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In response to criticisms of the use of the Ideological Surround Model to analyze Tolerance of Ambiguity, emphasis is placed on how the methodologies of this model operate from Christian pacifist assumptions. This model seeks to promote social scientific methodologies that will allow competing perspectives to obtain increasing clarity on points of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a critical analysis of the definition of globalization in sociological studies. It argues that sociologists, unlike economists, have not achieved a commonly accepted definition of globalization. This seriously hinders the development of empirical studies. The ambiguity of the concept of globalization is rooted in three dialectics: globalization-as-a-process vs globalization-as-a-condition; globalization-as-reality vs globalization-as-futurology and one-dimensional globalization vs multi-dimensional globalization. These dialectics are rarely made explicit in different studies on globalization, which contributes to an accumulation of confusion rather than an accumulation of knowledge. The article aims to provide a theoretical framework in which concepts of globalization can be positioned through the formal analysis of a commonly used definition. Conceptual limitations that arise from the choice of a specific concept are highlighted, such as the underestimation of the present when globalization is considered a process, the neglect of internal contradictions when globalization is seen as a multidimensional concept; and the dangers of determinism and ignorance of unique features when the processes of globalization are defined by their sole destination. It challenges the sociological community to position research on globalization within this proposed framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expansion of high-stakes accountability in the past decades has created an unavoidable tension with contemporary efforts to promote multicultural curricula. Accountability requires that states establish common standards, a difficult task when there is disagreement about what content students should learn. Policy makers can adopt an "augmentative" strategy and add material to standards. This approach is less effective, however; in high-stakes systems where standards are expected to provide concrete guidance. At such times, negotiations become more nearly "zero sum" -- something has to come out of the standards for each new item that goes in. Given the nature of the American system, conflicts are more often resolved by devising ambiguous and aspirational standards. Conflict is more common in the humanities and social sciences than in mathematics or science because the "soft" subjects are less able to appeal to a neutral authority and because additional content can be grafted onto them more readily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism. The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly "generalized, "remains what it says: a materialism. In order to substantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions three areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of (1) human agency (as seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherness, and (3) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive social theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and selfunderstanding of social science. The action I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects reality in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subject and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for reasons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics before power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several lines of analysis show that functionalism is not a special method within sociology or social anthropology. First, the definitions most commonly agreed upon make functionalism synonymous with sociological analysis, and make non-functionalism synonymous with either reductionist theories or pure description. Second, the issues raised with respect to functionalism, except insofar as they spring from the ambiguities of words like "function," are really the basic issues or questions of sociological theory. Third, historically the rise of functionalism represented a revolt against reductionist theories, anti-theoretical empiricism, and moralistic or ideological views under the name of sociology or social anthropology. Although functionalism may have been salutary at the time it arose, the ambiguities of its special terminology make the myth that it is a special method a liability now. It seems wise to abandon the myth for the sake of increased clarity and efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the increased focus on language and interpretation and its implications for the social sciences. Issue of linguistic ambiguity and the representation of social reality; Introduction to a series of articles on related topics; Role of postmodernism in the increased focus on linguistics and ambiguity.