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This survey of the Supreme Court of Canada's pivotal anti-discrimination rulings over a 30-year period assesses the extent to which the shifting nature of the grounds approach and the Court's conceptions of dignity together form part of a gendered system of enunciation at the intersection of autonomy, identity and affect. This article is written as a corrective to some of the author's early optimism about the possibilities that dignity may offer in the context of constitutional equality rights cases and as a cautionary tale for those who would attempt to use it as a vehicle for rights claiming through the courts. These cases reveal that in the context of Canadian anti-discrimination law, the concept of dignity is most often used to circumscribe agency, limit subjectivity and curtail possibilities for redress by reducing large scale structural problems to the individual in ways that reproduce law's originary violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This intervention queries whether subjecting feminist jurisprudence to a methodological transfiguration toward pragrammatology (Derrida, in Smith and Kerrigan 1984) holds liberating potential for f (be it 'woman', 'female' or 'feminine') as both a signifier and a subject to be read with lucidity and nuance in feminist justice claims. I examine feminist jurisprudence's methodological challenges in the settler colonial context of Alaska with respect to the murders of Della Brown (in 2000) and Mindy Schloss (in 2007). I advance my case for pragrammatology as a critical methodology for feminist jurisprudence by subjecting the case(s) of Brown and Schloss to a more lucid (re)reading in two related and intersecting moves. First, I trace and deconstruct the citations of Brown and Schloss' legal narratives to expose violence in the systemisation of f as a power and legal relation (Ahmed in Soc Legal Stud 4:55–73, 1995). I then examine the paradoxical nature of f justice claims which necessitate a pragrammatological approach. I conclude by advancing counsel on how we might move within paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an article recently published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the legal scholar Helen Reece argues that the prevalence and effects of rape myths have been overstated and the designation of certain beliefs and attitudes as myths is simply wrong. Feminist researchers, she argues, are engaged 'in a process of creating myths about myths' in a way that serves to close down and limit productive debate in this 'vexed' area. In this article we argue that Reece's analysis is methodologically flawed, crudely reductionist and rhetorically unyielding. We locate Reece's analysis within the wider theoretical field to show how her failure to engage with feminist literature on rape other than in the narrowest, most exclusionary terms, yields an approach which impedes rather than advances public understanding and panders to a kind of simplistic thinking which cannot begin to grapple with the complexity of the phenomenon that is rape. We conclude by emphasizing the continuing commitment of feminist researchers carefully to theorize and (re)map the fraught field of progressive legal strategizing in order to identify and counter the kinds of risks and shortcomings of political activism with which Reece is rightly concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3. This is a very significant decision from a variety of perspectives. The judgment is an important addition to the Canadian criminal law jurisprudence as it clarifies the scope of the defence of duress. However, from a feminist perspective, the case also highlights issues relating to situations in which victims of domestic violence eventually kill their partners following long cycles of abuse. In addition, the judgment serves as a reminder of the substantial problems which still exist regarding the responses of criminal justice systems to victims of domestic violence and the abuse they have suffered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen the advent of two feminist judgment-writing projects, the Women's Court of Canada, and the Feminist Judgments Project in England. This article analyses these projects in light of Carol Smart's feminist critique of law and legal reform and her proposed feminist strategies in Feminism and the Power of Law (1989). At the same time, it reflects on Smart's arguments 20 years after their first publication and considers the extent to which feminist judgment-writing projects may reinforce or trouble her conclusions. It argues that both of these results are discernible-that while some of Smart's contentions have proved to be unsustainable, others remain salient and have both inspired and hold important cautions for feminist judgment-writing projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1989 Smart problematised law as a masculinist knowledge which disqualified other forms of knowledge, particularly feminism. Twenty-one years later Smart characterises the relationship between law and feminism quite differently. In this account law responds to feminism and outcomes are progressive. Smart suggests that rather than continuing to focus on law's disciplinary and normalising role, it is more productive to conceptualise contemporary family law as a creative kinning practice. We argue, however, that we must also bring into this account the changes to the state brought about by neo-liberalism. The paper tests these observations about the trajectories of feminism, law and neo-liberalism by reflecting upon our study of the Albert Kennedy Trust (AKT). AKT was established in 1989, in the wake of gay and lesbian resistance to Clause 28, to provide homes with gay and lesbian adults for homeless gay and lesbian teenagers. We are interested in AKT's shift in its description of the adults' relationship with the teenagers in their care from 'brothers and sisters' to 'carers' as it moved from a marginal force to mainstream partner/provider. In this context we explore the complexity of law's responsiveness to feminism's dynamism, its contingent recognition of kinning practices and, in the light of neo-liberalism, its continuing disciplinary role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author revisits Carol Smart's 1989 publication Feminism and the power of law. She engages with Smart's main claims by way of a number of other thinkers. Following Marianne Constable's description of contemporary American legal thought as socio-legal, the author tentatively considers if it could be argued that some strains in contemporary legal feminism that adopted a sociological method resulted in a similar absence of justice that concerns Constable. Smart's caution against the development of a feminist jurisprudence is critically analysed with the benefit of hindsight. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault and Goodrich, the author tentatively considers the becoming of a feminist jurisprudence as a minor jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An afterword to the periodical "Feminist Legal Studies" is presented.

One of the main purposes of feminist jurisprudence is to create or find better ways of being and living for women through the analysis, critique, and use of law. Rich work has emerged, and continues to emerge, from feminist theorists exploring conceptions of the self, personhood, identity and subjectivity that could be used to form a basic unit in law and politics. In this article, it is argued that a strong sense of human subjectivity needs to be retained to enable the human potentiality of women and men to flourish. This can be done in a way which is not essentialist, yet does not dissolve the subject out of existence, issues pertinent to feminist jurisprudence in recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of the article "Toward A Feminist Jurisprudence," by Ann Scales, which appeared in the 1981 issue of "Indiana Law Journal" is presented.