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The article considers two forms of relativism: cognitive and cultural. It is critical of the impact of ‘the new sociology of science’ which in the hands of Paul Feyerabend and others exaggerated the claims of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific change. The article argues that a distinction between scientific and nonscientific arguments can be, and must be, sustained. Secondly, cultural relativism is also considered and criticized. The article considers the legacy of Montaigne, Hume and Weber on modern, primarily anthropological, theories of cultural relativism. Anthropologists are fond of demonstrating that, for example, Western indignation over genital mutilation is only or merely the consequence of socialization into a particular culture. It is argued that, while some rituals may be necessary to inculcate young people into a community, there are rational grounds for rejecting mutilation where alternative rituals would be equally effective. The article therefore rejects both cognitive and cultural relativism as resting on exaggerated or hyberbolic versions of the sceptical consequences of the critical rationalism of Montaigne, Hume and Weber

Social science has in the past granted much credence to two forms of relativism: cognitive relativism and cultural relativism. These two forms constitute the major components of postmodernism. Why do we believe so easily the arguments put forward by both cognitive and cultural relativism? Suspect arguments are often hyperbolical versions of valid ideas. Cognitive relativism rests on the efforts made, from the work of the Vienna Circle to that of Popper, to identify general criteria by which to differentiate between science and non-science. It also rests on sound studies of the history of science by scholars such as Kuhn. Cognitive relativism is based on hyperbolical conclusions drawn from these two sources; we are not, however, obliged to accept these conclusions. Cultural relativism is legitimated most notably by theories elaborated by certain sociologists and anthropologists on the basis of sound ideas borrowed from Montaigne, Hume and Max Weber. Again, they have drawn hyperbolical conclusions from them that we are not compelled to accept. The influence of the theories that legitimate the two forms of relativism is also due to them having been launched on the ‘market of ideas' at an historical conjuncture when they were perceived by various publics as ‘useful’ (in Pareto's sense of the word).

Many important social scientific theories develop a culturalist view of norms and values. Their proponents consider values and norms as cultural features that are endorsed or rejected by social actors because they have been socialized to them. Against these influential traditions, which all dissolve the reality of moral feelings and make them the effect of highly conjectural psychological or social forces, a naturalistic reaction inspired notably by sociobiology has appeared. Its growing influence is due to the fact that its criticisms of culturalist theories are solidly grounded. However, the naturalist response is also exposed to serious criticism. An alternative solution is proposed here: moral convictions are established in the same way as cognitive convictions, i.e. that the source of moral convictions lies in strong reasons. This can be illustrated by empirical examples. The cognitivist theory of moral feelings proposed here is not contradicted by the fact that moral convictions change over time, but can explain this change more easily than other theories. Furthermore, it clarifies the question as to the nature of the moral constraints that made Durkheim uncomfortable. This theory has a special relevance in today's world where `community' seems to become the ultimate moral referent. Clearly, the positive value ascribed to the idea of community is on a par with the fact that culturalism is so popular today.

Recently, two French doctors were convicted in a trial dealing with the transfusion of blood contaminated by the AIDS virus. A petition was signed all over the world by numerous doctors and scientists, including 30 Nobel Prize winners, making the point that the trial had been unfair and requiring that the French President use his prerogative of presidential pardon, which can effectively be applied in this case, to release the doctors from jail. A strong majority disapproved of the proposal. Influential members of the government had already made clear they would not recommend a pardon. This is an example of current `collective beliefs', which the social sciences should be able to explain. The example is taken because the `collective belief' appears here as unusually strong. Can the `rational-choice model' explain this social fact satisfactorily? Can the classical sociological `internalization of norms' model explain it? It is contended that none of them can explain the case as it is. If so, there are many important facts which cannot easily be explained by these two current models. From this example, a model is sketched, the `cognitive model', of which the rational-choice model turns out to be a particular case.

In proposing a comprehensive network theory that cuts across the range of social sciences, Harrison White rejects conventional hierarchical models and focuses instead on efforts of control in a social structure described as a tangle of locked-in practices. He argues that the widely held conceptions of "person" and "goal" grounded in traditional political economy do not provide a basis for social theory that is either coherent or consistent with current developments in psychology and anthropology. White replaces "person" with "identity", which, in a distinctively human sense, emerges from frictions and social noise across different levels and disciplines in networks. Likewise, he reshapes the notion of "goals", maintaining that they merely inhabit sets of stories used to explain agency and that action itself comes through selective strategies to break through formal organization. As his main empirical basis, White uses case studies covering a wide range of topics, including tribal religions, changing rhetorics of industrial administration and the premodern Church, practices of state-building and changes of style in popular music. His analyses draw from English social anthropology, n

This article discusses the central role of subjective rationality in the social sciences, particularly sociology. Actions need not produce good outcomes to be subjectively rational, but need only be carried out for reasons seen as good by the actor. The article examines a class of reasons that are both good (that is, subjectively rational) and invalid, that is, not objectively rational. An imaginary dialogue between David Hume and Anthony Downs is used to illustrate the way in which the apparent irrationality of ideology can be incorporated into subjective rationality. The social use of magic and the case of false beliefs are examined as further examples in the same class. Finally, the way in which good mental procedures can lead to false beliefs is examined.

The student revolt of May and June, 1968 in France may be explained by the fact that the growth of the student body and the drastic change in its social composition made the main organization of principles of the liberal uni versity system inherited from the nineteenth century more and more dysfunctional, especially after the early sixties. This dysfunctionality, which also characterizes a majority of the continental universities, was probably particularly strong in France. The situation of the French student of the sixties may be described as one of social marginality, and this is a direct consequence of the rapid growth of the number of students in all countries in the last few decades. But its effects are largely accentuated in "liberal" university systems, especially when, like most of the present continental systems, they are associated with a low degree of diversification of the academic institutions.

In addition to the close correspondence indicated by the rank order correlations in Table 7, computer-generated responses and labor union members' decisions do not differ significantly on any of the eight individual questionnaire items (see Table 5). Data from both the computer-simulated respondents and the human respondents support theoretical predictions, and this version of the model regarding decision strategy produces data that are remarkably close to living persons' responses, even in the variations from predictions.