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Italy has abandoned its nuclear power ambitions in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster and following the decision of the popular referendum held on 8 November 1987. However, nuclear waste from four permanently shut down nuclear plants, various research reactors, reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities represents a pressing problem. The nuclear waste governance in Italy is characterised by a complex, intertwined relationship and interaction between the different political-territorial levels from the national, the regional to the local. Recently, after a long period of incoherent stop and go nuclear research and industrial policies, local opposition and a subsequent deadlock, the mandatory search for a national site has started taking shape. The national map of potentially suitable area released in 2021 was followed by a series of consultations to which several institutional and civil society actors participated. In January 2022, the public consultation was concluded and in March 2022 the proposed National Map of Suitable Areas (NACI) was submitted to the Ministry of Ecological Transition for approval. The final site search process should lead to the location of a site, which should initially house 78,000 cubic metres of intermediate and low-level waste as well as 17,000 cubic metres of HLW. The latter should be stored for a maximum of 50 years to be then placed in a deep geological repository about which nothing has been revealed at the moment. This challenges institutional actors, like the Ministry of Ecological Transition, the regulator and the operator to adopt inclusive and decentralised forms of decision making. The process is therefore expected to be slow and cumbersome and will require more democratic approaches to nuclear waste management.

The decision-making processes in the field of radioactive waste in the Federal Republic Germany have been dominated for long time by the decide-announce-defend (DAD) strategy. In response, the movement against nuclear power and the transport and storage of nuclear waste grew strong and continues to be a key political actor in the current siting process. Following the decision in 2011 to phase out nuclear power by 2022 and with a view to the failures of the past, an ambitious Site Selection Act (StandAG) was passed in 2013 and amended in 2017. This provided the frame for the establishment of new institutions and a far-reaching participation procedure. In this respect, the StandAG represents a key milestone for the new start of the site search for high-level waste (HLW) based on the principle of the blank map and has contributed to modify the nuclear waste governance system. In 2020, following the release of a preliminary report with an evaluation of regions with potentially suitable host rock formations for a geologic nuclear repository, the operator BGE designated around 90 potential areas. The search for a site that provides the greatest possible safety and security potential sites is being accompanied by a participative process involving various stakeholder groups. It was planned to find a suitable, accepted location by 2031. However, in November 2022 the operator BGE announced that the search for a site would last longer, possibly between 2046 and 2068. The process is thus confronted with significant challenges and Germany must work out a concept for a long-term temporary storage facility as in several European countries. This chapter analyses the long-term multi-level governance of HLW in Germany and the evolution of new institutions with a focus on the domains: politics & administration, legislation, science & technology and civil society and the interaction between them.Procedural fairness and inclusiveness of the process remain important and necessary prerequisites for building public confidence and for the social acceptability of the political siting decisions. The chapter maintains that the legal framework and the StandAG leave many unresolved issues, but still permits extensive room for manoeuvre and represents an opportunity for new and expanded forms of participation to be pursued.

The article analyses drivers as well as coordination mechanisms and instruments for the energy transition in Italy from a multilevel governance perspective. It addresses the structural constraints that influenced the decision-making processes and organisation of the Italian energy sector and the socio-technical challenges opened up by enhancing renewables. The current energy system is making the move from a centralised, path-dependent institutional and organisational structure to a more fragmented and pluralistic one. Renewables and decentralised patterns of production and consumption are key elements of this paradigmatic shift, which is paralleled by a multiplication of decision-making arenas and actors. These actors follow different interests, problem understandings and green growth narratives, increasing the complexity of governing the energy transition. Against this background, community-based renewable energy policy is assuming a very important role and Italy is putting efforts to establish an enabling framework in line with the requirements of the European Union. The goal of this strategy is to foster a positive link between acceptance of the energy transition and decentralised local activities. In the conclusion we address problems and barriers to new modes of governance, and discuss possible approaches to improved cooperation.

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the work of selected commissions appointed in Germany over the last 40 years to advise the Parliament or ministries in matters concerning nuclear waste disposal. Our analysis focuses on the science policy interfaces; it questions the role of science in society and politics by scrutinising the composition of these committees with regard to distance, plurality and neutrality as well as the evolution of disposal concepts and strategies within these advisory bodies. Five exemplary institutions are considered: the Enquete-Commission “Future Nuclear Energy Policy”, the Working Group on the Selection Process for a Nuclear Disposal Location (AkEnd), the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (ESK) (2008-present), the Commission on the Storage of High-Level Radioactive Waste (EndKo) and the National Civil Society Board (NBG). By reviewing the work of these bodies, we also explore the role played by scientific advisors and advisory bodies in policymaking. Finally, we discuss the scope of their mandate and their influence with regard to political and policy outcomes.

Disposing of nuclear waste remains one of the most complicated problems to solve; it is a wicked problem. Finding and gaining public acceptance solutions for a high level radioactive waste (HLW) repository is cumbersome even in the case of the most resilient democratic political system. Handling radioactive waste is a permanent reminder of the historical paths and legacies connected with the civilian and military development of nuclear power. Despite the many attempts made in the last forty years, there is no civilian permanent repository for spent fuel and HLW in operation in any nation state. Long-lasting and thorny social conflicts and distrust continue to play an inhibiting role in actual siting procedures of nuclear waste repositories. However, in the last decade, these issues have stopped being regarded as a mere technical problem. Against the background of conflicts and deadlocks, the nuclear waste issue has broadened in scope to consider societal, political, psychological and ethical factors. This has led to the use of deliberative procedures enhancing the integration of community and stakeholder values into decision-making. The chapter briefly introduces the major issues dealt with in this volume and discusses the role of inclusive participatory procedures and stakeholder involvement, as well as of consent-based siting and compensation to enhance acceptability of contested socio-technical solutions.

This is the second volume examining high level radioactive waste (HLW) disposal processes around the world. Volume I examined European and North American cases (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Volume II looks at: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, Japan, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, and the Ukraine.

Worldwide, the majority of countries with nuclear activities have – or plan to have – national legislative, regulatory, and organisational frameworks. There is an implicit ethical principle or even a common understanding that each country should be responsible for the safe disposal of its own spent fuel elements and radioactive waste. Due to safety and proliferation concerns, however the disposal of radioactive waste should not be considered a national matter. National frameworks and policies are designed in accordance with standards and guidelines set at, and agreed to at the international level. These are laid down in international agreements and conventions.

The International Dimension.- Countries with Geological Disposal after Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel.- Countries with Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel.- Countries with Long-Term Surface Storage for High Level Radioactive Waste.

The governance of radioactive waste in Italy is burdened by the legacy of over 50 years of discontinuous nuclear research as well as by incoherent technology and industrial policies. Nuclear waste management cannot be separated from the broader political debate on nuclear power, which was and remains a highly political issue. Italy has only a very modest park of four permanently shut-down power plants. Spent fuel (SF) and radioactive waste (RW) are being temporarily stored in at least 21 sites (Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) 2013), some of which are dedicated to fuel reprocessing and manufacturing.

The contrasting arguments are well known: opponents of nuclear power argue that the nuclear industry should not continue to produce nuclear energy without having a deep geological disposal (DGD) repository for its radioactive high-level waste (HLW). The nuclear industry and parts of the scientific community claim that the necessary knowledge and technologies for radioactive waste management exist; they argue the main problem hindering a waste solution lies with missing societal acceptance and that the fault for this lies with politics.

The German energy transition strategy aims at moving towards a sustainable energy supply and demand over the long term. It consists of many different activities and measures to address existing greenhouse gas mitigation potentials and to mobilize the necessary resources to reach stringent mitigation targets. It builds upon the federal government’s Energy and Climate Programme (BMU 2007) as well as its Energy Concept (BMU & BMWI 2010) and is described in detail in various official documents (BMU & BMWI 2011). The National Climate Initiative (NCI) of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMUB) represents an important element of the programmes and measures relating to the Energiewende. It aims to provide substantial support for the reduction of Germany’s GHG emissions by 40% by 2020 and by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. The NCI is geared to bring about more climate-friendly behavior among businesses, consumers and local authorities in areas with significant efficiency potentials that cannot be tapped by instruments such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (the revenues of which fund the NCI). Numerous projects have been developed by the NCI so far, with many others to follow. These projects range from energy-aware and climate-friendly behavior, the use of efficient technologies and renewable energy, to measures

Die olympische Disziplin des Hurdenlaufs kann aus ganz verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet werden. Beim Zuschauen sind Schnelligkeit, Leichtfusigkeit und Eleganz zu bewundern. Beim Sprint wird Kraft gefordert. Es werden hohe technische und koordinative Anforderungen gestellt. An der Ziellinie wird die Zeit genommen, die fur die zuruckgelegte Strecke benotigt wurde. Nicht grundlos wird der Hurdenlauf als die anspruchsvollste Disziplin in der Leichtathletik angesehen.

Smart metering is alleged to be opening up a new frontier for energy supply and consumer empowerment. These are both very important elements of the German energy transition strategy. Since the second half of the 1990s, the diffusion of smart metering has become an issue that has increasingly drawn attention at both theoretical and empirical levels. A high number of countries in the European Union introduced smart meters in homes – some on a large scale – and there have been massive investments. The diffusion of smart metering is not only significant in Europe, where the EU legislation (especially the Energy Services Directive and the 3rd Energy Package) has been an important driver, but also in the USA and in countries with high electricity demand profiles in East Asia. The most recurrently cited reasons for a large-scale roll-out are that they allow frequent or even realtime reading and billing; peak load management/shifting and improve energy efficiency (ERGEG 2009; KEMA 2012; Smart Regions 2013). In Germany – where along with the UK, France and Italy there have been high investments in smart grid technology – there has been no official commitment to the deployment of smart meters. Smart grid is an element of the energy transition strategy, but a roll-out of smart metering on a large scale is not part of this strategy. In the absence of a wide-ranging national policy, smart metering has been left to market forces and has been “relegated” to pilot projects and some commercial initiatives. In July 2013, after years of inertia, the publication of the long awaited cost-benefit analysis on behalf of the Ministry for Economy (Ernst & Young 2013) put smart metering again in focus, albeit in the middle of the