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The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, appointed two former military generals, Ryamizard Ryacudu (2014–2019) and Prabowo Subianto (2019–present), for the first- and secondterm defence minister positions consecutively. The appointment of military officers – either retired or active – as defence ministers has been perceived as a recipe for potential democratic setbacks. Current studies on the quasi-civilian defence minister mainly focused on explaining the logic behind such appointments. On the other hand, our study attempts to test the argument about whether the decision to select former military figures to lead the Ministry of Defence undermines civilian control. This article examines: (1) the institutional arrangement of the defence establishment; (2) the composition of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence’s leadership structure; and (3) the leadership activities and key initiatives. The findings are that military officers have indeed dominated the ministry’s organisational structure. Nevertheless, such domination did not automatically translate into the deterioration of civilian supremacy as the institutional arrangement limits those quasi-civilian defence ministers’ manoeuvres. Submitted/Accepted version

Supplemental material file: online appendix. Civil-military relations are characterized by a fundamental dilemma. To lower coup risk, leaders frequently empower the military, which satisfies the armed forces with the status quo and enables them to fight against threats challenging the civilian leadership. Simultaneously, a too powerful military itself constitutes a potential threat that is capable of overthrowing the government. Our research adds to this debate by examining the impact of mechanization, that is, the degree to which militaries rely on armored vehicles relative to manpower, on coup risk. We discuss several (opposing) mechanisms before developing the theoretical expectation that higher levels of mechanization should lower the likelihood of a coup due to the increased costs of coup execution. Empirical evidence strongly supports this claim and, thus, contributes to our understanding of the emergence of coups as an essential breakdown of civil-military relations, while adding to the debate surrounding the many trade-offs leaders face when coup-proofing their regimes.

Military mutinies are critical to scholars’ collective understanding of civil–military relations. This article introduces a new dataset that systematically codes mutinies across all regions and conducts an exploratory analysis of these new data. The primary contribution made here is the introduction of a new dataset that provides scholars with a sample of mutinies across region, space, and time. The new Military Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD) codes events of military indiscipline from 1945 to 2017. This dataset uses geocoding techniques that will enable scholars to explore the spatial patterns and diffusion associated with mutinies. The second contribution is the preliminary exploration of these new data. Of note, I demonstrate that over one-third of all mutinies are violent, 6% of mutinies are associated with civilian deaths, and anocracies are more likely to experience mutinies than democratic or autocratic counterparts. MMDD provides investigators with an exciting new tool to explore dimensions of military disloyalty.

In the pages of this journal, Damon Coletta and Tom Crosbie published a response to our article entitled, “The Continuing Relevance of Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers.” In that article, we argued that Janowitz’s emphasis on the need for political awareness in the U.S. military should receive greater attention in the education of today’s officer corps. Coletta and Crosbie suggest that we are too ready to abandon Samuel Huntington’s classic work, The Soldier and the State. In this continuation of that dialogue, we respond with three clarifications and three substantive disagreements. Huntington and Janowitz offer divergent perspectives on the issues of officer education and “political virtue,” we suggest, and Janowitz’s perspective deserves greater weight that it has traditionally received. Coletta and Crosbie also place greater emphasis on the separability of political and military affairs than is warranted, and Janowitz is more helpful here as well.

This article analyzes civil–military relations and the issue of civilian control through the lens of new managerialism. It illustrates that the means and mechanisms applied by governments to govern the military actually shape its organization and affect its functions in ways not always acknowledged in the civil–military debate. We start by illustrating the gradual introduction of management reforms to the Swedish Armed Forces and the growing focus on audit and evaluation. The article thereafter analyzes the consequences of these managerialist trends for the most central installation of the armed forces–its headquarters. It further exemplifies how such trends affect the work of professionals at the military units. In conclusion, managerialist reforms have not only changed the structure of the organization and the relationship between core and support functions but have also placed limits on the influence of professional judgment. Governing public professions: Performance management and professional autonomy in the police and military

Scholarly debates on civil–military relations often focus on how the military impacts society. Adding to the vast literature of civil–military relations, this article examines how socio-cultural practices and societal developments in the host society affect the military. Based on long-term ethnographic engagement with the Ghana Armed Forces, the piece presents empirical observations of how culturally informed practices, such as begging via proxies ( djuan toa), infiltrate the Ghanaian military barracks and affect the institutions’ functioning. The article illustrates how two additional elements, skewed recruitment practices and the politicisation of the rank and file, are used as tools by political factions, such as Ghana’s two most prominent parties (the New Patriotic Party and National Democratic Congress), seeking to gain control over the Ghanaian military. The article analyses how these approaches contribute to undermining the armed forces’ discipline and military professionalism and consequently affect the military institution as a whole.

Scholars have contended that norms of professionalism are critical to understanding how militaries interact with civilian leaders and when they intervene in politics. Yet, few studies have directly examined the normative structures of military officers. Through a survey of 1468 US Military Academy cadets, this study evaluates cadets’ views toward professionalism, and in particular what is often presumed to be the dominant framework of those norms based on Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. We identify five patterns of normative beliefs based on cadets’ views of civil–military interaction and the nonpartisan ethic: orthodox, unorthodox, inconsistent, non-committal, and motivated norms. Cadets fall into each of these categories, but approximately one-quarter demonstrate motivated norms, adhering when convenient, and otherwise dispensing with them when the rules they prescribe clash with their partisan identities. These findings, especially our novel conceptualization on norm adherence, contribute to a greater understanding of military culture and professionalism.

The presumed “gap” in fundamental foreign policy beliefs between what Huntington (1957) described as “liberal society” and the “conservative military mind” lies at the core of research on civil–military relations. However, we still know surprisingly little about the precise nature of differences between the two groups’ core foreign policy orientations. This study presents the first empirically grounded evaluation of the public–military gap. We deployed a unique survey to directly compare the views of 470 active-duty US military officers against a representative sample of the American public. Our study included beliefs concerning the appropriate role of military force and of US engagement in global affairs, the likely direction of US national security in the coming decade, and the causes and costs of future military conflicts. While we confirm aspects of Huntington’s dichotomy, we also observe critical differences between the two groups that diverge from the traditional conceptualization of a “civil–military gap.”

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.

The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) played a critical role in the lives of many Union veterans after the Civil War. Its efforts were supported by its women’s auxiliary, the Woman’s Relief Corps (WRC). Yet scholars do not know much about the evolution of the relationship between the rising WRC and the slowly declining GAR, whose members were dying away in the early 20th century. Here, we evaluate state-level membership and local group data for both associations to determine the nature of their connection from 1884 to 1924. The evidence reveals that the WRC’s auxiliary role helped sustain the GAR while providing an organizational structure that allowed women to chart an independent course.

This Armed Forces & Society forum is dedicated to exploring recent trends in the characteristics of military reserves and of the changing character of reserve forces within the armed forces within the military, the civilian sphere, and in between them. To bring new and critical perspectives to the study of reserve forces and civil–military relations, this introduction and the five articles that follow draw on two organizing conceptual models: The first portrays reservists as transmigrants and focuses on the plural membership of reservists in the military and in civilian society and the “travel” between them. The second model focuses on the multiple formal and informal compacts (contracts, agreements, or pacts) between reservists and the military.

The principal threat most autocratic leaders face stems from within the regime. To control militaries and mitigate the risk of coups d’état, many autocratic leaders repeatedly purge strong officers from the military. What are the causes and consequences of such purges? Despite its importance, scholars rarely have studied the question, as they have lacked a systematic and comprehensive dataset. The Military Purges in Dictatorships (MPD) dataset contains information on the dates and characteristics of 1,007 military purges, and covers 566 political leaders in 116 authoritarian countries over the period 1965 to 2005. In this article, I describe MPD, compare it with other datasets, present descriptive statistics on the data, and suggest its applications. By coding the timing and various characteristics of military purges, MPD facilitates empirical study of the relationships between autocratic leaders and their militaries, and thus is useful for researchers studying political violence, repression, civil-military relations, coup-proofing, leader survival, and regime transition.

Suzanne Nielsen and Hugh Liebert recently published “The Continuing Relevance of Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers” in which they argued that officer education is too enamored with Samuel Huntington’s aging theory of civil–military relations from Soldier and the State. Huntington’s ideal of objective control grants senior military advisors autonomy within their professional sphere, and it best ensures that unvarnished military expertise survives politically charged national security decision making processes intact, regardless of which party controls the White House. While these features explain Huntington’s traditional popularity with the military, Nielsen and Liebert warn that Huntington’s separation between military and civilian matters in theory engenders wishful thinking in practice, so much so that officers neglect, to the detriment of national policy, Morris Janowitz, Huntington’s cofounder of the modern study of civil–military relations. However, the civil–military community should reconsider banishing Huntington in order to appreciate Janowitz.

Samuel Huntington theorized in The Soldier and the State that rather than make the military in the image of society (subjective control), both superior civilian control and military outcomes would result if the military was allowed its own sphere and culture, shaped by military requirements (objective control). Since 1963, the Canadian Armed Forces have argued for objective control, while political leadership and the country have largely paid little attention to military demands for greater social independence. An examination of defense policy, the “civilianization” crisis, the Somalia Inquiry, and diversity legislation and programs demonstrate the triumph of subjective control. This article concludes that subjective control has had costs to civilians in military shirking and to the military in alienation from its parent society. Huntington remains useful, but it is time to consider modern alternatives to understand civil-military relationships.

What explains the post–Cold War surge in peacekeeping contributions from the developing world? I argue that, amid a wave of democratization and expanded peacekeeping activity, such countries use peacekeeping deployments to reduce the threat of the military to nascent democratic institutions. Peacekeeping participation serves to placate the military in the short term with resources and continued activity, while socializing and professionalizing it to pro-democracy behaviors in the long term. Assessing troop contributions from 1990 to 2011, I find evidence that new democracies make larger contributions than other states, where the effect diminishes as democracy becomes consolidated. Moreover, the effect is amplified in countries with a greater military legacy. I supplement this with a study of Argentina to further support the proposed mechanism. These findings help explain the shift in state peacekeeping contributions in recent years, the role of democracy in peacekeeping efforts, and the impact of international actors in supporting democratization.

In the current strategic environment, Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier deserves renewed emphasis, especially from the military’s senior leaders who are responsible for the education and development of the country’s officer corps. Janowitz’s work is an especially valuable guide to the education of officers today because of his focus on the need for military officers to understand the political impact of military posture and military operations. The education of U.S. military officers to meet the country’s national security needs in the 21st century must go beyond Huntington’s formulation of expertise to an appreciation, in Janowitz’s terms, of “the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs” across the spectrum of conflict. Janowitz’s formulation is the better guide because military means serve political purposes, and ultimately, a country’s strategic success will be judged in political terms.

Since the mid-2000s, French military telecommunications have been partially outsourced to private companies. This was justified by an intent for budgetary savings and efficiency. However, an interview survey conducted among military technicians shows that this transfer weighs upon their work and expectations. Outsourcing damages the profession’s appeal, deprives staff of strategic resources, and places their time under the control of private providers. This represents a symbolic cost for the personnel committed to the institution but also grants symbolic benefits to officers who are hostile to the process. Although they were not designed for this purpose, market procedures closely regulate the activity of frontline military technicians.

Military service is a highly social—and potentially socializing—experience. However, the long-term social effect of military service is a little-studied topic, and some have dismissed any direct impact of service on civic participation. Using data from a large, national survey, our estimates show, in contrast, that the likelihood and intensity of group participation is higher among veterans than other men and that combat veterans have the highest level of participation. Mettler argued that education funded through the GI Bill gave veterans both resources (“civic capacity”) and a desire to reciprocate to society (“civic predisposition”) for the generous benefits they received, but she did not allow for the possibility that service itself could also increase both civic capacity and predisposition. Furthermore, our estimates confirm that education is strongly associated with higher civic participation and that the association between military service and participation is largely independent of education.

Corporate privatization of security has generated a neoliberal iteration of an old profession: the private military contractor. This development has revolutionized security policies across the globe while reviving old patterns of inequality. Following neoliberal logic, outsourcing fosters two types of employment: the exploitative and the exclusive. The first refers to low-status individuals hired en masse to perform menial labor; the second refers to experts who perform functions central to the employer’s mission. We contribute to this discussion by focusing on the qualifications of a different subsample of this industry: American contractors who died while performing military and security functions in Iraq. We assert that such American employees directly engaged in mission-essential combat and security functions better fit the employment category of an exclusive, expert sector at the core of the private military industry.

This article reexamines and develops the analytical metaphor of “Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants” in three directions. First, we advance the notion of transmigration by linking it to the explicit and implicit “contracts” or agreements struck between the military and individuals and groups within and outside of it. Second, we show that the “management” model of reserve forces is not just an administrative matter but that “negotiating” with reservists involves wider issues that include managing identity, commitment, and the meaning attached to military service. Third, we examine the institutional and political meaning of the reserves at the macro sociological level. The juxtaposition and interplay of two models—transmigration and multiple contracts—allows us to introduce structural elements into the movement of soldiers between the military and civilian society, and add a dynamic dimension to the contents of the implicit contracts that organize reservists’ relations with the state and military.

Are Americans aware and concerned about White nationalism in the U.S. Military? Our large and demographically representative survey suggests that while most Americans suspect at least some presence of White nationalism in the military, many do not view it as a serious problem; particularly self-identified conservatives and respondents who hold highly favorable views toward military service members. However, in a between-/within-subjects experiment embedded in our survey, we show that providing information about the issue of White nationalism in the U.S. Military increases the public’s overall concern about White nationalism in the U.S. Military.

This article argues that Theo Farrell’s book Unwinnable is a semi-official British Army history of the Afghan war and reflects the ‘dominant military narrative’. The book’s argument is contradictory, it suggests that NATO was ‘learning, adapting and winning’ the war but the politicians stabbed the military in the back by withdrawing just as a turning point had been reached in 2009-11. This was Farrell’s optimistic analysis when the war was ongoing. But Unwinnable also argues that the war was unwinnable from 2001. This implies that it was the military elite that blundered because of their enthusiasm for the escalation of Britain’s involvement in an unwinnable and, therefore, futile war. Unwinnable tries to rescue ‘counterinsurgency’ by trying to claim, implausibly, that it was only properly implement during 2009-11. Farrell champions the empowerment of the military elite and is unconcerned that the politicians struggled to exert democratic control over the military.

Although voluntary recruitment to the military is today the Western norm, we know little about citizens’ beliefs regarding service members’ reasons for joining. This article, reporting and analyzing the results of a nationally representative U.S. survey, rectifies this gap. We find that, despite the reality of market-based recruitment, many Americans continue to subscribe to an idealized image of service members as moved by self-sacrificing patriotism. This belief is most heavily concentrated among conservative Americans. Liberal Americans are more likely to believe that service members join primarily for economic reasons. Those furthest to the left are more inclined to aver that service members join chiefly to escape desperate circumstances. Perhaps most surprising, we discover a disconnect between respondents with military experience and their families: The former are more likely to acknowledge that pay and benefits are a primary motivation for service, whereas their families are more likely to embrace a patriotic service narrative.

When confronted with mass uprisings, governments deploy their security forces for crowd control or repression. However, sometimes security agencies choose to side with the opposition movement. Recent work shows that “fragmentation” contributes to defection: fragmenting the security forces into parallel units leads to oversight problems and grievances among soldiers, which raises the risk of members of the security forces defecting to the opposition movement. However, I argue that the effect on defection is strongly moderated by the circumstances under which states choose to fragment their military: fragmentation for the purpose of security specialization, called “differentiation,” even decreases its risk. Employing Bayesian multilevel modeling, the findings corroborate this distinction. The study contributes to the fundamental discussion on civil–military relations, shedding light on why some conflict situations see security defections while others do not. Understanding this phenomenon is a pivotal element to explaining how conflicts develop, escalate, and end.

After decades of military reform, how does the Chinese military justify its persistent role in politics and social life? This mixed-methods study examines the discursive strategies used by military deputies to understand how a semi-professional military speak to its relations to the Party, its own organizational missions and goals, and potential conflicts between them. Computer-assisted text analysis is combined with targeted deep reading to identify and examine latent topics in comments made by military deputies between 2001 and 2017. The findings show that the military deputies simultaneously mobilize a political discourse and a discourse of professionalism. This duality of discourse constitutes a source of legitimacy for the military’s pursuit of corporate interests.

Does restructuring security forces reduce the risk of civil war recurrence? Prior research has examined effects of military integration in alleviating commitment problems, but the evidence has been inconclusive. Other aspects of civil–military relations have received less attention. This article examines the effects of civil–military relations in the context of postwar struggles to consolidate authority. It outlines three pathways through which security forces contribute to renewed civil war: by excluding rival factions and facilitating insurgent mobilization, by exploiting control over resources to challenge the regime, or by escalating incipient insurgency through repression. Analysis of original, cross-national data on postwar civil–military relations shows that reducing the potential for exclusion and exploitation through diverse officer appointments and robust civilian oversight lowers the risk of civil war. These findings emphasize the distributive effects of restructuring security forces and highlight the value of examining political contests around state institutions to understand why civil wars restart.

Defense ministers are among the most central players in democracies’ civil–military relations. This article aims to identify the determinants of the selection criteria of defense ministers in democracies and semi-democracies. More specifically, it attempts to measure the effects of systems of government on decisions to appoint civilians or military officers to head the defense ministry. We argue that some characteristics of presidentialized regimes lead to the appointment of military defense ministers. This is a novel contribution, one that connects the literature on civil–military relations and that on systems of government. To assess our hypothesis and its mechanisms, we use comprehensive cross-national data in 1975–2015. Our tests indicate a robust association between presidentialized systems of government and the appointment of military ministers. We also show that military defense ministers are associated with some relevant outcomes. These findings have important implications for the study of civil–military relations, defense policy, and democracy.

Over the years, attempts to define the notion of national security in terms of what it means and what it represents have ranged from a classical, purely military definition, to a broader multidimensional concept encompassing a range of different features. Studies on Israel’s national security concept have tended to emphasize the formative role played by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister and defense minister. These works have focused on the military aspects of the national security concept, based on arguments concerning the perceived threat of wartime engagements with Arab armies. This article argues that Ben-Gurion’s national security concept was essentially a civilian perspective with military features that responded to the four types of threats, local, regional, international, and Jewish, facing the State of Israel at the time, most of which were not military.

This article modifies the framework for the analysis of civil–military “gaps” proposed in Armed Forces & Society (Vol. 38, 2012) by Rahbek-Clemmensen, Archer, Barr, Belkin, Guerro, Hall, and Swain, who depicted a continuum of four binary fissures (“gap dimensions”) dividing two hypothetically homogeneous communities: civilians versus military personnel. Extrapolating from Israel’s experience, this article instead visualizes a more dynamic and fissured landscape, inhabited by several heterogeneous clusters of population groups, each comprising impromptu coalitions drawn from both the armed forces and civilian society. That environment, we argue, although certainly influenced by the traditional penetrability of Israel’s civil–military boundaries, more directly reflects current technological and cultural processes, which are transforming encounters between civilians and military personnel in other countries too. We therefore suggest replacing the predominantly dichotomous taxonomies that generally characterize studies of civil–military relations in contemporary democratic societies with the fractured format observed in the Israeli case.

Endorsements by retired flag and general officers are now a fixture of the presidential election cycle. However, their motivations are unclear. Retired flag officers might endorse with material, purposive, or solidarity motives. We evaluate these motivations with a new data set of 1,340 endorsements by 1,041 endorsers between 2004 and 2016 matched with campaign contributions. We find that campaign contributions, service in the Navy, and retiring as a higher ranked officer are all associated with an increased likelihood of endorsing. We conclude that about 10 retired flag officers participate to improve their material situation, 193 seek to advance their ideological preferences, and the remainder participate to demonstrate solidarity with their peers or acquaintances. These findings provide new insight into endorser motivations and civil–military relations.

Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups as a dependent variable, there is a growing debate as to how coups influence a country’s long-term political trajectory. This literature includes a handful of studies that claim coups against authoritarian regimes can act for the public good and provide a boost to the state’s democratization prospects. Causal mechanisms have included factors such as aid conditionality, economic interdependence, and foreign pressure more generally. We argue that this growing body of work can benefit from increased attention given to those who carry out coups: the armed forces. Specifically, we argue that coups reflecting a larger societal interest, be it the removal of a dictator or the desire for democracy after a dictator’s ouster, are more likely undertaken by conscript armies. A cross-national exploration of over 170 coups suggests that conscript militaries are in fact significantly more likely to oversee democratic transitions following military coups. Beyond contributing to a broader literature on civil–military relations, the article points to important policy implications for developing nations.

This article examines the coherence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) coordinated military strategy during the war in Afghanistan. We argue that much of this coherence can be lost when decision makers adopt multinational strategic guidance that is then interpreted by different national contingents operationally. Different strategic and military cultures across troop-contributing countries may account for observed variation in operational outcomes, but better theoretical tools are needed to examine this phenomenon. Our aim is to further scholars’ understanding of how cultural variables can affect mission outcomes. This assumed effect of strategic and military cultures is explored empirically with reference to the Canadian and German Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, which formed part of the NATO-led ISAF operation.

Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military’s inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Machiavelli’s virtú.

Do activists seeking to challenge the U.S. military presence overseas succeed in persuading the local population? While the comparative literature on base contestation often makes implicit causal claims about public opinion and behavior, these claims have never been tested empirically using individual-level data. Based on an online survey, experiment with residents of communities hosting U.S. military bases in Korea and Japan, we demonstrate a disconnect between anti-base movements and local residents. Local public opinion is most responsive to pragmatic framing of opposition by social movements and tangible information about the consequences of base expansion. Other common activist tactics have little effect and may even backfire. Our findings fill an important gap in the growing literature on the politics of U.S. military bases abroad.

Military scandals are disruptive episodes that can have long-lasting organizational consequences for military institutions. Recently, scholars who study military institutions have sought to understand this phenomenon and its significance. However, given their complexity and empirically opaque nature, military scandals are difficult to study, and a general account of this phenomenon has remained elusive. This article addresses this problem by drawing upon the growing field of scandal research to present a definition and account of the military scandal. We argue that military scandals are episodes of mediatized public moral conflict concerning transgressions involving the military institution, its members, and/or associated actors. We employ Ari Adut’s theory of public attention as a core explanation of scandal dynamics and effects and use this to argue that the military scandal phenomenon can be employed to simultaneously examine interactions and relationships between the military, the state, news media organizations, and civil society.

This article argues that autonomous militaries can play a balancing role during major internal political crises. However, when militaries’ autonomy is curtailed by political leaders before the crisis, militaries cannot maintain the political balance between rulers and opponents, thereby increasing the risk of armed conflict. The article first explains the main concepts relevant to the discussion (autonomy, political crisis, balancing role), exploring their possible interlinkages and presenting several hypotheses. Subsequently, it discusses four relevant cases from the Middle East before and during the Arab revolts of 2010–2011: Egypt in 2011 and Lebanon in 1958, which demonstrate the balancing capacities of autonomous militaries during major political crises, and Lebanon in 1975 and Syria in 2011, which reveal that nonautonomous militaries cannot play a balancing role in such circumstances. The article concludes with several observations regarding the military’s balancing role during major internal political crises in divided and homogenous states.

Although just under half of all coup d’état attempts involve fatalities, there has been surprisingly little attention to the conditions under which coups turn violent. Existing research emphasizes the incentives coup plotters have to avoid bloodshed but does not explain the conditions under which violence nonetheless occurs. This article develops a theoretical framework that predicts that the extent of violence that occurs during coup attempts will vary systematically with central features of incumbent regimes and coup plotters. It then tests these predictions using new data on the fatalities associated with 377 coup attempts between 1950 and 2017. Coups against military regimes are found to be less violent than those against civilian dictatorships. This is because military rulers are better able to estimate the likelihood of the coup succeeding and more sensitive to the costs associated with using violence to suppress a coup. Since their post-coup fates tend to be better than those of other authoritarian leaders, they also have fewer incentives to hang on to power at any cost. The analysis also demonstrates that coups led by senior officers involve less bloodshed than those by junior officers and enlisted men. However, coups against rulers that counterbalance their militaries are no more violent than those against rulers that do not. The results shed new light on the dynamics of coup attempts.

From 2007 to 2012, Russian armed forces faced unprecedented changes that affected their structural, economic, social, and ideological elements. However, not all aims were fulfilled, and some changes were rolled back, despite the political and financial support from Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev for the defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Using the data from 11 interviews with former high-ranking military officers, scholars, and insider press workers, the research shows that the unsustainability of the reform was caused by the radicality of changes, the interest groups influence, and the technocratic policymaking in nondemocratic Russia. In addition, the research demonstrates the strategies the reformers used in order to overcome the resistance from mobilized interest groups. They had not succeeded, that ultimately led to the resignation of the defense minister, which stopped further radical changes in the contemporary Russian armed forces.

Candidates often highlight military experience on the campaign trail. Do they also govern differently? This study examines whether and how military experience is associated with state lawmaking. We examine legislative productivity, success rates, and the substantive content of legislation with a large original data set. The data include over 60,000 bills introduced in four state legislatures over a 10-year time span, coded for their substantive focus. It also includes information on characteristics of over 4,000 legislators. Our analysis of these data indicates that veterans do not differ in overall levels of productivity but do have common legislative agendas. Veterans’ shared legislative agendas are not narrowly confined to defense or security issues but vary depending on state context. This is, to our knowledge, the most extensive empirical analysis of the legislative behavior of veterans in a single study.

The ability to regulate negative emotions is especially necessary for service members in the contemporary U.S. armed forces, since they routinely face situations that elicit negative emotions while executing their professional roles. Yet difficulties with regulating emotions, which are associated with stress and mood disorders, suicidality, and impairments in work performance, remain prevalent across this group. This article surveys research in five domains—recruitment and selection effects, military cultural pressures and coping strategies, training, common chronic stressors, and the contemporary operational environment—to highlight structural contributors to the heavy stress loads that U.S. service members often bear, which may contribute to their difficulty with emotion regulation (ER). It concludes with several recommendations that the military could implement to mitigate service members’ stress loads and facilitate ER. Enhancing their ER skills may offer a long-term strategy to improve their resilience and performance.

Civil–military relations in Ghana have a chequered history; since the first coup of 1966, there had been four military takeovers of political power, in 1969, 1972, 1979, and 1980. Relations are thawing, as evidenced by the fact that there has been no overt attempt at overthrowing a government since 1992. This article employs a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis to explain civil–military relations in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1992–2018). It argues that there is agreement among three societal partners—political elites, military, and the citizenry on four variables; social composition of the officer corps, political decision–making, and recruitment and military style. Yet focus of the civil–military discourse has been on political elites and military. These two are vital to the political decision process. Although the third partner, the citizenry has a meaningful voice, military–society relations fluctuates over time. There is mixed perceptions among Ghanaian about the armed forces.

Includes supplemental material for the online appendix How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.

This article explores the governance of post-traumatic stress disorder among soldiers-turned-contractors in the private military labour market. Using original data relating to the UK case, it argues that this governance regime is best understood as a political economic process which transcends the public–private divide. On one side, post-traumatic stress disorder is managed as an economic issue—a calculation to be factored into the pursuit of profit maximization. On the other side, it is managed as a political or social issue—a component of the civil–military relationship in which state and society have a duty to care for all those who have served and sacrificed in defense of the nation. In other words, this process is shaped by—and gives shape to—the complex professional identity of the individuals under examination: they are private military contractors and, at the same time, armed forces veterans.

There is little empirical evidence of the widely shared belief that most civilians know next to nothing about defense policy and armed forces. This article examines knowledge of defense policy in Germany and its determinants. The database is a public opinion survey from 2016. The survey included six questions on various aspects of knowledge of defense policy. Its results show that knowledge of defense policy is approximately on a level with general political knowledge in Germany. Determinants from the categories of resources and sociodemographics, motivations, and opportunity structures explain individual knowledge levels. Internal efficacy, interest in politics, the intention to vote, and the perception of the Bundeswehr’s presence in the media are among the most important predictors. These results indicate that the armed forces can bridge the gap between the public and the military, the civil–military gap, by being present in society and active in personal and mass media communication.

The US government implemented the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Meeting to look over its politico-military policies and strategies to implement NSC 68/4 during the Korean War. The meeting became a critical organization to conduct the war as a limited war by developing a limited goal and providing strategies for a decision-making apparatus after the removal of General MacArthur from the post of Commander of the United Nations in March 1951. The meeting later provided politico-military directives to the JCS to continue the war in limited terms, supported the armistice negotiation, and contributed to the success of the first year’s agreement.

With four successful and three failed coups in less than 60 years, the Turkish military is one of the most interventionist armed forces in the global south. Despite this record, few scholars have analyzed systematically how the military’s political role changed over time. To address this gap, this article examines the evolution of civil–military relations (CMR) in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Based on a historical analysis, this article offers a revisionist account for the extant Turkish scholarship and also contributes to the broader literature on CMR. It argues that the military’s guardian status was not clearly defined and that the officer corps differed strongly on major political issues throughout the Cold War. This article also demonstrates that the officer corps was divided into opposite ideological factions and political agendas and enjoyed varying levels of political influence due to frequent purges and conjectural changes.

Unlike other political leaders, leaders coming to power through military coups face a dual legitimation challenge: they must justify not only why they should rule but also how they came to power. Little attention has been paid to how coup leaders solve this legitimacy deficit and even less to the audiences of this legitimation. We ask: why do some coup leaders legitimate their coups by holding elections while others do not? Counterintuitively, we argue that coup leaders who oust democratically elected leaders are less likely to hold elections, except when tied to US military aid. We test these hypotheses through a data set of military coup regimes from 1946 to 2014 and trace out mechanisms through case studies of the Nigerian coup of 1983 and the Egyptian coup of 2013. This argument provides a new explanation for the emergence of authoritarian elections and a new perspective on the international dimensions of dictatorship.

Scholars and media outlets that cover the U.S. Congress devote substantial attention to the rise in partisanship and polarization over the past few decades. The steady increases in partisanship and polarization coincide with a comparable decline in veteran representation in Congress. While there are many factors that influence a congressperson’s behavior, an understudied issue is whether these trends suggest that veterans are more likely to exhibit bipartisanship than their nonveteran colleagues. Using two different measures of bipartisanship, this article draws on data from 12 different Congresses to examine whether veterans are more likely to be bipartisan than nonveterans. Utilizing difference in means tests, the results provide only modest evidence that increasing veteran representation would lead to more bipartisanship when controlling for generational differences. This article suggests a research agenda to further assess these findings and discusses the implications of increasing veteran presence in Congress on civil–military relations.