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During the occupation of the Netherlands, the Jewish population was systematically robbed and deprived of their property rights. Their economic and social isolation went hand in hand with a loss of social status, connectedness, security and identity, as homes were expropriated and furniture was confiscated. The process of depriving the Jews of everything they owned, which happened with such apparent ease by the seemingly all-powerful authorities, had a profound impact on the victims that went far beyond mere material loss. Furthermore, after the war, the restitution process confronted the survivors with bureaucratic procedures and formalities that evoked negative feelings among the persecuted victims. A strictly quantitative approach to compensation for the loss of furniture and other household items therefore seems to fall short. The view of loss as something that can be compensated with money does not take into account the psychological aspects of losing those personal possessions. This article pleads for a more qualitative approach to the subject of looting and restitution, free from the limitations imposed by the quantitative scope of official archives. The authors suggest that future research should relate more to the link between ‘dignity taking’ – a term that was coined by Bernadette Atuahene, professor of Law in Chicago – and ‘emotional loss’. Looking into property loss from an emotional perspective will teach us more about the fragility of settledness against the backdrop of occupation and persecution.

Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine, Public Affairs, New York, U.S., 2015, 321 pp., ₹1,596.

This article proposes a multitemporal approach to the study of archaeological ceramics in the Peruvian North Coast through archaeological ethnography. It allows us to create a new perspective of a past that seems to be continuously brought back in the ritual practices of curanderos (shamans), and in the daily life of other subjects that interact with what archaeologists call archaeological artifacts. In the rituals of curanderos and in the practice of huaqueo, where archaeological ceramics are known as huacos, it is possible to see how these vessels come to life, performing within a complex meshwork of relationships which extend over different worlds, as well as human and other-than-human participation. This discussion provokes the reevaluation of the relationships among archaeological heritage, archaeological material, and archaeological practice itself. It also shows how past and present are related in this specific Andean context.

The U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is steward to vast cultural resources across public lands and in museum collections. Like other land-managing agencies, its resource protection strategy includes Federal enforcement of cultural property laws. Between 2007 and 2013, a case code-named Operation: Cerberus Action recovered more than 100,000 objects, mainly consisting of artifacts from the American Southwest, through undercover operations, evidence gathering, seizure, and forfeiture. Prized by collectors and stockpiled as part of illicit ventures, most of the artifacts have little-to-no provenience. To address the immense quantity of material and best meet the public interest, the BLM developed a decision-tree with criteria to determine appropriate disposition options. This process involved three intensive phases: (1) identification; (2) return or repatriation; and (3) assessment of the remaining items to inform disposition based on specific criteria. In this third phase, artifacts are categorized for curation, education, conveyance to tribes beyond the scope of NAGPRA, another public use, or ultimately, destruction. This paper summarizes the case, addresses the legal foundations for determining ownership, presents the significance criteria for disposition, and concludes with a reflection on the opportunities and challenges of this endeavor, which may guide similar efforts in the future.

Following the traditions of the preceding feudal dynasties, efforts were made by the Nguyen Dynasty (Vietnam) to prevent piracy and ensure security and marine safety in the South China Sea during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Nguyen Dynasty directed its energies towards national interests and showed an elevated level of international awareness and responsibility, especially at the beginning of the successful cooperation with Qing Dynasty (China) to resolve this widespread problem. This article examines the attempt of the Nguyen Dynasty to suppress the raiding and looting of pirates in the South China Sea, and its important achievements in this difficult and dangerous work. Addressing this non-traditional security problem also helped confirm the Nguyen Dynasty’s possession of islands within the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands.

This article explores the genesis, scope, and significance of the 1899 Hague Convention’s prohibition against pillage. It analyses how it intersected with the moral contours of pillage as revealed in the actions and attitudes of British soldiers, British commanders, and Boer civilians during the South African War. In doing so, it crosses from ideal moral theory to international law, to shared and disputed moral beliefs among participants in the South African War. Drawing from pillage in the South African War, it concludes that the motives, policing, and moral and political context of pillage are vital to understanding its historical significance.

Many British soldiers charged with suppressing the American Revolution embarked on their mission animated by anger. They expressed their fury most frequently through indiscriminate looting. Marauding undermined the discipline of the king’s troops and their commanders’ strategy by making enemies out of American moderates who had not yet rebelled, alienating Loyalists, and renewing Rebel resolve to continue fighting. In either 1778 or 1779, General Sir Henry Clinton, the British commander-in-chief in North America, commissioned two aides-de-camp, Major Patrick Ferguson and Captain John André, to formulate independent plans to enable British armies to operate in the interior without alienating hearts and minds. This article explores how Clinton, Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis, and other British commanders attempted to implement the André/Ferguson plan in the American South in 1780 and 1781.

International audience; France was massively affected by Nazi looting and plundering, and was also probably one of the most successful countries in securing the return of cultural property. Drawing on recently opened Archives, this article reflects on the entangled history of the 'recovery' of works of art in Soviet occupation zones, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and in the GDR, focusing on the French investigations in the East. The micro history of this fieldwork allows for an interpretation of looting and restitution as a transnational moment of political and memory construction. The article first presents the organization of missions in the changing landscape of Europe, leading to the beginning of an East-West relationship on the ground. Then it analyses French and Soviet visions of the notion of looting, restitution and cultural property and finally concludes by attempting to interpret a loss of memory.

The Chilean province of Concepción was little prepared for the impact of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that took place on February 27, 2010. Because of the destruction of roads and bridges, the power outage, and ineffective communication, each neighborhood was essentially left to fend for itself with virtually no assistance from local and provincial authorities. Within the first 24 hours, panic hit, with stores being looted and local politicians calling for a military presence, and neighbors joined together to protect their property from looting gangs, even in the poorest neighborhoods. Most of these committees were not based on the traditional neighborhood councils that had emerged since the return to electoral democracy in 1990. In the emergency camps established by families that had lost their houses, the new leaders established a more autonomous and horizontal leadership style in their search for decent living conditions and a definitive housing solution. At first glance, these new leaders appear to be a return to the autonomous popular organizations that emerged during the dictatorship but were demobilized under electoral democracy. Ironically, the earthquake and the new center-right government seem to have offered a political opportunity for the reemergence of a more autonomous civil society. La provincia chilena de Concepción estuvo poco preparada por el impacto del terremoto y el posterior tsunami que ocurrió el 27 de febrero de 2010. Debido a la destrucción de caminos y puentes, el apagón, y la comunicación ineficaz, cada barrio fue esencialmente librado a su suerte prácticamente sin asistencia de las autoridades locales y provinciales. Dentro de las primeras 24 horas cundió el pánico, con saqueos de las tiendas y llamados de los políticos locales por una presencia militar, y vecinos juntándose para proteger su propiedad de las bandas de saqueo, aún en los barrios más pobres. La mayoría de estos comités no estaban basados en los tradicionales consejos barriales que habían surgido desde el retorno de la democracia electoral en 1990. En los campamentos de emergencia establecidos por las familias que habían perdido sus casas, nuevos líderes crearon un estilo de liderazgo más autónomo y horizontal en la búsqueda de condiciones decentes de vida y una solución definitiva sobre la vivienda. A primera vista, estos nuevos líderes parecen representar un retorno a las organizaciones autónomas populares que surgieron durante la dictadura pero que fueron desmovilizados bajo la democracia electoral. Irónicamente, el terremoto y el nuevo gobierno de centro-derecha parecen haber brindado una oportunidad política para la reemergencia de una sociedad civil más autónoma.

Using the Islamic State/Da'esh as a case study, we identify the genesis of a new form of terrorism arising from the convergence of networked social media and changes in the forms of conflict. Socially mediated terrorism is defined as ‘the use of social and networked media to increase the impact of violent acts undertaken to further a social, political and/or religious cause with the aim of creating physical, emotional or psychological suffering that extends beyond the immediate audience'. Our analysis distinguishes three strategies involving cultural heritage. The first is smoke, mirrors and mock destruction, which exaggerates perceptions of power and tests the impact of potential destruction. The second is shock, awe and censure, which uses international outrage to cloak the Islamic State with an aura of invincibility and highlight the impotence of its opponents. The third is financing the Kaliphate, which has transformed the ad hoc looting of archaeological sites into a business model. Iconoclasm has a lengthy history in which cultural icons were destroyed with the primary aim of subjugating local populations/audiences. In contrast, the Islamic State’s promotion of cultural heritage destruction through networked social media is directed simultaneously towards local, regional, and international audiences with reactions from one audience used to subdue, embolden or intrigue another. As such, networked social media can be viewed as a fresh – and currently under-rated – threat to cultural heritage in conflict zones. Finally, we draw attention to Bevan’s (2012) notion that crimes against cultural property can provide an early warning of potential genocide.

In the mid-1700s, the relationship between the British Empire and Imperial China began to collapse over a series of cultural, economic, and ethical conflicts which would result in the First (1839-1842) and Second (1856–1860) Opium Wars—tumultuous events that would have a devastating and humiliating impact on Chinese history. The looting of the Yuanmingyuan Summer Palaces during the Second Opium War was a tragedy that would be as destructive to Chinese culture as the wars’ resulting treaties were to its territorial borders. Today, the Chinese continue to dispute the morality of both the wars and the subsequent looting of their Summer Palaces. It is thus unsurprising, then, that modern China has undertaken great effort to recover the artifacts from the Summer Palaces. While some of these attempts have been largely unsuccessful, it is clear that China will continue to pursue repatriation of lost relics. This struggle provides an excellent opportunity for examining both China's modern approach to cultural heritage preservation and the potential problems existing in international laws hindering the protection of cultural resources throughout the world.

Antisemitic attacks on shops are a well-known facet of the history of National Socialism. But patterns of violence against commercial targets during the Weimar Republic are less familiar. Widespread theft and vandalism initially corresponded with periods of emergency, such as the Spartacist Revolt or Hyperinflation. By the early 1930s, looting became a regular rather than an exceptional part of urban commercial life. Shopkeepers and police officials struggled to comprehend and categorize these crimes and to implement effective responses. By 1931, in the context of a general breakdown in public security, the police promoted a fortified shop as the best means for crime prevention. In contrast to ‘invisible’ security measures invented by department stores to deter crime without inhibiting consumption, these measures made explicit a defensive posture of the shop toward the street. Violence against shops shaped commercial practices and policing tactics not only during the Weimar Republic but also during the National Socialist era. As evidenced by the April 1933 Boycott, Nazi officials strategically unleashed and contained public violence. In response, shopkeepers struggled to comprehend and adapt old protections to new threats. More broadly, I argue that attacks on shops reveal the precariousness of modern consumer culture and how easily domestic unrest can destabilize its fundamental assumptions and practices.

W will South Africa achieve its longpromised renaissance? When will its ruling African National Congress (ANC) abandon “careerism,” refuse to be a “predatory elite” looting the “national wealth,” shun the temptations of greed, abandon its willingness to tolerate corruption at multiple governmental levels, and begin to act thoroughly in the full national, rather than the party, interest? timely and harshly relevant today, those were among the many tough challenges put to the ANC in a 1997 speech by none other than Nelson Mandela, its president and South Africa’s first leader, posttransition (Mandela quoted in Sampson 1999, 533). In that speech at a party congress in Mafikeng, Mandela called for a national and a party-led “moral renewal.” Without such a moral renewal, he warned, there could be no societal transformation. Mandela worried that the embryonic new nation to which he and other key ANC figures had given birth would fail to flourish if politicians used their positions to help themselves rather their fellow South Africans, and if they failed to be inclusive, generous of spirit, and responsibly to uplift the full nation rather than themselves and the party.

As the US Army drove deep into Germany in early 1945, American soldiers looted civilian possessions on a large scale. While GIs did take items in Allied countries, what occurred in Germany was different and more extensive. Servicemen justified their actions by claiming wartime necessity, opportunities for profit or trade, keepsakes, and revenge for Nazi atrocities. Researching Americans looting in Germany provides the full narrative of war’s end, and troops’ interaction with a public that was still considered the enemy. Drawing on memoirs, journals, letters, interviews, and official US Army documents, this work seeks to extrapolate the reasons why GIs looted, while outlining the motivations of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to stop such actions.

This paper examines the prevalence and relevance of looting for understanding the 2011 English riots. It begins by distinguishing these riots from previous British riots by arguing that although looting is by no means a new phenomena looting nevertheless became central to discussions, interpretations and recollections of the riots. The paper will explore public and media responses to the looting and will focus on the uses of looting as a means of identifying a feral underclass of people seen to be morally and culturally separate from mainstream society. By unpicking the relationships between looting and what currently stands for ‘consumer culture’, the paper will argue that looting is seen as the lowest common denominator of mob behaviour since its focus is deemed to be entirely apolitical. The paper will look towards current understandings of consumer culture to try to make sense of the looting. It will argue that whilst there is now a good deal of literature exploring the relationships between judgments of taste and the reproduction of existing class structures and barriers, there is virtually nothing examining the relationships between consumption and social exclusion. I will argue in this paper that exclusion is crucial in providing a comprehensive understanding of the looting. In particular, I suggest that Bourdieusian accounts of the effects of popular expressions of disgust at the looters can offer only a partial understanding of the looting, since they do not explain the strength of desire for consumer goods. In order to address this, the paper expands on cultural capital discourses by incorporating the concept of ‘emotional capital’ into the analysis. The paper concludes by arguing that we should not be surprised by the widespread looting that took place in August 2011 given that advanced consumer society is characterised by common feelings and emotions and that many of the looters were not part of the original riots but opportunists who took advantage of the lack of police presence.

In contemporary Argentina, as in much of Latin America, politics is often found in the streets. In recent years it has bypassed traditional political party politics to bring day-to-day needs to the forefront through road blockades and cacerolazos (pot banging). These methods have been particularly successful in Argentina, not only in changing policy but also in bringing down administrations and politicians. They emerged from the 2001 Argentinazo’s repertoire of assemblies, demonstrations, riots, looting, and sit-ins as the primary tactics for actors participating in protests in Argentina today. The continuity of resistance in Argentina is a concrete example of Foucault’s notions of power and resistance in practice. En la Argentina contemporánea, como en gran parte de la América Latina, la política muchas veces se encuentra en la calle. En años recientes se ha desviado de la política partidaria tradicional para dar énfasis más bien a las necesidades cotidianas del pueblo por medio de bloqueos a los caminos y cacerolazos. Estos métodos han sido particularmente exitosos en Argentina no solo para cambiar políticas públicas sino también para quitar a políticos y administraciones. Emergieron del repertorio de asambleas, manifestaciones, disturbios, saqueos, y sentadas del Argentinazo de 2001 como las tácticas principales usadas por los actores que participan hoy día en las protestas argentinas. La continuidad de la resistencia en Argentina es un ejemplo concreto de las nociones foucaultianas de la práctica de poder y resistencia.

Edward S. Herman and David Peterson The Politics of Genocide, Monthly Review Press: New York, 2010, 159 pp: 9781583672129, US$12.95 (pbk) Herman and Peterson's book fundamentally critiques 'the basic outline of the politics of genocick' in contemporary times. By employing three ingenious frameworks ('constructive', 'nefarious' and 'benign') for disentangling the politics of genocide, the volume brilliantly captures the sheer hypocrisy of 'genocide-oriented intellectuals and media' and the cruelties of Western humanitarian interventions that evidently reflect a 'huge political bias' in favour of the USA and other imperialist countries. Unsurprisingly, the intensity of the crimes and the worth of the victim's life are decided by a single criterion: that of 'who is responsible for carrying them out' (p. 16). The crimes and mass killings committed by the USA and other imperialist powers are always 'constructive', therefore the 'victims are unworthy' and this cannot thus be called 'ethnic cleansing' or 'genocide'. However, mass murders carried out by US allies and clients are 'benign'. Finally, brutalities carried out by enemies of the USA are 'nefarious', and therefore victims deserve immediate attention and rigorous punishment for the perpetrators. Herman and Peterson's analysis painstakingly reveals the role of media pundits, human rights intellectuals, international NGOs and their criminal silence over US-supported mass killings in various parts of the world. Liberal academic and media treatment of human rights violations, and their laments over 'crimes against humanity', are always selective. Their explanations do not touch any of the mass killings perpetrated by the USA, and 'whenever the United States colludes in a genocidal process', they pretend that 'U.S. guilt is at worst that of remaining a mere "bystander", but never that of an accomplice, let alone a perpetrator' (p. 64). Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize winning (2003) book 'A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide, is a classic example in this regard. The section 'Constructive Genocides' includes various cases of mass murders, like the thirteen years (1992-2003) of economic sanctions that killed a million people, mainly children and women, and the occupation and destruction of Iraq, which killed a million and displaced around 5 million, by Anglo-American forces in 2003. The economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq destroyed that country's social fabric, and its impact was genocidal. Massive bombings and destruction and the looting of archaeological heritage were serious crimes, but still 'it is the Iraqis who owe the United States a debt' (p. 37). For the Western establishment, these 'sanctions of mass destructions' were constructive, and therefore the victims were unworthy. The authors point out that in Iraq's case, media references to 'genocide' numbere eighty, but in 'Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and Darfur, four Nefarious cases, the usage ran to 481, 323, 3, 199, and 1,172 respectively' (p. 33). The book discusses the Western 'politics of framing' false questions in the context of various political conflicts and violence. The political conflicts in Darfur have been treated as 'nefarious'. Here, 'genocide' was used ninety times, and was successfully racialised as an 'ethnic cleansing' of Black Africans by Arab Muslim rulers. The death toll was twenty times more violent than in the Democratic Republic of Congo; but for the West it was a benign bloodbath because it had the complete the support of the USA, France, and Britain. Conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999) were labelled as 'Serb evil and violence', and portrayed as the ethnic cleansing, genocide and massacre of Bosnian Muslims, Croatians, and Kosovo Albanians. The 'Srebrenica massacre' (July 1995) got huge attention in the Western media and political circles, and was 'cited heavily and repeated endlessly, and with great indignation, to demonstrate that "genocide" actually had taken place in Bosnia' (p. …

We examine the consequences of hosting refugees for domestic and international terrorism. In line with the old saying, “no good deed goes unpunished”, we argue that the infusion of aid resources provides militant groups with opportunities for looting and for attacking foreign targets. A cross-national, time-series data analysis of 154 countries for the years 1970–2007 shows evidence that countries with many refugees are more likely to experience both domestic and international terrorism. This finding implies that while the international community should strive to reduce the number of refugees by preventing the eruption of major conflict events, individual countries should find a way of maintaining the balance between humanitarianism toward refugees and providing safe, secure environments for refugees and those that assist them.

In June 2010 the Kyrgyzstani city of Osh was engulfed in three days of mass killing, arson, and looting. Accounts by journalists, academics, politicians, and organisations tend to either overdetermine ethnicity as a causal factor, or dismiss its significance as a social process. As a result, internal responses to the tragedy have been viewed by outsiders as mendaciously irrational. To overcome this impasse, this paper foregrounds the idea of Osh as national territory. Based on ongoing ethnographic study since 1995, plus an analysis of media reports, it shows the ways in which Uzbek and Kyrgyz residents of the city have narrated its ethnic past as one of divided or shared space. The resonance of these narratives can both help account for responses to the violence within Kyrgyzstan that have puzzled outsiders, and also uncover resources of hope. The paper highlights the importance of considering nationalism as a geographical phenomenon in explicating ethnic-based violence in contemporary Central Asia. Keywords: nationalism, territory, Kyrgyzstan, violence, peace

Just as with the riots of 1981, the riots of summer 2012 will play a key role in the reshaping of British society. Most analyses frame these events as pathologies of the poor or as contemporary expressions of Mertonian anomie. Drawing on the work of Randall Collins, this article explores the riot as a form of collective action, considers the role of looting and arson within it, and the extent to which the actors involved find themselves part of multiple logics that mutually undermine each other. The analysis highlights the importance of the embodied, mobile, temporal and visual dimensions of the riot, and argues that the social sciences need to develop conceptual tools and methods to both engage with such embodied events and to be part of the social debate about their meaning.

This article presents findings from a recent worldwide study of archaeological site looting, which largely fuels the international trade in illicitly obtained antiquities. Focused on practicing archaeologists’ opinions about and personal experiences with site looting, the study surveyed 2,358 archaeologists excavating throughout the world in 118 countries. Key findings presented here include archaeologists’ reports of connections between archaeological site looting and the production of and trade in methamphetamine across the United States. American archaeologists report run-ins with “meth heads” on their sites with increasing frequency. Other archaeologists working throughout the world report violent encounters with looters on site, some of whom even report being shot at and assaulted by looters. Overall findings suggest that archaeological fieldwork has become an increasingly dangerous occupation around the world.

This article argues that the media frames utilized in the first month after Hurricane Katrina legitimated punishment as disaster policy through lurid reports of individual crime. The application of prevailing state policies led to a quick embrace of punitive policing and incarceration, and journalistic routines ended up supporting this process. Although journalists openly expressed their disgust with state neglect, news conventions nonetheless criminalized much of the New Orleans population and suggested militarized policing and imprisonment as fundamental to restore order. Lacking credible sources, reporters relied on rumors and helped create a racialized ‘looter class’ that aided state efforts to regain control through existing policies of mass incarceration rather than mutual aid or state welfare. Even though various media outlets recanted the more extreme elements of this coverage, the tropes they employed created a lasting effect. Building off Stuart Hall et al.’s (1978) analysis of a moral panic over mugging in 1970s England, this article examines both the conventions and consequences of this crisis coverage. The result, I argue, bolstered the existing crisis of incarceration.

We examine position papers by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) arguing for recognition of the ecological debt. We utilize Toulmin's (2003[1958]) model of argument analysis to outline the major claims advanced. The results illustrate the argument is comprised of four interrelated claims: 1) Northern historical development and present disproportionate production and consumption are founded on a socio-ecological subsidy or the underpayment and, at times, explicit looting of the natural resource assets of Southern countries; 2) the Southern external financial debt should be cancelled because it promotes the socio-ecological subsidy; 3) levels of Northern production and consumption are unsustainable over the long term because they are predicated on the North—South socio-ecological subsidy; 4) equity for present and rational obligations to future generations demands Northern countries begin paying back the accrued socio-ecological subsidy, an obligation defined as the ecological debt.

Two experiments involving White participants tested the influence of media-based priming of Black stereotypes on support for government policy that assisted Black versus White persons-in-need. Experiment 1 showed that priming the “Black criminal” stereotype through exposure to photographs of Blacks looting after Hurricane Katrina reduced policy support for Black evacuees-in-need but did not influence support responses toward White evacuees-in-need. Experiment 2 showed that priming the “promiscuous Black female” stereotype through exposure to sexual rap music reduced policy support for a Black pregnant woman-in-need but did not influence support responses toward a White pregnant woman-in-need. Further tests of mediated moderation demonstrated that in both experiments, the interactive influence of priming Black stereotypes and race of persons-in-need on policy support was mediated by empathic responding.

On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina thrashed the Gulf Coast as one of the deadliest hurricanes in U.S. history. Katrina resulted in thousands of deaths and $75 billion in damages1 producing memorable stories of heroic rescue and heartbreaking accounts of death, disease and distress. The media reported murders and rapes in crowded New Orleans shelters as desperate evacuees waited for help. When residents were finally brought to safety, investigators discovered that many reports included exaggerated rumors.2 A bipartisan Congressional committee determined that erroneous reporting hampered relief efforts, influenced decisions on where to direct resources and increased the need for additional security.3Many pointed to failed media coverage as a significant problem; however, different media seemed to have provided vastly different stories. Did local, regional and national newspapers frame events differently during the days immediately following the storm? What topics were presented at the different levels? These questions were the impetus behind this study. Research comparing national, regional and local coverage of a disaster is limited. Wenger and Friedman examined the treatment of disaster myths by local and national media following Hurricane Alicia.4 Others have studied media preferences, behaviors and frames in covering crises;5 however, no studies have compared topics, frames and sources selected by local, regional and national newspapers in covering a disaster.This study examined front-page newspaper content during the two weeks following the storm to reveal whether topics, frames, sources and assignment of blame for damage and suffering varied. Our analyses also included interviews with management and reporters to determine the extent to which their experiences and insights were concurrent with the stories. Such an examination aimed at comprehensively uncovering how newspapers record a monumental event in relation to the direct impact on their readers.Literature ReviewThe media are a crucial avenue through which crisis information is transmitted. 6 When prearranged communication networks fail, officials are forced to turn to the media to coordinate their responses.7 The media are also a vital link between victims and the authorities who try to help them.8 Consequently, news reports may be the only credible information source for the general public during a disaster event.9 The media bring before the public those issues involving accountability for official response to the disaster, rebuilding of the devastated community and dialogue on preventing such disasters in the future.10 Wenger and Quarantelli state that disasters present a problem of adjustment for the media because news organizations are structured to cover routine events.11 Waxman suggests there is actually a shortage of news during disasters; consequently, everything related to disaster makes its way into print, bypassing the usual gatekeepers without thorough processing.12While community officials provide most of the news in a crisis, citizens often become sources. In newscast of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, the majority of "faces" belonged to average citizens.13 Salwen found that "unaffiliated individuals" were quoted most often during Hurricane Andrew, refuting the belief that government and industry receive the lion's share of coverage.14 Two potential problems may arise-the pressure to produce answers may lead public officials to speculate about causes or even minimize dangers to allay public fears. Additionally, the media add to difficulties in mitigation and response activities by presenting a distorted and inaccurate picture of those affected by the disaster and by overemphasizing the non-social and chaotic aspects of the situation.15Past literature indicates that images of disaster are often inaccurate or exaggerated. 16 Wenger observed that reports of looting are common during times of disaster even when police assert otherwise. …

In both western Turkey and the Levant, archaeology has a long history, with the rise in interest and discovery beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While many have focused on the history of excavations in both of these areas, we approach historical analyses from a different perspective. Utilizing the voices of local actors, this article aims to understand the social reactions of local communities to the increasingly prominent role of people practicing archaeology — archaeologists, diplomats, explorers — through the lens of the antiquities trade over the last two centuries. Interlacing examples from Lydia and the Levant, we provide an overview of archaeological praxis and then offer the positions of the participants, gathered from archival and published materials as well as more recent interviews, conversations, and correspondences.

The looting of art and antiquities is an ancient practice. However, recent decades have witnessed such a dramatic increase in the magnitude and impact of “time crime” that it is now one of the larger transnational markets in illegal goods. The authors argue that this market can be understood as consisting of three elements: a supply component, primarily in impoverished nations; a demand component, primarily in wealthy Western nations; and a social control component, which permits transfer of goods from the illicit to the licit economy. Changes in each of these three components are responsible for the exponential increase in the size and scope of the market. The authors examine those changes and the roles through which the three components of the market are organized.

Diversified transnational criminal activities coupled with broader geographic capabilities have turned the black and white line between the licit “upperworld” and the illicit underworld a murky shade of grey, and the illicit antiquities trade is no exception. This article highlights criminal dynamics of trafficking in looted antiquities from the perspective of the source end of the problem—that is, theft of antiquities from archaeological sites and their illicit export. Trafficking in antiquities is a crime of transnational proportions because it involves the illegal removal and export of cultural material from source countries, which supplies the demand generated from developed, rich, market economies.

The last few decades have upset the old balance that had long been the inspiration of historians. Historians and others who recorded their thoughts and research with the long term in mind, thinking of permanence and continuity, were encouraged to place emphasis on communication and circulation. In their eyes both of these were questioning the fragmentations of the local, changing acquired habits, requiring dialogue and exchange - in the peaceful mode of commercial trade or the violent one of war and looting. This paper claims that today's view is fundamentally different, since the threat has changed place and nature: standardization has replaced isolation. So the question facing us today with particular force is: can history and knowledge of the past still claim to help us understand the present?

The world is witnessing a political-economic passage on a global scale: from economic stagnation, amplified uneven development and financial volatility to worsening primitive accumulation (‘looting’) and socio-economic conflict. Considering Africa's plight in this way suggests intellectual links between the political economy and security disciplines. Reforms proposed at the global level by elite bodies are apparently ineffectual and actions taken by elites in the name of conflict resolution often undermine peace because they reinforce the very dynamic of external looting. If these reforms continue to fail, it is to popular struggles that we should turn, especially in Africa where oppression is most extreme and global and local elites have the least credibility. For social movements, the objective of transforming power relations as the basis for ending conflict and underdevelopment requires engaging this new theoretical approach with the critique of capitalism. Conflict and peace theorists should also consider other innovations in political economy which address uneven and combined development, primitive accumulation and imperialism more broadly.

PEACE AT ANY PRICE How the World Failed Kosovo Iain King and Whit Mason Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 328pp. US$27.95, cloth (978-0-8014-4539-2).The United Nations interim administration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) recently entered its ninth and possibly final year as the primary governing authority in Kosovo. Since June 1999, the UN administration has overseen economic, social and political development in the disputed territory, and sought to promote a transformation of the former zone of conflict into a peaceful and multi-ethnic society. Iain King's and Whit Mason's book assesses the performance of the international community in achieving this aim, and presents a comprehensive, illuminating, and often scathing account of the UN's efforts to date.Both authors have close connections to Kosovo, each having held senior political roles within UNMIK, and their insider experience informs the text throughout and adds credibility to their account. From the title of the book onwards, it is clear that this is not a defence of UNMIK, but rather a critique. The authors charge the UN administration, and the international community behind it, with many failings-failing to understand the nature of the conflict between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, failing to identify the correct solutions, and ultimately failing to fulfil its aim of transforming Kosovo into a multi-ethnic, law-abiding democracy. In particular, the authors allege that UNMIK lost an opportunity to change Kosovo's political culture by neglecting the available levers of soft power, especially in the spheres of education and the media. UNMIK, the authors allege, not only failed to transform hearts and minds, it never even properly tried.Most of this compact but thorough book is taken up with a review of the administration of Kosovo, structured both chronologically and thematically. The four central chapters deal with four separate phases in the administration from 1999 to 2006. Each examines progress in a range of areas, including law and order, security, political developments, "hearts and minds," and the economy. The authors locate the roots of many of the ongoing problems in contemporary Kosovo in the first phase of administration, between June 1999 and October 2000. During this period, international authorities displayed a reluctance to clamp down on hardliners, and in particular on the Kosovo Albanian nationalists that reacted to the withdrawal of Serb troops from the territory by initiating a prolonged campaign of revenge violence on the minority Serb community within Kosovo. Much of this revenge violence went unpunished due to international preferences for stability rather than justice, and the low conviction rates contributed to a sense of impunity that the authors suggest was never eradicated in subsequent years. Furthermore, the departure of large sections of the Serb community at the time served to set back the project of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The second "consolidation" phase entailed a shift from humanitarian concerns to political development, and included Kosovo's first elections under UNMIK, as well as the establishment of new institutions of self-government. But it was also a period in which many of the physical challenges had been overcome, and the political challenges that remained required changes in local behaviour that UNMIK was unable to achieve. This gave way to a third phase of "confrontation and stagnation," where the gap between expectations and the reality on the ground led to local frustration with the international mission. Despite a range of UNMIK initiatives, there was little progress towards resolving Kosovo's political status due to continued divisions within the international community. The dire state of the economy further fuelled local dissatisfaction. This stage culminated in the infamous March riots of 2004, when Albanians turned on Serbs and the international authorities were unable to assert control during two days of violence and looting that left 19 dead, hundreds of Serb homes burnt, and thousands of Serbs displaced. …

This article reviews Nazi confiscations during World War II, focusing on three major points: 1) the theory and rational behind the confiscations; 2) the laws enabling the seizure of property; and 3) the organizations and people responsible for the looting. The story of Maria Altmann illustrates the complexity of international laws involved in recovering looted art works. Altmann v. Austria is a landmark case because it was the first of its kind to reach the U. S. Supreme Court. In January 2006, Mrs. Altmann agreed to binding arbitration in Austria; the three judges unanimously awarded her 5 of the 6 paintings by Gustav Klimt to which she is heir. In late March 2006, the paintings arrived in Los Angeles where the most famous of the paintings, Adele Bloch-Bauer I was placed on display in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art.

It has long been understood by disaster researchers that both the general public and organizational actors tend to believe in various disaster myths. Notions that disasters are accompanied by looting, social disorganization, and deviant behavior are examples of such myths. Research shows that the mass media play a significant role in promulgating erroneous beliefs about disaster behavior. Following Hurricane Katrina, the response of disaster victims was framed by the media in ways that greatly exaggerated the incidence and severity of looting and lawlessness. Media reports initially employed a “civil unrest” frame and later characterized victim behavior as equivalent to urban warfare. The media emphasis on lawlessness and the need for strict social control both reflects and reinforces political discourse calling for a greater role for the military in disaster management. Such policy positions are indicators of the strength of militarism as an ideology in the United States.

Using several data sources including an extensive database of media reports and a series of government documents, but relying primarily on the University of Delaware’s Disaster Research Center’s field research in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the authors describe the nontraditional behavior that emerged in that catastrophe. They also discuss the prosocial behavior (much of it emergent) that was by far the primary response to this event, despite widespread media reports of massive antisocial behavior. Their study focuses on individual and group reactions in Louisiana during the first three weeks following the hurricane. The authors limit their systematic analyses of emergent behavior to five groupings: hotels, hospitals, neighborhood groups, rescue teams, and the Joint Field Office. Their analysis shows that most of the improvisations undertaken helped in dealing with the various problems that continued to emerge following Katrina. The various social systems and the people in them rose to the demanding challenges of a catastrophe.

The author considers the importance of well drafted national and international legal texts for ensuring the effective protection of cultural property. Examining the destruction of cultural heritage, he notes the adoption of the UNESCO Declaration concerning the International Destruction of Cultural Heritage. The complex issues surrounding the looting and restitution of cultural property are described, and the significance of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property is noted.

China is one of the most important foreign investment markets in both volume and growth. However, property rights protection in China is extremely weak and expropriations by both public and private actions are rampant. How can the booming of foreign investment and the looting of property co-exist? Why is protecting property rights so difficult in China? This article shows that the different paces of institutional change between formal and informal constraints are the major cause behind the lack of property right protection in China. It discusses policy considerations for China to improve property right protection and raises two fundamental issues for multinational firms doing business in China.

Certain standard, indeed classic, varieties of war have become so rare and unlikely that they could well be considered to be obsolescent, if not obsolete. Moreover, much, but not all, of what remains of war is substantially opportunistic predation waged by packs of criminals, bandits, and thugs who engage in warfare in much the same way as they often did in medieval and early modern Europe: as mercenaries recruited or dragooned by weak (or even desperate) state governments or as warlord gangs developed within failed or weak states. Much of this warfare could be reduced or substantially eliminated by disciplined police and military forces and, in their new era of essential consensus in the wake of the Cold War, the developed countries could create mechanisms for policing civil warfare. However, they are likely to do so with any sort of reliability only where their interests seem importantly engaged or where they manage to become self-entrapped. Rather, the key lies in the establishment of competent domestic military and policing forces, tracing a process Europe went through in the middle of the last millennium. Indeed, much of the civil warfare that persists in the world today is a function of the extent to which inadequate governments exist. Of late, there seems to have been an increase in the number of countries led by effective people who, instead of looting and dissipating their country's resources, appear to be dedicated to adopting policies that will further its orderly development. Thus, while far from certain, a further (or continuing) decline in a most common remaining kind of war does seem to be an entirely reasonable prospect.

Genocidal violence leaves but a broken historical trace. Not surprisingly, therefore, the surviving records of the subcontinent's (1) Partition are marked by their fragmentariness. They move, in fits and starts, through jerks and breaks and silences--incoherent, stuttering, even incomprehensible--between the poles of testimony and rumor. Testimony, Langer notes, is "a form of remembering." Rumor, by contrast, is a form of doing--of making happen--by telling. (2) The record of Partition clearly bears the mark of both. The importance of first-person testimony (for the judge, as for the historian) requires no underlining. "I was there"; "I saw"; "I can name"; "I recognize"; and (more than occasionally for the journalist, as well as for the historian, though less commonly, we are told, for the judge) "I learned from the most reliable witnesses." Testimony's method is that of particularizing and individualizing, specifying sites and bodies that carry the marks of particular events, making "real" in everyday, physical, nameable terms. Its difficulty in the "limit case" is that it needs to articulate an unparalleled, "unthinkable" history struggling to find voice. How does the witness share "the particularity, the unshareability, and the incommunicability of pain in torture"? (3) How can we speak for the dead, who are no longer present? How can we t estify on behalf of the dead, if we are not dead? How can anyone who is not a Muselmann know what it is to be a Muselmann, as historians of the Holocaust have repeatedly said? (4) The importance of rumor in the record of violence is also established, though perhaps more in the matter of its making than in that of its evaluation or reconstruction. Rumor moves in a direction almost contrary to that of testimony: generalizing, exalting to extraordinary (even miraculous) status, and employing the sweeping terms of deluge and just desserts (actual or impending). In rumor, language is transformed from a mode of (possible) communication to a particular kind of imperative condition, communicable, infectious, possible (and almost necessary) to pass on. The impact of this anonymous, mercurial, fleeting figure is well attested in accounts of the history of violent uprisings--from Lefebvre's and Rude's writings on the French Revolution to Guha's analysis of peasant insurrections in colonial India and Veena Das's account of the 1984 massacre of the Sikhs. (5) That rumor is no stranger also to the written records and oral accounts of 1947 is hardly surprising. How seriously has all this affected our assessment of that moment? It is the purpose of this article to examine the extent to which historical discourse on Partition, from 1947 to today, takes the form of testimony or that of rumor--or hovers between the two. For this purpose, I focus on the twin questions of violence against women and the number of casualties, both of which loom large in the annals of the event. "The figure of the abducted woman became symbolic of crossing borders, of violating social, cultural and political boundaries," Menon and Bhasin write. By the time that the rape, looting, and migrations were finished, "about eight to ten million people had crossed over from Punjab and Bengal ... and about 500,000-1,000,000 had perished." (6) "Estimates of the dead vary from 200,000 (the contemporary British figure) to two million (a later Indian estimate) but that somewhere around a million people died is now widely accepted," writes Butalia. She goes on to note the statistical evidence of "widespread sexual savagery": "about 75,000 women are thought to have been ab ducted and raped by men of religions different from their own (and indeed sometimes by men of their own religion)." (7) Observers described the violence that erupted so fiercely between Hindus/Sikhs and Muslims in 1946 and 1947 as "a war on each other's women" and as a war waged "especially" on women and children. …

In the year 2000, fifty-two years after Partition and fifty-four years after he had left, Bir Bahadur Singh, a Sikh survivor of Partition, returned to his home village of Saintha in Rawalpindi district, Pakistan. I accompanied him on this visit. In this article, I tell the story of Bir Bahadur's journey home, and what it meant to him. I believe that this journey--and other such journeys--allow us a way of looking at the experience of Partition, at how it is remembered, and how it is filtered through the memories of those who lived through that time. In the wake of the kind of explorations of "alternative" (for example feminist, people-centered) histories of Partition that have taken place in recent years, some scholars have asserted that the exploration of such traumatic events through oral narrative, the testimonies of those who lived through such violence, is best left alone and not "raked up again." I am not particularly concerned with scholarly anxiety about whether a certain subject is fit or otherwise for study. Such concern will not stop "return journeys" like Bir Bahadur's, and it is important, both for scholarship and action, that we try to understand why these journeys are so important to the people who make them, and what their wider ramifications can be. Bir Bahadur Singh is one of a community of Sikhs from different villages in Rawalpindi district--Thoa Khalsa, Doberan, Thamali, Nara, and others--that came under attack from Muslims in March 1947. These attacks were said to be in retaliation for Hindu attacks on Muslims in Noakhali, in eastern India. Bir Bahadur's family--his father, Sant Raja Singh, was owner of a provision shop and acted as a sort of bank/moneylender--had lived for many years in a small village called Saintha, where theirs was the only non-Muslim family. In 1945, as rumors about the possibility of Partition began to fill the air, and tensions began to mount, Bir Bahadur's father decided to move the family to a nearby village, Thoa Khalsa, where Sikhs formed the majority. Safety--and that is the word Bir Bahadur used in describing it to me--he felt lay in numbers. Ironically, and tragically, it was in Thoa Khalsa that the violence took place. A number of villages were attacked in March 1947, and there was large-scale violence, arson, looting, murder, and rape. Thoa Khalsa was among those villages that saw the worst of this violence. Interestingly, and importantly, the violence was not random. It was preceded by negotiations between the two communities--safety was offered in return for money and weapons. According to the survivors, despite the fact that this "fee" was paid, the attacks still took place. Once the villagers realized that there was no escaping attack, the village elders--mostly men--got together to decide how best to offer a defense. Bir Bahadur remembers that it was at this time that the villagers of Saintha, led by the headman, Sajawal Khan, came to offer shelter and protection to his family. But such was the atmosphere of fear and suspicion, that Bir Bahadur's father, Sant Raja Singh, refused. He did not trust the Muslims any longer. Here is how Bir Bahadur described the incident when I spoke to him: We came away from there [Saintha] honorably. And when the trouble started, the people came from there. You know, that Ma Hasina whom I mentioned to you, her son Sajawal Khan, he came to us and said we could stay at his house, if we wanted to. He came with his children. But we were doubtful, and today I feel that what he was saying, the expression on his face, his bearing--there was nothing there but sincerity and compassion and we, we misunderstood him. We had all been through so much trouble, and they came to give us support, to help us, and we refused. This rejection stayed with Bir Bahadur for many long years. The village elders also took a collective decision--that, at least. …

A game-theoretic model is analyzed for discussing the determination of looting and fighting activity during a civil war between two ethnoregional groups. The Nash equilibrium of this game emphasizes population size, production capacity and productivity, and access to external funding as the main determinants of the size of the armies and the intensity of looting activity. The Nash equilibrium of the game between the two warlords involves an excessive level of looting. Some lessons are drawn from this framework to bring out the minimum redistribution of resources between groups that must take place in a peaceful equilibrium.

In a brief section in his reporting text called, Building the Disaster Story, William Metz starts with the following advice: One of the first things a reporter does after arriving on the scene is to compile a casualty list that includes the names, ages, addresses (or hometowns) and occupations.1 Metz's advice might be appropriate for an accident, but it does not fit the definition of a disaster. Accidents, like train wrecks and plane crashes, usually occur at one specific location. However, in a disaster, there usually is no specific site. The impact area can extend for blocks or hundreds of miles. In an accident, especially one in a controlled location such as an airport, emergency agencies are heavily involved in initial responses. In a disaster that covers a wide area, it is not emergency personnel but survivors who do most initial response and provide initial transport to hospital; and no one is keeping track of casualty lists. Even when emergency agencies do get involved, especially if there are casualties, they do not keep very good records because there is too much to do.2 3 4 Also, in a disaster some injured don't go for treatment because they feel others are in greater need. No one could possibly assemble a list of casualties much less acquire names, ages, addresses, occupations or hometowns. Over the past few decades, social scientists have learned a lot about disasters. They have learned, for example, that disasters are not simply large accidents but different kinds of events. They have learned that individuals perform well in disasters but organizations have difficulty. They have learned that there are many false beliefs about disasters and that the media are partly responsible for that. A review of journalism textbooks suggests that the authors who deal with disaster coverage often state as fact what social scientists have shown to be inaccurate. Perhaps that explains why myths about disasters are perpetuated in the media. Most likely, the students who used these texts were influenced by the inaccurate representation of disasters when they became reporters. Disaster research There is a lot we know about human and organizational behavior in disasters. Disaster experts know people are reluctant to believe warnings unless they are very specific and come from all possible sources. Disaster victims often put aside their own concerns to help others, panic is not a concern it's easier to cope with stark truth than vague information, and that while looting may be commonplace in riots, it is extremely rare in disasters. Riots occur because communities are divided on issues: Disasters usually pull people together (Quarantelli and Dynes (1972); Quarantelli (1984); (Drabek (1986); Scanlon (1992a); Scanlon (1992b). Logically, these findings make sense. When a tornado, earthquake or hurricane causes widespread destruction, survivors can see what needs to be done. Their family, neighbors, or co-workers need help. Organizations have more trouble responding effectively, because disasters overload or destroy communications and disrupt transportation. They have trouble finding out what happened and difficulty responding when they find out. Even when they know what has happened, they have to make difficult choices because there is too much to do. Most important, accidents and disasters are different kinds of events. Collapsed Buildings, train derailments or air crashes occur at one location and they don't threaten a community or disrupt its ability to respond. Disasters disrupt communities and the systems that make them work. It may be hours, days, weeks, or months before those systems are back in place. For example, in Kobe in 1995, the expressway between Osaka and Kobe collapsed in five places and there were 36 breaks in the 90-kilometer line for the bullet train.5 Many people have false beliefs about disasters. They believe warnings cause panic. They believe victims will be in shock, unable to help themselves let alone others. …

After visiting his home in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the author is confronted with a newly configured landscape and a new social reality marked by a culture of distrust and a decline in social capital among residents. The comments here view one aspect of the corrosive community impact: the decline in civic trust, more specifically, trust and interaction among neighbors. One indicator of this distrust is evidenced by signs posted to limit illegal activity. These signs are posted throughout New Orleans and the surrounding areas to deter looters from the outside and looters from “within.”

The literature on Latin American social movements has traditionally focused on expressions of protest such as revolutions or large-scale rebellions that openly defied state power and material structures of exploitation. However, largely as a result of the increasing influence of moral-economy theory and the new-social-movements school, in the past decade historians and sociologists have started to explore a broader spectrum of forms of resistance and social organization. This expansion and reorganization of the field rests on three strong assumptions. In the first place, small uprisings and subtle resistance practices seem to reveal the systems of beliefs and understanding of the subaltern classes more vividly and reliably than the rare and historically exceptional processes of outright confrontation. Second, these kinds of collective actions, though in less dramatic and deliberate ways than revolutions and rebellions, can undermine both political legitimacy and the conditions of material reproduction of different systems of exploitation. Third, the trajectory of Latin American social movements during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the widespread discrediting of teleological paradigms concerning the role of the working class and vanguard parties in transforming structures of domination, have prompted scholars to investigate patterns of social contention from the perspective of a wider plurality of collective actors. Thus, under the broad category of popular sectors, groups such as neighborhood associations, grass-roots communities, women, shantytown dwellers, and human rights advocates have gained a privileged space in studies of contemporary Latin American movements (Jelin, 1985; Filguera, 1985; Slater, 1985; Alvarez, 1990; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992). Beyond different theoretical and methodological approaches, many of the current analyses of Latin American protest share the objective of showing the deep meaning of movements and