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This paper describes some of the policy changes that have taken place during the last ten years in the United Kingdom with regard to disability and employment. The first part of the paper begins with an account of major changes in the vocational rehabilitation services provided by the government. More recent changes arising from the ‘New Deal for Disabled People’ are also described, together with those affecting training and supported employment. The Disability Discrimination Act is then outlined and, finally, some significant social security benefits for disabled people are considered. The second part of the paper attempts to analyse the values underlying these policy changes. The Consultative Document, which proposes changes in the vocational rehabilitation service, is examined, and this is followed by an analysis of a Social Security Green Paper, and a series of newspaper articles discussing the New Deal. The third part considers other influences on policy, such as the ongoing changes in perceptions of and social responses to disability, including the influence of the ‘social model’ of disability, (party) political influences and the influence of European Union policy and practice in other European countries. The final part offers a brief look at how UK policy is likely to change in the next few years.

This paper argues that the direct job-creation strategy adopted by the New Deal administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in programs like the WPA (the “New Deal strategy”) is best understood as an effort to secure what the New Dealers came to regard as a human rights entitlement—the right to work—rather than as an economic policy designed to promote the economy's recovery from the Great Depression. The paper goes on to argue, though, that in fashioning a policy to secure the right to work, the New Dealers unknowingly developed a strategy for delivering a Keynesian fiscal stimulus that is markedly superior to other anti-recession strategies. Unfortunately, neither the New Dealers themselves nor the generation of progressive policy makers that followed them understood the multiple strengths of the New Deal strategy. Consequently, the strategy was permitted to languish, and its potential contribution to public policy in the post World War II era was lost. In an effort to rekindle interest in the New Deal strategy the paper concludes by pointing out how much more effective the New Deal strategy would have been in combating the so-called Great Recession than the more conventional spending and tax-cut policies the Federal Government actually has deployed. For a fraction of the sum the Federal Government has allocated to stimulate the American economy since the fall of 2008, the New Deal strategy could have immediately reduced the nation's unemployment rate to pre-recession levels while simultaneously promoting a more rapid recovery in private-sector hiring.

Between 2004 and 2008, the Scottish Government's Working for Families Fund (WFF) in Scotland offered support to parents seeking to move into, within or towards employment, education or training. Focused on disadvantaged parents, the programme had registered a total of over 25,000 clients by April 2008, with 66 per cent of these having achieved a significant outcome during the life of the programme. In this paper, we examine the policy background from which the WFF programme emerged. The paper outlines key features of the programme that are distinct from other programmes (particularly the New Deal for Lone Parents) as well as setting out the key outcomes of the programme. The paper identifies some lessons concerning how WFF operated, and, finally, it outlines the key conclusions.

Since independence, India’s industrialisation has been based predominantly on large- scale, import- substituting heavy industries as the keystone, with traditional small-scale industry as an adjunct to meet every day demands of the people. Gandhiji was among the earliest advocates of small industiy but Gandhij i’s focus was on the expansion of traditional and rural manufactures and not on creation of modem, small urban factory sector. Gandhij i was mainly concerned with the household industiy. This is important, but this is not all. It was Prof. Mahalanobis, who set the pattern of the second five-year plan, which continues to be at the core of our industrial strategy, conceived of the small scale sector as a supplier of consumer goods needed to support workers in the large-scale sector of heavy industry'. The Mahalanobis model of industrialisation, which might have been appropriate at a given point of time, now needs refurbishing. For the most part, large- scale industry is non-competitive and technologically obsolete. Small scale industry has indeed grown, and provided employment. But the quality of the products that it has produced is less than desirable. Consumer goods are still outside the reach of a large section of our population. Indeed, the strategic shift needed in the eleventh plan is to get away from this preoccupation with the segmentation syndrome of large, medium and small, and ask how best consumer needs can be met. Small industry has to be promoted, encouraged and fostered, but somewhat differently from the way it has been so far. In this background, a new approach to the growth of small scale industry is the need of the emerging environment. The paper therefore highlights the new approach for development of SME sector in India. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the growth review, while the second part throws light on the need of a new approach for systematic and orderly growth of SSI sector. The conclusion is given in the third part.

The New Deal is the Labour government's flagship programme to "end the tragic waste of youth and long-term unemployment" by getting people off welfare benefits and into work. This paper argues that the principal weakness of the New Deal is that it seeks to influence the character of labour supply (i.e. the motivation and skills of the unemployed) while neglecting the state of labour demand, which varies greatly between places. The uneven geography of unemployment in the UK is likely to have a crucial bearing on the programme's impact and effectiveness, but this has been largely ignored in its development. The paper outlines some of the practical consequences of this imbalance and suggests how it could be rectified for the programme to be more effective.

This paper examines the making of the US government documentary film, Power and the Land (1940), in terms of how views about science and technology are communicated to the public. The paper argues that the film was shaped by a complex ideology of technical progress shared by the film's maker and sponsors (the Rural Electrification Administration; the short-lived US Film Service, headed by the award-winning director, Pare Lorentz; and Joris Ivens, an internationally acclaimed Dutch director and leftist), tensions between goals of producing a `factual' and `propagandistic' film, and perceptions of the rural audiences' response. This paper thus argues against the view that science and technology communication is simply the mediated diffusion of knowledge from scientists and engineers to the public (in this case, knowledge about the social and economic aspects of rural electrification) and supports an interactive model. The paper also compares Power and the Land with the better known documentaries by Lorentz, The Plow that Broke the Plains and The River, and with other `fact films' of the New Deal era that portray a relationship between technology and social change.

America’s long post war boom was underpinned by the state, by Roosevelt’s New Deal, by its wartime economy, and by Roosevelt’s plans for investment in post war science and infrastructure. In the 1970s America abandoned its developmental model, as critics from left and right attacked plans and planners: yet in the fast rising states of Asia it was embraced. Is it too late for a wakeup call in America and Britain, the champions of anti-planning and the small state? This paper looks for explanations, examines consequences and suggests that the Covid pandemic may trigger a sea change in norms, values and attitudes towards planning and governance.

This study aims to assess the recent debate that has emerged in the literature over the “economic” and “organizational-political” models of strikes and to propose and test a synthesis of those models as an explanation for the pattern of strike activity in the United States since 1900. The paper begins with a review of strike activity in the post-1900 period and then develops a conceptual framework incorporating six factors—the size of union membership, economic conditions, political events, institutional arrangements, psychological variables, and the extent of rival unionism—to explain this historical pattern. The second part of the paper contains a regression analysis of strike activity over the 1900–1977 period. The regression results show that both the economic factors of unemployment and inflation and various noneconomic factors, such as changes in union membership, the outbreak of World War II, and enactment of New Deal legislation, are significant in explaining variations in strike activity during the period studied. The results also show that economic and noneconomic factors have worked together to cause a marked reduction in the variation in strike activity in the post-1948 period.

The conventional negative understanding of the scientific management movement has been challenged in recent decades by heterodox scholars who hold that the movement supported the democratization of the management process and in so doing worked closely with unions and with progressives within and around Roosevelt’s New Deal administration. This paper seeks to strengthen this challenge to orthodoxy by documenting how the leadership of the Taylor Society, a body established by Frederick Taylor’s inner circle as a vehicle to develop and promote their mentor’s ideas, strove to internationalize the diffusion of participatory management in tandem with the International Labour Organization, a body whose core purpose was and is to promote codetermination both in workplaces and in wider society.

The New Deal for Communities (NDC) Programme is one of the most intensive area-based initiatives (ABIs) launched in England. Between 1998 and 2010, 39 NDC Partnerships were charged with improving conditions in relation to six outcomes within deprived neighbourhoods, each accommodating around 9800 people. This paper outlines the approaches taken by NDCs to improve educational outcomes. Change is explored within three themes: change within NDC areas; change relative to other benchmarks; and modelling change. Education saw the least change of all six outcomes adopted by the NDC Programme. Unique to this outcome, spending more on education was associated with less change. Spend may have been better directed at supporting younger children and their parents combined with targeted out of school programmes of support for specific NDC cohorts.

In the United States the apparent crisis of neoliberalism has called forth nostalgia for the regulated capitalism of the post World War II era. In particular, radical economists’ thinking continues to be influenced by the notion of a “limited postwar capital-labor accord.” But a careful accounting of historial scholarship since the 1980s shows the stylized thinking found in social structures of accumulation (SSA) literature and radical political economy generally to be inaccurate and misleading: inaccurate because it creates an image of a golden age that never was, and misleading in that it suggests a politics of social cooperation rather than worker militancy. In this paper we show that capitalists as a class never accepted anything resembling such an accord.JEL classification: B5, J5, N32

In England, there have been 40 years of area-based initiatives (ABIs) involving strategic national government intervention in local authority areas with significant regeneration needs. Whilst they have been examined individually, less consideration has been given to the layering and legacy of ABIs. Uncertainties include whether local authorities have institutionalised new ways of operating or whether layering complexities have acted as significant barriers. Focusing on Wolverhampton, in the West Midlands, this paper examines recent ABI experiences and discusses why support for City Challenge (1992–98) appeared stronger than the more recent New Deal for Communities programme (2001–11). Important ABI legacies include greater diversity of neighbourhood structures, anxiety towards ABIs where property markets are depressed and the realisation that, whilst partnership working has intensified, traditional exclusionary aspects remain. Achieving the most effective governance structures to facilitate urban regeneration remains an on-going challenge, including within emerging Coalition government policy frameworks.

Urban regeneration is increasingly framed around notions of community empowerment. Policy programmes seek to make communities visible and then strengthen and support them through the establishment of a leadership role in urban regeneration practices. At first glance, this appears to be a positive development. Yet commentators note how community partnerships—seen to invoke a `rolling back' of the state—are indicative of a particular economic logic that is governing urban policy provision. Partnerships, it is argued, constitute tokenistic organisations that do not represent the diversity of interests within a particular area. Instead, they work primarily in support of business or government agendas. This paper re-orientates this critique. Focusing on one example of a community-led urban regeneration programme—New Deal for Communities in Bristol—it explores the subjects and spaces to emerge in and through this new form of governance. By identifying the manner in which New Deal for Communities composes all participants as partnering subjects, it posits community engagement as the medium through which power is being reconstituted in extremely comprehensive ways. It then questions the possibilities for developing and sustaining alternative forms of collaborative practice.

This paper revisits the data collected for the mid-term evaluation of the six Housing Action Trusts (HATs) to throw light on the theory of change embodied in this neighbourhood regeneration model. The analysis employs Ostrom's theoretical framework to understand the role that HAT residents played in the regeneration of their neighbourhoods and how specific structuring mechanisms helped to bring about change. The similarities and differences that have surfaced between the HATs and the New Deal for Community partnerships at their mid-point are compared. The analysis concludes that formal structures to empower residents are insufficient on their own and that empowerment comes through specific customised training for employment, decision-making rights and a culture of commitment from skilled support staff.

An unfortunate drift towards theories of structural recurrence informs much of the thinking about post-Fordism. In a typical structuralist manner, the idea is that once a particular regime of regulation collapses, a transition period ensues culminating in a new regime of accumulation. Historical evidence suggests otherwise. The paper re-assesses the concept of Fordism in light of the experience of the US, and in particularl in the context of the powerful anti-trust movement of the early twentieth century, which fused with a broader ‘constructivist’ agenda of the First New Deal administration. I am not arguing that Fordism should not be considered as a social mechanism for coping with the advent of the new corporation and mass production. But it should equally be understood as a wide-ranging political movement that brought together elements of small business, middle and working classes in response to the emerging trusts or cartels and the immense corruption of the ‘robber barons’. Conversely, the Post-Fordist period saw not only the collapse of the Fordist compromise, but also of the collapse of that political movement and its replacement by the pro-business politics associated with the Competition State.

For years, labour market policy in the UK has been dominated by activation measures that seek to increase employment levels among the unemployed. This supply-side focus emphasises individual characteristics and responsibilities in isolation from wider labour market factors. However, there is widening acceptance that policies for employability can provide a link between the supply and demand sides of the labour market. This implies the involvement of employers in the design of skills training and work experience programmes, and for these to be related to employment sustainability and career progression. Several projects in the UK under the New Deal Innovation Fund are currently testing the merits of what is termed a 'demand-led approach'. This paper examines this in terms of increasing job procurement and retention, and critically assesses the way in which it has been applied in the UK to date. It investigates the role played by labour market intermediaries in engaging both job seekers and employers, and considers the difficulties of successfully implementing the approach in different circumstances. It concludes that in most cases demand-led schemes in the UK have been less about improving employability than meeting employers' short-term labour needs.

In this paper, I focus on the political influence of class forces surrounding the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). The RTAA was instrumental because it shifted much of the trade-policy process from Congress to the Executive Branch. I find that capitalist class relations had a great impact on the development and passage of the RTAA. Despite the concerns of capitalists from the nationalist segment over their ability to influence Executive Branch policy making, the nationalist segment unified with capitalists from the increasingly powerful internationalist segment and were successful in their combined efforts to change the institutional arena within which trade policy was formulated. This research bolsters support for the class embeddedness perspective of trade policy as portrayed in the works of Domhoff (1990), Prechel (1990), and Dreiling (2000). Further, it contributes to this work by explaining the historical foundation for the class embeddedness of contemporary foreign trade policy debate as established by capitalist class relations and changes in state organizational structures during the New Deal.

As Americans took their leave of 1938, before the full horror of Germany's Nazi regime became widely known, the Los Angeles Sentinel, a black newspa- per, sounded a disturbing note. In an editorial titled "Ghettoes, American Style," the paper warned that those "who have been protesting Hitler's despi- cable plan to herd German Jews into ghettoes will be surprised to learn that their own government has been busily planning ghettoes for American Negroes through the Federal Housing Authority (sic)." "The American plan lacks the forthright and brutal frankness of Hitler's plan," the editors con- cluded, "but in the long run it is calculated to be as effective." 1 Twenty years later, an agency of the government itself, the United States Commission on Civil Rights, could not entirely dismiss the Sentinel's hyper- bolic allegations. Examining the policies and practices of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) and its constituent bodies—the Public Hous- ing Administration (PHA), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Urban Renewal Administration (URA)—the commission asserted that the agency had not "moved very far or very fast" in eliminating segregation. 2 The commission also made it clear that the government and its minions were more contributing architects than passive bystanders in the residential isolation of African Americans. The PHA, in giving carte blanche to local authorities, affirmatively sup - ported explicit policies of racial separation in the South and accepted its rein - forcement elsewhere through tightly controlled site- and tenant-selection practices. 3 In complementary fashion, the FHA's mortgage insurance program largely denied its benefits to blacks. "With the help of FHA financing," the commission reported, "all-white suburbs have been constructed in recent years around almost every large city." "Huge FHA-insured projects that became

In its nine-year existence, the Civilian Conservation Corps employed over 2.9 million young, unmarried men on a variety of conservation projects. Along with providing relief, the CCC, its supporters claimed, could literally “re-build” America's young working-class men, who many thought had become demoralized—emasculated, even—by the effects of the Great Depression. Through a program consisting of heavy manual labor, vocational and technological training, civic and political education, and an intensely homosocial living and working environment, the CCC sought to produce an economically independent, responsible, and above all, “manly” male working class. This paper examines the changing image of manliness publicized by the CCC, highlighting the shift from the athletic manual laborer of the early 1930s to the highly trained citizen-soldier of the immediate pre-World War II period. It then links this changing ideal of manhood to larger socio-economic, political, and cultural changes influencing American society in the inter-war period.

This paper examines the lessons for the New Deal era of some older strands in UK and European labour market measures; the Community Programme of the 1980s and the experience of “entreprises d'insertion in France, Spain and the Netherlands. It considers whether the institutional infrastructure of the New Deal is appropriate for the realisation of "intermediate labour markets”. This raises some further questions; whether ILMs are about creating employment or merely redistributing it, and whether it would be preferable to use the “benefit transfer principle” to produce social wealth without regard for commercial viability.

This paper contributes to the continuing debate on how structures of economic power are connected to political processes in the United States by examining a widely respected theory concerning the financial support for the two dominant parties during the New Deal. Thomas Ferguson's “investment theory of politics” purports to demonstrate that capital-intensive, internationalist firms supported the Democrats while the labor-intensive, nationalist firms supported the Republicans. Campaign finance contributions for the 1936 Presidential election were used as an empirical indicator of the political preferences and material interests of business firms. It was found that there was little evidence to support Ferguson's claims. While there were firms where all political contributions went to the Republicans, it was highly unusual to have firms that contributed only to Democrats. There was also a total absence of Democratic industries. It is suggested that other variables need to be considered in determining the material bases of the major political parties, particularly the Democratic.

This paper is a response to Webber's (1991) critique of Thomas Ferguson's (1983, 1984, 1986) essays on the New Deal and his “investment theory” of political parties. It argues that Webber's evidence is invalid and that his statistical design is conceptually flawed. The sample is defective: it includes many people it should not and it excludes others who should have been reckoned in, notably many Texas oilmen. His procedure for ascertaining corporate partisanship is inadequate, since, among other problems, it excludes large payments made to the 1936 Democratic campaign by firms such as Standard Oil of New Jersey and General Electric. The campaign finance data he relies upon are also far less complete than he implies.An entirely new data analysis is presented, incorporating not only Webber's data, but much new material from archives. The results confirm Ferguson's central thesis about the 1936 election: contributions to the Democrats in 1936 do indeed come from firms that are more internationally-oriented and capital-intensive than those contributing to the Republicans.

Since the late 1950s, successive British government's have embraced the philosophy of caring for dependent groups in the community in prefer ence to institutions. Yet through this period it has become commonplace for social policy analysts to deride the gap between political and profes sional rhetoric, and the lived experiences of the users of services and informal carers.The policy has become characterised as by the communority, and not care in the community (Walker, 1982). After much prevarication, the present govermment has provided a policy framework which purports to offer the prospect of a better deal for those who need care, and their carers. This paper axamines the adequacy of this policy framework, and argues that serious faiging exist withine it. Unwar ranted assumptions, contradictory policy aims, and substantial amissions characterise the most recent attempt to improve communty care policy. Based on this analysis, we argue that a radical; historically based, review of recent develppments of the mental health services is urgently required.

This paper addresses what the author views as a prevailing misconception of labor law theorists and practitioners: that the goal of the Wagner Act was no more than the promotion of peaceful negotiating procedures and written agreements between organized interests—unions and employers—presumptively equal in power. The author argues that in fact the NLRA was drafted, and for a time implemented, with the avowed purpose of giving workers equality with employers in all aspects of industrial policy making, and that the now-prevalent approach became ascendant only after considerable conflict and the displacement of the Act's original administrators.

This paper calls for the enfranchisement of respondents into research decision making. Respondent participation is one way to overcome respondent posturing to control information. Respondent posturing is produced when researchers create an unbalanced exchange where respondents have no motivation to participate, or when, through their use of rewards, researchers change the rules of the game. Typical researcher-respondent relations are explored in relation to respondent posturing, and the problems and prospects of using respondent participation to create a more open and productive research relationship are examined. We conclude by pointing to respondent relations as an area in which social researchers need to be trained.

I want to say just this about them. There is a decided trend towards co6perative and joint effort in (advertising) research. Advertisers agencies and media combine to make it successful. This is a fortunate development. It furnishes a broader point of view and gives to findings an authority they might not otherwise possess. There are three major factors in control of what may happen to us, in my opinion. Changes in business sentiment, in methods of distribution, and in consumer response. A new trend in business seems to be at work today, towards fair play and a more equal opportunity in the competitive struggle. There is also a trend towards a simpler and less cumbersome scheme of distribution, to lower its cost. And, thirdly, the consumer is awakening as never before to her rights and her power to enforce them. It would be a daring prophet who ventured to foretell what is goinig to happen in the next decade. Think what has happened in the last, socially, morally, financially, politically. The only way we can tell anything about the future is to project present trends; where do they seem to lead? As far as business itself is concerned, there seems to be emerging a new working principle which is bound to have a telling effect upon advertising, and that is fair play to the average man and equal opportunity in the competitive struggle. Unfair discrimination seems to be on its way out, with all of the discriminatory prices, rates, discounts and allowances with which we have be n so long familiar. The depression undermined much that we had thought was as solid as a rock. Seven lean and desperate years put all tradition to the test; billions of property lost; millions of people without jobs. Such a collapse could not occur without business itself being put to a drastic test. Our ideas about doing business have been challenged and are being weighed in the light of a new point of view as to what is economically sound. This is being reflected in legislation, both State and Federal. Such measures as the Patman law, the Food & Drugs Bill, the Anti-Basing Point Bill, all point to what lies ahead. The average man, whether he be producer or consumer, retailer or worker, must be reckoned with as never before. This is not merely a political issue. It is too deep for politics. Mr. Roosevelt may be the champion of that movement; he is not the originator of it. It is one of those brewing sentiments in the public mind which requires a great war or widespread distress to crystallize, and we have been through both. I hold no brief for the new deal as such, but I believe it would be a dangerous mistake for business leadership not to recognize the under-current of the recent elec'A paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Marketing Society, Nov. 27, 1936.

I T IS OUR THESIS that every social problem has a natural history and that the natural history approach is a promising conceptual framework within which to study specific social problems. Let us first clarify our usage of the terms "social problem" and "natural history." The concept "social problem" as used in this paper can be stated in a series of propositions. I. A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some social norm which they cherish. Every social problem thus consists of an objective condition and a subjective definition. The objective condition is a verifiable situation which can be checked as to existence and magnitude (proportions) by impartial and trained observers, e.g., the state of our national defense, trends in the birth rate, unemployment, etc. The subjective definition is the awareness of certain individuals that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values. 2. The objective condition is necessary but not in itself sufficient to constitute a social problem. Although the objective condition may be the same in two different localities, it may be a social problem in only one of these areas, e.g., discrimination against Negroes in the south as contrasted with discrimination in the north; divorce in Reno as contrasted with divorce in a Catholic community. Social problems are what people think they are and if conditions are not defined as social problems by the people involved in them, they are not problems to those people, although they may be problems to outsiders or to scientists, e.g., the condition of poor southern sharecroppers is a social problem to the braintrusters of the New Deal but not to many southern landowners. 3. Cultural values play an important causal role in the objective condition which is defined as a problem, e.g., the objective conditions of unemployment, race prejudice, illegitimacy, crime, divorce, and war come into being, in part at least, because people cherish certain beliefs and maintain certain social institutions which give rise to these conditions. 4. Cultural values obstruct solutions to conditions defined as social problems because people are unwilling to endorse programs of amelioration which prejudice or require abandonment of their cherished beliefs and institutions, e.g., one possible "solution" to illegitimacy would be social acceptance of contraception and abortion, practices which in themselves are now defined as violations of the mores.