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Devising effective cost-containment strategies in public insurance programs requires understanding the distribution of health care spending and characteristics of high-cost enrollees. The aim was to characterize high-cost enrollees in a state’s public insurance program and determine whether expenditure inequality changes over time, or with changes in cost-sharing policies or program eligibility. We use 1999-2011 claims and enrollment data from the Alabama Children’s Health Insurance Program, ALL Kids. All children enrolled in ALL Kids were included in our study, including multiple years of enrollment (N = 1,031,600 enrollee-months). We examine the distribution of costs over time, whether this distribution changes after increases in cost sharing and expanded eligibility, patient characteristics that predict high-cost status, and examine health services used by high-cost children to identify what is preventable. The top 10% (1%) of enrollees account for about 65.5% (24.7%) of total program costs. Inpatient and outpatient costs are the largest components of costs incurred by high-cost utilizers. Non-urgent emergency department costs are a relatively small portion. Average expenditure increases over time, particularly after expanded eligibility, and the share of costs incurred by the top 10% and 1% increases slightly. Multivariable logistic regression results indicate that infants and older teens, Caucasian children, and those with chronic conditions are more likely to be high-cost utilizers. Increased cost sharing does not reduce cost concentration or average expenditure among high-cost utilizers. These findings suggest that identifying and targeting potentially preventable costs among high-cost utilizers are called for to help reduce costs in public insurance programs.

This study investigates whether new enrollees in the Alabama Children’s Health Insurance Program have different claims experience from renewing enrollees who do not have a lapse in coverage and from continuing enrollees. The analysis compared health services utilization in the first month of enrollment for new enrollees (who had not been in the program for at least 12 months) with utilization among continuing enrollees. A second analysis compared first-month utilization of those who renew immediately with those who waited at least 2 months to renew. A 2-part model estimated the probability of usage and then the extent of usage conditional on any utilization. Claims data for 826 866 child-years over the period from 1999 to 2012 were used. New enrollees annually constituted a stable 40% share of participants. Among those enrolled in the program, 13.5% renewed on time and 86.5% of enrollees were late to renew their enrollment. In the multivariate 2-part models, controlling for age, gender, race, income eligibility category, and year, new enrollees had overall first-month claims experience that was nearly $29 less than continuing enrollees. This was driven by lower ambulatory use. Late renewals had overall first-month claims experience that was $10 less than immediate renewals. However, controlling for the presence of chronic health conditions, there was no statistically meaningful difference in the first-month claims experience of late and early renewals. Thus, differences in claims experience between new and continuing enrollees and between early and late renewals are small, with greater spending found among continuing and early renewing participants. Higher claims experience by early renewals is attributable to having chronic health conditions.

This paper estimated the effects of tort law and insurer investment returns on physician malpractice insurance premiums. Data were collected on tort law from 1991 through 2004, and multivariate regression models, including fixed effects for state and year, were used to estimate the effect of changes in tort law on medical malpractice premiums. The premium consequences of national policy changes were simulated. The analysis found that the introduction of a new damage cap lowered malpractice premiums for internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology by 17.3%, 20.7%, and 25.5%, respectively. Lowering damage caps by $100,000 reduced premiums by 4%. Statutes of repose also resulted in lower premiums. No other tort law changes had the effect of lowering premiums. Simulation results indicate that a national cap of $250,000 on awards for noneconomic damages in all states would imply premium savings of $16.9 billion. Extending a $250,000 cap to all states that do not currently have them would save $1.4 billion annually, or about 8% of the total. A negative effect on malpractice premiums was found for the Dow Jones industrial average, but not for bond prices; effects of the Nasdaq index were not significant for internal medicine, but were marginally significant for surgery and obstetrics premiums.