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Does China exert influence over the AIIB, including its share allocation, to pursue its interests as many skeptical eyes suggest? What explains the subscription shares a member state has at the AIIB? Building upon existing literature on American influence in international financial institutions, we propose a unique theoretical argument on these questions. While most of the extant literature focuses on the US dispensing patronage to politically-economically proximate states, we suggest that China may not be so inclined. Instead, we theorize that states that are a priori distant from China might obtain higher shares relative to their GDP at the AIIB. We reason that this outcome is due to the benefits China faces in attracting more distant states (the supply side) as well as the political costs more distant states face in joining the AIIB (the demand side). More distant states are likely to demand more shares given their higher costs of membership, and China is inclined to accommodate these demands both for institutional legitimacy and the potential benefit of attracting distant countries closer to itself. Our evidence—from multiple interviews with top policy-makers and statistical analysis—provides robust support for our theoretical arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are accorded immunities and privileges as agents of their member states as justified by functionalist arguments. They are also operationally hybrid: they are actors in their own right in addition to being functional agents. Navigating the functionalist imagery and relying on the argument that they are delegated purely economic pursuits (i.e. financing economic development), MDBs are able to eschew accountability to rights-holders that are affected by their decisions and operations. Although administrative law approaches have succeeded in increasing transparency, instilling self-regulatory frameworks and providing for independent review, the absence of external oversight of such review mechanisms and the broad immunities to suit enjoyed by MDBs have impeded true accountability to rights-holders. This article argues that, in so far as they engage in private sector financing operations, MDBs and their constituent arms share the form, function and relationships of an economic corporation to a large extent. Consequently, their immunities should be limited to render them bound—like ordinary corporations- by the domestic norms with respect to rule of law and human rights of the home and host countries in which they operate in order to make them accountable to rights-holders and to provide recourse for wrongdoings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to characterize China's approach to global economic governance during the Xi Jinping era, and to provide details on how it is playing out. One finding is that China has moved away from the period of "hiding one's strength and biding one's time" and is now acting in a more norm-making and agenda-setting role in which it is seeking largely incremental change. Another finding is that China is doing these things through a variety of global governance forms such as inter-governmental organizations with a fairly highly degree of formality, looser international organizations that have weaker implementation capacity and unilateral initiatives which put China very much in a leadership position. Findings are based on an examination of major activities of the Xi period, including hosting the G20 leaders' summit in Hangzhou, China, joint creation of new multilateral development banks, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The paper also touches on motives for China's activities, including hedging against adverse developments in the international system, greater wealth, and a global power vacuum that has arisen with the rise of nativist and populist movements in the West, and possible constraints to the realization of China's objectives such as slowing domestic economic growth and a backlash against China's globalization, which could intensify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945 the number of multilateral development banks (MDBs) has increased at a linear rate, with approximately one new MDB created every three years. The proliferation of MDBs has resulted in an inefficient duplication of international institutions with overlapping functions. Further, this trend contradicts our existing understanding of why states create countervailing international organizations. This article proposes a novel, two-step theoretical model of institutional change and creation in an attempt to explain this empirical puzzle. Utilizing the complementarities of rational-choice and historical institutionalism, the model demonstrates that the rational actions of states in the past can lead to seemingly irrational institutional change in the future. This process results in the repetitive creation of countervailing MDBs designed to solve the same functional problems. To evaluate the model's hypotheses, three case studies are undertaken, employing archival material, internal documents, and 48 interviews conducted by the author in London, Washington, D.C. and Manila, Philippines. The empirical results are of direct interest to policy-makers currently negotiating the structure of new MDBs in Asia and Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasingly supporting climate change mitigation efforts. However, little is known about how and why this role in climate finance has evolved, and how MDBs are managing this change internally. This paper addresses these questions through an analysis of energy support provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The paper maps trends in the number and monetary value of ADB energy projects and technical assistance activities, presenting descriptive statistics on five categories of energy between 2000 and 2014. The results indicate that ADB while decreased its support for fossil fuel interventions, this sector continues to enjoy substantial funding support. At the same time, support for sustainable energy projects has also increased, reflecting the Bank's evolving priorities and providing a rough proxy for its entry into the climate finance system. These new insights enhance understanding of the changing dynamics of multilateral climate finance and its complex relationship with development finance institutions. Given their financial resources and policy influence, it is essential for MDBs to support the goals of the new global climate finance architecture. But to be considered a serious actor in the climate finance system, ADB has to revisit its policy architecture, strengthen its accounting procedures, and coordinate its efforts with those of other actors across this fragmented system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Energy demand is growing rapidly across the world, and international funding agencies like the World Bank have responded by emphasizing energy in their project portfolios. Some of these projects promote the use of fossil fuels, while others support cleaner forms of energy. For climate change mitigation, it is important to understand how international funders decide on the choice between fossil fuels and cleaner sources of energy. Examining the energy funding portfolios of the nine most important international funders for the years 2008-2011, we show that funding for fossil fuels has been concentrated in highly urbanized autocracies. Due to economies of scale, fossil fuels are suitable for generating heat and electricity for densely populated urban areas. Autocratic rulers are subject to urban bias in their policy formulation because the support of concentrated urban constituencies is key to an autocrat's political survival, and in democracies environmental constituencies can effectively oppose fossil fuel projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) dramatically increased social lending for health, education, and safety nets after 1985. Yet the great powers’ social policy preferences remained relatively static from 1980 to 2000. This contradicts the conventional view that powerful states control IOs. We argue that highly institutionalized IOs like MDBs require a complete model of possible member-state coalitions encompassing the preferences of all member states—not just major powers. We develop multiple measures of state preferences and include all member states in our coalitional model. We evaluate our model and alternatives with an analysis of more than 10,000 MDB loans from 1980 to 2000. We find that when we include all member states weighted by their voting shares, principal preferences are significantly related to lending outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, providing resources in exchange for voting power in these international financial institutions (IFIs). While the Treasury Department manages the day-to-day aspects of US participation in these institutions, Congress retains authority on funding. With the aim of understanding the microincentives of US support for the IFIs, I analyze congressional voting on bills to fund the IFIs. I argue that members of congress are more likely to support a funding increase (1) the more “liberal” their ideology, (2) the larger the share of campaign contributions they get from banks that specialize in international lending, and (3) the larger the share of voters that gain from economic globalization that reside in their districts. Statistical analyses of voting on five IFI funding bills since 1977 provide support for these arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]