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Friedrich Hayek repeatedly stressed the centrality of submission to his own account of spontaneous order. In what he depicted as the rationalist refusal to submit to anything beyond human comprehension, he saw a threat to the "spontaneous order" of a market society. Kyong-Min Son's criticism of my account of the neoliberal subject provides me with an opportunity to further specify my understanding of the submissive disposition of the Hayekian subject. In this brief reply, I defend the claim that Hayek saw the complexity and opacity of the market order as constraining the possibility of collective political intervention that aims to alter the outcomes of market competition. While Hayek theorized a subject who was actively invested in the competitive "game," the premise of this investment was submission to the rules of the market and acceptance of its outcomes as a form of fate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friedrich Hayek's account of "spontaneous order" has generated increasing interest in recent decades. His argument for the superiority of the market in distributing knowledge without the need for central oversight has appealed to progressive democratic theorists, who are wary of the hubris of state planning and attracted to possibilities for self-organization, and to Foucaultians, who have long counseled political theory to cut off the King's head. A spontaneous social order, organized by an invisible hand, would appear to dispense with arbitrary power and foster creativity and individual liberty. This article challenges this view by highlighting the centrality of submission to Hayek's account of spontaneous order. It shows that Hayek struggles to obscure the providentialism underpinning the account of social order he derives from Adam Ferguson and the Scottish Enlightenment. Nonetheless, his own account of spontaneous order relies on faith in the workings of the market, and submission to unintelligible market forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]