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To date there has been an absence of cross-country empirical studies on the efficacy of carbon pricing. In this paper we present estimates of the contribution of carbon pricing to reducing national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fuel combustion, using several econometric modelling approaches that control for other key policies and for structural factors that are relevant for emissions. We use data for 142 countries over a period of two decades, 43 of which had a carbon price in place at the national level or below by the end of the study period. We find evidence that the average annual growth rate of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion has been around 2 percentage points lower in countries that have had a carbon price compared to countries without. An additional euro per tonne of CO2 in carbon price is associated with a reduction in the subsequent annual emissions growth rate of approximately 0.3 percentage points, all else equal. While it is impossible to fully control for all relevant influences on emissions growth, our estimates suggest that the emissions trajectories of countries with and without carbon prices tend to diverge over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift away from coal is at the heart of the global low-carbon transition. Can governments of coal-producing countries help facilitate this transition and benefit from it? This paper analyses the case for coal taxes as supply-side climate policy implemented by large coal exporting countries. Coal taxes can reduce global carbon dioxide emissions and benefit coal-rich countries through improved terms-of-trade and tax revenue. We employ a multi-period equilibrium model of the international steam coal market to study a tax on steam coal levied by Australia alone, by a coalition of major exporting countries, by all exporters, and by all producers. A unilateral export tax has little impact on global emissions and global coal prices as other countries compensate for reduced export volumes from the taxing country. By contrast, a tax jointly levied by a coalition of major coal exporters would significantly reduce global emissions from steam coal and leave them with a net sector level welfare gain, approximated by the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tax revenue. Production taxes consistently yield higher tax revenues and have greater effects on global coal consumption with smaller rates of carbon leakages. Questions remain whether coal taxes by major suppliers would be politically feasible, even if they could yield economic benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any limit on future global warming is associated with a quota on cumulative global CO2 emissions. We translate this global carbon quota to regional and national scales, on a spectrum of sharing principles that extends from continuation of the present distribution of emissions to an equal per-capita distribution of cumulative emissions. A blend of these endpoints emerges as the most viable option. For a carbon quota consistent with a 2 °C warming limit (relative to pre-industrial levels), the necessary long-term mitigation rates are very challenging (typically over 5% per year), both because of strong limits on future emissions from the global carbon quota and also the likely short-term persistence in emissions growth in many regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors discuss the need for policymakers to charge carbon tax on the difference between emissions and fixed threshold to achieve full potential to induce large emission reductions. They stress that carbon taxing has the advantage over carbon trading in creating a stable price, while not undermining other carbon control efforts that have a role in ineffective carbon pricing. They emphasize the strong motive of large, carbon-intensive companies to lobby politically for more free carbon.

Uncertainty is an obstacle for commitments under cap and trade schemes for emission permits. We assess how well intensity targets, where each country’s permit allocation is indexed to its future realized GDP, can cope with uncertainties in international greenhouse emissions trading. We present some empirical foundations for intensity targets and derive a simple rule for the optimal degree of indexation to GDP. Using an 18-region simulation model of a cooperative, global cap-and-trade treaty in 2020 under multiple uncertainties and endogenous commitments, we show that optimal intensity targets could reduce the cost of uncertainty and achieve significant increases in global abatement. The optimal degree of indexation to GDP would vary greatly between countries, including super-indexation in some advanced countries, and partial indexation for most developing countries. Standard intensity targets (with one-to-one indexation) would also improve the overall outcome, but to a lesser degree and not in all individual cases. Although target indexation is no magic wand for a future global climate treaty, gains from reduced cost uncertainty and the potential for more stringent environmental commitments could justify the increased complexity and other potential downsides of intensity targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor related to an article on the Australian government's carbon-pricing scheme that was published in the previous issue of the journal is presented.

A letter to the editor is presented regarding the emission-trading schemes introduced by the government of Australia.