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How does the withdrawal of troops after a military intervention supporting the government affect the number of rebel groups in the long term? This study argues that the withdrawal of foreign support for the government affects the number of rebels by directly provoking a nationalist backlash in the short term and threatening government legitimacy in the long term. Whether or not nationalism is provoked and whether legitimacy is enhanced or eroded depend on whether or not it was a humanitarian intervention. If rebels win, the intervention withdrawals also indirectly affect the number of rebel groups in the long term through the militias' presence. Using interrupted time-series estimates between 1961 and 2005, this study found that humanitarian intervention withdrawals decrease the number of rebel groups in the long term, whereas nonhumanitarian intervention withdrawals promote the growth of militias and increase the number of rebel groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do negotiations occur in civil war? How does military intervention alter this process? While the existing literature presents models of the onset of negotiations – both mediated and unassisted – they are incomplete if they do not consider third-party states involved in the conflict prior to negotiations. I argue that military intervention impacts negotiation onset by adjusting barriers to negotiation through three pathways: the likelihood of military victory, the risk of signaling weakness, and the presence of additional veto players. I examine these mechanisms using logistic random effects models on a dataset of African civil wars. An extension of the argument addresses how expectations of intervention shape conflict behavior. Rebel-supporting interventions, interventions with independent interests, and asymmetric interventions lead to an increase in the likelihood of negotiations occurring. Models controlling for expectations of intervention also suggest that third parties can impact belligerents' behavior through both expectations and follow-through. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As European radical right parties grow in influence, and as foreign and security policy becomes more politicised, these parties have increasing potential to shape national debates on international affairs. This paper shows how radical right opposition parties seek to exploit policy dilemmas surrounding military intervention according to the nature of the political opportunity these dilemmas present in specific national settings. Its findings are based on qualitative comparative case studies of Front National, AfD and UKIP responses to intervention debates surrounding the Syrian civil war in France, Germany and the UK. I find that non-intervention is not an absolute value for radical right parties. Whilst liberal-humanitarian interventions are uniformly rejected, interventions on national security grounds, whether to combat Jihadist threats or prevent uncontrolled migration, prompt a range of responses shaped by the domestic political context. Yet even where these parties back intervention in votes, their discourse focuses on fitting the issue to the populist dimensions of their political agenda, especially attacking mainstream rivals for incompetence, duplicity or incoherence, and failing to protect the sovereignty and ethnic integrity of the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does how intervener airpower affect civil war parties' ability to take and hold territory? I argue that airpower can have both short- and long-term effects on an actor's ability to take and hold territory, by reducing its ability to effectively fight its adversary. Using novel, disaggregated data, I conduct a quantitative within-case study of 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. I find that the NATO air campaign made the Libyan government less likely to capture territory in the short term, and that airstrikes reduced its ability to capture territory in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of politics, states have viewed military intervention as one of their tools of foreign policy. However, many scholars have not agreed on the effectiveness of military means in achieving the foreign policy objectives of states. Like other states, Ethiopia and Kenya have used the military as a means of foreign policy and tested their tools in Somalia practically. However, the effectiveness of their foreign policy tool has not been studied. That is why this article's main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of Ethiopian and Kenyan foreign policies that used military interventions to achieve their foreign policy goals in terms of outcomes. In doing so, the article used a comparative case study methodology. Besides, the 'good enough' approach is the proper theoretical lens that is used in this article to comprehend Ethiopia's and Kenya's operational outcomes. The analysis comes to the conclusion that both Kenya's and Ethiopia's military deployments in Somalia generally failed to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Accordingly, the findings reveal that using hard power as a tool of foreign policy without combining soft power is largely unsuccessful, as indicated by Ethiopia's and Kenya's military engagement in Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While scholars have made many claims about US military interventions, they have not come to a consensus on main trends and consequences. This article introduces a new, comprehensive dataset of all US military interventions since the country's founding, alongside over 200 variables that allow scholars to evaluate theoretical propositions on drivers and outcomes of intervention. It compares the new Military Intervention Project (MIP) dataset to the current leading dataset, the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID). In sum, MIP doubles the universe of cases, integrates a range of military intervention definitions and sources, expands the timeline of analysis, and offers more transparency of sourcing through historically-documented case narratives of every US military intervention included in the dataset. According to MIP, the US has undertaken almost 400 military interventions since 1776, with half of these operations undertaken between 1950 and 2019. Over 25% of them have occurred in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decade-long search for Osama bin Laden—in which a manhunt was conducted as part of a full-scale war—was a watershed moment for US foreign policy in the twenty-first Century. Bin Laden was not simply elusive, but ephemerally ghost-like. Similar Militarized Interstate Manhunts (MIMs) are also deeply ingrained in the security politics of the US at its Southwestern border. Specifically, the militarized cross-border pursuits of Pancho Villa in the 1910s and The Apache Kid in the 1890s, serve as analogs to the "War on Terror," especially regarding the allegedly-novel chasing of "ghostly" targets. Building on Jacques Derrida, we explore the role of an "absent/presence" by analyzing the claims of the ghostliness of the target in the context of concurrent claims about the unprecedented nature of events. These cases highlight the importance of the "absent/presence" in making military manhunts thinkable, and explain how the pursuit of "spectral" bodies authorizes exceptional military acts that would otherwise be violations of state sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resource curse literature shows that natural resources, particularly oil, help regime or leadership survival, but it also suggests that resource-rich countries are prone to civil wars or political instability. This article argues that the ownership structure of the oil sector matters and influences leadership survival. Specifically, foreign ownership of the oil sector raises leaders' survival prospect and leads to more military interventions aimed to help the leader. Using data on oil ownership and leaders from 1962 to 2006 across 120 developing countries, this article finds that foreign involvement in the oil sector has a negative effect on leadership turnover. Countries with deeper foreign involvement in the oil sector are also more likely to experience military interventions on the side of the leaders. In other words, leaders of oil-producing countries do receive political support when they cooperate with and serve as 'petro-friends' to foreign powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpretations of Russia's military intervention in Syria overwhelmingly focus on Russia's political motivations. An alternative view foregrounds Russia's economic motivations, namely, the construction of a multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline traversing Iran, Iraq and Syria. This article examines the salience of Russia's economic motivations and considers two related aspects: First, if Russian intervention aims to secure areas of strategic importance for the proposed pipeline. Second, if Russian intervention realises longer term political and commercial interests that include proposed future pipeline projects. The evidence suggests Russian military policies towards Syria are unlikely to be motivated primarily by the prospect of a proposed gas pipeline, but that regime consolidation is a more immediate policy goal. This article then posits that Russian intervention has a distinct 'dual logic' aimed at integrating the interests of key regional actors into a transnational energy network, while stabilising Russia's regional dominance within this network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do human rights organizations (HROs) aid the consolidation of democracy in post-authoritarian states? It is often argued that these groups contribute to accountability for past repression. Yet HROs can have unintended consequences if they threaten the interests of powerful domestic institutions. This paper develops a simple model of human rights activism in post-authoritarian states. Civilian governments in these states trade off support from the military and human rights activists which seek to punish the military. Counterintuitively, the model predicts human rights activists make amnesty for the military more likely, as activists tempt the government to punish the military and the military becomes more likely to intervene in politics. The model's implications are tested using a sample of post-authoritarian states from 1970-2010. Results show that more HRO influence increases the likelihood of amnesty laws and military involvement in government, though HROs may achieve justice through pathways such as truth commissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidents have significant incentives to mislead the public about the use of force. Under what conditions are members of the public willing to hold presidents accountable for what they say about military action? This article examines both spin and deceit at the micro-level to clarify when individuals are most likely to punish presidents for misinformation. Three survey experiments demonstrate that presidents incur political costs for misinformation, even when operations succeed. Introducing partisanship into the analysis then reveals that not all individuals are equally likely to punish all presidents—Republican leaders primarily concerned with their base have the most leeway to mislead. The findings highlight the dynamic nature of democratic accountability and domestic constraints on military force. Rather than a static institutional feature, the strength of accountability can vary across presidents and electoral coalitions. Additionally, the results show political costs are not limited to large-scale deception—even spin generates backlash. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the oil wealth of a potential target state affect the likelihood of the US public favoring the use of military force? Recent studies suggest that public opinion on foreign policy is responsive to the core characteristics of target states, such as regime type and majority religion. This article advances this research agenda by examining the effects of intra-regime heterogeneity in respect of an important characteristic of target states: their oil wealth. To examine the relationship between oil wealth and US public opinion on war, we fielded a conjoint experiment with US citizens. Respondents chose between hypothetical pairs of target states that varied across seven different intra-regime characteristics. We found that that the oil wealth of a target exerts a statistically significant (albeit small) effect on public support for the use of force, independent of the effects of other regime characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once considered artifacts of history, research on coups has burgeoned recently. Most studies focus on decisions to stage coups, considering factors like individual benefits, organizational interests, and government legitimacy. Less work considers what happens following coups. This article considers the political trajectory of states following coups. We argue that external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival. We test our argument by considering how international responses to coups from states and international organizations influence coup states' political trajectories. Our findings indicate that international actors play key roles in determining democracy levels of coup-born regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what circumstances will the public support military intervention in other countries? Recent answers have focused on the importance of identity and attachment to one's nation to explain variation in public support. We posit that some segments of the public are more willing than others to support military action even when there is perceived risk due to a psychological attachment to veterans. We distinguish kinship, geographic, and psychological forms of propinquity and argue that the psychological attachment of an individual to a group drives disparate attitudes about military force when their group is threatened. Using a unique national data set, we examine public attitudes across a range of hypothetical and actual military interventions and find that psychological attachment, measured using identity fusion, helps to explain the pattern of support across interventions. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings on the use of force literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to experience outside military intervention than are wars with other causes. Wars caused by commitment problems are more likely to draw in outside states because they tend to be more severe and produce larger war aims. These larger stakes create both threats and opportunities for non-belligerent states thereby prompting military intervention. The greater stakes also generate incentives for belligerent states to seek outside aid. This relationship between commitment problems and intervention implies that while certain types of wars may be more likely to experience intervention, the same causes can explain both intervention and war initiation. The argument is tested on the Correlates of War Interstate War dataset using logit-based generalized linear models. The findings support the commitment problem hypothesis and have implications for the bargaining framework and for theories about the causes of multilateral and general wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine the foreign policy implications of different types of investment flows. North–South investment is more sensitive to political risks (expropriation, default, civil war) than North–North investment. We argue that North–South investment flows create a constituency within the US financial sector that is likely to support stabilising intervention – military intervention aimed at reducing political risk abroad. Examining political action committee donations from Fortune 500 financial firms with a cross-sectional Tobit model, we find that US financial firms with greater exposure to the Global South are likely to favour congressional candidates with a record of voting for intervention in developing countries. This study contributes to the literature on economic interdependence and peace, proposes an original method for capturing the revealed preferences of political actors, and enhances our understanding of the sectoral underpinnings of foreign policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a new data set on the strategies and tactics employed by belligerents in 197 internal armed conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2013. The Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) data set provides scholars with a rich new source of information to facilitate investigations of how regimes and their foreign supporters have responded to insurgent threats and the effects of actors' force employment choices on a wide variety of intra- and postconflict outcomes. In addition to seventeen novel variables that measure the strategies and tactics employed by governments and intervening states, the STAC data set contains independently coded measures of many variables that overlap with existing data sets—a feature that facilitates the replication of existing studies and robustness checks on the results of new studies. We demonstrate the utility of the STAC data with an analysis of the impact of rebel mobilization on the basis of ethnicity on the propensity of governments to employ forced resettlement, civilian protection, civilian welfare projects, and civilian targeting to counter the insurgent threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this text is to describe the three categories that the Drug Policy Program at the Center for Teaching and Research in Economics (CIDE-PPD) database comprises, their limitations, and their main features. Additionally, we explain what we believe to be the source of the database we originally received and analyze its accuracy by comparing it with public records. We describe the validation and codification processes the database was subjected to, as well as the main biases and limitations the database may have. Additionally, we offer a preliminary analysis of the type of research that the CIDE-PPD Database can support. This analysis is not only relevant to those interested in studying the "war on drugs" in Mexico but also to those studying conflict in other countries involved in illegal drug production and trafficking, as well as countries experiencing conflicts related to organized crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research shows that the combined presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and military interventions can serve as 'force multipliers', leading to improvements in some human security outcomes. In this paper, we examine a couple possible mechanisms that can help to explain why we see these improvements. More specifically, we ask whether this is a result of military intervention aiding in the coordination among NGOs or whether humanitarian interventions, that likely share similar goals with human rights NGOs, provide the security necessary for them to carry out their missions. Using data on military interventions and human rights NGOs, we find that NGOs present in states with humanitarian interventions have more network ties than organizations not in states with interventions. Using the same NGO data and data on terror attacks targeting NGOs, we find less support for the security enhancing effects of humanitarian interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to the expansive literature on military casualties and support for war, we know very little about public reactions to foreign civilian casualties. This article, based on representative sample surveys in the United States and Britain, reports four survey experiments weaving information about civilian casualties into vignettes about Western military action. These produce consistent evidence of civilian casualty aversion: where death tolls were higher, support for force was invariably and significantly lower. Casualty effects were moderate in size but robust across our two cases and across different scenarios. They were also strikingly resistant to moderation by other factors manipulated in the experiments, such as the framing of casualties or their religious affiliation. The importance of numbers over even strongly humanizing frames points toward a utilitarian rather than a social psychological model of casualty aversion. Either way, civilian casualties deserve a more prominent place in the literature on public support for war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As research on leaders matures, a next step is a better understanding of the advisers who surround them. This article explores the often-hidden politics of leader–adviser interactions, focusing on how leaders strategically manage elite cues from within their own circle that could engage otherwise dormant or permissive public opinion. Advisers can serve as cue givers when leaders contemplate the use of force, but leaders can shape which cues reach the public by accommodating advisers. This article explores this argument by combining a survey experiment with a case study of the 2009 escalation in Afghanistan, illustrating how the dynamics identified in the experiment motivate the president to bargain with advisers whose support or opposition would most influence public opinion. An important implication is that in the real world, damaging cues found in survey experiments may be diminished in volume or may not reach the public, whereas helpful cues could be magnified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research emphasizes the effectiveness of biased third parties and their use of leverage in resolving conflicts. However, scholars fail to explore systematically the conditions under which conflict management strategies straddle the confines between mediatory techniques and approaches more commonly associated with joining behavior. This article examines the threshold between neutral conflict management and overt joining by offering a model of third-party intervention based on the notion of international social proximity and situated within the familiar opportunity–willingness framework. Our arguments are tested with a novel combination of data on biased joining from Corbetta and Dixon and data on neutral mediatory efforts from Frazier and Dixon. Our findings reveal that the application of biased leverage and mediation is rare but salient, and asymmetrical ties between third parties and combatants explain their occurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How may the legitimacy of rebel groups shape the decisions of third-party states to support insurgencies militarily? In aiming to better understand how the (group-level) attributes of insurgencies motivate interventions on their behalf, we argue that the size of rebel forces serves as a proxy for a revolution’s perceived legitimacy within the international community. Specifically, we maintain that the larger the insurgency, the greater the insurgency’s perceived legitimacy and, thus, the more likely intervention on its behalf becomes. This analysis challenges previous studies that have confined the causal salience of faction size to relative capabilities or strength, and it also underscores the controversial policy implications of this finding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, Armed Forces & Society published Ali’s work, “Contradiction of Concordance Theory: Failure to Understand Military intervention in Pakistan.” Shortly thereafter in 2015, Schiff, the author of concordance theory, defended her theory with “Concordance Theory in Pakistan: Response to Zulfiqar Ali.” To this, Ali reiterated his position with, “Pakistan, Military Coup and Concordance: Four Objections to Schiff.” In response to Ali’s ideas, this article argues that Ali’s accounts not only lack theoretical and methodological rigor but also suffer from empirical fallacies and factual errors. Thus, he has failed to understand military intervention in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protests and democratic transitions tend to spread cross-nationally. Is this true of all political events? We argue that the mechanisms underlying the diffusion of mass-participation events are unlikely to support the spread of elite-led violence, particularly coups. Further, past findings of coup contagion employed empirical techniques unable to distinguish clustering, common shocks, and actual diffusion. To investigate which events diffuse and where, we combine modern spatial dependence models with extreme bounds analysis (EBA). EBA allows for numerous modeling alternatives, including diffusion timing and the controls, and calculates the distribution of estimates across all combinations of these choices. We also examine various diffusion pathways, such as contagion among trade partners. Results from nearly 1.2 million models clearly undercut coup contagion. In comparison, we confirm that more mass-driven political events robustly spread cross-nationally. Our findings contribute to studies of political conflict and contagion, while introducing EBA as an effective tool for diffusion scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the effect of parliamentary involvement on security policy. Building on Democratic Peace Theory, it examines whether democracies with a parliamentary veto power are indeed less likely to participate in military interventions, than democracies without such a veto power, ceteris paribus. By studying patterns of participation across 25 to 35 countries in five military missions, this paper finds modest evidence for such a parliamentary peace and suggests that it depends on the character of the military mission in question. If a mission is framed as a test case of alliance solidarity, as was the case with OEF and the Iraq War, domestic institutional constraints can be trumped by alliance politics. If, however, countries enjoy more discretion in deciding on the use of force, domestic constraints such as parliamentary war powers have a tangible impact on government policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large literature has emerged in political science that studies the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This article summarizes the lessons learned from this literature, both theoretical and practical. To put this emerging knowledge base into perspective, we review findings along two dimensions of conflict: factors influencing whether states or substate groups enter into conflict in the first place and variables affecting the intensity of fighting at particular times and places once war has started. We then discuss the external validity issues entailed in learning about contemporary wars and insurgencies from research focused on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars during the period of US involvement. We close by summarizing the uniquely rich qualitative and quantitative data on these wars (both publicly available and what likely exists but has not been released) and outline potential avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we contend that the current gender and conflict literature ignores the context of military decisions and thus underestimates the support of women for certain types of military interventions. We argue that the issues related to humanitarian crises are likely to provoke support from women. Consequently, as more women enter elected positions in state legislatures, the more likely a state will become involved in a humanitarian military intervention. To test our argument, we compile a data set of humanitarian military interventions and women legislators from 1946 to 2003. A series of estimation approaches and robustness tests support our assertion that more women legislators impact the likelihood that a state will become involved in a humanitarian military intervention. Our research has specific implications on the role of gender in conflict processes and more general implications on the connection between domestic political processes and foreign policy decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent can international peacekeeping promote micro-foundations for positive peace after violence? Drawing on macro-level peacekeeping theory, our approach uses novel experimental methods to illustrate how monitoring and enforcement by a neutral third party could conceivably enhance prosocial behavior between rival groups in a tense, postconflict peacekeeping environment. Using a laboratory experiment in postwar Kosovo, we find that third-party enforcement is more effective at promoting norms of trust between ethnic Serbs and Albanians than monitoring alone or no intervention at all. We then consider real-world extensions for building positive peace across different intervention environments. Using a dictator experiment that exploits heterogeneity in NATO peacekeeping in different regions of Kosovo, our inferences about monitoring and enforcement appear robust to ecological conditions in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to explain the pattern of contributions to NATO's military campaign in Libya. It combines collective action theory with hypotheses on balance of threat, alliance politics, and domestic constraints in a multicausal framework, which is tested with qualitative comparative analysis. The results suggest novel inferences on the interactions between partisan politics, and the benefits states wish to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to support Operation Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. Whereas left-wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute significantly to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-wing governments only contributed if their countries' interests were threatened by the crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation's success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study examines the effect of foreign military interventions on the incidence of suicide attacks. It presents three theoretical explanations. Foreign military interventions may boost insurgent use of suicide attacks by (a) fomenting a nationalist backlash that sanctions the use of more extreme and unconventional tactics like suicide attacks, (b) providing more and better targets against which suicide attacks can be launched, or (c) prompting insurgents to use suicide tactics in order to overcome their power asymmetries and to confront better defended targets that are enhanced by interventions. We test these competing explanations using a battery of statistical tests on cross-national, time-series data for 138 countries during the period from 1981 to 2005. We find that only foreign interventions with specific features -- pro-government interventions involving larger numbers of ground troops -- boost suicide attacks in countries experiencing interventions. This finding suggests that by tipping the balance of power against insurgents and hardening targets in the context of assisting a local government, foreign military interventions are likely to increase the use of suicide attacks by regime challengers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a theory of coups that centers around coordination and learning. The military is modeled as many officers who only want to join a coup if others join as well (i.e., coordination). If the current regime has survived past coup attempts, it is common knowledge that it is relatively strong (i.e., learning). Combining these effects, once the regime survives the first period, officers know that the regime is strong enough that they may refrain from staging a coup—regardless of how dissatisfied they may become with the status quo—under the mutually enforcing expectation that no other officer will rebel. The model has other equilibria where coup attempts can occur after the first period, allowing for more detailed empirical predictions. The analysis highlights several reasons why new regimes are prone to coups, but among regimes surviving the initial turmoil, structural factors that would seem to predict coup attempts can have an ambiguous effect. The model also makes novel predictions about how the “initial conditions” of a regime as well as what kinds of changes to payoffs affect the likelihood of coups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the narratives produced in Associated Press, The New York Times and The Times (of London) reports surrounding key events in Kosovo and Syria, leading to calls for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, and the construction of perceptions and cultural memories of the conflicts in which they are wielded. The article argues that the narrative themes emerging from this coverage produced uncritical calls for military intervention that are limited and ubiquitous, narrowly delineated the options for response and understanding, relied heavily on press briefings of those that advocate military intervention (ignoring alternative voices), failed to provide deep-level analysis of the conflicts, and remained constant across all three media outlets and across both the Račak and Ghouta events. The article then examines the implications, arguing that the coverage can be understood as the deployment of weaponized media on a battlefield of public opinion and wielded in a way necessitating Western military action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy, human rights, and terrorism are major foreign policy issues. However, among these issues, what do the US leaders care about the most? This study assesses the degree to which Washington responds militarily to threats to democratic institutions, human rights abuses, and terrorist activity in other countries. Based on a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 164 countries for the years 1981 to 2005, this study presents empirical models that evaluate the relative importance of these issues for contemporary American foreign and security policy. It turns out that, all other things being equal, the United States is likely to engage in military campaigns for humanitarian reasons that focus on human rights protection rather than for its own security interests such as democracy promotion or terrorism reduction. This finding is extremely robust and reinforced by case illustrations that support a causal explanation for US intervention with a basic and sustained place for human rights protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This article expands the concept of 'audience costs' from the military realm to the realm of economic coercion. • 'Audience costs' occur when an executive publicly commits to a coercive foreign policy action and subsequently reneges as public approval will decline. • An experiment specifies when the public will support economic or military coercion, and how this preference affects the evaluation of executives who renege on threats. • The findings suggest that audience costs do occur when the executive threatens economic sanctions and subsequently reneges, similar to military coercion. • However, I find that inconsistency is not punished when a leader reneges after threatening military intervention in a crisis that does not threaten national security. I specify the role public support for economic and military coercion and reactions to executive inconsistencies play in generating and/or weakening approval for executives. In times of international crises, these factors may compete against each other when it comes to determining public approval. To examine this claim, I conducted a survey experiment on a representative sample of adults to determine when audiences will support economic or military coercion, and how this willingness to support specific coercive action affects their evaluation of the executive's handling of international crises. I find that public policy preferences can have a stronger effect than a preference for having a leader behave consistently. Specifically, I find that (1) executive inconsistency is not punished when a leader backs down from a military commitment in a non-threatening crisis, (2) executive inconsistencies are not only punished in military disputes but also in cases of economic coercion (punishment is in fact more prominent in sanctions cases), and (3) executive inconsistency can be punished both in major and lesser conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What motivates the United States, the world’s most powerful country, to seek multilateral approval from the United Nations or NATO for its military interventions? Drawing on interviews with top-level US policymakers and combining process tracing with a structured-focused comparison of several cases, this article reveals that American leaders do not value multilateral approval primarily to avert negative issue linkage, or ‘soft balancing’ in other policy domains. Instead, they are motivated by narrower concerns. Their main goal is to facilitate sustained military and financial burden sharing on the prospective intervention, in the expectation that this will assuage congressional concerns about resource costs, reducing the risk that Congress might withdraw its support once American troops are deployed. The article therefore demonstrates that (1) US policymakers worry less about issue linkage than many International Relations theorists, as policymakers are confident that overall, US power inclines other countries to bandwagon with the United States, and (2) contrary to widespread belief, executive-branch concerns about congressional opposition do significantly influence US military intervention decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the Mexican government launched an aggressive campaign to weaken drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). The security policies differed significantly from those of previous administrations in the use of a leadership strategy (the targeting for arrest of the highest levels or core leadership of criminal networks). While these strategies can play an important role in disrupting the targeted criminal organization, they can also have unintended consequences, increasing inter-cartel and intra-cartel fighting and fragmenting criminal organizations. What impact do captures of senior drug cartel members have on the dynamics of drug-related violence? Does it matter if governments target drug kingpins versus lower-ranked lieutenants? We analyze whether the captures or killings of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drug-related violence and whether the violence spills over spatially. To estimate effects that are credibly causal, we use different empirical strategies that combine difference-in-differences and synthetic control group methods. We find evidence that captures or killings of drug cartel leaders have exacerbating effects not only on DTO-related violence but also on homicides that affect the general population. Captures or killings of lieutenants, for their part, only seem to exacerbate violence in “strategic places” or municipalities located in the transportation network. While most of the effects on DTO-related violence are found in the first six months after a leader’s removal, effects on homicides affecting the rest of the population are more enduring, suggesting different mechanisms through which leadership neutralizations breed violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a genealogical analysis of the relationship between liberal state violence and the contemporary liberal will-to-care by way of an exploration of what is sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian war’. I explore the historical convergence of contemporary human rights norms with military intervention in the post-Cold War context. I suggest that, far from representing a limit upon state violence in the present, human rights in fact move us closer to the ‘emancipation’ of state violence as an instrument of liberal police power. Further I take up the question of the law as it structures and shapes this emergent form of state violence more directly. Focusing on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), I suggest that the form of power that is made possible by military humanitarian interventions, and in doctrines such as R2P in particular, is an international variant of what Michel Foucault termed the power of the ‘police’. I suggest that thinking about this power as a form of distributional authority may be helpful in holding to account both liberal interventionism and its underlying will-to-order in favour of an international politics of care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does military intervention affect civilian death tolls? Existing research has focused on international actors’ ability to limit ongoing slaughter but has not examined their ability to prevent the emergence or escalation of such killing. I develop a theory of government killing that accounts not only for the government’s decision to kill civilians but also for the transference of the killing order from leader to perpetrator, and for the perpetrator’s implementation of that order. Focusing on the principal–agent relationship produces new expectations about the effects of military intervention on government killing. I find that international actors are well equipped to limit civilian slaughter: intervention supporting the government decreases the likelihood that a government orders civilians killed. Intervention against the government leads to a decrease in death tolls when killing occurs. Ultimately, supportive intervention is a useful means of preventing government killing, while oppositional intervention limits its escalation once it begins. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines how a discourse of crime and justice is beginning to play a significant role in justifying international military operations. It suggests that although the coupling of war with crime and justice is not a new phenomenon, its present manifestations invite careful consideration of the connection between crime and political theory. It starts by reviewing the notion of sovereignty to look then at the history of the criminalisation of war and the emergence of new norms to constrain sovereign states. In this context, it examines the three ways in which military force has recently been authorised: in Iraq, in Libya and through drones in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. It argues the contemporary coupling of military technology with notions of crime and justice allows the reiteration of the perpetration of crimes by the powerful and the representation of violence as pertaining to specific dangerous populations in the space of the international. It further suggests that this authorises new architectures of authority, fundamentally based on military power as a source of social power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2001, international attention has focused on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and specifically on the question of whether external intervention can assist weak or fragile states in successfully making the transition to stable democracies. This article analyzes the U.S. occupations of Japan beginning in 1945, Afghanistan beginning in 2001, and Iraq beginning in 2003, and uses these cases to review and critique the literature on why some interventions have been more successful than others in building robust and effective state institutions. The comparative analysis suggests that external interveners face substantial barriers to state-building in circumstances that lack favorable domestic preconditions. The United States has been more successful when preserving existing state capacity than when attempting to build state strength where it did not previously exist. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Empirical research has shown how the role of institutions, civic culture, ethnic fractionalisation, the political economy, and demographic factors affect the stability of democracies, but none has explored the role of the military as an institution that can drastically influence the process of democratic consolidation. This led many scholars to notice how the study of comparative democratisation has been state-centric, but it has largely neglected the role of the military in determining post-transitional outcomes. Thus, this study takes on this challenge by examining the role of the military in the democratisation process more than 30 years after the third wave. The results suggest that highly politicised military structures among transitional states have a deleterious effect on the quality of democracy. More specifically, if the military has institutionalised its role in politics as being interventionist, the likelihood of democratic consolidation becomes difficult. The article highlights the importance of restricting reserved domains granted to the military in the transition process in order to strengthen prospects for democratic stability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the effect of foreign armed intervention on human rights conditions in target countries. It is argued that military intervention contributes to the rise of state repression by enhancing the state’s coercive power and encouraging more repressive behavior, especially when it is supportive or neutral toward the target government. Results from bivariate probit models estimated on time-series cross-section data show that supportive and neutral interventions increase the likelihood of extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture. Hostile interventions increase only the probability of political imprisonment. The involvement of an intergovernmental organization or a liberal democracy as an intervener is unlikely to make any major difference in the suggested negative impact of intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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International organizations (IOs) frequently link their military interventions with democratization efforts in the target state. However, existing research suggests that these attempts often fail. This article analyzes the conditions under which interventions by IOs shorten or prolong civil war dyads. When militarily strong rebel groups with low public support expect externally enforced democratization, they have incentives to continue fighting. These incentives arise when democratization leads to power shifts that cause commitment problems for belligerents with high popular support. Cox hazards models are used to test the article’s hypotheses on a new data set on African rebel leaders’ ethnicity. The results demonstrate that IO interventions with democratization mandates are only associated with shorter conflicts if rebel leaders come from ethnic groups representing more than 10 percent of a country’s population. IO interventions without democratization mandates are not associated with shorter conflict duration and show no interaction effect with the rebels’ ethnic support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines the place of the military in the unprecedented ten-year survival of Nigeria’s democracy. Two competing hypotheses are presented. Was democratic stability a product of (1) improvements in democratic governance or (2) characterized with the Nigerian armed forces? Although neither hypothesis can be rejected, military factors appear to provide the strongest explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks from recipient countries, while U.S. military interventions are liable to increase this supply. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid, with a special emphasis on supporting education, and use military interventions more sparingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, public support can play a crucial role in the decisions to initiate and terminate military action. Some scholars argue that the public holds "prudent" opinions regarding the use of the military—supporting efforts to stop aggression but not to engage in nation building. We argue that what seems like a "prudent" opinion may be driven more by the White House's rhetoric. Experimental tests show that the rhetorical complexity has a more powerful impact on the respondent's support for military action than the actual policy goal, although this result is substantially tempered by political awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]