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This article complements Wlezien’s review of ‘conceptualisation, measurement and interpretation in representational research’ by considering how these operate within five predictive theories validated against comparative evidence, as recommended for cumulative research by Taagepera: and related to their wider institutional and methodological context by Budge. Methodologically, the article illustrates how predictive theories can be set up to explain political processes and validated against statistical evidence. Substantively, the theories both highlight and resolve the ‘Paradox of democracy’ – how can ideologically based political parties effectively match public policy to popular preferences with only weak guidance from citizens? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In practice, democracies privilege plurality parties. Theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice. Abstract social choice theory wonders whether an electoral majority even exists. A more optimistic line of argument, prominent in research on collective representation, assumes that the policy position of the median voter embodies the majority electoral preference. The conflict between what democracies actually do and what two leading theories of the democratic process say calls for a comparative inquiry into electoral majoritarianism. For each of a dozen countries, the authors ask whether any political party commands a predominant majoritarian position among voters—that is, is a Condorcet winner—and, if so, which party it is. They find that a Condorcet winning party exists in all 12 countries and that the plurality party can lay more claim to representing the popular majority than the left—right median party. These findings have important implications for the study of democratic representation, which the authors consider in their conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Capital to the best-known classification of Political Arguments is a distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding principles, upon which this paper bases alternative representations of the dynamics of political debate. These are discussed with specific reference tot eh possibility that want-regarding goals are served less well by British planning decisions than if ideal-regarding arguments were permitted. The representations provide a limited explanation of how such a situation might come about and be maintained. Initially the draw on Down's models of voting and party competition, but explore alternatives because of: (1) the possibility that some assumptions needed for a Downsian representation cannot realistically be made about political arguments; and (2) the probability that factors other than verbal arguments enter into planning decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]