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The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005. Emissions reductions targets established by the protocol will be met by domestic policies and by three international flexible mechanisms: clean development, joint implementation, and emissions trading. Following a value-theoretic and class-based approach, the purpose of this paper is to analyze these flexible mechanisms. In particular, the paper investigates the nature and adoption of flexible mechanisms, and their class and environmental links and implications. Carbon-intensive capitalist firms and developed economies are found to be exerting great influence on the shaping and implementation of flexible mechanisms. Environmental effectiveness and justice, and equal sustainable development raised and claimed by worker-citizens, social movements, local communities, and developing countries have not been secured. Thus flexible mechanisms do not present a real challenge to current institutions and practices for sustainable climate conditions for the workers-citizen of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Non-governmental organisations have been playing a significant role in the formation and implementation of global climate change policies. The incremental participation of non-governmental organisations in climate change negotiations is significant for two reasons: 1) they provide governments with expertise and information; and 2) they help to bridge the lack of democracy and legitimacy in global environmental governance. The fulfilment of these two functions, however, is surrounded by doubts, as very little progress has been made so far in combating climate change. Many non-governmental organisations themselves lack democratic legitimacy in their formation and structures, and international climate change agreements are often fragile, not because the negotiators lack information but because they lack political will. This paper examines and outlines the areas for identifying how non-governmental organisations could contribute more to produce effective climate policies, in order to mitigate and manage climate change in the absence of more democratic international climate-change policy-making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since entry into force of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994, negotiations on controlling future greenhouse gas emissions have turned into one of the largest development issues of our time. In February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and 9 months later a historical first meeting of the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 1) was held in Montreal side-by-side with the 11th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 11). After several years of stalemate, the Montreal meeting has resulted somewhat unexpectedly in a constructive outcome that has opened the door for new momentum in climate talks. Along with several key technical decisions, an agreement was reached to hold separate talks to discuss the futures of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. This paper discusses the main outcomes of the conference and explores possible ways forward. It concludes that success in the UNFCCC process is imperative to address climate change in both developing and developed countries, even if the most effective actions are taken outside the immediate context of the legal process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kyoto protocol was the first step taken by governments towards implementing the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). This seeks to prevent dangerous 'global' warming and its impacts; the assumption being that all or most of this warming is caused by human action and is therefore susceptible to mitigation. Only governments in developed countries have so far committed themselves to emission reduction targets and thus to potentially major interventions in their economies and societies. At Kyoto, in December 1997, developed countries negotiated national commitments. Their net reductions of six greenhouse gases measured from a 1990 baseline, are to be achieved between 2008 and 2012. However, Australia may increase its net greenhouse gas emissions by 8%, while the UK agreed to a cut by 12.5%, considerably above the EU average cut of 8%. Examples of 'common but differentiated'responsibility have major economic implications, especially for trade. The mandatory British reduction target - if the Kyoto Protocol comes into force - is considerably below a promised 20% reduction, a target to which the UK government remains committed. This paper asks whythe EU/UK and Australia adopted such different positions. It does soby analysing internal factors and forces that have shaped domestic policies. It is argued that while similar motivations produced different outcomes, the Australian government also received less biased and broader advice from its experts. The Australian case, as well as thatof the EU/UK, thus presents a most interesting contrast to Swedish climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a critique of global carbon markets and trading, with a special focus on the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. It explores problems with the use of tradable permits to address climate change revolving around four areas: homogeneity, justice, gaming, and information. Homogeneity problems arise from the non-linear nature of climate change and sensitivity of emissions, which complicate attempts to calculate carbon offsets. Justice problems involve issues of dependency and the concentration of wealth among the rich, meaning carbon trading often counteracts attempts to reduce poverty. Gaming problems include pressures to promote high-volume, least-cost projects and the consequences of emissions leakage. Information problems encompass transaction costs related to carbon trading and market participation and the comparatively weak institutional capacity of project evaluators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that the effects of a new US president on global climate politics will be rather less than might be expected. This is partly because the rhetorical differences between Bush, his predecessor Clinton and President Obama mask great continuities in US climate change politics since the early 1990s. It is also because, unlike in other issue areas, the EU has moved into a position of clear international leadership, which is likely to provoke diplomatic conflict, both for standard reasons of realpolitik but more precisely because of the different growth strategies pursued by each side and the different implications of those strategies for climate policy. Finally, the emergence of a dense pattern of transnational climate governance will increasingly constrain the options for either side in pursuing new climate change agreements after 2012. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors with divergent interests. This presents the additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and regime theories to identify drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship and develop an analytical framework. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to illustrate how collective inaction was over- come to realize a global regulatory institution, the Kyoto Protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]