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I read E. P. Stringham’s book on private governance against the background of Morris Hoffman’s account of the evolution of legal punishment. This allows us to see how the evolution of private governance moves through three levels of punishment: the first-party punishment of conscience and guilt, the second-party punishment of retaliation and revenge, and the third-party punishment of retribution. This suggests that neither pure anarchism nor pure statism is possible, because every social order shows some form of governance, and no authoritarian state can ever hold an absolute monopoly on governance to the exclusion of private governance. One can also see that liberal states leave lots of room for private governance, which allows for adaptive flexibility in solving public problems in ways that promote peace and prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hayek's social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek's dismissal of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenging the dominant view, we claim that Hayek's monetary views did not significantly change over his lifetime. The prevalent perception of early Hayek as a money stream stabilizer and late Hayek as a price level stabilizer is attributable to an unjustified normative interpretation of Hayek's positive analysis. We argue that in his contributions to monetary theory, Hayek took the goals of monetary policy as exogenously given and analysed the efficiency of different means of achieving them. Hayek's allegedly inconsistent transformation from a critic to an advocate of price level stabilization is explained by a change of issues under his focus, rather than by a change in his positive views. We also claim that Hayek was always aware that every practical monetary policy involves difficult trade-offs and that he was therefore reluctant to impose his own value judgments on what people should strive for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

F. A. Hayek took two trips to Chile, the first in 1977, the second in 1981. The visits were controversial. On the first trip he met with General Augusto Pinochet, who had led a coup that overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973. During his 1981 visit, Hayek gave interviews that were published in the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio and in which he discussed authoritarian regimes and the problem of unlimited democracy. After each trip, he complained that the western press had painted an unfair picture of the economic situation under the Pinochet regime. Drawing on archival material, interviews, and past research, we provide a full account of this controversial episode in Hayek's life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This lecture, given by James Buchanan in February of 1979, examines the meaning of F.A.Hayek's career path in the context of the development of economics in the 20th century, and argues for the importance of financial support of scholars like Hayek, and their academic research into the values of a free society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-evaluates the orthodox understanding of the role which the 1974 award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to F.A. Hayek had on the revival of Austrian Economics in the later part of the 20th century. The orthodox view, which focuses exclusively on the sociological role of the award on returning Austrian economists to the conversation among academic economists, omits the critical role of purely doctrinal developments. In particular, the work done in the decade 1937-1948 is argued to be central to the Austrian revival. In this decade, both Hayek and Mises independently developed new clarifications of Austrian thought which represented an extension of the subjectivist tradition in economics: Mises' emphasis on human entrepreneurial action and Hayek's exploration of the role of knowledge in the market process. The interest of a generation of younger academics to the ideas developed in that critical decade is thus understood to be the true cause of the Austrian revival, with the award of the Nobel Prize serving a catalytic rather than causative role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These edited remarks explore the relationship of the thought of F.A. Hayek to the development of experimental economics and related programs in economic design. Particularly emphasized are the insights of Hayek with respect to competition and their importance to the theoretical justification for, and empirical results derived from, the experimental study of market behavior. These remarks include some personal commentary on experimental methods, from the early double auctions of the 1960s through more recent work exploring the nature of business cycles. Finally, the intellectual history of the market structures examined in Vernon Smith's work is discussed, comparing the exploration of the double auction to the horse market of Bohm-Bawerk, as well as the general insight of Adam Smith that causality stems from the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange to the discovery of specialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction provides an overview of the papers in the symposium on Hayekian themes in The Order of Public Reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hayek's original 1945 University College Dublin lecture outlined the origins and evolution of two different interpretations of 'individualism', comparing and contrasting what Hayek terms 'true' and 'false' individualism notwithstanding the misleading contemporary interpretations and distorted perceptions of the assumptions underlining 'true' individualism. Hayek developed and extended the Scottish Enlightenment theory of spontaneous order originally formulated by Adam Ferguson's maxim that social order was the result of unintended human action rather than the result of deliberate human design in order to explain the origin of complex social structures, which originated in a Cromwellian maxim. The origination and inspiration for the title of Hayek's lecture is also considered, as is the influence of other thinkers; Mandeville, Tocqueville, Mill, Acton and Schatz that Hayek cites in his Dublin lecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade, a small group of Austrians has attempted to argue that there are crucial distinctions between the Misesian and Hayekian lines of influence, and that the former is the superior. This paper argues that the group has both misread Hayek and underplayed the similarities of Mises and Hayek. More specifically, it sees Mises's emphasis on monetary calculation and goal-driven human action as providing the microfoundations for Hayek's emphasis on spontaneous order and the epistemic properties of the price system. The paper also disputes the claim that Hayek held a “fully-informative,” neoclassical view of prices and explores the disequilibrium foundation for Hayek's understanding of the role of prices as knowledge surrogates. The relationship between monetary calculation and cooperation in anonymity is discussed in the final section. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]