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Mind uploading—the transference of mind from a biological brain to a computer—offers the alluring possibility of immortality. This paper provides a novel challenge to mind uploading, focusing on the distinction between abstract objects and concrete individuals. Uploads are abstract objects, while currently, persons are concrete individuals. This presents a dilemma: if the mind is concrete, uploading it to a computer is impossible. Alternatively, if mind uploading is feasible, the resulting abstract upload cannot be numerically identical to the original person. Furthermore, by differentiating survival from persistence, this paper argues that concrete persons might survive as abstract uploads, but only in a highly restricted sense, without preserving their numerical identity. Despite these philosophical hurdles, practical reasons for considering mind uploading as life nears its end still need to be acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The digital transfer of the mind to a computer system (i.e., mind uploading) requires representing the mind as a finite sequence of bits (1s and 0s). The classic "stored-program computer" paradigm, in turn, implies the equivalence between program and data, so that the sequence of bits themselves can be interpreted as a program, which will be algorithmically executed in the receiving device. Now, according to a previous proof, on which this paper is based, a computational or algorithmic machine, however complex, cannot be free (in the sense of 'self-determined'). Consequently, a finite sequence of bits cannot adequately represent a free mind and, therefore, a free mind cannot be digitally transferred, quod erat demonstrandum. The impossibility of making this transfer, as demonstrated here, should be a concern especially for those who wish to achieve it. Since we intend this to be a rigorous demonstration, we must give precise definitions and conditions of validity. The most important part of the paper is devoted to explaining the meaning and reasonableness of these definitions and conditions (for example that being truly free means being self-determined). Special attention is paid, also, to the philosophical implications of the demonstration. Finally, this thesis is distinguished from other closely related issues (such as other possible technological difficulties to "discretize" the mind; or, whether it is possible to transfer the mind from one material support to another one in a non-digital way). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Would you survive if your consciousness branched into two or more streams? Commonly discussed within the context of split-brain scenarios, this possibility might soon become commonplace with mind uploading technology. Cerullo ( Minds and Machines, 25, 17-36, 2015) suggests that after nondestructive mind uploading and other branching scenarios, personal identity would continue in two streams of consciousness. Thus he argues for what he calls branching identity. In this discussion, I evaluate the theory of branching identity and Cerullo's arguments for it, concluding that branching identity is insufficiently justified and does not yield a better interpretation of branching cases than provided by Parfit (1984). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]