of all humours, and insofar represented a well-balanced, healthy body politic. Machiavelli’s intention was to offer ‘practical lessons from the study of history’ through comparison of the ‘ancient events’ of the Roman republic with the ‘modern events’ of the existing lizenzia in Florence, so that a real republican order be (re)established in the Florence of his days. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Explication of the concept of socialrace: the concept variously refers to (1) a social group that is taken to be a racialist race, (2) the social position occupied by a particular social group that is a socialrace and (3) the system of social positions that are socialraces. Socialrace is distinguished from other more familiar forms of social construction. The sense in which socialrace counts as a race concept is explained. The advantages of the term ‘socialrace’ are discussed. The desiderata for a conception of socialrace are articulated. The concept socialrace is contrasted with other similar concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Adorno and Foucault are among the 20th century’s most renowned social critics but little work has been done to compare their ideas about the activity of critique. ‘Adorno, Foucault and Critique’ attempts to fill this lacuna. It takes as its starting point the Kantian legacy that informs Adorno’s and Foucault’s notions of critique, or their ‘ontologies of the present’, as Foucault calls them. Exploring the ontological foundations of critique, the article then addresses the principal objects of critique: domination and fascism. It ends with a comparative account of the central aims of Adorno’s and Foucault’s critiques of western societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both environmental social movements and academic thinkers appear to move away from fundamental critique of dominant values in the direction of a more pragmatic approach to environmental politics. This article highlights some of the disadvantages of this development, using environmental concerns to illustrate the broader argument that decent societies aiming for social and environmental justice are best served by the existence of an informed, fundamental type of opposition next to cooperative, loyal modes of dissent. For academics in their inescapable role as fundamental critics, this would imply a relatively distant role as guardians of the critical potential of civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article defends the principle of non-establishment against 21st-century projects of political religion, constitutional theocracy and political theology. It is divided into two parts. The first part, published in special issue 39.4–5 of Philosophy and Social Criticism, proceeds by constructing an ideal type of political secularism, and then discussing the innovative American model of constitutional dualism regarding religion that combined constitutional protection for the freedom of religious conscience and exercise with the principle of non-establishment. It then critically assesses the integrationist approach –disguised as a concern for pluralism and fairness – as an alternative to this framework. The integrationist approach challenges ‘separation’ and political secularism in a subtle attack on the non-establishment principle, aimed at drastically narrowing its scope. Successes of this approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and politics, have triggered a response by liberal egalitarians. I address this response – the equal liberty model – in this second part, arguing that although on the right track, it fails to find a middle ground between political secularism and integration. Instead, by abandoning the discourse of separation, it plays into populist integrationist hands without delivering on the promise of providing a coherent standard for deciding cases. The article proposes a third approach, one that does not throw out the non-establishment baby with the strict separationist bathwater and that wholeheartedly endorses political secularism, a sine qua non for 21st-century constitutional democracy. Equal liberty properly construed can help provide criteria for determining when an accommodation, a regulation or no regulation of religion by the state is appropriate. But it must be supplemented by other values – democratic and civil republican. The article concludes with a typology of the forms of regulation that are warranted under the conditions of the contemporary regulatory state, now the target and prize of politicized religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article defends the principle of non-establishment against 21st-century projects of political religion, constitutional theocracy and political theology. It is divided into two parts, which will appear in two consecutive issues of Philosophy & Social Criticism, 39(4–5) and 39(6). Part 1 proceeds by constructing an ideal type of political secularism, and then discussing the innovative American model of constitutional dualism regarding religion that combined constitutional protection for the freedom of religious conscience and exercise with the principle of non-establishment. The article analyses the strengths and limits of the ‘separation– accommodation’ frame that became hegemonic in 1st amendment jurisprudence from the 1940s to the 1990s. It challenges the standard caricature of the American model as strictly separationist and privatizing. It then critically assesses two contemporary alternatives to that frame: the integrationist approach and the equal liberty approach. The first, disguised as a concern for pluralism and fairness, challenges ‘separation’ and political secularism in a subtle attack on the non-establishment principle, aimed at drastically narrowing its scope. Successes of this approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and politics have triggered a response by liberal egalitarians. The author addresses this response – the equal liberty model – in part 2, which will appear in Philosophy & Social Criticism 39(6), arguing that although on the right track, it fails to find a middle ground between political secularism and integration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What is the role, if any, of professional music criticism in the age of the internet, and what are the potential consequences of its likely demise? How do we evaluate the claim that the erosion of traditional forms of cultural authority, including professional criticism, is inherently democratic? To address these questions, this paper compares professional music criticism with the technologically-mediated forms of cultural judgment that have increasingly replaced it, analyzing the shift from aesthetics to consensus as the basis for cultural judgment. Rather than signaling the end of cultural authority, the recent transformations of the music world are marked by the emergence of authority of a different kind. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A bibliography on the subject of Philosophy and Social Criticism is presented which includes the book "Nietzsche and the Drama of Historiobiography," by Roberto Alejandro, "Mahatma Gandhi," by Douglas Allen and "What Does A Jew Want? On Binationalism and Other Specters," by Udi Aloni.

It is often argued that Michael Walzer’s theory of social criticism, which underpins his theory of justice, is not much of a theory at all, but rather an impressionistic collection of historical anecdotes. Contrary to this perception, I argue that Walzer’s method can be accurately described as a version of John Rawls’ well-known method of wide reflective equilibrium. Through a systematic comparison it can be shown that the two methods are strikingly similar. This implies that, far from the critics’ claim, Walzer’s method can be described as a philosophically sophisticated method. This also adds credibility to Walzer’s views on politics and justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two notions of reconciliation exist. The weak or thin conception is akin to ‘resignation’. It is sought by groups that have waged war against one another but have come to the realization that neither can win. Reconciliation in this sense results from an enforced lowering of expectations. In the stronger sense, reconciliation means a virtual cancellation of enmity or estrangement via a morally grounded forgiveness, achievable only when conflicting groups acknowledge collective responsibility for past injustice, and shed their deep prejudices by a profound and painful transformation in their identities. It is because this process is not possible without a somewhat brutal confrontation with oneself and a painful recognition of one’s own moral degradation that reconciliation is difficult to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A bibliography on the subject of philosophy and social criticism is presented which includes the books "Nudities," by Giorgio Agamben, "Democracy in What State?," by Alain Badiou and "Sousveillance, Media and Strategic Political Communication," by Vian Bakir.

The author responds to a series of commentaries on his book "Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future." He expresses his gratitude for the way the commentaries express reservations about his proposal for renewing critical theory. The author discusses the argument raised by the commentaries.

In Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future, Nikolas Kompridis proposes a new model of critique for critical theory based on the unlikely alliance he constructs between Habermas and Heidegger while seeking to avoid the philosophical shortcomings of both. Focusing on his accounts of ‘receptivity’, arguably the central concept in his new model of critique, I argue sympathetically that although his rejection of some and appropriation of certain features of Habermas' theory serve his philosophical aims, his allegiance to Heidegger’s ontology would thwart his interest in receptivity as an alternative model of critique stressing the interpretation of meaning and learning over validity and rationality. Kompridis must be attentive to the conditions that enable or constrain receptivity, yet this is a theoretical move unavailable to him within his Heideggerian framework. To secure the work learning performs in his critical model Kompridis must relinquish ontology and cultivate an approach situating receptivity in the political and socially contingent contexts in which it is conditioned. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Nikolas Kompridis has recently argued that the future of critical theory depends upon a critical appropriation of Heidegger’s concept of ‘world disclosure’, and hence on a transformation of critical theory into a form of ‘world-disclosing critique’ oriented towards the future. This article engages in a critical dialogue with Kompridis' account of world-disclosing critique, arguing that critical theory should embrace it as an innovative way of retrieving the forgotten tradition of aesthetic critique of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Nikolas Kompridis' Critique and Disclosure is a sustained argument for the proposition that critical social theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt School is best carried forward by rejecting central aspects of Habermas' neo-Kantian version of it. The most promising future direction for critical theory according to Kompridis involves a reconsideration of the resources of hermeneutic phenomenology, especially renewed attention to the Heideggerian concept ‘disclosure’. To this end, Kompridis develops a distinctive dialectical version of this concept. I agree that Kantian versions of critical theory are philosophically suspect, and that critical theory is most conceptually vital and politically trenchant when turned away from ‘discourse ethics' and the like. I am a bit less sanguine than is Kompridis with a turn to Heidegger, however, and raise several issues having to do with that aspect of Kompridis' account. This caution is not rooted simply in the historical fact that critical theory from its inception has attempted to immunize itself against phenomenology; it is rather a conceptual matter. In my judgment, Kompridis does not need to develop, as he does, an intricate account of overlap between what he holds best about critical theory and Heidegger’s ontology. If one were looking for historical antecedents that do not come freighted with what Horkheimer derided as ‘irrationalism’, one would do better to investigate early German Romanticism, in which there is an explicitly interpretive yet dialectical methodology on offer. Moreover, the central doctrines of Jena Romanticism exhibit more positive points of contact with the earlier, more skeptical forms of critical theory that Kompridis might favor, e.g. Adorno’s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the relationship between power and reflective disclosure in Nikolas Kompridis' book Critique and Disclosure. Although the concept of power is not explicitly theorized in great detail in this book, I argue that power is highly relevant for Kompridis' account of reflective disclosure. I offer a few ways in which a thematization of power relations might complicate and enrich Kompridis' understanding of disclosure. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article considers the ongoing difficulties for mainstream political theory of actualizing human rights, with particular reference to Rorty’s attempt to transcend their liberal foundations. It argues that there is a problematic disjuncture between his articulation of exclusion and his hope for inclusion via the expansion of the liberal human rights culture. More specifically, it shows that Rorty’s description of victimhood is based on premises unavailable to him, with the consequence that stateless persons are rendered inhuman, and, further, that his accounts of sentimentality and solidarity have limited potential for the inclusion of such victims within the liberal ‘community of justification’. In the final analysis, the article argues that there is a substantial mismatch between Rorty’s dependence on both liberal norms and international political practice, and his hopes for the human rights culture to include those stripped of human dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy is acting uneasily when it comes to contemporary politics. There is a sort of agitation in his work in relation to this question. At several places we read an appeal to deal thoroughly with this question and ‘qu’il y a un travail àfaire’, that there is still work to do. From the beginning of the 1980s with the ‘Centre de Recherches Philosophiques sur le Politique’ and the two books resulting out of that, until the many, rather short texts he published on this topic during the last years of the century, the question of politics crosses very clearly Nancy’s work. He not only fulminates against the contemporary philosophical ‘content’ with democracy. Instead of defending a political regime, he wants to think the form of politics in the most critical and sceptical way. To Nancy, the worst thing we can do in thinking contemporary politics, is taking it for granted that we know what politics is about today, given the evidence of the global democracy. So to him, we almost have to be at unease when it comes to politics. On the other hand, in thinking contemporary democracy, the work of Claude Lefort is undeniably the main reference. Long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the upsurge of an all-too-easy anti-Marxism, Lefort articulated in a nuanced way the formal differences between totalitarianism and democracy. According to Lefort, the specific ‘form’ of democracy is that it never becomes an accomplished and fulfilled form as such. In a certain sense, the only ‘form’ of democracy is formlessness, a form without form. In a democracy, the place of power becomes literally ‘infigurable’ as Lefort says. Democracy stands for formlessness or the relation to a void. Nancy objects so to say against a ‘Leformal’ conception of democracy – the empty place, the formless, the ‘infigurable’ or ‘sans figure’, the ever yet to come. … This conception of democracy would still be caught in the infinite metaphysical, dialectical horizon of immanentism, while it pretends to have already left that horizon behind it, presenting itself as the finite alternative to the infinite totalitarian politics. Democracy as formlessness is indeed no longer based on a metaphysical Idea, Figure, or Truth. We want to clear up the philosophical sky of Nancy’s remarks by confronting them with some thoughts of Lefort. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the practice of social criticism, the concept of human dignity has played and still plays an important role. In philosophical debates, however, we find widely divergent accounts of that concept, ranging from views based on a conception of human needs to religious approaches trying to explain the ‘inviolability’ of the person. The view presented here reconstructs the basic claim of human dignity historically and normatively as resting on the moral status of the person as a reason-giving, reason-demanding and reason-deserving being. The person as holding a basic moral right to justification is the true ground for the claim of having one’s dignity respected: as someone who must not be subjected to norms, rules, or institutions which cannot be properly justified to that person in appropriate practices of justification. To possess human dignity means being an equal member in the realm of subjects and authorities of justification and to be respected as such. This is the moral ground of social criticism, implied in particular social and political demands raised in given historical contexts. Thus, critical theory has to be reoriented towards a critique of the relations of justification in a given social order of justification. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

David Edgar is Britain’s leading anti-racist playwright and a prominent commentator. His contribution as a political writer and public social critic has been analysed by Janelle Reinelt and Gerald Hewitt in their forthcoming book, The Political Theatre of David Edgar: negotiation and retrieval (Cambridge University Press, 2011). The piece below is based on excerpts that focus on Testing the Echo, a recent play on Britishness by Edgar. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article calls for a critical re-evaluation of Walzer’s theory of justice. It argues that there is a deep tension between Walzer’s social criticism and his complex equality. Social criticism is based on the normative value of a connected and ‘whole’ self, and complex equality is based upon a value pluralism that threatens to fragment this sense of wholeness. Walzer therefore commissions a tacit premise, borrowing from the same ‘political philosophy’ that he explicitly repudiates, and which social criticism is intended to supplant. This premise is a Kantian-inspired conception of self; brought to the argument as an a priori premise and thus in violation of Walzer’s own stated commitment to ‘internalism’ and ‘interpretation’. Furthermore, this same conception of self is the moral source of Walzer’s substantive commitment to the universal value of pluralist political regimes. The article closes with a suggested reconciliation of the inherent tension within Walzer’s theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Reflexive pluralism is here put forward as the conception that is most reasonable for supporters of political liberalism to hold at a period when the reasons justifying acceptance of political and religious pluralism seem inadequate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social critics in many societies invoke the reading of literature as critical to both a desired form of political organization and the state of national politics. Relatedly, a variety of political projects throughout the past several centuries have employed literature as a technology for the construction of particular subjectivities. This article critiques the quasi-magical powers with which literature has been endowed over space and time, and describes a 'critical' orientation toward society encouraged through reading literature in college-preparatory Slovak secondary schools in the first part of the 2000s. Drawing inspiration from anthropological studies of literacy as situated practice, I outline features of how Slovak students have learned social critique while pointing out areas in which anthropologists could improve their perspectives on how classroom practices relate to macrosociological and political phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While communication scholars suggest that the internet can serve as an important resource for social movement communication, few studies examine whether and how social movements actually use the internet. This article examines US-based social movement organization (SMO) internet use at one of its most visible points of access, the world wide web. Drawing on alternative media studies, the article develops a typology of communication functions central to social movements and surveys a random sample of SMO websites in order to determine whether and to what degree they exhibit features or attributes related to these types. The survey results suggest that the majority of US-based SMOs are not utilizing the web to its full potential, and posits a number of reasons why this might be the case, including organizational objectives, organizational resources and resource sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]