Search

Explores the difference between proportional representation (PR) systems with preference voting or open-list PR and those without or closed-list PR in terms of the propensity for early elections. Factor that influence the propensity for early elections; Difference between strategic theory and attributes theory; Theoretical assumptions of the authors.

In this paper we focus on a previously unexamined route for constituency preferences to influence Congressional voting behavior. Jacoby and Schneider (2001) find that public opinion (as measured through state partisanship) plays a strong role in determining state policy priorities. States allocate resources to meet societal needs in different ways. These allocations are variable across states (Gray 1999; Nathan 1996; Rivlin 1992), and when measured can give us a good idea about what types of programs specific states like to spend their money on. States that prefer certain groups of programs to others usually do so because there is a constituency base that prefers these groups of programs. We argue that these state policy priorities should have an effect independent of other variables on the voting behavior of state delegations to the US Congress.The measure of state policy priorities is calculated using state general expenditures in 15 policy areas. Jacoby and Schneider (2001) find that state spending tends to group into two different categories, particularized benefits and collective goods. We hypothesize that delegations from states which focus spending on collective goods will be more likely to support collective goods policies with roll call votes in Congress, while state delegations from states which focus spending on particularized benefits will be more likely to support policies addressing particularized benefits. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a puzzle in the literature on the social determinants of health--why are wealthier people healthier? The answers seem obvious, from childhood nutrition to lifestyle advantages to the ability to afford better health care. The puzzle arises, though, from the empirical finding that, controlling for lifestyle and resources, wealth is still a significant predictor of health outcomes. While some plausible causal mechanisms have been identified for this phenomenon, this paper seeks to augment those explanations with an argument about how wealth and other resource endowments influence the selection of sexual partners. Put another way, the principal argument of this paper is that if wealthier individuals are advantaged in the selection of healthier mates, and if endowments of health and wealth are inheritable by progeny, then the wealth-health relationship within any particular generation is necessarily attenuated. That is, wealth's relationship to behavioral factors, environmental factors, resource factors, and even physiological factors must be viewed in the context of how wealth in previous generations can influence inherited traits in the current generation. More generally, however, the proposal puts forward a model of the relationship between wealth and health outcomes that takes seriously notions of financial and genetic inheritance. Using an agent based modeling (ABM) approach, I then propose a model that allows the simulation of different policies and their subsequent effect on the wealth-health relationship over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written about roll rates in the recent literature on congressional organization. A roll is a roll call vote on which a member or coalition of members votes against a legislative provision that nevertheless passes. A roll rate is then constructed by finding the proportion of rolls among some sample of roll call votes of interest. The debate over roll rates regards the utility of roll rates as a measure of party effects. This paper argues that roll rates used to test for party effects in this way posit alternative possible legislative agendas, and that evidence for party effects uncovered by roll rates analysis must be compared to baseline roll rates produced through "nonpartisan" means. This paper uses simulation techniques to produce such baseline roll rates, using a simple decision rule and a variety of measures of legislators' preferences, and compares these baseline roll rates to the observed roll rates produced by the actual agenda of the House of Representatives. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of complexity science and agent based models has been growing within social science, in general, and specifically within political science. The tools of complexity have been used to examine a wide range of social science issues; collective action, elections, political economy, macroeconomics, and international relations. As of yet, though, there has been very little application of the tools of complexity science to issues associated with American political institutions. This project seeks to begin that process by taking a complex adaptive systems approach to the United States Congress. Traditionally formal models of Congress have used a game theoretic approach. However we believe that there are analytical gains to be made by using the agent based approach. Systems that have dynamics, heterogeneous agents, non-linear interactions, adaptation, positive and negative feedback, and externalities are prime candidates for an application of the complex adaptive systems approach. We make the argument in this paper that each of these properties is an important (and often core) attribute of the congressional policy making system. In order to illustrate the analytical leverage of the complex systems approach we first build a set of models that replicate the most prominent models of congressional policy making. To these we add a model using the complex adaptive systems approach. We are then able to simulate a simple public goods allocation problem in each model and view the various policy outcomes. The core feature of our model is that it allows the pivotal agent to arise endogenously. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]