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Aldous Huxley's work The Doors of Perception introduced the phrase 'Mind at Large' to the lexicon of psychedelic experience in 1954. I argue that its original presentation requires re-evaluation. I present evidence that Huxley manipulates the construction of the discourse he uses to present this phrase as a philosophically legitimate term. His choice of a pivotal quotation implies support from the conclusions of philosophers C. D. Broad and Henri Bergson. A hermeneutic analysis of this discourse highlights problems with this implication and shows that a reinterpretation of Huxley's methods and intentions is warranted. An increase in references to Mind at Large and related terms in studies of the effects of psychedelics motivates this re-evaluation of its implied philosophical value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a comparative analysis of Charles and Ray Eames' Powers of Ten, and Eva Szasz and Robert Verrall's Cosmic Zoom, seen through the lenses of Bergsonian and Deleuzo-Guttarian philosophy. The author claims that, despite similarities with respect to their subject matter and modes of production, there are significant stylistic differences between these films that are suggestive of divergent ontological, epistemological and political commitments. Of particular importance is the foregrounding of objectivity in the case of Powers of Ten and subjectivity in the case of Cosmic Zoom – a distinction that is reflected in their respectively quasi-indexical and expressive modes of representation. This fundamental tension similarly conditions their differently inflected approaches to time, space and measure, drawing attention to the strange intertwining of representation, abstraction and affect that is characteristic of much animated film. Ultimately, it is proposed that, in the context of Powers of Ten and Cosmic Zoom, animation's capacities for abstraction and expression are differently distributed, resulting in a cosmopolitical opposition which can be aligned with the Deleuzo–Guattarian distinctions between major and minor language, and royal and nomadic science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in the work of Bergson has seen a revival in political theory over the past two decades. Initially, this interest focused primarily on Bergson's earlier writings. However, recently there has been increased attention to Bergson's controversial last book – The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. This has had the benefit of bringing attention to a book frequently maligned as uneven and disappointing. At the same time, mostly absent from this renewed interest has been the subject of race. One of the great ironies of The Two Sources is that, even as it calls for an open morality, it relies on a series of regressive, racist and Eurocentric assumptions. It is this article's contention that, if we are going to see a renewed turn to The Two Sources, we must grapple with these assumptions, both to investigate how they limit the effectiveness of Bergson's argument, and to ensure that they are not smuggled into our own work. The article goes on to argue that Bergson's philosophy ultimately gives us the tools to challenge these reactionary elements; that his focus on morality as a dynamic and open-ended process provides us with the opportunity for recognizing the contingent limitations of Bergson's worldview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of time as a methodological tool and pathological focus of clinical psychiatry and psychology in the first half of the 20th century. Contextualizing 'psychopathologies of time' developed by practitioners in Europe and North America with reference to the temporal theories implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis and Henri Bergson's philosophy of durée, it illuminates how depression, schizophrenia, and other mental disorders such as obsessive-compulsive behaviours and aphasia were understood to be symptomatic of an altered or disturbed 'time-sense'. Drawing upon a model of temporal synthesis whereby in healthy individuals, a subjective temporal sense (Ichzeit, durée, or personal lifetime) was perceived and understood in relation to objective time frameworks (Weltzeit, clock-time, or quantitative time models like historical chronology), clinicians argued that mentally ill patients were unable to synthesize Ichzeit and Weltzeit, using variations in this disturbance to define specific pathological conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper brings together comics studies and geography to consider how space operates both on and off the comics page. We integrate discussion of comics' formal properties with a sitespecific comics installation (Dave McKean's The Rut) to show the intertwining of these spaces. Our argument is articulated through juxtaposition of the literature on space-time in comics with our case study. This montage speaks to graphic narratives' formal properties, especially its alchemic, emergent nature. Our argument begins by introducing The Rut as an example of how space and narrative can be intertwined. Our argument tacks back to the literature, discussing the pluralization of time-space(s) throughout recent writing within human geography and how this can help us think with The Rut. We then briefly describe the way The Rut is physically laid out. Returning once again to the literature, we argue that the topological figuration of comics is mediated by readers' practices of relation-building and narrative construction, which are in turn impacted by the irreversible nature of time. This is demonstrated for The Rut through experience of the art as well as participant observation. Finally, we highlight how actual spaces are overlaid with virtual spaces that help shape the actualized version; we illustrate this by showing how the embodied experience of The Rut's materiality was productive of a multiplicity of experiential spaces, both actual and virtual. We close by drawing three conclusions: the first about the implications of graphic narrative's relational ontology for how social scientists narrate socio-spatial processes; the second, a call for more empirical work examining the emergence, evolution, and dissipation of topological spaces; and the third about the political possibility of initiating new practices of 'reading' spaces and times to produce and access new ways of being in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the influx of neurological research into France from across Europe that took place rapidly in the late 19th century, the philosophy course in lycées (the French equivalent of high schools) was mobilized by education reformers as a means of promulgating the emergent brain sciences and simultaneously steering their cultural resonance. I contend that these linked prongs of philosophy’s public mission under the Third Republic reconciled contradictory pressures to advance the nation’s scientific prowess following its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 without dropping France’s distinct tradition of 19th-century spiritualism, which extended from Maine de Biran’s philosophical psychology to Victor Cousin’s official eclectic spiritualism. Between 1874 and 1902, the French Ministry of Public Instruction transformed philosophy into a national project designed to guide the reception of experimental psychology generally and neurology in particular. This article features original archival research on philosophy textbooks and students’ course notes that illuminate the cultural and intellectual impact of these sciences in the fin de siècle from inside the classroom. I argue that the scientific turn in the psychology section of the lycée philosophy course reflected and brought about a distinct philosophical movement that I call ‘scientific spiritualism’. While historians have analysed philosophy instruction as a mechanism used by the Third Republic to secularize students, this article sheds new light on lycée philosophy professors’ campaign to promote scientific spiritualism as a means to advance incipient brain research and pare its reductionist implications. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article uses the philosophical concepts of Henri Bergson (namely duration, intelligence, and intuition), in order to problematize ways of thinking about psychology, and how psychology produces knowledge. From this perspective, we discuss psychology as a scientific discipline and examine the differences between science and philosophy. In so doing, we deepen the understanding of the concepts of duration, time, and space, in relation to the logics of spatialized time which influence analysis in Human Sciences. We also discuss differences between ways of apprehending knowledge through intelligence and intuition, causing a change in the perspective from which we approach our objects of investigation. Finally, we propose a view of psychology in terms of duration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay demonstrates that T. E. Hulme's distinction between 'romanticism' and 'classicism' was introduced in The Commentator as part of an attempt to provide the Conservative Party with an efficient propaganda strategy. The antithesis, which Hulme proposed together with Edward Storer, was intended to demarcate an absolute ideological and philosophical difference between the Conservative and the Liberal or Labour positions; at the same time, Hulme and Storer also hoped to unify Conservative political principles under the catchword 'classicism'. Acknowledging the context in which this antithesis originated highlights the way in which the language of modernism is imbricated with political propaganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modernity, with its automobiles, recording devices, and mechanical methods of production, threatened to divorce the mind from the body by transforming the human organism into a machine, either through workers' increasingly automaton-like body movements or through the supersession of human input by mechanical input. This threat impelled modernists to reconsider the seemingly rigid machine/human and mind/body binaries. This article argues that certain modern writers, thinkers, and film-professionals (James Joyce, Henri Bergson, Charlie Chaplin, Georges M?li?s) used comedy as a way of thinking through these twin binaries. While the work of both Joyce and the film-makers clearly parallels Bergson's anti-Cartesian laughter theory, ultimately, these works anticipate Maurice Merleau-Ponty's later phenomenological ideas, particularly the concept of 'body-subjects', of humans as neither purely mechanical, nor solely cerebral, as a mixture of subjectivity and corporeality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modernity, with its automobiles, recording devices, and mechanical methods of production, threatened to divorce the mind from the body by transforming the human organism into a machine, either through workers' increasingly automaton-like body movements or through the supersession of human input by mechanical input. This threat impelled modernists to reconsider the seemingly rigid machine/human and mind/body binaries. This article argues that certain modern writers, thinkers, and film-professionals (James Joyce, Henri Bergson, Charlie Chaplin, Georges M?li?s) used comedy as a way of thinking through these twin binaries. While the work of both Joyce and the film-makers clearly parallels Bergson's anti-Cartesian laughter theory, ultimately, these works anticipate Maurice Merleau-Ponty's later phenomenological ideas, particularly the concept of 'body-subjects', of humans as neither purely mechanical, nor solely cerebral, as a mixture of subjectivity and corporeality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces back the origins of Georges Bataille's philosophy to Henri Bergson's Le Rire. It seeks to demonstrate that Bataille purposely shaped his philosophy into a 'reader-unfriendly' paradoxical writing in an effort to recreate the experience '' described in Bergson's book '' of a child unsuccessfully trying to retain a wave. Bataille made his philosophy (hètérologie) just like Bergson's laughter: something impossible to grasp, slipping through our fingers like a wave in a child's hand. To counteract the idea of sovereign truth, Bataille chose a world of glissement where he leads and misleads us, enticing us to fully commit to his words but letting us down the very moment we think we have him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Zemeckis' Beowulf (2007) is the latest film made using motion capture technology, a film that tells the story of a hero's quest to defeat a series of monsters.This article examines not only the thematic role of monstrosity in the film, but also the way in which the film's very construction, through motion capture and CGI, can be understood as monstrous. That is, after Deleuze's Cinema 2: The Time Image (1989[1985]), Beowulf can be understood as typifying a cinema that has seen a shift from montage to montrage, a cinema that shows. Analysing the aesthetics of monstrosity in Beowulf, the author also considers how the film's motion capture synthespian performances can be understood as comic through Henri Bergson's (1912[1900]) theory of laughter, which suggests that humans laugh at mechanized human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This autobiographical essay examines my inclination towards the use of the long take in documentary film and video. I discuss how my documentary practice is dominated by the take in duration; the ways in which I use the time of the frame to draw closer, in an intuitive way, to the profilmic; and how the long take makes visible the complexities of living through the representation of landscape, space, and time. I describe the process of framing my subject, what the long take signifies in the moment of its capture, as well as what the duration of my frame might express to an audience in search of meaning. I also consider the possibility that the long take is an autobiographical impulse, derived from the experience of inhabiting a landscape that is itself both time and space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to further inhabit my grandmother's memories as a young wife, I began an autobiographical, photographic record of my experiences with her recipe journal. The Hostess Project is as much a social experiment as a nostalgic experience. I dress in her clothing, prepare meals based on her hand-written recipes, serve invited guests, and perform the role of hostess. I prepare dishes based on her handwritten instruction: her recipes. Aspics, croquettes, meatloaf with pickle and egg garnish . . . And I photograph the results. This article describes the origins of The Hostess Project and explores the relationship between time and memory, photography and memory, and food and memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marcel Poëte was a founding figure of French urbanisme, or town planning, both its pedagogy and its codification as a discipline and practice in the early twentieth century. The philosophy of Henri Bergson was central to his writings on the city and teaching at the École des Hautes Études Urbaines. I argue that Poëte's use of Bergson's philosophy, his ideas of the vital impulse and duration, may be understood in two ways. First, Poëte's Bergsonian urbanism participates in the greater context of continental fascism wherein Bergson's vitalism fomented a critique of scientific positivism and class hierarchy. Second, Poëte imports Bergson's ideas of time, la durée or duration, and "creative evolution," into urbanisme as a means of resistance to vulgar functionalism in architecture and town planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]