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In surveys, Europeans routinely express high levels of support for a common security and defence policy of the European Union. Do these responses reflect real demands or superficial support that would crumble if the issue was politicised? This article provides new answers to this question. We conducted pre-registered survey experiments with more than 40,000 respondents from 25 European countries in which we randomly varied whether respondents received information about potential costs of two hypothetical cooperative activities: military operations and defence procurement. Support for these activities was systematically lower when costs were mentioned. We conclude that, in the event of politicisation, there is considerable potential for shifts in opinion and that caution is required in deriving a mandate for specific activities from high approval rates for cooperation in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU aims to advance to a relevant and autonomous actor in international politics—especially concerning security and defense politics. Scholars interested in whether the EU member states actually converge in their security and defense preferences often analyze strategy papers qualitatively, focusing on selected countries at specific points in time. In this article, we propose a dictionary approach for analyzing the development of security and defense preferences within the EU over the last three decades using quantitative text analysis. We make use of 163 strategy papers, published by all EU member states and the EU itself since 1994. The findings show that EU member states react similarly to international events, but do not converge substantially in their preferences. Furthermore, there is no substantial convergence to the position of the EU itself. We finally discuss usefulness and validity of quantitative text analysis in comparative research more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illiberal regimes use overt and covert political communication to influence public opinion in democracies. We present an argument about how such propaganda impacts targeted publics. We posit that effectiveness depends on whether the source of the message is revealed, on the nature of the issue, and on individual characteristics of the recipients. We test these propositions in Germany, in the context of Kremlin messaging, using eight survey experiments administered to a large sample of German voters (n = 2, 303). Citizens who mistrust the government, believe in conspiracy theories, or are generally disconnected from politics are vulnerable to propaganda warfare that involves anti-mainstream messaging, while the rest of the populace is not. At the same time, providing a pro-Western, mainstream viewpoint and outing the Russian source are not generally effective countermeasures. We discuss the implications of illiberal regime communication for information wars between states and for the internal workings of democratic politics.* [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with the role of perceived policy objectives in German citizens' attitude formation toward military action in Afghanistan. While some scholars have claimed that public opinion is prudent because citizens assess the effectiveness of a mission on the basis of these perceptions, micro-level tests of this kind of prudence remain scare. Drawing on two cross-sectional surveys of the German population conducted in 2008 and 2009, we use responses to open-ended questions about the German government's policy goals in Afghanistan to analyze whether such perceptions influenced support and whether any such influence was mediated via the perceived effectiveness of the mission. The results indicate that, irrespective of the level of political awareness, it was virtually irrelevant what German citizens perceived the military mission's objectives to be. In contrast, value-based attitude formation emerges as more important, with the foreign policy predispositions antimilitarism and Atlanticism exhibiting especially large effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]