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This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-Taiwan Relations have become significantly less confrontational since 2008. One of the indicators demonstrating the improvement of their relations is the resumption of the contact between China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 2008 after 9 years of no formal interaction. The purpose of this paper is to explore China-Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2008 by examining the interaction between the aforementioned two organizations which were founded in 1991. By analyzing the relevant official announcements and statements made by China and Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 2008, this paper finds that China became more hostile toward Taiwan and therefore its ARATS in turn was unwilling to negotiate with Taiwan's SEF when it perceived that the Taiwanese government was pushing for Taiwan's independence. By contrast, when it perceived that the Taiwanese government was more compromising on the issue of Taiwan's independence, it became relatively conciliatory and its ARATS in turn was more willing to interact with Taiwan's SEF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor's stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute has caused tensions among China, Japan, and Taiwan for decades. Although the Taiwanese government keeps a low profile on the dispute, the issue has flared up online discussion among Taiwan's netizens. Many consider Taiwanese people more pro-Japan than other countries in East Asia, as elder generation living on the island shares nostalgia toward Japan, and as its younger generation charmed by Japanese manga and anime, let alone Taiwan being the top donor to Japan's 311 earthquake. In this vein, Taiwanese people should accommodate well with Japan. However, Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute may tell another story. The act of Japanese government to nationalize Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012 has provoked anger among its neighbor countries. Are Taiwanese people in favor of Japan's stance on Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute due to the attachment for Japan or the other way round? This paper applies text mining technique and sentiment analysis to the digital data of Taiwan's largest bulletin board system station-PTT-established by college students and extracts postings concerning Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute in the past 4 years (2009~2012). By this bottom-up approach, we aim to examine Taiwan's netizens' emotion toward the two hegemonies-i.e., Japan and China-and to see whether the strong attachment to Japan has any impact on netizens' opinions on the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an exploratory research that seeks to investigate how ideology predicts Taiwanese perceptions of cross-strait relations, including attitudes toward Taiwan independence, perceptions of mainland China and Chinese people, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and Chinese democracy. We took an inductive approach to left-right differences in Taiwan to offer a more systematic empirical understanding of ideology beyond the West. To do so, we conducted a nationally representative survey among adult Taiwan citizens (N = 1,350). Findings revealed that those who identified with the Left (vs. Right) tended to demonstrate more negative perceptions of cross-strait relations. Specifically, the political left is more negative about the outlook of Chinese democracy while favoring Taiwan independence, than the political right. Furthermore, the political left perceives both mainland China and the Chinese people more negatively than the political right. These findings underscore the role of ideology for a full comprehension of cross-strait relations, as they indicated a fundamental difference between the political left vs. right in terms of perceptions of cross-strait relations. The present research extends existing political psychology literature on ideology and international relations, particularly in the East Asian context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The island of Taiwan has successfully managed 60 years of fast-paced economic growth. Taiwan is a demonstrably resilient player in the global economy, while also maintaining high levels of income equality. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding whether the factors that have enabled and sustained the Taiwanese development project thus far will be an adequate means of managing the contemporary challenges facing the island. Taiwan may be becoming increasingly vulnerable to global economic conditions, and the island's future seems also to be increasingly tied to developments in the Chinese mainland. This paper examines the prospects for a continuing Taiwanese growth paradigm from both a cultural and an economic perspective and finds reason for optimism. This optimism is contingent on the strength of international export markets and prudent management of cross-Strait relations with the Chinese mainland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei's post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei's restriction on trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan's economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems of the security externalities or promoting the island's economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is considered to be one of the most progressive countries in Asia but has no asylum law. Does it need one? Many in Taiwan, including officials and politicians, claim that the regulations that are currently in place are sufficient. There are, however, some people in Taiwan who require protection, and the government is not able to respond effectively in the absence of an asylum law. The author has identified several different groups in Taiwan that would benefit from an asylum law — from Hong Kong protesters facing persecution, through Chinese dissidents or descendants of the ROC army from the Thai-Myanmar border region, to Turkish people with revoked passports; grouped into two major categories — persons from the PRC, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau (group 1) and persons from other countries (group 2). The draft of the asylum law has been sitting in the Parliament for 14 years, and the reason for it not yet having passed is the "China Factor." The Taiwan-China relationship thus cannot be disconnected from this issue, and the article discusses the three most common concerns with regard to this in the Taiwanese society. While these are legitimate concerns, they could be solved by adopting a dual asylum system dealing with group 1 and group 2 separately. Compared to UN member countries, Taiwan is on its own when it comes to the asylum issue, although adopting an asylum law is part of a broader push to bring Taiwan's legal system in line with international human rights law. The article provides a comprehensive description and analysis of the refugee situation in Taiwan; it is based on document studies and interviews conducted in Taipei in autumn 2020. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 elections in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It not only won the presidency but also an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan. It is now in full control of the government. An intriguing question is how the DPP government under President Tsai Ing-wen will deal with China which has warned Taiwan time and again that it would attack Taiwan if the latter declares de jure independence. The current study investigates the possible move that may be considered by the Tsai Ing-wen government, that will not irritate its own constituents on the island, and at the same time will not escalate the tension across the Taiwan Strait. Whether Tsai's policy is tenable given the domestic and international constraints remains to be seen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often argued that at the root of the Taiwan question are the myriad differences in politics, ideology, identity, and economy between mainland China and Taiwan. Any prospect for its peaceful resolution, it seems, hinges on bridging those differences through economic and/or political integration. Although the Taiwan conundrum has much to do with wide-ranging cross-strait divergence, this article argues that it cannot be disconnected from one important commonality between Beijing and Taipei, namely, a cross-strait normative convergence on the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty. Encompassing an exclusionary understanding of final authority, territory, and identity, Westphalian sovereignty provides both Beijing and Taipei with a common meaning that Taiwan is an issue of sovereignty, central to their respective national identity and political survival and hence not subject to compromise. As a consequence, it argues that this common meaning is paradoxically responsible for much of the mistrust, tension, and deadlock in cross-strait relations. In order to find a long-term solution to the Taiwan impasse, we need to pay attention to this particular normative convergence as well as to the many differences across the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan may be an internal affair but the domestic public opinion is not invited to participate very much in a debate and a decision-making process that have remained confined to the Chinese Communist Party and the military top leadership and, on purpose, involves a very small number of officials and experts. Conservative and nationalist forces do constrain Beijing’s Taiwan policy. And some leaders are tempted to use the Taiwan issue for unrelated domestic or foreign policy purpose. Nevertheless, what is striking is the potential for flexibility in China’s Taiwan policy. While Chinese local governments and companies’ increasing interests in business-as-usual in the Strait and the unbearable cost of any armed conflict tend to narrow the government’s options, concentration of power and the efficiency of the propaganda machine allow it to rather smoothly manage, in particular vis-à-vis the elites’ conservative opinion group as well as its own public opinion, this flexibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]