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While memory for semantically related items is improved over unrelated items in many cases, relatedness can also lead to memory costs. Here we examined how the semantic relatedness of words within a display influenced memory for their locations. Participants learned the locations of words inside grid displays; the words in a given display were either from a single category or were from different assorted categories. When a display containing words from a single category was compared to a scrambled display containing words from multiple categories, location memory performance was rendered worse, while word recall performance was significantly improved. Our results suggest that semantically structured spaces can both help and harm memory within the context of a location memory task. We hypothesize that relatedness can improve memory performance by increasing the likelihood that matching candidates will be retrieved, yet might worsen performance that requires distinguishing between similar target representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current accounts of the production effect suggest that production leads to the encoding of additional production-associated features and/or better feature encoding. Thus, if it is the act of production that leads to the storage and/or enhanced encoding of these features, then less of this act should reduce the resulting production effect. In two experiments, we provide a direct test of this idea by manipulating how much of a given item is produced within a single mode of production (typing). Results demonstrate that such partial production can yield a significant production effect that is smaller than the effect that emerges from producing the entire item. These results suggest that how much of an item is produced can moderate the size of the production effect and are considered in the context of recent modelling efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often rely on external devices to store to-be-remembered information in our everyday lives (e.g., writing grocery lists, setting reminders), yet there is limited research about how certain information (i.e., valuable information) may be differentially encoded when we rely on our internal memory versus an external store. Across three preregistered experiments, we examined the effect of relying on an external store on the recall of high-value and low-value information. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we presented participants with words associated with point values and examined mean recall performance during two critical trials in which the external store was not available: (1) a trial in which participants were told that they would have access to an external memory store at test (told-external-store) and (2) a trial in which participants were told that they would not have access to their external store at test (told-no-external-store). In Experiment 2, we explored participants' metacognitive predictions of performance on the recall test. Critically, across all of the experiments, we found that the value effect (i.e., better recall for valuable information) was significantly reduced when individuals were told that they could rely on an external store. The same pattern was present in participant's metacognitive judgements. Together, these results suggest that when relying on external stores, individuals forgo (to some extent, at least) selective encoding by value and that individuals might be aware of this change in strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on external memory aids is a common memory strategy that has long allowed us to "remember" vast amounts of information more reliably than with our internal memory alone. However, recent work has provided evidence consistent with the idea that offloading memory demands encourages a reduced engagement in intentional or top-down memory strategies/efforts, leading to lower memory performance in general. Evidence for this view comes from results demonstrating a reduced primacy effect but intact recency and isolation effects when individuals could offload memory demands (but had to unexpectedly rely on their internal memory at test). In the present investigation, we attempt a replication of these critical results, given some inconsistencies in the findings between studies. In addition, we extend the examination of offloading's impact on memory via examining individual differences in reliance on the external store (when available) and different strategies for the use of that store. Results of the replication are generally consistent with previous research. An individual differences analysis yielded results consistent with the notion that increased reliance on an external store can compromise internal/biological memory in the absence of that store. Finally, a verbal model of offloading memory demands within a framework of effort and study time allocation is presented. Together, the results both reinforce extant research and extend it in new directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the long history and pervasiveness of cognitive offloading as a memory strategy, the memorial fate of offloaded information is not well understood. Recent work has suggested that offloading information may engage similar mechanisms as instructions to forget (e.g., directed forgetting). In the present investigation, we test this prediction by examining the serial position effect for offloaded information. Previous research has demonstrated that "forget" instructions can eliminate the primacy effect while leaving an intact recency effect. Across two experiments, participants completed a number of free recall trials using an external aid and then a final recall trial without the external aid. We compared a group that was expecting to use the aid for the final trial (offloading) with a group that was not (no-offloading). We found a memory impairment for offloaded items that was characterized by a reduced primacy effect but a typical recency effect, similar to what has been reported in research on intentional/directed forgetting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some actions evaluated as effortful? In the present set of experiments we address this question by examining individuals' perception of effort when faced with a trade-off between two putative cognitive costs: how much time a task takes vs. how error-prone it is. Specifically, we were interested in whether individuals anticipate engaging in a small amount of hard work (i.e., low time requirement, but high error-likelihood) vs. a large amount of easy work (i.e., high time requirement, but low error-likelihood) as being more effortful. In between-subject designs, Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated that individuals anticipate options that are high in perceived error-likelihood (yet less time consuming) as more effortful than options that are perceived to be more time consuming (yet low in error-likelihood). Further, when asked to evaluate which of the two tasks was (a) more effortful, (b) more error-prone, and (c) more time consuming, effort-based and error-based choices closely tracked one another, but this was not the case for time-based choices. Utilizing a within-subject design, Experiment 4 demonstrated overall similar pattern of judgments as Experiments 1 through 3. However, both judgments of error-likelihood and time demand similarly predicted effort judgments. Results are discussed within the context of extant accounts of cognitive control, with considerations of how error-likelihood and time demands may independently and conjunctively factor into judgments of cognitive effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explored the possibility that increasing participants' motivation to perform well on a focal task can reduce mind wandering. Participants completed a sustained-attention task either with standard instructions (normal motivation), or with instructions informing them that they could be excused from the experiment early if they achieved a certain level of performance (higher motivation). Throughout the task, we assessed rates of mind wandering (both intentional and unintentional types) via thought probes. Results showed that the motivation manipulation led to significant reductions in both intentional and unintentional mind wandering as well as improvements in task performance. Most critically, we found that our simple motivation manipulation led to a dramatic reduction in probe-caught mind-wandering rates (49%) compared to a control condition (67%), which suggests the utility of motivation-based methods to reduce people's propensity to mind-wander. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many situations, increasing task difficulty decreases thoughts that are unrelated to the task (i.e., mind-wandering). In the context of reading, however, recent research demonstrated that increasing passage reading difficulty actually increases mind-wandering rates (e.g., Feng et al. in Psychon Bull Rev 20:586–592, 2013). The primary goal of this research was to elucidate the mechanism that drives this positive relation. Across Experiments 1–3, we found evidence that the effect of Flesch–Kincaid reading difficulty on mind-wandering is partially driven by hard passages having longer sections of text (i.e., more words per screen) than easy passages when passages are presented one sentence at a time. In Experiment 4, we controlled for reading difficulty, and found that section length was positively associated with mind-wandering rates. We conclude by proposing that individuals may tend to disengage their attention from passages with relatively long sections of text because they appear to be more demanding than passages with shorter sections (even though objective task demands are equivalent). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of cognitive load on social attention was examined across three experiments in a live pedestrian passing scenario (Experiments 1 and 2) and with the same scenario presented as a video (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the load was manipulated using an auditory 2-back task. While the participant was wearing a mobile eye-tracker, the participant's fixation behavior toward a confederate was recorded and analyzed based on temporal proximity from the confederate (near or far) and the specific regions of the confederate being observed (i.e., head or body). In Experiment 1 we demonstrated an effect of cognitive load such that there was a lower proportion of fixations and time spent fixating toward the confederate in the load condition. A similar pattern of results was found in Experiment 2 when a within-subject design was used. In Experiment 3, which employed a less authentic social situation (i.e., video), a similar effect of cognitive load was observed. Collectively, these results suggest attentional resources play a central role in social attentional behaviors in both authentic (real-world) and less authentic (video recorded) situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]