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More laws obtain in the world, it appears, than just those of microphysics – e.g. laws of genetics, perceptual psychology, economics. This paper assumes there indeed are laws in the special sciences, and not just scrambled versions of microphysical laws. Yet the objects which obey them are composed wholly of microparticles. How can the microparticles in such an object lawfully do more than what is required of them by the laws of microphysics? Are there additional laws for microparticles – which seems to violate closure of microphysics – or is the ``more'' a coincidental outcome of microphysics itself? This paper argues that the appearance of violation is illusory, and the worry about coincidence misleading. We cannot expect to understand the special sciences at the level of the microparticles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are judgements and wishes really brain events (or brain states) which will be affirmed by a completed scientific account of how human behavior is caused? Materialists, other than eliminativists, say Yes. But brain events do not cause muscle contractions, hence bodily movements, directly. They do so, if at all, by triggering intermediate causes, viz. firings in motor nerves. So it is crucial, this paper argues, whether they are characterized as biological events – performances of naturally-selected-for operations – or instead as complex microphysical events. ``A causes B, B causes C, so A causes C'' is defensible for biological brain events, but fails for microphysical ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]