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"Dogs" are connected to "cats" in our minds, and "backyard" to "outdoors." Does the structure of this semantic knowledge differ across people? Network-based approaches are a popular representational scheme for thinking about how relations between different concepts are organized. Recent research uses graph theoretic analyses to examine individual differences in semantic networks for simple concepts and how they relate to other higher-level cognitive processes, such as creativity. However, it remains ambiguous whether individual differences captured via network analyses reflect true differences in measures of the structure of semantic knowledge, or differences in how people strategically approach semantic relatedness tasks. To test this, we examine the reliability of local and global metrics of semantic networks for simple concepts across different semantic relatedness tasks. In four experiments, we find that both weighted and unweighted graph theoretic representations reliably capture individual differences in local measures of semantic networks (e.g., how related pot is to pan versus lion). In contrast, we find that metrics of global structural properties of semantic networks, such as the average clustering coefficient and shortest path length, are less robust across tasks and may not provide reliable individual difference measures of how people represent simple concepts. We discuss the implications of these results and offer recommendations for researchers who seek to apply graph theoretic analyses in the study of individual differences in semantic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is a correction notice for an article titled "Local but not global graph theoretic measures of semantic networks generalize across tasks" published in the journal Behavior Research Methods. The original article contained typographical errors, including incorrect symbols and a misplaced table caption, which have been corrected in the revised version. The outcome in the Weighted Graphs section was also updated to include a decimal point. The publisher, Springer Nature, maintains a neutral stance on jurisdictional claims and institutional affiliations. The authors of the article are Maria M. Robinson, Isabella C. DeStefano, Edward Vul, and Timothy F. Brady. [Extracted from the article]

The world around us is filled with complex objects, full of color, motion, shape, and texture, and these features seem to be represented separately in the early visual system. Anne Treisman pointed out that binding these separate features together into coherent conscious percepts is a serious challenge, and she argued that selective attention plays a critical role in this process. Treisman also showed that, consistent with this view, outside the focus of attention we suffer from illusory conjunctions: misperceived pairings of features into objects. Here we used Treisman's logic to study the structure of pre-attentive representations of multipart, multicolor objects, by exploring the patterns of illusory conjunctions that arise outside the focus of attention. We found consistent evidence of some pre-attentive binding of colors to their parts, and weaker evidence of binding multiple colors of the same object. The extent to which such hierarchical binding occurs seems to depend on the geometric structure of multipart objects: Objects whose parts are easier to separate seem to exhibit greater pre-attentive binding. Together, these results suggest that representations outside the focus of attention are not entirely a "shapeless bundles of features," but preserve some meaningful object structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationships between word frequency and various perceptual features have been used to study the cognitive processes involved in word production and recognition, as well as patterns in language use over time. However, little work has been done comparing spoken and written frequencies against each other, which leaves open the question of whether there are modality-specific relationships between perceptual features and frequency. Words have different frequencies in speech and written texts, with some words occurring disproportionately more often in one modality than the other. In the present study, we investigated whether perceptual features predict this frequency asymmetry across modalities. Our results suggest that perceptual features such as length, neighborhood density, and positional probability differentially affect speech and writing, which reveals different online processing constraints and considerations for communicative efficiency across the two modalities. These modality-specific effects exist above and beyond formality differences. This work provides arguments against theories that assume that words differing in frequency are perceptually equivalent, as well as models that predict little to no influence of perceptual features on top-down processes of word selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three experiments, we used face-name learning to examine the puzzling feedback delay benefit-the tendency for feedback to be more effective when it is delayed rather than presented immediately. In Experiment 1, we found that feedback presented after a 3-s blank screen was more effective than feedback presented immediately, even after controlling for the exposure time to the material. In Experiment 2, we replicated the benefit of a feedback delay even when participants were given extra time to view the feedback or to try to retrieve the answer, indicating that this benefit is specific to a delay before feedback. Finally, in Experiment 3, we showed that the 3-s delay is beneficial only if it involves a blank screen, not if the delay is filled with an unrelated distracter task. These results suggest that the feedback delay benefit in this paradigm could arise from an active anticipatory process that occurs during the delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three experiments, we investigated whether memory tests enhance learning and reduce forgetting more than additional study opportunities do. Subjects learned obscure facts (Experiments 1 and 2) or Swahili-English word pairs (Experiment 3) by either completing a test with feedback (test/study) or receiving an additional study opportunity (study). Recall was tested after 5 mm or 1, 2, 7, 14, or 42 days. We explored forgetting by means of an ANOVA and also by fitting a power function to the data. In all three experiments, testing enhanced overall recall more than restudying did. According to the power function, in two out of three experiments, testing also reduced forgetting more than restudying did, although this was not always the case according to the ANOVA. We discuss the implications of these results both for approaches to measuring forgetting and for the use of tests in promoting long-term retention. The stimuli used in these experiments may be found at www.psychonomic.org/archive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incubation refers to the popular idea that stopping work on a problem may, at times, be a more efficient means by which to reach a solution than continuing to work. Empirical studies of incubation have used few participants and have provided ambiguous and discrepant results. We investigated three potential accounts of incubation in retrieval and search problems (subconscious work, spreading activation, and fixation forgetting) with the help of a large Internet-based participant pool. The amount of time allotted for explicit work on each of 12 problems was controlled, while the distribution of that time was manipulated in several incubation conditions. When problems were presented by themselves, none of the incubation conditions aided in the solution of either anagram or remote associate test problems. However, incubation benefits arose when participants were given misdirecting clues (probably because time delays facilitated forgetting of these clues). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The brain can process input without perception, but what distinguishes conscious from preconscious processing? Using aftereffects induced by quickly alternating images, we show that cortical mechanisms track color much faster than perception, responding well to color alternations that are too rapid to be perceptible. The more restricted frequency response of the conscious perception of color suggests that extra integrative steps give conscious color perception a time course substantially slower than that of early cortical mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]