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This paper examines the application and evolution of philosophical practice in China, which employs philosophical principles and methods to facilitate insights and address life's complexities. We aim to bridge the knowledge gap regarding the trajectory and contemporary landscape of China's philosophical practice and its impact on individual and societal flourishing. Guided by the research question, "How has philosophical practice evolved in China, and what are its challenges and future prospects?" this study adopts a qualitative research methodology, including a literature review, historical analysis, and case studies from Chinese philosophical communities. Findings indicate a burgeoning growth of philosophical practice in China, with traditional Chinese philosophies being adapted to provide practical guidance for contemporary issues. The spread of philosophical practice communities across China reflects a growing embrace of these practices. This paper outlines the hurdles and prospects for philosophical practice, pinpointing opportunities for further research and cross-cultural engagement. The insights furnished by this study offer a framework for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to enhance philosophical practice's role in personal growth and societal well-being, both within China and internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resulting meta-level picture, Plunkett and Sundell maintain, vindicates the intuition that the phenomenon of metalinguistic negotiation is at once pervasive yet ultimately unified; and it brings into view the diverse capacities in which the notion itself, and its attendant theoretical framework, can be fruitfully employed in numerous areas and debates of philosophical interest - including, in particular, conceptual engineering. At its most general, the worry is that Plunkett and Sundell's account seems to invite the problematic conclusion that linguistic agents engaged in metalinguistic negotiations are often confused about what they, and their fellow disputants, are doing. Following this same line of thought, metalinguistic negotiations are shown to vary - actually or potentially - along three further dimensions: with respect to the intended I audience(s) i of the negotiation; the I scope i of the normative claims put forward in the dispute; the I kind i of normativity, and/or evaluative commitments, in play. For instance, one level of variation tracks the possible I motivations i driving speakers to engage in a metalinguistic negotiation: whether these motivations are implicit or explicit, whether they are cooperative or rather adversarial in character, whether they are intended to serve goals that are (primarily) practical, theoretical, epistemic, prudential - each of these parameters will make a difference to the kind of metalinguistic negotiation that actually takes place. [Extracted from the article]

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents' moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people's actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants' moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

B Ragnar Van der Merwe b focuses on a key feature of William Whewell's philosophy of science in order to contribute to a contemporary debated issue. Guzzardi attempts especially to show that it was Mach's inclination towards experimental research that may have had crucially contributed to the development of his epistemological and ontological views, and not the contrary, as has been often argued in the scholarly literature. In fact, as Guzzardi aptly argues, Mach's early experimental work was largely independent from any kind of ontological commitment, and it is only at a later stage - on the basis of the collected results - that Mach elaborates some epistemological considerations. [Extracted from the article]

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it explores the extent to which Mach was inspired by Kant's approach to philosophical inquiry and tried to further elaborate it through his historico-critical method for enlightening scientific knowledge claims. On the other hand, it argues that the focus on the situated character of these claims that is implied in Mach's epistemology makes it possible to compare his view to recent attempts to defend a perspectival realist account of scientific knowledge, thus revealing the relevance of Mach's own approach as a methodology in the philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the interaction of ideas of Modern Western philosophy, including Polish philosophy, and Ukrainian philosophy in Eastern Galicia in the late eighteenth century through the early twentieth century. The authors argue that during this period the methodological foundations of Ukrainian philosophy and its history, both in periodization, and the development of philosophical terminology, were intensively elaborated. This is proved by the analyzing works of such Galician thinkers and cultural figures as Klym Hankevych and Ilarion Svientsits'kyi. Both were able to involve Ukrainian philosophy in Central-Eastern philosophical discourse. Such an involvement was fruitful because it contributed to the development of Ukrainian philosophy and its methodology for both historic-philosophical researches and the formation of philosophical terminology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Malcolm X emerged as one of the foremost and formidable leaders of the late 50s and early 60s. He esteemed and affirmed black culture, history, and beauty, thus igniting a nationalistic movement that injected "Black Power" and "Black Pride" into the America lexicon. Malcolm's pro-black message also shaped the philosophy and methodology of a young theologian named James H. Cone who was struggling at the time to construct a Christian faith relevant to an oppressed and frustrated Black community. Cone blazed a new trail in the 1960s as the prophetic voice and the prolific scholar who creatively integrated the social justice theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with the black ideology of Malcolm X. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The S.I. at hand supplements this debate about philosophical methodology by placing emphasis on other methods and debates. Reflections on these less discussed philosophical methods are of fundamental importance for many debates taking place in contemporary philosophy, such as the debate about ameliorative projects within social and political philosophy, the knowledge-first approach in epistemology, the a priori/a posteriori distinction in the philosophy of language, and the distinction between verbal vs. non-verbal disagreement as well as the debate about armchair philosophy in philosophy in general. The discussion is framed in terms of Carnapian explication, and can be regarded as a defense of both, Carnapian armchair philosophy and conceptual engineering (à la Carnap) in the sciences against criticisms raised by William Demopoulos, David Papineau and Willard Van Orman Quine. In his paper "Why Metaphysical Debates are Not Merely Verbal (Or How to Have a Non-Verbal Metaphysical Debate)", Mark Balaguer tackles the question of whether particular metaphysical debates are merely verbal, such as debates about the existence of objects in the past. [Extracted from the article]

Within the last decade or so, political philosophers have undergone intense disagreement over the proper methodology of political philosophy. This paper contributes to and tries to move past this debate by offering a new way of thinking about what it is political philosophers are trying to do. Instead of being either ideal or non-ideal theorists, political philosophers can orient themselves east of Eden or west of Babel. After examining different possible research projects, I argue that the most promising route forward for political philosophers is theorizing that is non-ideal and west of Babel. The paper ends by articulating what such a research program might look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We thank Sander Greenland and Albert Hofman (hereafter abbreviated GH) for their comments [[1]] on our paper [[2]], and the Editor for giving us the opportunity to respond. They proceeded by fitting a hierarchical model, in which the food coefficients were modeled as HT ht Graph where HT ht is a vector of fixed parameters and HT ht is a random error term, assumed to have a normal distribution with mean 0 and fixed assumed variance HT ht . If, in addition, the variance of HT ht is small, then the food coefficients are prevented from varying within this subspace, which will further increase the shrinkage. In this case, the dimensions of HT ht and HT ht are identical, and there will be no shrinkage, regardless of the assumed variance of HT ht . [Extracted from the article]

In "Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language" (2003), Joshua Knobe reported an asymmetry in test subjects' responses to a question about intentionality: subjects are more likely to judge that a side effect of an agent's intended action is intentional if they think the side effect is morally bad than if they think it is morally good. This result has been taken to suggest that the concept of intentionality is an inherently moral concept. In this paper, we draw attention to the fact that Knobe's original interpretation of the results is based on an abstract rendering of the central scenario (the Chairman scenario) that is significantly different from the vignettes presented to the survey participants. In particular, the experimental vignettes involve temporal and social dimensions; they portray sequences of social actions involving an agent and an interlocutor, rather than a lone agent making a momentary decision in light of certain attitudes. Through textual analyses of a set of vignettes used to study the Knobe effect, drawing on ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and discursive psychology, we show that there are many differences between the experimental conditions besides the moral valence of the side effect. In light of our textual analyses, we discuss vignette methodology in experimental philosophy and suggest an alternative interpretation of Knobe's original experimental results. We also argue that experimental philosophy could benefit from considering research on naturally occurring social interaction as an alternative source of empirical findings for discussions of folk-psychological concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"If philosophy misconceives I what i it is doing" - as an influential contemporary philosopher has wisely observed - "it is likely to do it worst" (Williamson [40], Preface ix, emphasis added). It would indeed be descriptively accurate to say that by the early Nineties thought experimentation had become deeply ingrained in analytic philosophy's self-conception, and judgments about hypothetical cases had grown to become the common stock-in-trade of most mainstream debates in several areas of analytic philosophy (cf., e.g., Sorensen [33]; Häggqvist [14]). Eduard Machery, one of the acknowledged pioneers of the field, has recently been explicit in this regard: "Experimental philosophers" - he writes - "have given the impression that their argument was directed at the alleged use of intuitions in philosophy. Extant formal approaches to actual causation couched in terms of structural models tend to be regarded with suspicion by scientists and philosophers of science alike, due to the allegedly "unscientific" way in which philosophers typically theorize about it, namely by means of TEs. [Extracted from the article]

Compared to his previous ground-theoretic writings (Prawitz [22], [23], [24], [25]), the paper in this volume focuses specifically on the afore-mentioned circularity, as well as on the role that Heyting's ideas play in Prawitz's solution. Usberti's critical discussion of Prawitz's proof-theoretic semantics and theory of grounds is furthermore - and quite surprisingly - based on the BHK setup, so that it relies on the very theoretical context that Prawitz himself uses, as said above, to substantiate his standpoint. These latter are in turn obtained via a further modification of the notion of correct inference, differing from Prawitz's one in that it is I local i - whereas, in Prawitz's setup, inferences are valid in the I global i sense of preserving validity throughout the whole structures they belong to. Here, it may be of interest to remark that Prawitz's ground-theoretic notion of valid inference is local too, which could allow for a fruitful integration between Prawitz's recent theory of grounds and Tranchini's standpoint. [Extracted from the article]

Political philosophy offers a range of utopian proposals, from open borders to global egalitarianism. Some object that these proposals ought to be constrained by what is feasible, while others insist that what justice demands does not depend on what we can bring about. Currently, this debate is mired in disputes over the fundamental nature of justice and the ultimate purpose of political philosophy. I take a different approach, proposing that we should consider which facts could fill out a feasibility requirement. This search for the facts requires requires looking to the social sciences, but I argue that it turns out that the social sciences will not provide us with findings that rule out, nor even count against, the kinds of proposals that political philosophers actually make, whether ideal or non-ideal. At the least, to deny this requires adopting deeply controversial commitments within the philosophy of social science. Thus, I conclude that a feasibility requirement has little practical use for political philosophers. Disputes over that requirement ought to be replaced by other, more fruitful ways for political philosophers to address both the findings of social science and the debates over non-ideal theory or political realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen considerable attention paid to the methodology of philosophy. The puzzle is simple—if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these theoretical virtues is simplicity—so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical theories to more complex ones. Huemer (Philos Q 59:216-236, 2009) objects that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The algorithm, a building block of computer science, is defined from an intuitive and pragmatic point of view, through a methodological lens of philosophy rather than that of formal computation. The treatment extracts properties of abstraction, control, structure, finiteness, effective mechanism, and imperativity, and intentional aspects of goal and preconditions. The focus on the algorithm as a robust conceptual object obviates issues of correctness and minimality. Neither the articulation of an algorithm nor the dynamic process constitute the algorithm itself. Analysis for implications in computer science and philosophy reveals unexpected results, new questions, and new perspectives on current questions, including the relationship between our informally construed algorithms and Turing machines. Exploration in terms of current computational and philosophical thinking invites further developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends an interventionist account of causation by construing this account as a contribution to methodology, rather than as a set of theses about the ontology or metaphysics of causation. It also uses the topic of causation to raise some more general issues about the relation between, on the one hand, methodology, and, on the other hand, ontology and metaphysics, as these are understood in contemporary philosophical discussion, particularly among so-called analytic metaphysicians. It concludes with the suggestion that issues about the ontology of causation often can be fruitfully reconstrued as methodological proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I show how certain requirements must be set on any tenable account of scientific representation, such as the requirement allowing for misrepresentation. I then continue to argue that two leading accounts of scientific representation-the inferential account and the interpretational account-are flawed for they do not satisfy such requirements. Through such criticism, and drawing on an analogy from non-scientific representation, I also sketch the outline of a superior account. In particular, I propose to take epistemic representations to be intentional objects that come with reference, semantic contents and a representational code, and I identify faithful representations as representations that act as guides to ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines issues of ontology and methodology in behavioral economics: the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations. Of special interest is the epistemological status of neoclassical economic theory within behavioral economics, the runaway success story of contemporary economics. Behavioral economists aspire to replace the fundamental assumptions of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. Yet, behavioral economists have gone out of their way to praise those very assumptions. Matthew Rabin, for example, writes that behavioral economics 'is not only built on the premise that [orthodox] economic methods are great, but also that most mainstream economic assumptions are great.' These apparently contradictory attitudes toward neoclassical theory raises the question of what, exactly, its epistemological status within behavioral economics is. This paper argues that the paradox can be resolved, and the question answered, by thinking of the epistemological status of neoclassical theory within behavioral economics in terms of Max Weber's ideal types: analytical constructs that are not intended to be descriptively true of anything but which nevertheless can be used for a variety of theoretical purposes. The analysis is consistent with many of the insights from the philosophical literature on models in science and has important implications for the practice of economics-behavioral and neoclassical-as well as for the very nature of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific practice involves two kinds of induction. In one, generalizations are drawn about the states of a particular system of variables. In the other, generalizations are drawn across systems in a class. We can discern two questions of correctness about both kinds of induction: (P1) what distinguishes those systems and classes of system that are 'projectible' in Goodman's (Fact, fiction and forecast, ) sense from those that are not, and (P2) what are the methods by which we are able to identify kinds that are likely to be projectible? In answer to the first question, numerous theories of 'natural kinds' have been advanced, but none has satisfactorily addressed both questions simultaneously. I propose a shift in perspective. Both essentialist and cluster property theories have traditionally characterized kinds directly in terms of the causally salient properties their members possess. Instead, we should focus on 'dynamical symmetries', transformations of a system to which the causal structure of that system is indifferent. I suggest that to be a member of natural kind it is necessary and sufficient to possess a particular collection of dynamical symmetries. I show that membership in such a kind is in turn necessary and sufficient for the presence of the sort of causal structure that accounts for success in both kinds of induction, thus demonstrating that (P1) has been answered satisfactorily. More dramatically, I demonstrate that this new theory of 'dynamical kinds' provides an answer to (P2) with methodological implications concerning the discovery of projectible kinds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In empirical modeling, an important desiderata for deeming theoretical entities and processes as real is that they can be reproducible in a statistical sense. Current day crises regarding replicability in science intertwines with the question of how statistical methods link data to statistical and substantive theories and models. Different answers to this question have important methodological consequences for inference, which are intertwined with a contrast between the ontological commitments of the two types of models. The key to untangling them is the realization that behind every substantive model there is a statistical model that pertains exclusively to the probabilistic assumptions imposed on the data. It is not that the methodology determines whether to be a realist about entities and processes in a substantive field. It is rather that the substantive and statistical models refer to different entities and processes, and therefore call for different criteria of adequacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psillos (, ), Kitcher (), and Leplin () have defended convergent scientific realism against the pessimistic meta-induction by arguing for the divide et impera (DEI) strategy. I argue that DEI faces a problem more serious than the pessimistic meta-induction: the problem of accretion. When empirically successful theories and principles are combined, they may no longer make successful predictions or allow for accurate calculations, or the combination otherwise may be an empirical failure. The shift from classical mechanics to the new quantum theory does not reflect the discarding of 'idle wheels.' Instead, scientists had to contend with new principles that made classical calculations difficult or impossible (the Maxwell-Boltzmann equipartition theorem), and new results (the anomalous Zeeman effect) that were inconsistent with classical theorems (the Larmor theorem), and that suggested a new way of conceiving of atomic dynamics. In this shift, reference to atoms and to electrons was preserved, but the underlying causal explanations and descriptions of atoms and electrons changed. I propose that the emphasis on accurate description of causal agents as a virtue of background theory be replaced with Ruetsche's () advocacy of pragmatic, modal resourcefulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines several ethical and epistemological issues that arise when philosophers conduct empirical research focused on, or in collaboration with, community groups seeking to bring about systemic change. This type of research can yield important policy lessons about effective community-driven reform and how to incorporate the voices of marginalized citizens in public policy debates. Community-based reform efforts are also particularly ripe for philosophical analysis since they can demonstrate the strengths and shortcomings of democratic and egalitarian ideals. This type of research also raises unique ethical dilemmas that challenge central tenets of research ethics. We focus on two foundational questions: What does informed consent mean in the context of community-based research (CBR) when CBR may dissolve differences between researcher and research participant, and its parameters can be hard to delineate? And what ethical, democratic, and epistemic issues arise when conducting research with and on community groups, given potentially competing commitments to respect the epistemological contributions of all participants while also meeting research norms to warrant findings and conclusions? Our examination has two aspects: we grapple with these issues through examples from our work to reveal their significance in our own philosophic practice, and more broadly, to reveal their significance as problems within traditional research ethics. We believe that this approach will demonstrate the utility of philosophic engagement with dilemmas in research ethics as a reflective matter, and in the course of empirical research itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article illustrates one way in which philosophical inquiry and empirical research can be combined to illuminate processes like learning and social identification. Over the past 20 years, my empirical work in classrooms and communities has drawn on philosophical discussions about how knowledge is interconnected with social relationships and how we should conceptualize multiple levels of explanation. Both empirical research and philosophy can be done in various ways, and I offer no comprehensive account of how the two relate. I focus instead on one central goal of my work-to clear away assumptions that commonly limit our view of human activity and to offer alternative conceptualizations that open new pathways for thought and action. In pursuing this goal I have drawn on philosophical accounts of knowledge, identity and scientific explanation, as well as on philosophical methods for interrogating assumptions. My empirical analyses also provide philosophers useful cases to think with. Empirical research enriched by philosophical insights and methods can combine tools from both traditions to clear away unproductive assumptions and advance our understandings of the human world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical research tends to be done separately from empirical research, but this makes it difficult to tackle questions which require both. To make it easier to address these hybrid research questions, I argue that we should sometimes combine philosophical and empirical investigations. I start by describing a continuum of research methods from data collecting and analysing to philosophical arguing and conceptualising. Then, I outline one possible middle-ground position where research is equally philosophical and empirical: the Community of Inquiry reconceived as a research method. In this method, a group of participants (the community) engage in philosophical discussion and dialogue to answer the research question (the inquiry). I argue that this collaborative philosophical inquiry, moderated by a philosopher, provides a new method for collecting and testing data. The results are philosophical positions and arguments blended with empirical findings. Next, I illustrate how I used this philosophical-empirical method in a recent study to evaluate the strength of educational metaphors. I conclude that the Community of Inquiry is a viable means of combining philosophical and empirical research, and a new and worthwhile method for research in education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have pursued philosophical inquiry through empirical research. These empirical projects have been shaped-to varying degrees and in different ways-by philosophical questions, traditions, frameworks and analytic approaches. This issue explores the methodological challenges and opportunities involved in these kinds of projects. In this essay, we briefly introduce the nine projects featured in this issue and then address two key questions: First, how do these diverse contributors understand their empirical research as a mode of philosophical inquiry? And, second, what is the value in engaging in empirical research oneself, as opposed to drawing on the empirical work of others? As the essays in this issue demonstrate, there is no single answer to these questions. Our hope is that these guiding questions-and the diverse and divergent answers offered within this special issue-might demonstrate the live and pressing methodological questions involved in integrating empirical research and philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don't know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap's methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian desiderata of exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity. Carnap proposed his methodology more than a decade before Gettier's seminal paper appeared, making the present solution to the problem a candidate for being the least ad hoc proposal on the market, one whose independent standing cannot be questioned, among solutions that depart from the usual method of revising a theory of knowledge in the light of counterexamples. As an illustration of the method at work, I reconstruct reliabilism as an attempt to provide an explication of the (externalist) concept of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Russia, philosophy of religion, likewise religious studies, only managed to claim their name, let alone their right for self-realisation, as late as the early 1990s. The article represents an attempt to elicit the maximum possible number of primary methodological accounts, conceptual divergences and discussions pertaining to both the domain of understanding and that of studying the phenomenon of religion and the variety of religious expression, as well as methods of establishing the actual interdisciplinary relations between religious studies and the philosophy of religion, with their disciplinary scope defined, on the one hand, and contiguous scientific disciplines and worldview discourses on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In contrast, we instead focus on the idea of “muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct and analyse two methodological approaches to the problem of universals, presented in Bocheński's papers 'Powszechniki jako treści cech w filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu' and 'The Problem of Universals.' It is argued that, although these approaches are rather different from historical and methodological points of view, they are still based on the same ontological ground, viz. on immanent realism. The article provides a detailed analysis and comparison of the respective views. Justification is provided for the claim that Bocheński was an immanent realist and some of Bocheński's detailed solutions are highlighted that may be of particular importance for further debate over the problem of universals. A couple of minor critical comments concerning some of Bocheński's analyses are presented at the end of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to reconstruct Bocheński's method of philosophical analysis as well as to clarify the purpose of that method and its basic elements. In the second part of the paper I will compare Bocheński's method with the methods of modern applied ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and more general replies. The general replies include the suggestions that the surveys consider the wrong sort of judgement, or the wrong kind of judge, or that the results of the surveys do not generate scepticism about philosophical appeal to intuition in particular, but rather a more problematic and general scepticism. I argue that the last of these general replies is the most promising. To assess its merits, I consider the most developed account of how the survey results are supposed to raise sceptical problems specifically for philosophical appeal to intuition, that presented in Weinberg (Midwest Stud Philos XXXI:318-343, ). I argue that there are significant objections to Weinberg's account. I conclude that, so far, experimental philosophers have failed to show how their survey results raise a sceptical challenge that applies to philosophical appeal to intuition in particular, rather than having a problematic, more general scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the present-day condition of philosophy in Russia as being at par with philosophies in other countries. The development of Russian philosophy is affected by several factors including the absence of stimulus which is present when an official ideology during the Soviet era was established, the penchant to imitate the latest philosophical trends, and the absence of competition in philosophy. Russian philosophers adopted the philosophy and methodology of science.

The article describes the present-day condition of philosophy in Russia. There are several circumstances by which Russian philosophy is defined including the conflict between the Soviet and Russian discourse which is influenced by the values of Orthodox Christianity, the conflict between philosophical and scientific styles of thinking, and the philosophical search for the existence of virtual practice and contemporary art. Other factors mentioned are language, consciousness and logos.

The article describes the present-day condition of philosophy in Russia as a mixture of inherent and imitated ideas from various philosophers in the tradition of Chinese, Buddhist, Indian and Arabic/Muslim philosophies. The absence of a single prominent philosophical tradition is also predicated on the failure of authors to identify with specific school of thoughts and the emergence of various philosophers without a known leader. The role of the philosophical community is cited.