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With the rise of enterprise-government joint ventures, how to carry out the construction of corporate culture to promote the development of enterprise-government joint ventures has gradually become the focus of scholars’ research. However, at present, the articles on the cultural construction of enterprise-government joint venture companies are still insufficient, and the academic circles have not discussed it too deeply. Taking Changning Company as an example, this paper deeply analyzes the problems existing in promoting the construction of corporate culture in Changning Company as an enterprise-government joint venture company, and probes into the deeper causes of the corresponding problems, and then puts forward some countermeasures. Through this study, it fills up the deficiency in the research on the cultural construction of the enterprise-government joint venture company, and provides some reference for later researchers.

In the article, the authors analyze motivators and motivation tools used in entrepreneurial networks of strategic alliances in order to improve the efficiency of corporations and the effectiveness of their personnel. The analysis and comparison of indicators is based on the example of entrepreneurial networks organized within the framework of Russian-Chinese strategic alliances. A comparative characteristic of motivators and motivation tools is performed, and conclusions are drawn about the possibility of their application in a Russian-Chinese joint venture. The results of the analysis show that there are the same number of common positions and its differences in the motivation system.

A Foreign-Invested Limited Partnership Enterprise operates in the particular legal framework for foreign investments which has been established in China over the past decades. In order to fully understand the special characteristics of the Foreign-Invested Limited Partnership Enterprise, the development of China’s foreign investment legal framework is analysed with a special focus on the alternative enterprise forms which have been available for sino-foreign alliances. This includes an analysis of the administrative framework of guiding and restricting foreign investments and its latest reforms through the newly implemented Foreign Investment Law. An overview is given of the different types of joint venture companies which foreign investors have used in the past.

The article investigates the experience of using innovative methods of managing financial results in a joint venture and the possibility of using these methods at a Russian enterprise. The importance of managing financial results for an individual enterprise and for the country’s economy as a whole is indicated. The research includes CVP analysis of the enterprise, DuPont model, and profitability analysis of the enterprise. The authors make conclusions about the applicability of classical and innovative methods at each of the considered enterprises. Recommendations for managing financial results within the research object are proposed, their effectiveness is calculated, and the repeated CVP analysis was performed based on the expected results. It is concluded that these measures will be effective for the company in various ways. They can be implemented together or separately. However, their combined effect may differ from the sum of the effects.

Building on Chap. 2, which offered a rationale for choosing Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) advantages for explaining international oil companies’ preference for joint venture agreements, this chapter explains how international oil companies think they can best realise these three advantages through the choice of a joint venture agreement.

This chapter established that joint venture agreements are the outcome of a process of deciding which co-operation agreement to choose: it is a social process involving a ‘large number of decisions made by different people at different points in time’. This process, the chapter further argued, can be analysed based on the reasons for such a preference within the individual organisations of international oil companies at the micro-level, in addition to macro-level reasons that address how the organisational culture of the Qatari gas industry contributes to the preference for joint venture agreements.

In this chapter, chronicles Renault of France’s two car assembly complexes in Spain. It begins with a brief review of the French automaker’s joint venture plant with Fabricacion de Automoviles SA in Valladolid, followed by a section chronicling the expansion of the complex to add bodywork and engine plants, and then a second assembly hall. The discussion then turns to Renault’s building of an additional assembly works 30 minutes north of Valladolid in Palencia Province in 1978. Thereafter, sections review the progress of these factories through 2016 and offer commentary regarding Renault’s near-term future in Spain.

This chapter provides a case study of a cybersecurity accelerator, recently established in Australia, in response to the growing threat of cybercrime. The accelerator has been launched as a joint venture between an IT service provider and a university, with the backing of the regional government. In setting up and differentiating the accelerator particular attention has been paid to the deal flow quality, selective engagement of a broad range of mentors with deep skills and the establishment of an environment conducive to innovation. As will be discussed in this chapter, these factors increase the likelihood of success based on developing strong and dynamic networks, building founders’ skills and increasing collaboration within the ecosystem. This chapter demonstrates how the principles of transformational entrepreneurship are being utilised within this context to build a successful accelerator to tackle a challenging situation.

In this chapter, provides a brief history of Volkswagen’s (VW’s) current Sociedad Espanola de Automoviles de Turismo, SA (SEAT) division through 1989. It begins by discussing the then Spanish automaker’s Barcelona Zona Franca factory tie-up with Fiat. It then reviews the early history of British Leyland’s Authi Landaben joint venture plant in Pamplona, which SEAT absorbed in 1975. This is followed by sections reviewing SEAT’s breakup with Fiat and subsequent partnership with, and takeover by, VW of Germany. VW’s post-1989 control of SEAT is continued in Chap. 15.

At the turn of the century, Dunning provided the clearest statement of his views on his eclectic paradigm of ownership, location and internalisation (OLI) advantages.

Zambia, a landlocked country in sub-Saharan Africa, has many natural resources and industries, including a flourishing textile industry. Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles Limited is a joint venture company based in Kabwe, Zambia, which manufactures and markets textiles. After a decade of standstill, the organisation was reopened in 2016. However, during the past few years, some issues have arisen regarding decision-making and participation of local employees. Many Zambian employees feel disrespected by their Chinese managers. Mrs Kabelo, a qualified design maker who is in middle management, is promoting new African-style textile designs, which could attract more customers and protect the organisation from a second shutdown. How should she approach the Chinese management? At a meeting of the Zambian employees aiming to reach an agreement, they discuss how to access the Chinese management and decide to write an official letter using language that is interculturally sound. Is it appropriate to use Chinese idioms to open the ears of Chinese management to hear the Zambian issues on participating in decision-making to promote modern African design patterns and colours?

As Europe’s launch sector continues substantial development to grow more competitive in the global market, Arianespace’s Vega launcher—manufactured by ELV (a joint venture between the Italian Space Agency and Avio)—has launched a total of 12 times since 2012, all successfully. Over the reporting period in particular (including up to August 2018), Vega launched three times in 2017 and once in 2018. Looking to the future, and as part of overall efforts to increase the Vega’s competitiveness on the launch market, ESA and Avio have been developing since 2016 a new Small Spacecraft Mission System adaptor (SMSS), which can deliver cubesats and microsats up to 400 kg to orbit. In 2018, Arianespace secured four customers on the first SMSS, scheduled for 2019, including Spaceflight Inc. (American), ISIS (Dutch), and the Italian Sitael and D-Orbit. The SMSS is intended for one to two flights per year. Moreover, the P120 C engine under development by ArianeGroup (as of July 2017, the corporate name of Airbus Safran Launchers was changed to ArianeGroup) and Avio, intended for both the next-generation Vega C and Ariane 6, is to be produced in up to 35 units per year and “will provide scale meaningful enough to drive prices lower, according to Arianespace and Avio officials”. Lastly, with the Vega C still scheduled for its first flight in 2019, Avio is also developing a further launcher, known as Vega E (Evolution), expected for launch in 2024; ESA has additionally committed to the latter in a contract with Avio valued at 53 million €. According to SpaceNews.com, this reportedly represents only a “first tranche”.

Chapter 2 argued that one major limitation in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm is the absence of explicit attention to the perspective of host countries in identifying the reasons for foreign direct investment, including joint venture agreements.