Search

This paper examines the question as to whether propositional seeing is best thought of as a way of knowing a proposition to be true. After showing how Pritchard's distinction between objective and subjective goodness motivates a negative answer to this question, I examine a challenge raised by Ghijsen for Pritchard's construal of that distinction. I then turn to the connection between propositional seeing and belief. I argue that doxasticism about propositional seeing – the claim that propositional seeing involves belief – ultimately lacks independent motivation and I offer a model of propositional seeing that explains how propositional perception can provide one with a rational basis for forming a perceptual belief. Finally, I discuss in what way the proposed model of propositional seeing may remain compatible with the claim that propositional seeing is a way of knowing a proposition to be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding whether consumer preferences are inherent or constructed has profound implications for a range of marketing and economic issues, such as demand estimation, consumer education and information, market design and competition. The literature reveals a formidable divide between inherent versus constructed preferences, underscoring a long-standing debate regarding the nature of consumer preferences. In this research, we develop a dual-process structural learning model rooted in cognitive theories, enabling empirical estimation of the extent to which preferences are inherent versus constructed. Our results show that brand preferences are largely constructed, with 76% of brand evaluations across all studied brands being formed at the time of purchase. This finding helps to reconcile the enduring divide that has shaped the field's evolution. In addition, our analysis reveals that the mode of evaluation significantly influences market competitive dynamics, with 60% of brand-switching resulted from constructed preferences. Furthermore, we also find mode of evaluation has asymmetric impacts on established versus new brands. These findings open up novel avenues for shaping competitive landscapes by strategically altering (e.g., through nudges) consumer's mode of evaluation, becoming extremely relevant in the digital economy characterized by overwhelming and rapid information exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior studies indicate that emotions, particularly high-arousal emotions, may elicit rapid intuitive thinking, thereby decreasing the ability to recognize misinformation. Yet, few studies have distinguished prior affective states from emotional reactions to false news, which could influence belief in falsehoods in different ways. Extending a study by Martel et al. (Cognit Res: Principles Implic 5: 1–20, 2020), we conducted a pre-registered online survey experiment in Austria (N = 422), investigating associations of emotions and discernment of false and real news related to COVID-19. We found no associations of prior affective state with discernment, but observed higher anger and less joy in response to false compared to real news. Exploratory analyses, including automated analyses of open-ended text responses, suggested that anger arose for different reasons in different people depending on their prior beliefs. In our educated and left-leaning sample, higher anger was often related to recognizing the misinformation as such, rather than accepting the false claims. We conclude that studies need to distinguish between prior affective state and emotional response to misinformation and consider individuals' prior beliefs as determinants of emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Adjuvant endocrine therapy has a vital role in reducing breast cancer mortality. The beliefs in adjuvant endocrine therapy is a very important factor in the medication adherence of breast cancer survivors. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a standardized scale for assessment of adjuvant endocrine therapy. The purpose of this study was to identify the attributes of adjuvant endocrine therapy beliefs, and to evaluate adjuvant endocrine therapy beliefs scale psychometric properties. Methods: A hybrid model was applied to identify the concept of adjuvant endocrine therapy beliefs and measurement question were developed by the scale development process. Statistical analysis using validity analysis and Rasch analysis based on item response theory were performed. A total of 228 breast cancer survivors in South Korea participated in the study. Results: The finally developed adjuvant endocrine therapy beliefs scale consisted of 22 items. The items extracted by 4 factors explained 59.72% of the total variance. The model fit showed an acceptable level. The adjuvant endocrine therapy beliefs scale was excellent in convergent and discriminant validity with reliability. Conclusion: This scale is expected to be practical and useful in identifying adjuvant endocrine therapy beliefs and developing intervention strategies to promote adjuvant endocrine therapy adherence. In addition, continuous education and support should be accompanied so that breast cancer survivors can maintain positive beliefs in adjuvant endocrine therapy adherence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address an open problem in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI): how to justify the epistemic attitudes we have towards the trustworthiness of AI systems. The problem is important, as providing reasons to believe that AI systems are worthy of trust is key to appropriately rely on these systems in human-AI interactions. In our approach, we consider the trustworthiness of an AI as a time-relative, composite property of the system with two distinct facets. One is the actual trustworthiness of the AI and the other is the perceived trustworthiness of the system as assessed by its users while interacting with it. We show that credences, namely, beliefs we hold with a degree of confidence, are the appropriate attitude for capturing the facets of the trustworthiness of an AI over time. Then, we introduce a reliabilistic account providing justification to the credences in the trustworthiness of AI, which we derive from Tang’s probabilistic theory of justified credence. Our account stipulates that a credence in the trustworthiness of an AI system is justified if and only if it is caused by an assessment process that tends to result in a high proportion of credences for which the actual and perceived trustworthiness of the AI are calibrated. This approach informs research on the ethics of AI and human-AI interactions by providing actionable recommendations on how to measure the reliability of the process through which users perceive the trustworthiness of the system, investigating its calibration to the actual levels of trustworthiness of the AI as well as users’ appropriate reliance on the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monothematic delusions are bizarre beliefs which are often accompanied by highly anomalous experiences. For philosophers and psychologists attracted to the exploration of mental phenomena in an evolutionary framework, these beliefs represent—notwithstanding their rarity—a puzzle. A natural idea concerning the biology of belief is that our beliefs, in concert with relevant desires, help us to navigate our environments, and so, in broad terms, an evolutionary story of human belief formation will likely insist on a function of truth (true beliefs tend to lead to successful action). Monothematic delusions are systematically false and often harmful to the proper functioning of the agent and the navigation of their environment. So what are we to say? A compelling thought is that delusions are malfunctioning beliefs. Compelling though it may be, I argue against this view on the grounds that it does not pay due attention to the circumstances in which monothematic delusions are formed, and fails to establish doxastic malfunction. I argue instead that monothematic delusions are misfunctioning beliefs, that is, the result of mechanisms of belief formation operating in historically abnormal conditions. Monothematic delusions may take their place alongside a host of other strange beliefs formed in difficult epistemic conditions, but for which no underlying doxastic malfunction is in play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study assessed the relationship between career preparation, beliefs, attitudes, in-service training, and peer communication of primary school mathematics teachers and their knowledge of students' misconceptions. Seven hundred one Chinese teachers were selected for the test and questionnaire survey. The mathematics teacher test paper had good reliability and content validity. The coefficient omega ( ω ) and the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were used to test the reliability and validity of the questionnaire items on mathematics teachers' beliefs, attitudes, in-service training, and peer communication. The structural equation model (SEM) was used to explain the relationship between factors. SEM results showed that career preparation had no significant influence on mathematics teachers' knowledge of students' misconceptions. Mathematics teachers' attitudes towards students' misconceptions, student-centered beliefs, and peer communication positively influenced their knowledge of students' misconceptions. Furthermore, peer communication was the mediating variable between mathematics teachers' attitudes and knowledge of students' misconceptions, meanwhile between the student-centered beliefs and the knowledge of students' misconceptions. These results of the study have indicated the direction for education departments and schools to improve teacher education courses and teacher activities in classroom practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As large language models (LLMs) continue to demonstrate remarkable abilities across various domains, computer scientists are developing methods to understand their cognitive processes, particularly concerning how (and if) LLMs internally represent their beliefs about the world. However, this field currently lacks a unified theoretical foundation to underpin the study of belief in LLMs. This article begins filling this gap by proposing adequacy conditions for a representation in an LLM to count as belief-like. We argue that, while the project of belief measurement in LLMs shares striking features with belief measurement as carried out in decision theory and formal epistemology, it also differs in ways that should change how we measure belief. Thus, drawing from insights in philosophy and contemporary practices of machine learning, we establish four criteria that balance theoretical considerations with practical constraints. Our proposed criteria include accuracy, coherence, uniformity, and use, which together help lay the groundwork for a comprehensive understanding of belief representation in LLMs. We draw on empirical work showing the limitations of using various criteria in isolation to identify belief representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients hospitalized for neurosurgical procedures are highly susceptible to venous thromboembolism (VTE). It is crucial to evaluate the prevention beliefs of VTE among neurosurgical inpatients and analyse the influencing factors. This research sought to create an instrument grounded in the Health Belief Model (HBM) to evaluate the beliefs about VTE prevention and the factors influencing these beliefs among neurosurgical inpatients. A questionnaire comprising 28 questions was designed, validated, and distributed offline to 386 neurosurgical inpatients through random sampling. The data analysis was conducted using SPSS 26.0 and Amos 27.0. The measurement model was assessed through reliability, validity, and confirmatory factor analyses. Additionally, multiple linear regression analysis was utilized to identify the factors influencing VTE prevention beliefs. Statistical significance was determined by P values less than 0.05. The questionnaire encompassed six constructs, all of which exhibited strong internal consistency along with solid convergent and discriminant validity. VTE prevention beliefs score among neurosurgical inpatients was 99.56 (SD = 10.11). Among the belief dimensions, the scoring rate of perceived benefits and cues to action ranked highest, while perceived barriers were the lowest. The influencing factors of VTE prevention beliefs were educational attainment (β = 0.343, P < 0.001), receipt of VTE knowledge education from healthcare providers (β = 0.214, P < 0.001), Personal history of VTE (β = 0.175, P < 0.001), surgical history (β = 0.116, P < 0.01), sources of VTE-related information (β = 0.113, P < 0.01) and method of paying medical expenses (β = 0.112, P < 0.05). The questionnaire showed strong reliability and validity, and the results indicating that neurosurgical inpatients hold moderate beliefs about VTE prevention. While they recognize its benefits, barriers to preventive behaviors persist. Addressing these barriers and enhancing self-efficacy through targeted education and interventions is key to improving VTE prevention awareness and actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sustainable water supply is one of the most important issues related to global climate change in Türkiye. The government, local authorities and universities have developed strategic action plans to raise public awareness about the sustainability of water supply. In this study, which was conducted in Çorum province in Türkiye in 2021 and 2022, the population of the study consisted of teachers who belong to the Ministry of National Education. The purpose of this study was to identify the factors that influence teachers' sustainable water consumption behaviors (SWCB). Data were collected from 380 teachers. Within the framework of value belief norm theory, a structural equation model and path analysis were used to identify the factors that influence teachers' SWCB. According to the research results, the direct effects of biospheric–altruistic values, egoistic values and ascription of responsibility on personal norms and the indirect effects of egoistic values were also significant. Conclusion: in order to develop personal norms, which are the antecedents of SWCB, biospheric–altruistic values and egoistic values should first be included in the curriculum as part of values education. In this context, it is very important for sustainability to train teachers on water footprint to improve awareness of consequences and ascription of responsibility. As a result of this research, it can be said that biospheric–altruistic values orientation must be higher than egoistic values orientation to achieve sustainability, and both must have a significant impact on personal norms, which is crucial in terms of the three dimensions of sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stephen Yablo has argued that ascriptions of belief and knowledge are sensitive to subject matter and that theorising in such terms may help resolve philosophical questions about the semantics of such ascriptions. Truthmaker semantics offers a way of theorising about subject matters. My main aim in this paper is to investigate what a semantics for knowledge or belief ascriptions might look like within truthmaker semantics. I then discuss what the resulting account might have to say about the problem of logical omniscience, the nature of concepts, and rational belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper replies to “Can AI Believe?”—an insightful commentary on “Can AI Know?” Addressing the substantive concern, this paper argues that AI systems can possess knowledge-conducive dispositional beliefs, rather than mere dispositions to believe, akin to certain human perceptual and manipulated beliefs. In response to the dialectical concern, it defends the appropriateness of the original dilemmatic reasoning. The commentators’ claim that proponents of innate knowledge deny knowledge’s need for experience is critically examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that individual propositional knowledge, as traditionally analyzed in terms of true-justified-ungettiered belief, does not require phenomenal experience. Accordingly, those who are satisfied with the traditional conception need to come to terms with the possibility that AI and other zombies that lack phenomenal experience possess knowledge. Alternatively, those who resist attributing knowledge to AI based on the assumption that knowledge requires phenomenal experience need to modify or replace the traditional conception of knowledge to incorporate this requirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of the book "Normative Reasons: Between Reasons and Explanation" by Artūrs Logins, which seeks to reconcile views about the nature of reasons that seem to be in opposition. Topics discussed include the reconciling projects in the book, factor that makes something normative reason for Logins, and desiderata/constraints that Logins articulated for a theory of normative reasons.

Does religious belief differ in any interesting way from other kinds of belief? For now, take ‘belief' to mean how one takes the world to be, on the basis of which they act. Call beliefs like this ‘ordinary beliefs'. There are also more complicated, or abstract, beliefs. Call such beliefs ‘non-ordinary beliefs’. Are religious beliefs different in any significant or interesting way from what we call ‘standard belief’? Our analysis shows that they are not. Although the content of religious belief is different, and sometimes so is the function, religious beliefs are still mental, dispositional attitudes that aim to provide a correct representation of the world. Therefore, religious beliefs are best understood as a sub-category of standard beliefs, alongside ordinary and non-ordinary beliefs. This account of religious belief provides further insight into the meaning of belief and supports a revision of a strict demarcation between standard and non-standard beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and inter-relationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, knowledge and beliefs are attributed to agents. The article explores an alternative approach where knowledge is informed by data and belief comes from trust in, not necessarily reliable, data. At the core of the article is the modality “if one dataset is trusted, then another dataset informs a belief”. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system capturing the properties of this modality and its connection with functional dependency between datasets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that knowledge satisfies interpersonal independence, meaning that a non-trivial sentence describing one agent’s knowledge cannot be equivalent to a sentence describing another agent’s knowledge. The same property of interpersonal independence holds, mutatis mutandis, for belief. In the case of knowledge, interpersonal independence is implied by the fact that there are no non-trivial sentences that are common knowledge in every model of knowledge. In the case of belief, interpersonal independence follows from a strong interpersonal independence that knowledge does not have. Specifically, there is no sentence describing the beliefs of one person that implies a sentence describing the beliefs of another person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: While intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is widely recognized as a transdiagnostic risk factor for psychopathology, there is limited research on its internal structure and core features. This study aimed to employ network analysis to examine IU as a system of interconnected beliefs among a large sample of Chinese adolescents. Methods: A total of 108,540 students participated in this study by providing data through an online platform. IU was measured using the RCIUI-A-C, a customized assessment specifically developed and validated for Chinese adolescents. This assessment focused on individuals' beliefs regarding the general unacceptability of uncertainty. Results: The beliefs "can't stand being in an uncertain situation" and "can't stand waiting when I don't know what's going to happen" were identified as the most central beliefs within the IU network. Additionally, the weighted adjacency matrix revealed that the beliefs "can't stand being in an uncertain situation" and "can't stand not knowing certain things in life in advance" exhibited the strongest connection. Moreover, two distinct communities were identified within the IU network: "intolerance of uncertainty and of uncertain situations" and "intolerance of the unexpected and difficulty waiting in an uncertain situation". Notably, one of the most central beliefs served as the strongest bridge between these two communities. Conclusions: These findings offer novel insights into the internal characteristics of IU and contribute to a better understanding of its nature and malleability. The identification of the two most central beliefs and the bridging beliefs suggests that they may serve as effective targets for IU-based interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that mental types can overlap. That is, one token mental state can be multiple types. In particular, I argue that a perceptual experience can simultaneously be a belief. This does not imply that belief and experience are type-identical, they merely share some of their tokens. When a subject perceives with content p, that content is usually accessible to the subject. By endorsing p, whether automatically or consciously, the subject comes to believe that p. In this instance, the perceptual experience, while retaining its content and phenomenology, becomes a belief. The possibility of this kind of overlap turns out to have epistemic benefits, especially in the face of arguments by Alex Byrne and Kathrin Glüer. I consider several objections to overlap, including the idea that perception and belief have different kinds of content, that beliefs tend to outlast experiences and differences in phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the Yorùbá, one of the three largest ethnic groups primarily based in southwest Nigeria, water holds several meanings which are usually demonstrated in its capacity as a regenerating and degenerating power. To draw upon its affirming quality and elude its caustic powers, the Yorùbá exhibit strong reverence for water and, therefore, give critical attention to it. This reverence manifests through various ritual observances and religious rites that may include the presentation of non-human life or blood or any other acceptable ritual material. In the literature, water is presented ordinarily in its fluid state or as a 'staple' consumed to sustain human, animal and plant life as well as satisfy all kinds of human needs. Among the Yorùbá, however, water is approached in a different light and beyond its mere physical state. Drawing on Yorùbá verbal texts such as odù ifá (divinatory poems or texts) and òwe (proverbs), oral interviews and secondary sources, I present a hermeneutic approach to the intrinsic capacity of water within the context of Yorùbá religious belief and practices. I also examine water as a numinous power in Yorùbá culture and myths. I argue that the Yorùbá people's reverence for water informs the diverse religious and cultural practices that manifest across sites where sacred water bodies are situated and why verbal formulations have been developed to explain water's 'extraordinary' powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some philosophers claim that perception immediately and prima facie justifies belief in virtue of its phenomenal character (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2001; Pryor, There is immediate justification. In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, London (2014), pp. 181–202, 2005). To explain this special justificatory power, some appeal to perception’s presentational character: the idea that perceptual experience presents its objects as existing here-and-now (Chudnoff, Intuition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Berghofer, Husserl Stud 34(2):145–170, 2018). As some philosophers have noted, if perception justifies in virtue of its presentational character alone, the kind of content perception has should not matter for perceptual justification; more precisely, it should not matter whether perceptual content is propositional or not (e.g., Smithies, The epistemic role of consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Kriegel, Australas J Philos, 2021. ). However, most philosophers tend to resist this conclusion, holding that perception must be propositional in order to justify, on the ground that all our model of justification are propositional (e.g., Gauker, Philos Perspect 26(1):19–50, 2012). This paper challenges this claim. The paper consists of a negative and a positive part. In the negative part, I discuss and reject the master argument for the propositionality of perception; the conclusion is that propositional content is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain perception’s justificatory power. In the positive part, I take this conclusion seriously and outline an objectual model of perceptual justification. I define objectual attitudes as mental states whose content is not a full proposition, but a sub-propositional representational item, such as the representation of objects, properties, and kinds (Grzankowski and Montague, Non-propositional intentionality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018), and show that it is plausible that some perceptions and some beliefs are attitudes of this kind. I then argue that objectual perceptual experiences have the right kind of phenomenal character and the right kind of structure to serve for immediate prima facie justification. I conclude by defending my objectual model from three objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, but rather a suspicion of the unwelcome truth. I do this by showing that post-self-deception judgments are themselves instances of self-deception where the individual is self-deceived that they believed the unwelcome truth. I then suggest that the motivational cause of the self-deceit is hindsight bias, specifically the kind known as foreseeability, and that as a result, post-self-deception judgments are not reliable because they do not accurately track previous self-deceptive experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695–705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase "conspiracy theory" has no negative effect upon people's willingness to endorse a claim. We revisit Wood's findings and its (re)uptake in the recent literature. Is the label "conspiracy theory" a pejorative? If so, does it sway or affect people's belief in specific claims of conspiracy (i.e. particular conspiracy theories), or is the effect one that concerns claims of conspiracy more generally (i.e. all conspiracy theories)? Through an examination of the conceptual and methodological scope of Wood's work and the results of our similar quasi-experimental design, we argue that it is premature to suggest the label "conspiracy theory" has no impact on the believability of a claim, or that it has no rhetorical power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the cognitive model of psychopathology, maladaptive beliefs about oneself, others, and the world are the main factors contributing to the development and persistence of various forms of mental suffering. Therefore, the key therapeutic process of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)—a therapeutic approach rooted in the cognitive model—is cognitive restructuring, i.e., a process of revision of such maladaptive beliefs. In this paper, I examine the philosophical assumptions underlying CBT and offer theoretical reasons to think that the effectiveness of belief revision in psychotherapy is very limited. This is the case, I argue, because the cognitive model wrongly assumes that our body of beliefs is unified, while it is in fact fragmented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigating factors affecting students' academic performance seems a hard job for researchers on the empirical front. Beliefs, parents' educational background, motivation, and attitudes have been proven significantly influence achievement. However, concurrent research on the relationship among these variables seems scarce. Therefore, to contribute to this gap in knowledge, the purpose of this study is to examine the structural relationships among beliefs, parents' educational level, attitude, motivation, and achievement in mathematics learning. We selected 30 classes randomly from six schools in Surabaya, Indonesia. This study involved 894 fifth- and sixth-grade students (448 boys and 446 girls). Structural equation modeling results showed that this model predicts students' achievement in mathematics (R2 = 0.49). Beliefs are positively associated with students' achievement (β = 0.20, p < 0.001), attitude (β = 0.82, p < 0.001), and motivation (β = 0.68, p < 0.001). Parents' educational level is positively associated with achievements (β = 0.17, p < 0.001) and motivation (β = 0.07, p = 0.04). Beliefs were indirectly associated with achievements through attitude (β = 0.31, p < 0.001) and motivation (β = 0.08, p = 0.01). The indirect association between parents' educational level and achievement through motivation was insignificant. This study is valuable because it helps unpack the relationship between beliefs, parents' educational level, attitudes, motivation, and achievement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Base Station (BS) is a gateway between a wireless sensor network (WSN) and the network administrator (NA). It is responsible for gathering information from the sensors and forwarding it to the NA while collecting instruction from him and communicating it to the WSN. Consequently, the BS has become the prime target of attackers. One form of attack on the BS is tempering. The attacker finds the physical location and destroys it. An adversary can easily find the BS since (in a typical WSN) it is the node with the highest traffic. In this paper, we hide the BS using proportional–integral–derivative (PID) controlled fake packet injection and data aggregation. The data aggregation strategy helps combine data from the sensor nodes into a super-packet, thus reducing the actual traffic. On the other hand, the PID-controlled fake packet injection technique compensates for the difference in traffic between the BS and other nodes in the network. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can protect the BS from packet-tracing and traffic analysis attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It might initially appear impossible to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p. At the very least, it might appear that doing so would be irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that things are not as they appear. Not only is it possible for a person to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p, it is very often rational. Indeed, combining inquiry and trust in this way is an epistemic balancing act central to a well-lived epistemic life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of the present reflection is Christian religious belief. Specifically, we will use Husserlian tools in order to examine the positional nature of this particular type of belief. We will be less interested in the question concerning the success conditions of this experience and more in its noetic structure. According to our proposal, to believe by faith supposes (although it is not exhausted by) accepting the existence of mundane evidence speaking against this fundamental belief. The believer acknowledges the existence of this contradicting en-doxical basis and nevertheless believes what she believes. We will refer to this simultaneous movement of accepting and cancelling as the concessive structure of the religious attitude. The para-doxical movement of experiencing conflicting evidence as being subjectively ineffective is a key component of this attitude. At least some inchoative conflict with the world is required in order for the religious belief to be religious. Lastly, we will try to show that, with a distinctive terminology, the idea that the Christian religious attitude involves a conflict between subjectivity and world is present not only in Kierkegaard but also in phenomenological figures like Scheler and even Husserl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses a set of observations, many of which are novel, concerning differences between the adjectival modals certain and possible and their adverbial counterparts certainly and possibly. It argues that the observations can be derived from a standard interpretation of certain/certainly as universal and possible/possibly as existential quantifiers over possible worlds, in conjunction with the hypothesis that the adjectives quantify over knowledge and the adverbs quantify over belief. The claims on which the argument relies include the following: (i) knowledge implies belief, (ii) agents have epistemic access to their belief, (iii) relevance is closed under speakers' belief, and (iv) commitment is pragmatically inconsistent with explicit denial of belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focused on undermining or defending narrow scope readings of doxastic norms. Wide scope readings are largely assumed to have been decisively refuted. This paper will oppose this trend by defending a wide scope reading of the norm of belief. We shall argue for the modest claim that if it is plausible to regard belief as constitutively normative (in the minimal sense that false belief is eo ipso defective), then a modified version of the wide scope reading of the norm of belief should be preferred to the narrow scope reading. (This is subject to certain attractive conditions relating to the holism involved in the fixation and confirmation of belief.) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Ippolito and Farkas (Linguist Philos, 45(4):943–984, 2022b) (I &F) question the premise that Italian future is epistemic necessity; in this brief response we want to show that there is no empirical motivation for abandoning it once we employ a more flexible framework of modality such as the one advanced in Giannakidou and Mari (Linguist Philos 41(6): 623–664, 2018) (G &M) which posits a ranking meta-evaluation in the modal structure that explains the empirical objections raised by I &F. We show that the core of the account in I &F shares the main ingredients with G &M and that, unlike what I &F propose, Italian future is not pure credence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between inquiry and epistemology? Are epistemic norms the norms that guide us as inquirers—as agents in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding? Recently, there has been growing support for what I, following Friedman (Philosophical Review 129(4):501–536, 2020), will call the zetetic turn in epistemology, the view that all epistemic norms are norms of inquiry. This paper investigates the prospects of an inquiry-centered approach to epistemology and develops several motivations for resisting it. First, I argue that the norms of inquiry are most plausibly seen as practical, not as distinctively epistemic. Second, I argue that a zetetically-grounded epistemology is unable to properly account for the rationality of belief. It fails to account for cases where intuitively irrational beliefs promote inquiry, or where intuitively rational beliefs are zetetically useless or counterproductive to inquiry. The main upshot is this: there must be a source of epistemic normativity that isn't ultimately zetetic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and blame that can explain why beliefs, but not credences, can non-derivatively wrong. First, forming a belief (but not updating one's credence) closes inquiry, and suspending judgment (but not updating one's credence) opens inquiry. Consequently, beliefs can distinctively wrong others by prematurely closing inquiry or inappropriately opening inquiry. Second, beliefs (but not credences) can constitute blame. Unfittingly blaming someone can wrong them, and hence beliefs which constitute unfitting blame can distinctively wrong. In addition to defending the claim that only beliefs can non-derivatively wrong, this paper gestures towards an ethics of belief which attends to the relationship between belief and attitudes such as inquiry, faith, trust, and blame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a large amount of evidence of placebo and nocebo effects showing that one’s expectation of a forthcoming pain can influence the subsequent experience of pain. Here I shall not discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of pain, but focus instead on the nature of pain anticipation itself. This notion indeed remains poorly analysed and it is unclear what type of anticipatory state it involves. I shall argue that there is more to pain anticipation than a mere combination of anticipatory beliefs and fears. When the impending damage is imminent, pain anticipation involves a distinctive sui generis mental state, which I call nociceptive prediction. One then anticipates the forthcoming event under the pain mode. After analysing its points of similarities and differences with pain, I shall argue that nociceptive prediction is best understood in imperative defensive terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alethic pluralists often claim that truth is not only relevant to normative evaluations, but inherently normative. I raise a problem for such versions of pluralism, based on the dual phenomena of "blindspots" and "brightspots." If truth is inherently a kind of fitness for belief, then all true propositions should be fit for belief, and no false ones should be. Blindspots, however, are true propositions that can't be the content of true beliefs. I argue that they aren't fit for belief. Similarly, brightspots are false propositions that can't be the contents of false beliefs. They are fit for belief. I also consider some moves alethic pluralists might make to avoid the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we defend what we call the 'Hybrid View' of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual's personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone's personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is more plausible than the Belief-Based View. Finally, we show how the Hybrid View generates a more plausible fit between the concept of privacy, and the concept of a (morally objectionable) violation of privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism's metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism (or some other non-superficial theory) or accept interpretivism's hand in marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like "chose to believe" are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of "chosen beliefs" is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense (pace Turri et al. 2018). While we employ the methods of experimental philosophy, our argument also concerns the fundamental question as to what those methods can achieve: as is typical of philosophical debates, the debate over doxastic voluntarism involves a refined theoretical concept, specifically a refined concept of voluntary belief. In such debates, we cannot determine our pre-theoretical position by conducting surveys on those who may not yet own the requisite theoretical concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even when the evidence suggests otherwise. This paper explores an alternative story, which still aims to respect widely shared intuitions about the motivating examples. Specifically, the paper proposes that what is at stake in these cases is not belief, but rather acceptance—an attitude classically characterized as taking a proposition as a premise in practical deliberation and action. I suggest that acceptance's theoretical usefulness in the ethics of belief has been hidden by its psychological obscurity. I thus aim to develop an empirically adequate and mechanistically specific psychological profile of acceptance. I characterize acceptance as centrally involving a cognitive gating function, in which we prevent a target belief state from having its characteristic downstream effects on reasoning, cognition, and action, and restructure those downstream processes. I then argue that there is substantial empirical support for the existence of the cognitive mechanisms needed to instantiate this view, coming from the science of emotion regulation. I argue that acceptance involves deploying the same mechanisms used in emotional response modulation to belief states: acceptance is doxastic response modulation. I then propose that having a better understanding of the psychological profile of acceptance leaves us better positioned to appreciate its potential usefulness for making progress on various puzzles within the ethics of belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Vaccination of children is of great importance for their healthy growth and development. Several concerns that have been mentioned by families due to various reasons could affect vaccination acceptance. Objectives: This study aims to investigate pregnant women's attitudes toward childhood vaccinations and trust in health services. Methods: This study was designed as a descriptive study. It was conducted in a city located in the eastern part of Turkey between March and May 2019. The sample was 193 volunteer pregnant women. Data were collected using the Socio-demographic Form, the Multidimensional Trust in Health-care System Scale, and the Public Attitude toward Vaccination Scale - Health Belief Model. Results: A positive, statistically significant relationship was found between the Multidimensional Trust in Healthcare System Scale total mean score and Perceived Susceptibility, Perceived Severity, Perceived Benefits, and Health Responsibility (p <.01). In addition, education and income level, having social security, having had a vaccination or not, and knowing vaccines affected trusts in health services; having social security, having had vaccinations or not, and knowing vaccines affected health beliefs about vaccinations (p < 0.05). Conclusions for Practice: This study found that knowing vaccines affects both trust in health services and health beliefs about vaccination. Therefore, community health nurses working in primary care should provide parents with accurate and effective information about vaccinations. Significance: Vaccination of children is of great importance for their healthy growth and development. Several concerns that have been mentioned by families in recent years due to various reasons could affect vaccination acceptance. The results of this study showed that there was a positive statistically significant relationship between the Trust in Health-care System and the Attitude toward Vaccination Health Belief. Besides, this study found that knowing vaccines affects both trust in health services and health beliefs about vaccination. Therefore, community health nurses working in primary care should provide parents with accurate and effective information about vaccinations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has achieved economic prominence but damaged the natural environment. Can religions excite pro-environmental actions? Chinese religion encompasses Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, native Taoism, and indigenous folk beliefs (GuanDi and Mazu). We theorize that believers demonstrate more sustainable HOPE (Help Ourselves Protect the Environment) than non-believers. Religions with standardized and formal liturgy show more pro-environmental HOPE than those without it. We challenge the myth that the believers of Christianity and Islam display more sustainable HOPE than other faith. The 2013 Chinese General Social Survey (involving 10,017 randomly selected participants across 28 provinces) revealed that 11.10% of them have faith. Believers display higher levels of HOPE than atheists, demonstrating the religion effect. Among believers, native Taoism and Buddhism exhibit more ecological HOPE than other religions, supporting the dogma effect in the Chinese culture. Religions with formalized liturgy demonstrate more pro-environmental HOPE than generalized folk beliefs—GuanDi and Mazu, validating the liturgy effect. Females, married, and people with good income, education, health, and country-domicile—the haves—exhibit robust ecological HOPE. The rich get richer and greener. However, those who are older, males, urban residents, and the Han majority do not. We empirically demonstrate the Matthew Effect in Religious Social Responsibility: Religious faith facilitates believers' pro-environmental behaviors—HOPE and ethical behaviors in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is extremism, and how can it be countered? According to a recent account by (Cassam, 2021), there are three kinds of extremism: ideological, methodological, and psychological. The psychological kind – what Cassam calls 'mindset extremism' – is used by Cassam to explain what leads individuals to resort to extreme methods. From there we can say that methods extremism can be countered by preventing people from becoming mindset extremists. This paper outlines Cassam's overall theory, and challenges it in two respects. First, it is argued that whilst mindset extremism does account for some individuals, it applies more readily to groups in a way analogous to the contrast between individual and group belief. This creates space for an account of group mindset extremism. Second, I propose that Cassam's account of the role mindset extremism occupies in predicting an individual's turn to extreme methods underplays the social aspects that lead the individual to form the mindset. By acknowledging these social and group properties, we can begin to develop a social epistemology of extremism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of superstitious beliefs in economics have attracted both of psychologists and economists over decades. To date, most studies focus on those beliefs with certain superstitious (religious, mystic, etc.) background stories (sometimes just brief sayings). However, superstitious beliefs without background stories may also exist and affect people's decisions consequently. These beliefs are often performed as beliefs in a nonexistent inherent relationship. In this research, we introduced a model, based on people's adjustment in expected utility upon receiving new information, to mathematize the effect of beliefs in nonexistent inherent relationships. This new model reviews such phenomenon in an economical and mathematical view, which could be applied to some unexplained irrational decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to answer the following question: what is the normative connection between paternalism and the paternalist's belief about the recipient's agency? I consider the following two views. The Robust View says that paternalism is pro tanto wrong insofar as the paternalist's belief about the recipient's agency is always disrespectful. The Less Robust View says that whenever the paternalist's belief about the recipient's agency is disrespectful, paternalism is pro tanto wrong. I interpret the major motive-based theories of paternalism as endorsing the Robust view. While this view is susceptible to a devastating criticism, I argue that the Less Robust view is true. To make my case, I elucidate three ways in which the paternalist may come to hold a disrespectful belief about the recipient's agency. I then argue that any paternalistic action which is predicated on or motivated by a disrespectful belief about the recipient's agency is pro tanto wrong. Consequently, I suggest that motive-based theorists endorse the Less Robust view instead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña's Being Rational and Being Right makes a challenging case that one's evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña's position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don't currently have any and perhaps also that I won't get any, and (absent certain evidence to the contrary) you are not afflicted with any either. This conclusion might seem too good to be true. I finish by raising a puzzle about one of the main motivations for Comesaña's view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental states (beliefs, emotions, moods, desires, etc.) towards things can fit or fail to fit those things. Perhaps actions can fit or fail to fit the situations in which they are done. This paper explores whether having fitting mental states and doing fitting actions can constitute additions to a person’s well-being. The paper first discusses the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being. Then the paper considers hedonistic theories of well-being and criticises the recent proposal from Rossi and Tappolet that well-being consists only in fitting happiness. Then the paper turns to the objective list theory of well-being and Badhwar’s Aristotelian theory. In this context, the paper considers Bruno-Niño’s recent argument for fitting attitudes as a part of well-being. Finally, the paper explores whether, on the objective list theory and Badhwar’s theory, doing fitting actions constitutes an element of well-being. The upshots are that fittingness is not an element of well-being according to some theories of well-being and that it is an element of well-being either contingently or necessarily according to other theories of well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I defend the judgementalist theory of emotion against the argument from recalcitrant emotions. Judgementalism holds that a necessary condition for being in an emotional state is that an evaluative belief is formed. Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that contradict endorsed beliefs and judgements. The argument from recalcitrant emotions states that a judgementalist explanation of recalcitrant emotions results in the absurd conclusion that one would hold two contradictory beliefs. I argue that emotion involves a so-called Spinozan belief-forming process: a process which automatically generates beliefs, without taking all available information into account. The generated beliefs might contradict something one already believes, as the so-called Fragmentation of Belief Hypothesis predicts. Thus the judgementalist explanation of recalcitrant emotions does not lead to an absurd conclusion and therefore the argument from recalcitrant emotions is refuted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]