Search

This document is a collection of abstracts from various research papers in the field of psychology. The abstracts cover a wide range of topics, including the influence of enterprise network tie strength on innovation performance, the impact of third-party logistics procurement models on mental health, and the effects of peer feedback on anxiety and written production. The studies provide valuable insights into their respective fields and offer guidance for further research. Additionally, the document explores the integration of ideological and political courses in higher vocational colleges, consumer satisfaction with agricultural products in live streaming e-commerce, and the impact of psychological factors on economic growth. The studies contribute to a better understanding of these areas and provide policy recommendations for improvement. The document also discusses the psychological depths and moral dimensions of Shakespeare's Macbeth, the factors that influence the educational mindset of college teachers, and the coping strategies of students with cognitive psychological disabilities in mathematics. Furthermore, it explores the development of vocational and technical education based on learning psychology, applies Marx's career choice theory in career perspective education, and examines the impact of social media travel sharing on travelers' behavior. The document also investigates the impact of employee stock ownership plans on employee motivation and company productivity, the professional psychological quality of teachers in Teaching Chinese as a Second Language, and the role of positive emotions in alleviating mental exhaustion among college students. These studies provide valuable insights and recommendations for their respective fields of study. [Extracted from the article]

Research in the wake of the contentious 2016 presidential primaries contends both Democrats and Republicans were internally divided along psychological lines. Specifically, MacWilliams (2016) finds authoritarian personality was strongly related to Trump support among Republican primary voters, and Wronski et al. (2018) finds authoritarianism was strongly related to Clinton support among Democratic primary voters. In this paper, I reassess the relationships between authoritarianism and 2016 primary candidate preferences for both Republicans and Democrats. I analyze two new large, probability-based surveys and generate random effects estimates using these surveys and two national surveys from Wronski et al. (2018). Overall, I find authoritarianism was moderately associated with support for Clinton over Sanders among Democratic primary voters, but weakly associated with support for Trump among Republican primary voters. My findings indicate authoritarianism may have played a more limited role in shaping Americans' candidate preferences in the 2016 presidential primary elections than past studies have suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Work in political psychology has found that the two major political parties are sorted based on individual's group attachments. This sorting has resulted in the Democratic Party's electorate and elites being made up of members from various racial, religious, and social groups. Given this heterogeneity, how do social group identities impact voter preferences in the Democratic primary? Based on social identity theory, I hypothesize that an individual's feelings toward racial or gender groups should be associated with their candidate preference in the primary election, but only when a candidate's group identities are known. Using the 2018 American National Elections Studies (ANES) pilot and a nationally diverse survey of 2020 Democratic primary voters, I find that the strength of sentiments toward racial or gender identities is associated with candidate preference and this association is conditioned by the ability to link the candidates to racial or gender groups. This paper shows that the effects of group identity extend beyond simply sorting individuals into one of the two major parties and have the potential to create group-based divisions within the "big tent" of the Democratic Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that the concept of democratic quality consists of two necessary, but independently insufficient, components. The first is an opportunity-structure component, which includes the institutional and structural opportunities that allow for democratic rule. The second is a citizen component, which refers to the ways in which citizens can and do breathe life into existing institutional opportunities for democratic rule. Based on work from political theory we show how different ontologies or models of democracy place different demands on citizens as much as they do on institutions. We demonstrate the need for quality-of-democracy research to engage with work in political behavior and political psychology, from which it has traditionally been disconnected. In doing so, we provide a parsimonious analytic framework for a theory-driven selection of indicators related to three key citizen dispositions: namely, democratic commitments, political capacities, and political participation. The paper ends with a brief discussion of important implications of our argument for the future study of democratic quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to a set of problems in contemporary psychology that cluster around the notion that the discipline might be “applied” to the real world, and that such application would thereby serve as the methodological and conceptual grounding for “political psychology.” The specific problems addressed comprise “interpretation” of material in the quantitative and qualitative traditions, the notion of “application” as such which rests on the prior modelling of individual and collective psychological phenomena, the conceptions of “politics” that operate in disciplinary interventions, the idealisation of “community” in different traditions of community psychology in the US and Europe, and finally “psychology” itself as the background against which these other problems are elaborated. In response to these problems the paper describes political theoretical concepts from feminist interventions in Left practice and brings them to bear on the discipline of psychology, turning the direction of travel of concepts around so that psychology itself rather than the outside world becomes the object to which ideas are “applied.” The five political theoretical concepts described here are: “performativity,” “standpoint,” “the personal as political,” the “tyranny of structurelessness,” and “intersectionality.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research demonstrates that acculturated co-ethnics of immigrant groups adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to that of host country dominant groups. However, acculturated U.S. Latinxs still maintain relatively open immigration policy preferences despite their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype (e.g., Spanish-speaking, immigrant). To answer the puzzle, I draw on sociological perspectives and theorize that the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in tandem with an expanding interior immigration enforcement apparatus generates rebuff against Anglo political norms among acculturated Latinxs. Using 6 national Latinx surveys, I corroborate my theory and find perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts forestall the adoption of restrictive immigration policy preferences via acculturation. Absent deportation threat, acculturated Latinxs adopt immigration preferences similar to white Anglos. I also replicate these findings for attitudinal dimensions outside immigration policy preferences. This paper suggests political assimilation is not preordained among acculturated immigrant co-ethnics in light of an unreceptive host society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do voters construct feelings toward inparty elites? More specifically, how do they do so when they lack a shared policy agenda or shared salient social identity with candidates beyond partisan identification? In this paper, I investigate this puzzle by developing a theory of Putting America First to explain white evangelical affect toward Republican presidential candidates from 2004 to 2016. Using ANES surveys from 2004 to 2016, I test the effectiveness of this model of candidate affect. I find that shared outgroup hostility, what I call Putting Us First, motivates positive affect for presidential candidates among white evangelicals, regardless of shared policy objectives and descriptive representation. Overtime, white evangelicals' affect is driven by outgroup hostilities rather than Culture Wars values. Overall, this informs our understanding of voter affect toward candidates and the increasingly important role of social outgroup hostility in defense of the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can "provoke" targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, assuming that a challenger's signals endogenously increase the target's resolve. Our model shows that introducing provocation can make signals of resolve more credible precisely because their provocative effects make them more costly to send. Moreover, against the prevailing intuition that provocation uniformly promotes conflict, the information from these signals can mitigate their provocative effects and elicit more generous offers than not signaling. Thus, in contrast to psychological accounts, we show that taking provocative actions can be rational and necessary for reaching peaceful bargains. We illustrate these findings with the 1911 Agadir Crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the issue of political deception by exploring the role of self-deception in democratic politics. Within politics, deception of the people is actually very often produced by the self-deception of political leaders and officials, which is then supplemented by mechanisms of self-deception of the public itself. That self-deception, rather than simply straightforward deception, is a significant obstacle to truth and transparency in democratic politics is often hinted at by political scientists and historians but never properly pursued. And yet it should be, for which one of them is the case has important normative implications. This paper briefly presents the notion of self-deception and offers some reasons to take its presence in politics seriously. It also counters possible objections to doing so. Different kinds of political self-deception are presented and illustrated through historical examples so as to provide a clear typology and make the case for self-deception in politics stronger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagine two incidents of political violence. In the first, you share political affiliation with the victim. In the second, they reside in the opposite party. How would this minor change – a shifting label, the difference of a word – impact your reaction? This article offers empirical insight through an experiment: U.S. participants read a mock college controversy, where a student sent death threats to, and doxed, a professor. The treatment varied whether the perpetrator described the professor as a Democrat, Republican, or used otherwise non-descript (e.g., "political") adjectives. A posttreatment survey then measured respondents' discrete emotions, the penalties they preferred the student receive, and their partisan group identity strength. Participants who read about violence against a copartisan victim showed a statistically significant increase in preferred penalty severity. But violence against an outparty victim mirrored the control, with subjects reacting as if they didn't know the political affiliation of anyone involved. Posttreatment measures also demonstrated the potential for anxiety (but not anger or partisan strength) to mediate this underlying partisan bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper highlights the importance of considering two facets of the content of internal conflicts: The concrete subject theme of the conflict and the abstract motivations that people perceive as being conflicted (e.g. values implicated in the conflict). The paper demonstrates how personal value priorities contribute to the understanding of internal conflicts. In two studies I examined the relationship between values and the content of internal conflicts. In Study 1 ( N = 250), students described a central conflict that they were experiencing and analysed the values they perceived as opposing in their conflict. Results indicated that the reported conflicts were usually between values not conceptualized as motivationally opposite to each other. Furthermore, personal value priorities were related to the values implicated in the conflict both directly and indirectly by their effect on the themes of the conflicts. In Study 2 ( N = 230), working parents analysed the values they perceive as coming in conflict in two work-family dilemmas. Findings supported the premise that values explain individual differences in the motivational meaning attributed to a conflict even when the conflict theme is held constant. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between social action initiatives and theory? In this paper we suggest that, like social action, theory is a means of intervening in social problems and is integrally linked with future possibilities. Devising the means of effective intervention requires the ability to understand and harness people's ways of actively striving to deal with the social problems which emerge in their everyday lives. Such efforts involve communicating across difference. For example, regarding the problems of HIV prevention and positive living, gay men in Sydney are positioned differently from each other in relation to the virus, sexual practice, understanding and use of biomedical developments in the development of safe-sex strategies. How do everyday struggles to communicate across difference feed into effective social action, and what is the role of theory in supporting and driving these efforts? In this paper we consider the limitations of notions of intersubjectivity which overemphasize the role of ‘mutual recognition’ in the development of relationships between actors. Talk of ‘mutual recognition’ overlooks the fact that communication is essentially ambiguous. The result is a failure to theorize the emergence of productive connections between people which work through openness to this ambiguity. The absence of recognition can give rise to confusion, but it also an important element in the development of new ways of connecting with others. In turn, the mechanisms of socio-political change can be affected through the development of new forms of connection between actors. That is, modes of intersubjectivity which are based on misrecognition and difference can function as transfiguring relations, opening new possibilities for actively tackling social problems. We argue that effective social action harnesses transfiguring relations. This approach to social action demands that we develop our understanding of social relations, and take account of the productive role of misrecognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research has shown that issues vary significantly in their salience across citizens, explaining key outcomes in political behavior. Yet it remains unclear how individual-level differences in issue salience affect the measurement of latent constructs in public opinion, namely political ideology. In this paper, we test whether scaling approaches that fail to incorporate individual-level differences in issue salience could understate the predictive power of ideology in public opinion research. To systematically examine this assertion, we employ a series of latent variable models which incorporate both issue importance and issue position. We compare the results of these different and diverse scaling approaches to two survey data sets, investigating the implications of accounting for issue salience in constructing latent measures of ideology. Ultimately, we find that accounting for issue importance adds little information to a more basic approach that uses only issue positions, suggesting ideological signals for measurement models reside most prominently in the issue positions of individuals rather than the importance of those issues to the individual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political interest is one of the strongest predictors of individual political engagement, but little is known about the origins of this political orientation. The goal of this paper is to clarify the role that biological and psychological factors play in the formation of political interest. A series of recent studies in genetics have illustrated that political interest is heritable, and a series of recent studies in political science and psychology have demonstrated that personality traits, many of which are heritable, are related to political interest. In this paper, we make a number of contributions to the literature: (1) we replicate previous analyses showing that political interest and personality traits are heritable, (2) we demonstrate that personality traits are related to interest, and (3) we estimate the extent to which genetic factors account for the correlation between personality traits and political interest. Using two datasets on twins, we find evidence that genetic factors account for a large amount of the correlation between political interest and personality traits. This study provides a more nuanced picture of the biological and psychological bases of political orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the features of a reconceptualised sovereignty. It offers an alternative to the view of sovereignty which has been pronounced dead, diminished or redundant. Two points in particular represent a contribution to the contemporary debate on sovereignty. First, the paper details the liberal character of orthodox state sovereignty. It identifies the correspondence between liberal principles and the features of state sovereignty and extends a critique of liberalism to those features. It then becomes possible to indicate the liberal basis of several intractable problems with state sovereignty. Second, the paper brings together aspects of the work of an important and heterogeneous group of writers, whose insights are employed to develop an alternative conceptualisation of sovereignty and to highlight some of the lacunae of the liberal conception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Political Science Review is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Review for the Sociology of Sport is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected boundaries of solidarity? Human-induced crises that impose asymmetric costs tend to sharpen pre-existing divides, but natural disasters often strengthen solidarity. The pandemic possesses properties of both kinds of crisis. In a panel survey conducted in Northern Italy, the initial epicenter of the pandemic, we asked respondents to complete conjoint tasks querying who was likely to violate health guidelines (wave 1) and who should be prioritized for vaccine distribution (wave 2). We find that while discrimination towards the rich is nearly universal, bias against other outgroups depends on ideology and personal experience with the crisis. Leftwing individuals display discrimination towards partisan outgroups, while those on the right display ethnic bias. However, this effect is conditional: those who suffered a significant income loss but no health effects display heightened discrimination, while respondents who experienced COVID-19 as a personal health crisis are less likely to penalize outgroups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a gap between morality as experienced and morality as studied. In our personal and professional lives, moral judgments are embedded within a specific context. We know the who, what, where, and when and often can infer the why; we know the broader context of actions; and we may have a specific relationship with the actors. However, scholarly theorizing is often built on inferences from participants' responses to decontextualized, impoverished stimuli. In our quest for uncovering general psychological truths, moral psychologists have examined evaluations of poorly guarded trolleys, strangers with odd sexual proclivities, and endorsement of abstract principles. The four articles included in this section demonstrate the power of contextualizing morality. In the current article, I place these papers within a broader framework for how scholars can contextualize morality research. I then argue why contextualizing morality matters: not only do contextualized questions better reflect the nuances of reality but also contextualized judgments might be key for improving predictions of moral behavior and understanding moral change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to developing a management and organisation studies perspective on political organising by focusing on: (a) populism; (b) the exercise of political power; and (c) the organisation of politics. We address two questions: in what ways have English populist politicians in the 20th and 21st centuries utilised language along with other aspects of campaign organising to build and enhance their symbolic power? And: how do populist political organisations convert symbolic power into symbolic violence? Drawing on a range of concepts from Pierre Bourdieu's sociology, most specifically his work on symbolic power, symbolic violence, political ontology and the performativity of language, we conduct a comparative analysis of texts from four waves of right-wing English populism culminating in Brexit. We develop a three-step framework to explain the organisation of right-wing populism via what we term populist political methodology: (1) establishing the symbolic power of the leader and the message; (2) organising power and the division of labour of domination; and (3) reinforcing symbolic violence in targeted sections of society. Understanding how populist politics is organised can support us in resisting, challenging and disrupting right-wing populism, providing lessons for organisations campaigning against racism and xenophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parliamentary institutions and partisan norms are complex and new members of parliament are unlikely to possess an innate awareness of optimal behaviour. This paper examines how new legislators adopt the behavioural patterns of incumbent members in the Sixth European Parliament. The latter provides an excellent opportunity to study such adaptive behaviour; in addition to newly elected members from 15 former states, new members from ten accession countries took seats for the first time. We examine how voting behaviour differs between new members from the 15 former states, new members from accession countries, and incumbent members. Our analysis shows that new members from former states defect less from their European political group than incumbents, while new accession country members defect more. Over time, the differences between these groups disappear. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Cross-sectional data from twins contain information that can be used to derive a test of causality between traits. This test of directionality is based upon the fact that genetic relationships between family members conform to an established structural pattern. In this paper we examine several common methods for empirically testing causality as well as several genetic models that we build on for the Direction of Causation (DoC) model. We then discuss the mathematical components of the DoC model and highlight limitations of the model and potential solutions to these limitations. We conclude by presenting an example from the personality and politics literature that has begun to explore the question whether or not personality traits cause people to hold specific political attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The main question addressed in this paper is how the great variation in the level of social trust in different countries can be explained. Most empirical research on this question has been based on survey data which has limitations when it comes to capturing the causal mechanisms. Building on theories that point to the importance of trustworthy governmental institutions for creating social trust, two parallel experiments were conducted in two countries where the levels of corruption and social trust are very different. One group of 64 Swedish and one group of 82 Romanian undergraduate students responded to a number of scenarios which describe situations at a police station or a doctor's surgery in a foreign country. In the scenarios, the person tries to receive immediate assistance from the police/doctor at the same time as another person who lives in the 'unknown' country. These encounters varied within groups in terms of (1) whether or not a bribe was used in order to receive immediate assistance, (2) whether the other person or the official took the initiative to request/offer immediate assistance in exchange for the bribe, and (3) outcome in terms of whether immediate assistance was approved or declined as a result of the offer or demand for a bribe. Type of authority (police vs. doctor) was a between-groups factor. Subsequent to each scenario, participants' levels of various aspects of vertical and horizontal trust were measured. As hypothesized, the Romanian sample had reliably lower initial levels of horizontal trust than the Swedish sample. For both samples, however, the results showed the expected effects of bribe, initiator, and outcome on all dependent trust measures. The results supported the hypothesis that trust in authorities influences the perceptions of the trustworthiness of others in general. Even though some of the effects were stronger for one sample than for the other, the influence of vertical trust on social trust was true for both the high- and the low-trusting sample. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people become opposition activists in authoritarian regimes where dissent invites social censure and can be dangerous? We make a new contribution to answering this classic question: personality. For the first time outside of democratic contexts, we investigate the association between personality traits and opposition activism, arguing that some traits work universally, while others interact with political context. We propose that—as in democracies—high extraversion predicts political activism, regardless of its pro- or anti-regime orientation, and, in particular, that extraversion is critical to explain the shift from online to offline action. We also argue that—contrary to democratic contexts—low agreeableness predicts opposition activism in autocracies, because it reduces the perceived costs of non-conformity. We test these arguments based on two independent survey samples from Russia, a stable authoritarian regime. In a series of statistical tests, including two case-control designs, we find consistent support for all hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While support for redistribution remains high across Europe, voting for left-wing parties, traditionally identified with this agenda, has been under par. Past research explains this puzzle by class-based disagreements about redistributive priorities and by second-dimension attitudes. These explanations, however, assume coherent voter preferences reacting to structural changes. By contrast, I argue that part of the puzzle also lies in attitudinal ambivalence—simultaneous negative and positive evaluations—regarding redistributive policy. Using cross-sectional public opinion and party position data, I find that such ambivalence increases with lower political sophistication, greater value conflict, and weaker economic need. Electorally, it deepens detachment between support for redistribution and left-wing self-identification and increases voting for more economically and culturally right-wing parties. These patterns hold independently of class differences and second-dimension attitudes and replicate stably in earlier data. The findings contribute to ongoing debates about attitude structures and voting patterns and illuminate an additional challenge for economically progressive parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconstructs and analyzes the memories of women who were in the city of Valparaíso on September 11, 1973, the day of the coup d'état in Chile. Research participants were six women from the Valparaíso region, militants of leftist parties, and survivors of political imprisonment and torture during the Chilean civil-military dictatorship. We conducted a focus group and two semi-structured individual interviews. Data analysis was carried out in two stages: the first one phenomenological-hermeneutic and the second one based on Grounded Theory. The research results show that the day of the coup d'état in Valparaíso is remembered by women as a mighty and irrevocable milestone, functioning as a biographical event. The coup d'état means a before and after in civic experiences in social, political, and historical aspects and in the dwelling manners of the city. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity—unlike other moral constructs—is not understood by what it is but what it isn't : obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm—the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality. People are fascinated by morality—how do people make moral judgments and why do liberals and conservatives seem to frequently disagree? "Purity" is one moral concept often discussed when talking about morality—it has been suggested to capture moral differences across politics and to demonstrate the evolutionary roots of morality, especially the role of disgust in moral judgment. However, despite the many books and articles that mention purity, there is no systematic analysis of purity. Here, we review all existing academic articles focused on purity in morality. We find that purity is an especially messy concept that lacks scientific validity. Because it is so poorly defined and inconsistently measured, it should not be invoked to explain our moral minds or political differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Progressivism has increasingly challenged traditional liberalism as the dominant influence within left-wing ideology. Across four studies, we developed a measure—the Progressive Values Scale (PVS)—that characterizes distinctly progressive values within the left-wing. In Study 1, left-wing participants evaluated divisive issues, with four scale factors emerging. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure and included a battery of personality and values measures to explore individual differences among those who maintain a progressive worldview. In Study 3, we achieved final confirmation of the factor structure and validated the ability of the PVS to assess a distinctly progressive perspective, insofar as progressives generated prototypical faces for Liberals and Conservatives that were markedly distinct from those generated by traditional liberals. In Study 4, we distinguished the PVS from measures of left-wing authoritarianism and demonstrated that it is a better predictor of progressive political preferences and social judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a theory of political timing. It argues that the timing of those political 'events' over which politicians have some discretion is non-random and that politicians attempt to influence the timing of events in such a way as to maximize the political benefits or minimize the political costs for themselves. In relation to 'good news', it is argued that politicians will attempt to increase the public attention given to it or the positive impact felt by electors and to reduce public attention, or the impact on welfare, of 'bad news'. Consideration of memory research, prospect theory and structural factors in the media suggests ways in which politicians can use their discretion over the timing of events to further these ends. Four specific behavioural hypotheses are advanced, regarding the way discretion will be exercised by politicians, according to whether the 'news' is, or is likely to be, good or bad, and the resulting patterns in the timing of events. The behaviours are labelled respectively as packaging, splitting, highlighting, and phasing. Data on the timing of three very different types of phenomenon-British parliamentary by-elections; the timing of announcements of increases in medical prescription charges in the British National Health Service; and the timing and nature of changes in official lending rates in the United Kingdom and the United States-are chosen to illustrate the hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immigrants, as a group, are frequently described in ways, such as vermin or disease, that portray them as less than human. This type of dehumanizing language leads to negative emotional responses and negative attitudes toward the dehumanized group. This paper examines how the dehumanization of immigrants influences immigration policy attitudes. I use original experimental data to show that dehumanization leads to more negative immigration attitudes. I further find that these negative attitudes are mediated by the role of emotion. Dehumanization increases anger and disgust toward immigrants, which causes anti-immigrant sentiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents the authors' opinion on an article concerning political alienation by Joan R. Kahn and William Mason in the 1987 issue of the American Sociological Review. Richard Easterlin has hypothesized that the relative size of cohorts affects their well-being throughout their life span. Kahn and Mason tested Easterlin's hypothesis concerning political alienation. Kahn and Mason's analysis focused on the relationship between alienation and the age-group-by-relative-cohort-size (RCS) interactions for each of the three youngest age-groups, controlling for the relationship of alienation to age, period and RCS. None of the 13 models reported in Kahn and Mason's article, however, tested the effects of RCS controlling for age and period alone; rather, when RCS is included in a model, it is always included in equations with age-group-by-RCS interaction terms. Although adding RCS to the age-period model increases the explained variance by less than two percent, the positive direction of the partial regression coefficient associated with RCS is consistent with Easterlin's hypothesis. They argue that the conditional effects of age and RCS are minimal. The net effect of RCS also appears to be small in our reanalysis of their data; that is, the coefficient associated with RCS is only .0161.

This article focuses on the political alienation in the U.S. during the year 1952-1968. Twenty-five attitudinal items in the 1968 survey were selected in five broad domains relevant to political tryst: race relations, law and order, the Vietnam war, government social welfare policies, and personal and financial well-being. Philip Converse, a social scientist identified the first three as the key issues of the 1968 election and as among the common events which heightened alienation in the 1960s. The first two domains and the domestic impact of the Vietnam war are central components of the social issue, the emergence of which is in their view the major political event of the 1960s. Attitudes toward government social welfare policies and personal and financial well-being represent their other major, but more traditional, political issue domain-the economic issue. Relating issue-attitudes to trust requires special attention to the attitudinal responses which are elicited. In particular, the form of the relationship between issue-attitudes and trust depends on the range of alternatives offered in the attitudinal questions.

Copyright of International Political Science Review is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Behavioral political science has not utilized observational methods and lacks the field research tradition found in other behavioral sciences. This paper explores the potential contribution of observational methods to behavioral studies in political science and illustrates their application with data developed around oral argument in the United States Supreme Court and the first Reagan-Mondale television debate in 1984. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diachronic investigation of partisan choice and issue orientation by generational analysis is a popular method of contemporary political research. There is as well increased interest in the role played by women in politics. Yet studies of European politics have rarely explored the utility of analysis which assumes shared generational political perspectives in explaining differences in the political behaviour and orientations of men and women. This paper evaluates generational analysis as an explanation of differences in the issue orientations of British men and women during the 1970 electoral campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the political sociology in Eastern Europe. The term sociology is a newcomer in the official nomenclature of social sciences in most East European countries. Sociology had been left out from the program of social studies, it was not because of any real scientific reasons, but because its name was objected, the present renaissance of sociology in these countries is related to the political changes which have taken place during the last decade; in fact, it is evidence of new political tendencies. Hence the importance of following the changing approach to political phenomena in the theoretical sociological publications in socialist countries. The period between 1957 and 1963, covered by the appended bibliography and referred to in the present paper, provides ample material on the subject. In this sense, the place of political sociology among sociological disciplines is essentially different from that of other branches of detailed sociology. The latter are concerned with some isolated fields of social life, while political sociology investigates social phenomena from the angle of their political aspect, the aspect of power. Hence, if there is any justification for regarding political sociology as a separate discipline, it is on the grounds of the difference in theoretical approach rather than the difference in the subject of study.

A recent line of research in the field of humor has proposed the existence of two morally based comic styles. One of them, corrective humor (or satire), seeks to ridicule and mock to establish justice. In contrast, benevolent humor attempts to correct deviances using humor in a friendly manner understanding human imperfections. Considering their focus on correcting what is perceived as morally wrong, in this study we seek to examine how these styles can affect the evaluation that is made of politicians after being exposed to humor that attacks them. To achieve this, we conducted an experiment in which three groups had to evaluate two politicians after being exposed to different stimuli (memes that ridiculed them, images with the same content without its humorous content, or no exposure; total n = 160). Our results demonstrate that it is corrective humor and not benevolent humor that influences the evaluation and that it does so positively; people with higher scores in corrective humor have a better evaluation of politicians after seeing memes with anti-politician content. We discuss possible explanations for this finding and implications for political psychology and humor studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much political behavior research highlights the role of post-immigration experiences in framing Latinx immigrants' preferences in the United States. We contend that immigrants' pre-migration political socialization also shapes their current views, political engagement, and ideological orientations. Findings from a unique set of 146 interviews on political party choice before and after migration suggest that Latinx immigrants exhibit consistency of political orientations for party choice across borders. In other words, home-country political and ideological orientations help guide choice of U.S. political party. Pre-immigration variables are thus crucial for a more comprehensive assessment of Latinx immigrant political psychology and behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elites degrade democracy in part because of incentives that arise from public opinion. We report pre-registered and exploratory tests of which Americans are most likely to support democracy-degrading action, focusing on three distinct democracy attitudes assessed in a large demographically representative sample 5 weeks before the 2020 election. Professed opposition to democracy was relatively rare and most common among citizens who felt disengaged with politics. But a different pattern of findings emerged for attitudes toward (1) flagrant, politically congenial authoritarian policy action and (2) election subversion framed with a pro-democracy justification. These anti-democratic attitudes were relatively common, related to cultural conservatism among both Republicans and Democrats, and – consistent with an "involved-but-ignorant" hypothesis – highest among those who combined strong political interest with low political sophistication. We recommend an increased focus on attitudes toward flagrant, contextualized, and politically cued authoritarian actions, including actions framed in pro-democracy terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research demonstrates that good looks matter in politics. The global trend today is toward more visual ballots, which include candidates’ photographs. Because voters are exposed to a candidate’s appearance right before they vote, physical attractiveness may be a significant contributor to electoral success. But does appearance matter equally in high-information elections, where all candidates are well known to voters, and low-information elections, where voters have little or no knowledge of who the candidates are? How does enhancing the photos of candidates through software programs affect their electability? To our knowledge, this article is the first to examine the impact of candidates’ appearance in high- and low-information elections in the field using two experiments involving the manipulation of their appearance. Data for the first study were collected in a low-information election in which a student population was asked to select from a list of fictitious candidates for city council. In this study, we found that the candidates’ looks had an impact on the votes they received. Data for the second study were collected right before a high-information election: A straw poll that took place immediately before the primaries for a major political party in Israel, involving party members selecting from a list of real candidates. Here the candidates’ appearance had no impact on the votes they received, even for the lesser known candidates on the list. The results indicate that the impact of visual manipulation of candidate images does influence voters, but is limited by the informational context of the elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asymmetric social alignments are transforming American partisan rhetoric, particularly how politicians leverage identity-based appeals. For example, asymmetric religious, racial, and ideological alignments within the Republican party now make reactionary religious rhetoric increasingly strategic. Focusing on that case, I propose a novel conceptual model to understand what such rhetoric aims to accomplish. Reactionary religious rhetoric advertises, appeals, and activates on a spectrum from overt to subconscious registers, which I explain using three metaphors: mating call, dog whistle, and trigger. Within a context of asymmetrical partisan "sorting," Christian nationalist rhetoric overtly advertises partisanship (mating call). Rhetoric deploying encoded terms like "Christian" and "socialist" appeals to ethno-culture, connecting specific political opponents to abstract ethno-religious threats (dog whistle). Lastly, research on overlapping identities increasingly suggests rhetoric involving threats to "Christianity" may unconsciously activate White racial threat (trigger). I consider applications of this conceptual model to growing political appeals to nationalist and populist identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civic education is often touted as a counterweight to the contentiousness of American politics. Yet, civic education's relationship to dislike and distrust of opposing partisans (affective polarization) remains largely untested. Simultaneously, there are calls for educators to promote more civic informed action, taking civic education beyond the walls of the classroom. This study utilizes data from a survey of the 2016 election to examine the relationship between individuals' recalled civic education experiences (classroom pedagogy and community service) and affective polarization. In addition, this study explores two potential moderators of the relationship between civic education and affective polarization, partisan social identity strength and age. Analysis of the sample shows a significant relationship between both types of civic education experience and affective polarization, though the nature of that relationship may depend on respondents' partisan social identity and age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authoritarianism literature is divided over whether perceived threats to normative social order (sociotropic threats) or threats to the individual's well-being (personal threats) activate authoritarian predispositions. In addition, while some approaches claim that perceived threats primarily trigger those high in authoritarianism, others claim that those who are low in authoritarianism are more sensitive to threats. Given the centrality of authoritarianism and threat on support for extraordinary policies in the context of COVID-19, this article sought to test to what extent different types of threats moderated the effect of authoritarianism on support for tough law and order policies and harsh punishments to contain the spread of coronavirus. Data from two preregistered survey experiments indicates that those high in authoritarianism were more willing to support tough law and order policies when primed with sociotropic threats while those low in authoritarianism became more willing to support such policies when primed with personal threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An emerging consensus holds that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns, partly because they attract more participants. Yet, we lack an understanding of whether and why nonviolent tactics attracts support. We propose two motivational logics that can explain support for nonviolence: An instrumentalist logic, whereby nonviolent resistance is preferred based on cost-benefit considerations, and an intrinsic logic where nonviolent resistance is preferred because of perceived inherent moral worth. To investigate the motivational pull of these two logics, we conduct a pre-registered survey experiment among more than 5000 respondents across 33 countries in fall 2019. We find that nonviolent tactics strongly increase movement support relative to violent tactics, and that the preference for nonviolence is primarily driven by intrinsic commitments to the moral worth of nonviolent resistance, rather than instrumental considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test three competing theoretical accounts invoked to explain the rise and spread of political (mis)information. We compare the ideological values hypothesis (people prefer news that bolster their values and worldviews); the confirmation bias hypothesis (people prefer news that fit their preexisting stereotypical knowledge); and the political identity hypothesis (people prefer news that allow them to believe positive things about political ingroup members and negative things about political outgroup members). In three experiments (N = 1,420), participants from the United States read news describing actions perpetrated by their political ingroup or outgroup. Consistent with the political identity hypothesis, Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their ingroup or the value-undermining behavior of their outgroup. Belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, but Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake news. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the comments on sociologists James S. House and William M. Mason's study entitled "Political Alienation in America, 1952-1968." They correctly emphasize the similarity of change in degree of political alienation across time for most groups in the population, but one disagrees on specific clans. For instance, while black and white average patterns of powerlessness have changed in a relatively similar manner, black and white patterns of powerlessness by education have clearly differed. In the late 1960's, educated Blacks were becoming quite alienated, so that differences in alienation between well-educated Whites and Blacks were becoming pronounced at the same time that differences in alienation between poorly educated Whites and Blacks were becoming minute. Well-educated Blacks, often the most knowledgeable and activism prone in the black community, undoubtedly felt particular hostility toward the government. There are also other important trends in powerlessness, which might be mentioned. An extension of the data to 1970 indicated a greater growth in the educational differential in powerlessness than House and Mason suggested. Furthermore, some statistically small but still important groups such as Jews were showing clear manifestations of heightened powerlessness in the late 1960's.

Political discourse often seems divided not just by different preferences, but by entirely different representations of the debate. Are partisans able to accurately describe their opponents' position, or do they instead generate unrepresentative "straw man" arguments? In this research we examined an (incentivized) political imitation game by asking partisans on both sides of the U.S. health care debate to describe the most common arguments for and against ObamaCare. We used natural language-processing algorithms to benchmark the biases and blind spots of our participants. Overall, partisans showed a limited ability to simulate their opponents' perspective, or to distinguish genuine from imitation arguments. In general, imitations were less extreme than their genuine counterparts. Individual difference analyses suggest that political sophistication only improves the representations of one's own side but not of an opponent's side, exacerbating the straw man effect. Our findings suggest that false beliefs about partisan opponents may be pervasive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens' fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotions are an important feature of representation, as they allow politicians to reflect the feelings of their constituents. Yet studies of elites' use of emotions have been confined to examinations of strategic incentives. We build on these studies by incorporating elites' group identities as a theoretical consideration. Our theory blends perspectives on the group identities of partisanship, gender, and race with political psychology research on emotions. We hypothesize that Republicans use more fear and disgust language than Democrats, that women candidates use more joy language than men candidates, and that Black candidates use less anger than white candidates. We test these hypotheses by applying emotional sentiment dictionaries to a corpus of primary candidates' speeches. The evidence supports our claim that Republicans use more fear and that women use more joy, but we find no significant differences in the use of disgust and anger language by partisanship and race, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]