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Whether attitudes toward postconflict justice and reconciliation are complementary or contradictory has been long debated. We posit that the answer to this question is context-dependent. Multilevel analyses of two large-scale surveys among war-affected communities in the former Yugoslavia (total N = 11,843), combined with geo-coded data on conflict events, demonstrate that a crucial contextual determinant is the prevalence of asymmetric violence in communities: The more a community was exposed to events of asymmetric violence, which disproportionately affect one group, the more the support for justice was linked to rejecting reconciliation. These findings were conceptually replicated with two different data sets and different operationalizations of justice and reconciliation attitudes. Conversely, in one study, the more a community was exposed to symmetric violence, which affects members of all adversary groups, the more the justice and reconciliation were perceived as compatible. This study shows the importance of a contextualized approach to understanding intergroup attitudes in postconflict settings.

The aim of this study was to investigate daily positive humor in couples as an interpersonal emotion regulation strategy. Associated changes in psychological intimacy were tested as a possible socio- affective pathway of emotion regulation that mediates the effects of couple humor on changes in individual momentary affect. Within a dyadic ambulatory assessment framework, 102 couples reported on their production of positive humor as an attempt to regulate their partner’s mood, psychological intimacy, and momentary affect four times a day for 1 week. An actor– partner interdependence mediation model revealed actor and partner effects of humor on changes in daily affect. Furthermore, the indirect effect of own humor via changes in the partner’s feelings of psychological intimacy (socio- affective pathway) on the partner’s affect was significant. Results support the assumption that daily positive humor experienced with one’s romantic partner serves as an interpersonal emotion regulation strategy in daily life as reflected in direct effects on one’s own and one’s partner’s momentary affect. The partner’s changes in affect were partially mediated by changes in their feelings of psychological intimacy. This speaks in favor of an indirect socio-affective mechanism of interpersonal emotion regulation associated with positive humor expressed toward the partner.

While many thoughts and mental images that people form about their personal future refer to emotionally significant events, there is still little empirical data on the frequency and nature of emotional future-oriented thoughts (EmoFTs) that occur in natural settings. In the present study, participants recorded EmoFTs occurring in daily life and rated their characteristics, emotional properties, and perceived functions. The results showed that EmoFTs are frequent, occur in various contexts, and are perceived to fulfil important functions, mostly related to goal pursuit and emotion regulation. When distinguishing between anticipatory and anticipated emotions (i.e., emotions experienced in the present versus emotions expected to occur in the future), a positivity bias in the frequency of EmoFTs was found to be restricted to anticipated emotions. The representational format and perceived function of EmoFTs varied according to their affective valence, and the intensity of anticipatory and anticipated emotions were influenced by the personal importance and amount of visual imagery of EmoFTs. Mood states preceding EmoFTs influenced their emotional components, which, in turn, impacted ensuing mood states. Overall, these findings shed further light on the emotional properties of future-oriented thoughts that are experienced in daily life.

Since Kraeplin and Kretschmer, the clarification of the limits between ordinary sadness and clinical depression has been a major concern. Much of the controversy has focused on whether and on which bases can be fixed a boundary in the continuum from the experience of sadness to major depressive episode. The new emphasis on the role of clinical judgment introduced by DSM-5 can be regarded as a way to address these issues, though leaving several questions open. After examining the implications of the main topics raised by this still ongoing discussion, we will argue that in a clinical reality both mobility and intensity of emotional states may account for the discontinuity between ordinary sadness and clinical depression.

This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war ( Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions to outgroup orientation.

A large body of research suggests arm extension and arm flexion to be indicators of automatically generated withdrawal and approach motivation, respectively. However, such a view has not remained unchallenged. Recent research suggests that the motivational significance of arm movements may be largely context dependent. The aim of this research was to demonstrate that an essential facilitating context factor for arm movements relies on the desirability of their expected outcomes. Participants viewed negative and positive stimulus material (pictures and words) and were asked to concurrently perform either an arm extension or an arm flexion. Arm movements were embedded in a meaningful context, leading to a stimulus size decrease or increase; and thus giving the visual illusion of withdrawing from the stimulus or approaching it. Results show that the significance of arm movements is indeed influenced by the desirability of their respective effects.

Appraisal theories have described elaborate mechanisms underlying the elicitation of emotion at the psychological-cognitive level, but typically do not integrate neuroscientific concepts and findings. At the same time, theoretical developments in appraisal theory have been pretty much ignored by researchers studying the neuroscience of emotion. We feel that a stronger integration of these two literatures would be highly profitable for both sides. Here we outline a blueprint of the “appraising brain.” To this end, we review neuroimaging research investigating the processing of major appraisal variables, and sketch a neuro-cognitive process model of appraisal with a special emphasis on the chronometry and the recursive aspect of emotional evaluation. We hope that this contribution will stimulate more hypothesis-driven research on the neuroscience of appraisal.

The aim of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of the attention training technique (ATT) on the frequency of intrusive thoughts experienced by a person with schizophrenia in her daily life. The attentional procedure was designed to attenuate self-focused attention and to reinforce attentional control and consisted of auditory external exercises. Homework practice was included to promote transfer to everyday life. The efficacy and specificity of the ATT were assessed with cognitive, functional, and control measures. The impact of ATT on symptomatology, work functioning, and self-esteem was also measured. Postrehabilitation results showed that, after nine training sessions, there was a reduction in intrusive thoughts for the cognitive and ecological outcome measures. Selective attention, attention switching, and resistance to distractive interference specifically improved. The person reported a reduction in intrusive thoughts in her daily life. In addition, positive symptoms decreased. Finally, a 6-month follow-up assessment revealed the maintenance of most of the beneficial effects in daily life.

Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.

In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this distinction, the authors claim, lies in the fact that, whereas appeal to character traits or sentiments in explanation is tantamount to making sense of a given behaviour in terms of an individual’s specific evaluative perspective — as embodied in this individual’s emotional profile — appeal to temperaments makes sense of it independently of any such evaluative perspective.

In this special issue we brought together a number of articles whose convergence may not be immediately evident to our readers. Varying in almost all respects from their conceptual underpinnings, through the methodologies used, and to the very objects of their inquiry the articles may leave the reader wondering what was the ultimate motivation to bring them together in one special issue of the journal. Indeed, at their face value, the foci of the papers, namely, the conceptualization of the distinctions within the affective domain (Deonna & Teroni) and, more specifically, within the emotion domain (Cochrane), the affective (non-propositional and connotative) effects of language that go beyond its representational capacity (Moeschler, Soriano & Valenzuela), and the pan-temporal and pan-cultural translatability of lexical and narrative emotion (Nelis, Bouvier, Zufferey) may seem reminiscent of the famous Jamesian ‘shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm', all quite unique and interesting, but not providing a unifying, central point of view (James, 1890: 448).

There is much empirical evidence for modulation of attention by negative—particularly fear-relevant—emotional stimuli. This modulation is often explained in terms of a fear module. Appraisal theories of emotion posit a more general mechanism, predicting attention capture by stimuli that are relevant for the needs and goals of the organism, regardless of valence. To examine the brain-activation patterns underlying attentional modulation, we recorded event-related potentials from 20 subjects performing a dot-probe task in which the cues were fear-inducing and nurturance-inducing stimuli (i.e., anger faces and baby faces). Highly similar validity modulation was found for the PI time-locked to target onset, indicating early attentional capture by both positive and negative emotional stimuli. Topographic segmentation analysis and source localization indicate that the same amplification process is involved whether attention orienting is triggered by negative, fear-relevant stimuli or positive, nurturance-relevant stimuli. These results confirm that biological relevance, and not exclusively fear, produces an automatic spatial orienting toward the location of a stimulus.