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In the past few decades, there have been efforts to transform qualitative inquiry, drawing on resources from both imaginative literature and art. There have long been tensions within social science that have encouraged the use of these resources, but the recent "literary turn" is more radical. The assumptions underpinning it are examined, and it is argued that what is most important is the purpose for which modes of expression are employed and how well they serve this. The problem with the literary turn is that it frequently involves substitution of the purposes of art or politics for those of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper some fundamental criticisms of Max Weber's conception of the vocation of science are addressed. These well-known criticisms focus on his admission that science cannot demonstrate its own value, and his broader claim that there can be no rational basis for committing oneself to one set of ultimate values as against another. Instead, he insisted that the adoption of such values is necessarily a matter of individual decision. Influential critics have argued that this amounts to relativism, or even nihilism: that, if it were true, neither science nor anything else could have genuine value, all value-judgements would be arbitrary or entirely instrumental (e.g. a matter of self-interest). I will outline Weber's position, and then examine the arguments of some of his critics: focussing particularly on Midgley and Strauss. This provides the basis for a careful reassessment of Weber's position, and for some suggestions about how he could respond to these critics. It is argued that fundamental values operate in a dialectical relationship with specific evaluations, and that they arise naturally out of more or less universal features of human beings' life experience. While this does not provide a compelling rational basis for commitment to those values, even less for prioritising one over another, it tells us why we often feel a need to uphold them. Furthermore, despite the fact that it does not guarantee agreement, rational clarification of these values and their implications, as well as appraisal of their relative significance in particular cases, is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, titled "Dangerous Liaisons in the Wasteland? A Found Document," discusses the author's experience with reviewing research proposals related to waste reduction. The author expresses surprise and confusion at the unconventional and theoretical approaches proposed by researchers, such as examining capitalism as the root of waste, exploring structural racism in waste production, and investigating waste through artistic expressions. The author questions the value and practicality of these proposals and suggests that further research should be conducted on the issue of waste in social science. The article raises concerns about the potential wastefulness of research activities and the use of public funds. [Extracted from the article]

It is, perhaps, necessary to reiterate that the article was not primarily about ethnomethodology, or even about ethnomethodological work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), but about a particular line of argument - what can crudely be called radical constructionism - which has long been part of STS and continues to be influential in some quarters there, as Lynch acknowledges. Keywords: ethnomethodology; representation; science and technology studies; constructionism; Michael Lynch EN ethnomethodology representation science and technology studies constructionism Michael Lynch 268 271 4 07/07/22 20220701 NES 220701 I welcome Mike Lynch's response to my article and thank him for it. Reply to Michael Lynch's Comment on "Is Representation a "Folk" Term?". [Extracted from the article]

An influential strand within Science and Technology Studies (STS) rejects the idea that science produces representations referring to objects or processes that exist independently of it. This radical 'turn' has been framed as 'constructionist', 'nominalist', and more recently as 'ontological'. Its central argument is that science constructs or enacts rather than represents. Since most practitioners of science believe that it involves representation, an implication of the radical turn must be that 'representation' is a folk concept; perhaps even a myth or an ideology. This paper explores this anti-representationalism and its implications for the relationship between STS and mainstream social science, in part through drawing parallels with ethnomethodology. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karl Mannheim's work, particularly his book Ideology and Utopia, has considerable relevance to current concerns about the public role of sociology. However, this is not widely recognised, and key aspects of his thought have frequently been neglected or disparaged. In this article the background to Mannheim's work is outlined, and a summary provided of the central argument of Ideology and Utopia, comparing this with the positions taken by Max Weber and Georg Lukács, both of whom were important influences on Mannheim. The major criticisms of, and problems with, Mannheim's argument are then addressed. While he was by no means completely successful in putting forward a convincing conception of sociology's public role, there is a great deal to be learned from his work, and from the manner in which he pursued it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, titled "Is There Quality in Qualitative Research?" by Martyn Hammersley, explores the concept of quality in qualitative research. The author questions whether quality can be objectively measured in qualitative research and suggests that it may be subjective and dependent on individual perspectives. Hammersley, an Emeritus Professor of Educational and Social Research, has written extensively on methodological issues in social inquiry. The article raises important considerations about the nature of qualitative research and invites readers to reflect on their own beliefs and perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the character of a small but detailed observational study that focused on two teams of researchers, one engaged in qualitative sociological research, the other developing statistical models. The study was presented as investigating 'the social life of methods', an approach seen by some as displacing conventional research methodology. The study drew on ethnomethodology, and was offered as a direct parallel with ethnographic and ethnomethodological investigations of natural scientists' work by Science and Technology Studies scholars. In the articles deriving from this study, the authors show how even the statisticians relied on background qualitative knowledge about the social phenomena to which their data related. The articles also document routine practices employed by each set of researchers, some 'troubles' they encountered and how they dealt with these. Another theme addressed is whether the distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches accurately characterised differences between these researchers at the level of practical reasoning. While this research is presented as descriptive in orientation, concerned simply with documenting social science practices, it operates against a background of at least implicit critique. I examine its character and the closely associated criticism of social research methodology and conventional social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Alfred Schutz's concept of 'multiple realities', and in particular, his portrayal of science as one of these realities. It is noted that, while this concept has been widely cited, it has often been interpreted in ways that are at odds with key features of Schutz's original formulation. A careful assessment is made of the main article he wrote dealing with this topic, focusing on the respects in which the 'multiple realities' he discusses are held to differ. Particular attention is given to the relationship between science and what Schutz calls 'the paramount reality', that of 'daily life'. It is suggested that there are some serious problems with the distinctions he makes and that these relate to an ambiguity in his position: that he starts from within phenomenological psychology, drawing on the work of Husserl and James, but moves in a more naturalistic and sociological direction in his account of 'the world of daily life'. This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of phenomenology and its relationship to social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the "methodology," or philosophy of social science, developed by Felix Kaufmann in the second quarter of the 20th century, with the aim of determining its influence on the early work of the sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Kaufmann's two methodology books are discussed, one written before, the other after, his migration from Austria to the United States. It is argued that Garfinkel took over Kaufmann's conception of scientific practice: as a set of procedural rules or methods that determine whether or not new propositions will be accepted into the corpus of scientific knowledge, and whether previously accepted propositions should be retained or abandoned. However, Garfinkel deployed this methodology not so much as a model for sociological inquiry, but rather for the processes by which the lifeworld is constituted—an area of investigation that is epistemologically prior to the focus of most social science, and one which had been opened up in the writings of Edmund Husserl and (especially) Alfred Schutz. It is suggested that Kaufmann's "methodology" was an important complement to the work of these other two philosophers in their influence on Garfinkel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnomethodologists have made some fundamental criticisms of conventional forms of ethnography. For example, it has been argued that they fail to examine the processes through which the phenomena studied have been constituted, and that they lack rigour because they rely upon unexplicated common-sense knowledge. In my view, these criticisms have not been given sufficient attention. This article outlines them in detail and then goes on to provide an evaluation. It is concluded that they do not provide a sufficient basis for the radical-re-specification of the focus of inquiry that ethnomethodologists propose. However, they do raise issues to which ethnographers should give more attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this article is the character of ethnomethodology and its relation to mainstream sociology, specifically as regards assumptions about the nature of social phenomena and the attitude that ought to be adopted towards these. This issue is explored mainly through the example of suicide, which has been used by some ethnomethodologists to highlight the distinctiveness of their position. The viability of three interpretations of ethnomethodology is assessed: as being agnostic regarding the ontological status of suicide and other social phenomena, as insisting that such phenomena are entirely constituted in and through processes of social interaction on particular occasions, and as itself constituting the world as one in which social phenomena are occasioned products. It is argued that none of these is sustainable, but that the plausibility of the second varies somewhat across different types of phenomena, with money being even more evidently constituted through ongoing social interaction than is suicide or death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A call to empiricists to rise up and reclaim reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A modest proposal of a sporting analogy is offered as methodological fiction about the democratization of research and the great mission such an ideal places upon qualitative inquiry. With apologies to Jonathan Swift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on what has been referred to as the 'radical critique' of interview data, to which Paul Atkinson has been an important contributor. This critique challenges the two main uses of such data in qualitative research, and in other forms of social science: to tap the knowledge of informants; and to draw inferences about the typical beliefs, attitudes, etc. of some group or category of actor to which the informant belongs. I argue that this radical critique relies upon a constructionist attitude towards the social world, and I examine one source of this: the influence of ethnomethodology. However, I suggest that a naturalistic stance can take account of the features of interviews to which the radical critique properly draws attention, without undercutting the normal uses of interview data. I emphasise that this does not obviate the need for careful consideration of how such data are produced, and particularly of the discourse practices involved. I illustrate my argument by briefly examining the opening section of an interview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to a previously published article on the ethics of interviewing for discourse analysis.

The focus is an ethical dilemma that arises, in an acute form, in interviews for studies using constructionist forms of discourse analysis. Informants typically assume that researchers are aiming to document their experiences, feelings, perspectives, etc., as features of a collectively shared world; an assumption that is probably reinforced by the rationales researchers provide, and by their behaviour. Yet, in such studies, the purpose of interviews is actually to generate displays of discursive practices, rather than to elicit information about the world or about people’s individual subjectivities. This discrepancy amounts to deception, but attempts to remedy it are likely to be counterproductive because of the gap between the natural attitude and a constructionist analytic orientation. From the perspective of some currently influential views about ethics, relating to informed consent and doing research ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ people, this would disqualify such research. However, these views are by no means beyond challenge. In these terms, discourse analysis poses important questions about currently accepted views of research ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article uses the later writings of Foucault as a means of reflecting on research ethics, and in particular on the notion of researcher autonomy. It is suggested that such autonomy is a precondition for ethical practice, and also for sound research, and it is noted that it is under threat today, not least from creeping ethical regulation. Foucault’s philosophical position is outlined, noting the shift that took place in his later writings. There have been only a few attempts to use his ideas in thinking about research ethics, but we examine how they have been applied in relation to the ethics of anthropology. This is followed by a discussion of some widely recognized, and quite serious, problems with Foucault’s position. Finally, a number of positive and negative lessons that can be learned from his work are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Analytic induction (AI) is an interpretation of scientific method that emerged in early twentieth-century sociology and still has some influence today. Among the studies often cited as examples are Becker’s articles on marijuana use. While these have been given less attention than the work of Lindesmith on opiate addiction and Cressey on financial trust violation, Becker’s work has distinctive features. Furthermore, it raises some important and interesting issues that relate not only to AI but to social scientific explanation more generally. These concern, for example, the presence and nature of causal systems in the social world, the relationship between historical and generalizing approaches, the character and role of social scientific theories, and how they are generated. In this article Becker’s research is examined in detail, and these issues explored through comparisons with the work of Lindesmith and Cressey. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article raises serious questions about the relativist approach to assessing qualitative research that has been championed by John K. Smith and various colleagues. They reject not just empiricism but also what they refer to as "neorealism." Against both these positions, they advance an antirealist, antiontological argument to the effect that we should not assume the reality of social phenomena as existing independently of our knowledge claims about them; insist that assessing the value of research findings is always a practical matter, rather than an issue of method; and claim that we must abandon epistemic in favor of moral criteria in assessing social research. On the basis of detailed scrutiny of their arguments, it is shown that neither the critique of neorealism they present nor the alternative approach they recommend is coherent or convincing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response by Martyn Hammersley about his article"Challenging Relativism," in the Volume 15 of "Qualitative Inquiry" journal is presented.

Identity is not only an important and difficult theoretical issue but also one that arises as a methodological problem. Indeed, which of the available conceptions of identity is adopted has implications for the very form that social inquiry takes. In this article, three quite different notions of identity are explored, as substantive agency, as a matter of discursive attribution, and as an analytic model. The issues involved in the use of each of these versions of identity in research are explored. In the second half of the article, in order to examine these problems in more concrete terms, we look at how they emerge in internet ethnography concerned with 'pro-ana' websites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word critical has become an honorific title used by researchers to commend their work, or the particular approach they adopt. Conversely, the work of others is often dismissed on the grounds that it is "uncritical". However, there are important questions about what the term critical means, about what we should be critical of, and about the form that criticism ought to take. These questions are addressed here in relation to both the role of the social researcher itself and that of researchers operating as public intellectuals. It is argued that the distinction between these roles is an important one, and has implications for what can legitimately be criticised, on what grounds, and in what way. In each case, there are proper limits to criticism, albeit different ones. Like anything else, criticism is not always a good thing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their article in this issue, Speer and Hutchby argue that qualitative researchers' fears about the reactive effects of audio- or video-recording on the quality of data are misplaced. They claim that these fears stem from a methodological orientation which assumes that in order to study the world we must obtain data that are unaffected by the process of research, that we should observe the social world as if through a one-way mirror. Yet, they point out, most research strategies do affect the data produced. So, the authors argue, qualitative researchers are faced with an intractable dilemma. The solution proposed is to abandon naturalism and to investigate those occasions when people address the fact that their talk is being recorded, using a conversation analytic approach. In response to this, I argue that a concern with reactivity does not imply commitment to any naïve naturalism, and that the approach recommended by the authors does not avoid this methodological problem, unless one is prepared to accept that conversation analysis is the only legitimate form of social research; a proposal for which the authors do not provide a convincing case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Difficult dilemmas face social researchers — in the field of social work and social policy, as elsewhere. These can include tensions between the following: doing what a commitment to research requires or serving policymakers; prioritizing basic inquiry or promoting applied research; having a primary concern with producing knowledge versus an immediate and urgent commitment to practical improvement in the world. These dilemmas are probably intrinsic to the position of social research in modern societies, but they are becoming more severe at the present time. It is argued that, in dealing with them, we should be clear about the distinctive character of research, as against other related activities; and must recognize its heterogeneity, identifying the dimensions that differentiate its legitimate forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Howard Becker's article 'Whose side are we on?' has been widely cited, and widely misunderstood. It has frequently been interpreted as recommending partisan research, or as suggesting that social research cannot be objective. This article examines Becker's position in detail, arguing that while there are some ambiguities within it, what it proposes is neither epistemologically nor politically radical in the way that is frequently assumed. What is true, though, is that Becker believes that systematic and rigorous sociological research inevitably tends to have radical political implications. In addition, he adopts a form of cultural relativism, whilst holding on to a notion of objectivity that is grounded in a commitment to pragmatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores metaphors in ethnography. Five moments through which qualitative research has passed; Role of researcher as bricoleur; Problems with bricolage as a model for ethnographic work.

The macro-micro problem has been a prominent feature of British sociology of education since the early 1970s. In this discipline macro and micro have each come to be associated with particular theoretical perspectives, notably Marxism and interactionism respectively. This has had several unfortunate consequences. First, arguments about the value of macro and micro work have often been little more than dismissals of one perspective by proponents of another. Second, the macro-micro debate has conflated several quite distinct methodological issues. This article focuses on one of these issues: the question of whether social events can best be explained as the product of large or small scale structures. It is claimed that this issue cannot be resolved by philosophical analysis alone, the answer is a matter for empirical discovery. Moreover, the problem cannot be settled at the moment because we have insufficient well-established theories. Only when more such theories are available will we be able to resolve the question of whether valid macro and micro theories are possible. What stands in the way of achieving this, however, is precisely what led to the fruitless character of the macro-micro dispute in the first place: the organization of the sociology of education around theoretical perspectives rather than around substantive research problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The archiving of qualitative data seems likely to become much more common in the future. It promises to make an important contribution to the development of sociological research. This contribution relates to at least two main areas. It should facilitate assessment of the validity of particular studies; and it ought to increase the scope for secondary analysis. At the same time, the archiving of qualitative data and its use are not without problems. This paper examines both the possibilities it opens up and the limits to the contribution it can make. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the author's response to comments by Caroline Ramazanoglu, Lorain Gelsthorpe and Anne Williams on his discussion of feminist methodology. Ramazanoglu attributes to me a fundamental opposition to the central tenets of feminism, claiming that I regard the whole of feminism as largely unconvincing, and complains that this only emerges piecemeal in my article rather than being stated explicitly at the beginning. What the central tenets of feminism are is a matter of dispute, I imagine, but I certainly do not reject the whole of feminism, nor does this follow from what I wrote. What I do find convincing is the case for a distinctively feminist methodology, and this is indicated at the start of my article, in the abstract. As I also make clear there, I do not deny the validity of all of the arguments that form part of the case for a feminist methodology, although I question some interpretations of them. In my view the idea of a feminist methodology suffers from the same weaknesses as all attempts to establish new research paradigms based on distinctive epistemological and/or political assumptions. One of the elements of feminist methodology that I questioned is the idea that the transformation of gender relations, which is the point of feminism, properly be the point of feminist research.

There is now a considerable literature advocating a feminist methodology. This article summarises the features of such a methodology under four headings: the ubiquitous social significance of gender, the validity of experience as against method, the rejection of hierarchy in the research relationship, and the adoption of the emancipation of women as the goal of research and the criterion of validity. The arguments supporting each of these themes are assessed. The conclusion reached is that while some of these arguments are convincing the overall case for a feminist methodology is not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper questions the commitment of ethnography to the goal of producing theoretical descriptions of particular settings, groups or organisations. It is argued that both the concepts of theory and description assumed by this goal are misconceived. Various interpretations of the concept of theory embedded in ethnographic work are examined, revealing some serious difficulties. It is also argued that the concept of ethnographic description, as currently conceived, obscures the role of values and purposes in structuring descriptions. The conclusion reached is that the goals of ethnographic research need rethinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a shortage of well-developed and systematically tested theory in sociology, and in the sociology of education in particular. The studies of the effects of streaming and banding carried out by Hargreaves, Lacey and Ball provide one of the few examples of a powerful theory which has survived systematic testing. This sequence of studies provides the basis for a research programme extending beyond the field of education. At the same time, and more importantly, this body of research offers a paradigm for case study research designed to develop and test theory. In this way it helps to close the deplorable, and much lamented, gap between theory and empirical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A paean to Trumpery, teasing its unwitting intellectual antecedents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]