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Central to much critical theory is the critique of instrumental rationality (roughly, the ability to pick good means to ends). This critique is overstated, I suggest. Critical theorists often depict instrumental rationality too narrowly, and many criticize the wrong target, for example, attacking capitalist instrumental rationality when the fundamental problem is capitalism, not instrumental rationality. Nonetheless, critical theorists’ critique requires certain changes to orthodox accounts of instrumental rationality. I offer a more palatable definition, highlight instrumental rationality’s essential contestability, and show that it can actually help us pick ends. Everyone needs instrumental rationality, especially Habermasian critical theorists. And far from instrumental rationality being amoral, I argue that because instrumental rationality almost always involves multiple ends, one end may prohibit immoral means, acting as a side-constraint. Ultimately, the substance of critical theorists’ critiques remains highly important but should not be framed in opposition to instrumental rationality.

Different scholars count `the number of parties' in different ways, partly because they examine different parts of the political process and for different reasons. Sartori's qualitative approach focused mainly on competition for government, but is now largely supplanted by the quantitative `effective number of parties' index, which deals with votes and seats. But some quantitative research requires us to look beyond votes and seats. For example, testing proportional and pluralitarian models of democracy requires us to count parties not just in terms of votes and seats but also in terms of legislative and cabinet power. I estimate party shares of legislative and cabinet power to test democratic norms at British and German elections and parliaments. So, the effective number of parties index needs to be, and can be, extended beyond votes and seats alone.

First-past-the-post is often seen as unfair. But this reflects a narrow understanding of fairness. Several ideas of fairness exist, some of which help to defend first-past-the-post. Two key parts of the British electoral reform debate are discussed: the translation of votes to seats, and the translation of votes to power. Several arguments about fairness by both critics and defenders of first-past-the-post are questioned. Tensions within and between certain ideas of fairness are addressed. Stronger justification of different notions of fairness, and more rigorous empirical assessment of normative claims, are advocated. Conceptual clarity requires that protagonists identify explicitly which ideas of fairness they favour, or preferably, that they simply avoid the misleading and overly rhetorical language of fairness.