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After viewing an image representing an action on an object, we recognize the forward states of the seen action faster than the backward states. The present study exploits a variant of a new experimental paradigm to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Participants viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects, each followed by a photo depicting either one of three (instead of two of the original paradigm) different and temporally distant moments after the image or one moment before the image, along with photos of different actions. Experiment 1 revealed the classical forward effects in this new context: when the task was to judge whether the action in the second photo was the same as in the first photo, evaluations were faster for all forward photos than for backward photos. In Experiment 2, we examined the role of participants' attention to the object alongside the role of attention to action kinematics in triggering these "forward effects" by manipulating participants' attentional focus. As the results showed, evaluations were faster for all forward photos when the focus was on the action kinematics, but when the focus was on the object, evaluations were faster only for the last forward photo showing the final action state. These results seem to suggest that focusing on the object triggers a representation of the action goal and thus modulates the mental simulation underlying action anticipation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the assumption that spatial reasoning relies on the construction of mental models of the states of affairs described in the premises, and on evidence that sensory-motor imagery can enhance cognitive abilities, we hypothesised that imagining moving the objects mentioned in the premises to the specific spatial locations should favour spatial reasoning. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction: when participants imagined moving the objects mentioned in the premises (dynamic-engagement condition), they drew accurate inferences faster compared with participants who merely read the premises (static-non-engagement condition). Experiment 2 was in part a replication of Experiment 1 but included two additional experimental conditions to control for possible effects of self-engagement in reasoning: in one condition, participants imagined that someone else was moving the objects (dynamic-non-engagement condition), and in the other condition, participants imagined that they were observing the objects (static-engagement condition). The results revealed an interaction between motor imagery and engagement in decreasing response times to spatial problems. We discuss the practical implications of the current results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a theory of recursion in thinking and language. In the logic of computability, a function maps one or more sets to another, and it can have a recursive definition that is semi-circular, i.e., referring in part to the function itself. Any function that is computable – and many are not – can be computed in an infinite number of distinct programs. Some of these programs are semi-circular too, but they needn't be, because repeated loops of instructions can compute any recursive function. Our theory aims to explain how naive individuals devise informal programs in natural language, and is itself implemented in a computer program that creates programs. Participants in our experiments spontaneously simulate loops of instructions in kinematic mental models. They rely on such loops to compute recursive functions for rearranging the order of cars in trains on a track with a siding. Kolmogorov complexity predicts the relative difficulty of abducing such programs – for easy rearrangements, such as reversing the order of the cars, to difficult ones, such as splitting a train in two and interleaving the two resulting halves (equivalent to a faro shuffle). This rearrangement uses both the siding and part of the track as working memories, shuffling cars between them, and so it relies on the power of a linear-bounded computer. Linguistic evidence implies that this power is more than necessary to compose the meanings of sentences in natural language from those of their grammatical constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the study on whether gestural information uptake is a deterministic process. The study reportedly involved several experiments and an analysis of the role of unrelated speech gestures which are not relevant to the speech they accompany. The results revealed that gestural information uptake is non-deterministic.

Classical studies on enactment have highlighted the beneficial effects of gestures performed in the encoding phase on memory for words and sentences, for both adults and children. In the present investigation, we focused on the role of enactment for learning from scientific texts among primary-school children. We assumed that enactment would favor the construction of a mental model of the text, and we verified the derived predictions that gestures at the time of encoding would result in greater numbers of correct recollections and discourse-based inferences at recall, as compared to no gestures (Exp. 1), and in a bias to confound paraphrases of the original text with the verbatim text in a recognition test (Exp. 2). The predictions were confirmed; hence, we argue in favor of a theoretical framework that accounts for the beneficial effects of enactment on memory for texts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies in the literature have revealed that a speaker's co-speech gestures favor the construction of a complete and articulated mental model of the discourse by the listener; moreover, from the literature on co-speech gestures we know that they help the speaker to organize the stream of thought. Given these data, we hypothesized that a person who listens to a discourse accompanied by gestures would produce fewer co-speech gestures in recollecting the discourse compared to a person who listens to a discourse not accompanied by gestures. The analysis of the co-speech gestures produced by the participants in two experiments while recollecting the content of a discourse confirmed our predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mental model theory claims that the ability to falsify is at the core of human rationality. We assume that cognitive conflicts (CCs) and socio-cognitive conflicts (SCCs) induce falsification, and thus improve syllogistic reasoning performance. Our first study assesses adults’ ability to reason in two different conditions in a single experimental session. In both conditions the participants are presented with conclusions alternative to their own. In the CC condition they are told that these conclusions are casual, in the SCC condition they are told they have been produced by another individual. The second study is analogous to the first, with the exception that the participants deal with the two conditions in two different experimental sessions. The overall results reveal that falsification is enhanced by conflicts experienced at the cognitive level. The results also reveal that learning to reason occurs in adults, when tested in two distinct experimental periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present a framework where possible relations between learning and mental models are explored. In particular, I’ll be concerned with non-symbolic gestures accompanying discourse and their role in inducing the construction of models and therefore deep comprehension and learning in the listener. Also, I’ll be concerned with cognitive and socio-cognitive conflicts and their roles in inducing construction of alternative models of a problem and therefore in learning to reason. Human ability to learn is of great importance for individuals interested in change. Indeed, to learn both declarative and procedural knowledge means to change, and in order to be able to intervene on change in a desired way it is necessary to have a theory of the mental representations and processes involved in learning and a theory of the communication and contexts that favour learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]