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A major blind spot in the development of a radical interactionist's perspective is the lack of an explanation of societal change, whether it be revolutionary or only reformatory in scope. Robert Park began to develop a cyclical theory of societal change, but he was unable to finish it. Nevertheless, in our development of a theory of societal change from a radical interactionist's perspective, we were able to follow up and launch this project with the valuable clues that he left behind. First, we expanded the number of phases in his cycle from three to five, so that each type of social interaction that he and Burgess identified could be incorporated under one of the different phases. Second, the cycle was refined to operate on a contingent rather than a strictly deterministic model allowing the occurrence of a truncated cycle. Next, we filled-in various missing details needed for this cycle's on going operation, such as circular reaction, social contagion, and social unrest. Fourth, we drew on his distinction between "societies" and "communities" to demarcate clear-cut starting, mid- and end points of the expanded cycle. Fifth, we replaced his dated notion of dominance with the newer and more nuanced one of domination, as well as updated his conception of the dynamics of super-ordination by incorporating the role of power within it. By improving on Park's ideas in these different ways, it was demonstrated that unlike symbolic interactionism, radical interactionism squarely addresses societal change on both the micro- and macroscopic planes. Unlike functionalist and conflict theories of social change, it stresses cooperation as much as conflagration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three pernicious myths that have been perpetuated about Robert E. Park merit our present attention. These myths are important because they now foreclose almost any chance of him ever becoming recognized as the true progenitor of the interactionist school of thought or of latter-day sociologist from building on his work. The first myth, which lays the foundation for the other two, is that he was a social Darwinist. The second and third myths, which directly follow from the first one, are that Park concocted a racist and conservative sociology. An inquiry into his sociological works published over more than a quarter of a century, however, reveals that these myths are based more on fiction than fact. Although these myths are widely maintained among present-day sociologists, they appear to be driven more by prevailing ideology than supported by hard evidence (i.e. the full written record of what Park actually argued in his sociological publications). This confusion underscores the danger of advocacy research, an approach currently in vogue in the field of sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Park died, he left his theory of the human habitat not only incomplete, but in considerable disarray. Although few present-day scholars have demonstrated much interest in building on this critical body of Park’s work, which he based on dominance, it probably represents his most important contribution to American sociology. I argue that the key to systemizing his highly discursive account of the human habitat is to view it from an emergent social evolutionary perspective, which makes it possible to differentiate his notion of “community” from “society,” as well as explain how the two concepts can logically be viewed as both separate and unified entities. A community is not only a necessary stage in the social evolutionary process of producing a society, but it also provides the habitat needed for a society’s later emergence. Among other things, Park’s theory of the human habitat is also criticized for its failure to (1) distinguish dominance from domination, (2) identify the reciprocal relationship existing between power and domination, (3) accurately characterize the nature of the economic order operating in communities, and (4) demarcate a pre-lingual, lingual and literate communal stages that precedes in the social evolutionary process the possible development of a society. In passing, I also point out critical, but often overlooked aspects of Park’s theory of the human habitat that contradict popular characterizations of his work as being purblind to the operation of dominance and power, social Darwinist, conservative, sexist, and racist. Finally, I deduce the implications of his theory for the future emergence of a “world society.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many sociologists have written about the development of the sociological perspective, known as 'interactionism,' two relatively important questions for understanding its emergence remain scarcely examined. (1) Why did George Herbert Mead become known as its progenitor rather than Robert E. Park ? (2) Why did 'radical interactionism,' which was inspired by Park, fail to appear on the sociological landscape until the first decade of the 21st century, almost a century after the appearance of the 'symbolic interactionism' that Mead inspired? To oversimplify, Mead became anointed as the progenitor of interactionism instead of Park primarily because Herbert Blumer proved to be a far more effective champion of Mead's thought than Everett Hughes proved to be of Park's ideas in sociology. Blumer's greater effectiveness in performing this role was primarily due to a stronger desire to carry the banner for a new sociological perspective, more personal charisma and verbal adroitness, and much closer connection to Chicago School of Sociology during its golden era than Hughes had. Thus, the delayed emergence of a radical interactionism based on Park's work cannot be attributed solely to the failure of Park and his heir apparent, Hughes, to fully grasp the radical implications of Park's work. Even if these implications of Park's work had been crystal clear to Hughes, however, it is highly doubtful that he would have ever considered promoting a radical version of interactionism. His lack of lack of desire to carry the banner for a sociological perspective, absence of personal charisma and verbal adroitness, as well as his want of closer ties to the original Chicago school of sociology, not to mention tepid liberalism, would have made him a very unlikely figure in American sociology to play this historic role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because Mead entered the pantheon of classic sociological thinkers much later than Durkheim, Marx, and Weber, sociologists have unsurprisingly devoted much more critical attention to their ideas than his. Perhaps, nowhere is the lack of this attention on their part more glaring than in his explanation of social conflict. Mead views the emergence and resolution of conflict as taking place within the social act, in which either individuals or groups may be the acting units, and attitudes, roles, significant symbols, and attitudinal assumption operate as the common, key components. As far as the emergence of conflict is concerned, he accounts for it on the basis of insufficient differentiation of roles, non-meritorious allocation of roles, and adoption of self-centered attitudes on the part of the participants during their construction of a social act. As far as the resolution of conflict is concerned, he predictably explains it on the basis of their expansion of role differentiation, distribution of roles on basis of merit, and the adoption of other-centered attitudes. Despite that Mead's explanation of the resolution and emergence of conflict is relatively consistent and offers many profound insights, it suffers from several irresolvable problems. All these various problems can be traced back to his decision to rest his explanation on his much cherished principle of 'sociality,' rather than domination, and thereby, ultimately, his rejection of a radical interactionist's perspective. Thus, it is now long overdue for sociologists to consider the merits of a new, more radical interactionism as a replacement for his much older and more conventional counterpart, symbolic interactionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]