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As a response and a reaction to the phenomenon of rural decline, the study of rural transformations has become an important research field in recent years, with special concern to the adaptation of agricultural systems, to the survival of rural communities and to the strategies of permanence in place at an individual farmer level. Based on a field research among farmers operating in the Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains National Park (a mountainous area in Central Italy that presents some rural decline related characteristics), this study is aimed at identifying the reasons behind permanence in place from the farmers' perspective. The farms' situation and the farmers' choice to keep staying in the remote areas of the Park are analyzed. The research has been carried out following a partially mixed methodology, which has combined quantitative and qualitative techniques, such as a secondary data analysis, a direct survey, territorial focus groups and face-to-face in-depth interviews. Based on the structural analysis of the rural decline within the area of the Park, the paper analyzes the processes of rural change associated with farmers' strategies to cope with the difficulties as well as the reasons behind their willingness to stay (permanence) according to an anti-reductionist view of individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and arguments about what specific social science research is committed to. I look at three case studies employing this perspective, one on agent based models and individualism, a second on the reality of social class, and a third on the reality of race. In all three cases work is first needed to clarifying what empirical social science is claiming, what ontology or ontologies it seems to presuppose, and then description of the kinds of evidence that supports its commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social enterprises are recognised as relevant rural development actors. The specific features of social enterprises operating within rural areas (i.e. their relational, socially innovative and multi-stakeholder character and their focus on integrated development) concur with the principles of the neo-endogenous approach to rural development, which stress the potential role of third sector organisations as development actors within governance frameworks. In order to study this phenomenon, that links social enterprises and rural development, we propose a conceptual and methodological framework drawing from Polanyi's socio-economic theory, complemented with the concepts of place, spatial scale and corporate agency. Through the proposed framework, we advocate for a plural vision of the economy, socio-spatial and geopolitical sensitive concepts and overcoming methodological individualism for the study of an increasingly relevant phenomenon such as the participation of third sector organisations like social enterprises in the (neo-endogenous) development of rural areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu's notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu's understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor's compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines a culture-analytical alternative in, and to, decision science. In contrast to the predominant individualistic and mentalistic conceptions of decision making an empirical and praxeological perspective is proposed. Beginning with empirical processes and situated practices of decision-making, this perspective aims to decenter the decision-making subject. The author revisits Harold Garfinkel's analyses of actual decision-making behavior amongst jurors in court proceedings and Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following to develop this critical perspective on decision-making necessities in contemporary culture and everyday life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James M. Buchanan (1919–2013) was notable for his contributions to different fields of Economics, being awarded with the Nobel Memorial Prize in this area in 1986. His methodology is characterized by three fundamental aspects: methodological individualism, a constitutional approach, and a contractarian political philosophy. In this paper, we explore the development of these features in Buchanan's works and contrast them with alternative classifications in these categories by scholars in other areas of knowledge. We show that Buchanan's individualism uses a concept of homo economicus that differs from most of his peers in economics. His constitutionalism follows a specific strand that differs from other constitutionalists of political science and law, and leads to his contractarianism, which also has its particularities within political philosophy and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Responsible Brains (MIT Press, 2018), Hirstein, Sifferd and Fagan apply the language of cognitive neuroscience to dominant understandings of criminal responsibility in criminal law theory. The Authors make a compelling case that, under such dominant understandings, criminal responsibility eventually 'translates' into a minimal working set of executive functions (MWS) that are primarily mediated by the frontal lobes of the brain. In so arguing, the Authors seem to unquestioningly accept the law's view of the "responsible person" as a mixture of cognitive capacities and mechanisms—thereby leaving aside other fundamental aspects of individuals' human agency. This commentary article offers a critique of the Authors' rationalist and individualist approach. The critique can be summarized through the following claim: We humans, as responsible beings, are more than our executive functions. This claim articulates through four main points of discussion: (1) role of emotions in moral judgments and behavior; (2) executive functions and normative criteria for legal insanity; (3) impact of adverse situational factors on executive functions; (4) Authors' account of punishment and, especially, rehabilitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has become quite common in environmental sustainability research to promote the influencing of so-called inner dimensions of individuals as means to address pressing environmental problems such as climate change, what we refer to as the Inward Turn. We argue that the conceptual foundations of the Inward Turn, an extreme form of methodological individualism, limit it significantly as a strategy for addressing climate change and other socially relevant environmental problems. After briefly reviewing major shortcomings with the way the Inward Turn conceptualizes the relationship between individuals and social change, including its neglect of causal structures and propensity to abstract its analysis away from problems that are specific to place and time, we sketch the basic tenets of an alternative methodological approach capable of overcoming these limitations. Our approach, however, does not go to the other extreme and neglect the role of individuals; rather, our recognition of the structural drivers of particular environmental problems points to the necessity of specific collective actions by individuals, for example, in the practice of social movements. This recognition demands a rethinking of the role of individual factors, like emotion and empathy, in addressing environmental sustainability problems, namely as they relate to collective action/social movement emergence, development, and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, I attempt to provide a reconstructed Marxian response to the question of whether the social (and behavioral) sciences constitute a philosophical threat to the autonomy of ethics. I suggest that shedding light on some aspects of the Marxian work (especially the Theses on Feuerbach), from the standpoint of the debate on naturalism in contemporary analytic philosophy, can offer valuable philosophical insights against the framework of scientific naturalism. This framework is responsible for presenting the social sciences as a philosophical threat to the autonomy of ethics. I argue that Marx detects and rejects three fundamental presuppositions of scientific naturalism: empiricism, ‘God’s point of view,’ and methodological individualism. I conclude that the Marxian view is a liberal naturalist perspective which allows both the scientific comprehension of the social world and the autonomy of ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this research is on values about methods, a specific instructional theory framework construct that represents a person's opinions about the usefulness of instructional methods. Previous studies have shown that values about methods have a "good guy/bad guy" structure, where instructional methods such as apprenticeship are seen by designers as being more useful than instructional methods such as lecture. This led to the question, how do human values influence values about methods? To answer this question, the researcher asked Designers (instructional design graduate students) and Non-Designers (undergraduate students in an introductory psychology class) to rate the usefulness of three higher-valued instructional methods and three lower-valued instructional methods. The researcher then asked them to rate how well those instructional methods reflect ten motivational value types. The results show that both higher-valued methods and lower-valued methods align with individualistic values as opposed to communal values, with varying intensity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agent-based models (ABMs) are increasingly important in social science research. They have two obvious apparent virtues: they can model complex macrosociological phenomena without strong assumptions about agents and without analytic solutions for models, and they seem to instantiate the methodological individualist program in a concrete way. We argue that the latter claim is false. After providing schematic accounts of ABM models and a first introduction to ways in which to characterize individualist explanations, we work through six conceptions of individualist explanations that are decreasingly "less individualist" and argue that ABM-based explanations in the social sciences are not inevitably individualist in any of these senses. ABMs allow for explanatory relations among social entities and properties in the model environment and they are silent on what basic agents are, allowing social entities and properties to play basic explanatory roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Methodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of (at least two) agents performs a deontically admissible group action cannot be expressed in a well-established deontic logic of agency that models every combination of actions, omissions, abilities, and obligations of finitely many individual agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the role of methodological individualism as a methodology for the social sciences by briefly discussing its forerunners in economics and sociology, especially in the works of Carl Menger and Max Weber, followed by some comments on Karl Popper's and other critical rationalists' contributions as well as rational choice theories. Some recent arguments against methodological rationalism are then provided, including counterarguments, mainly based on exemplary work by economists and sociologists. This paper proposes a scheme for analyses using (weak) methodological individualism, in particular, arguing that evolutionary approaches to the explanation of economic and other social phenomena that accord with methodological individualism suggest that it is a successful and progressive methodology for economics and sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sexual revolution that took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s is one of the most profound social changes during the second half of the twentieth century in America. Before the revolution, there existed a norm proscribing premarital sex (PS norm); premarital sex was not accepted. After the sexual revolution, the PS norm no longer existed; premarital sex became accepted. In the literature on how premarital sex became accepted, little attention is given to the institutional change that transpired—the collapse of a sexual norm. This study specifies one micro-mechanism of this social change. Specifically, adopting methodological individualism and the prisoner's dilemma game, I develop a theory that explains how a technological innovation for contraception triggered a change in individuals' perception of premarital sex, which led to their behavioral change. As a result, premarital sex became accepted, and the norm proscribing premarital sex collapsed. I use General Social Survey data to test the hypothesized micro-mechanism of the institutional change. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis derived from the theory. Based on the above analyses, I discuss two alternative explanations and the issue of teenage pregnancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using nationally representative survey data, this research note examines the association between immigrant legal status and poverty in the United States. Our objective is to test whether estimates of this association vary depending on the method used to infer legal status in survey data, focusing on two approaches in particular: (1) inferring legal status using a logical imputation method that ignores the existence of legal-status survey questions (logical approach); and (2) defining legal status based on survey questions about legal status (survey approach). We show that the two methods yield contrasting conclusions. In models using the logical approach, among noncitizens, being a legal permanent resident (LPR) is counterintuitively associated with a significantly greater net probability of being below the poverty line compared with their noncitizen peers without LPR status. Conversely, using the survey approach to measure legal status, LPR status is associated with a lower net probability of living in poverty, which is in line with a growing body of qualitative and small-sample evidence. Consistent with simulation experiments carried out by Van Hook et al. (2015), the findings call for a more cautious approach to interpreting research results based on legal status imputations and for greater attention to potential biases introduced by various methodological approaches to inferring individuals' legal status in survey data. Consequently, the approach used for measuring legal status has important implications for future research on immigration and legal status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rational outcomes of a social system do not necessarily require its individual participants to be rational. In macro systems, aggregate properties distinct from the behavior of their micro level components can emerge through complex interactions. Caution in building social sciences on assumption of methodological individualism seems appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on street-involved populations has documented their online presence and has highlighted the effects of their online presentations on their lives in the real world. Given the increasing conflation between the online and offline world, contemporary urban ethnographers should pay increased attention to their participants' online presence and interactions. However, methodological training of this sort is still in its infancy stages and has not yet evolved to guide the growing number of researchers undertaking this form of research. This article draws from our experiences using social media in our urban ethnographies with criminally involved groups, to examine the benefits, risks, and challenges of drawing on social media in urban ethnography. It is intended to serve as a foundational piece that will hopefully ignite scholarly dialogue, debate, and methodological training relating to deploying social media in urban—and specifically—gang ethnography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the parallel trajectories of anthropological archaeological and Austrian economic thought from central Europe to the Anglosphere. I note the work of Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) and Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992). Tracing the influence that similar theoretical perspectives has had on their respective fields, I particularly investigate the concept of methodological individualism within American archaeology in the twentieth century. This work therefore is a general abstract for the various points of contact between Austrian Economics and anthropological archaeology over the course of their intellectual histories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we focus on the development of geometric cognition. We argue that to understand how geometric cognition has been constituted, one must appreciate not only individual cognitive factors, such as phylogenetically ancient and ontogenetically early core cognitive systems, but also the social history of the spread and use of cognitive artifacts. In particular, we show that the development of Greek mathematics, enshrined in Euclid's Elements, was driven by the use of two tightly intertwined cognitive artifacts: the use of lettered diagrams; and the creation of linguistic formulae (namely non-compositional fixed strings of words used repetitively within authors and between them). Together, these artifacts formed the professional language of geometry. In this respect, the case of Greek geometry clearly shows that explanations of geometric reasoning have to go beyond the confines of methodological individualism to account for how the distributed practice of artifact use has stabilized over time. This practice, as we suggest, has also contributed heavily to the understanding of what mathematical proof is; classically, it has been assumed that proofs are not merely deductively correct but also remain invariant over various individuals sharing the same cognitive practice. Cognitive artifacts in Greek geometry constrained the repertoire of admissible inferential operations, which made these proofs inter-subjectively testable and compelling. By focusing on the cognitive operations on artifacts, we also stress that mental mechanisms that contribute to these operations are still poorly understood, in contrast to those mechanisms which drive symbolic logical inference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present work highlight the missing picture of interdisciplinarity in Indian social psychology from a critical cultural perspective. In India, social psychologists' tried to inculcate the missing picture of 'indigenous perspective' from the cultural vantage point. The idea of this article is to explain the problem with claimed indigenous status without critically handling the reified social categories such as social class, religion, gender, and caste. However, this was handled to some extent in other disciplines but a deeper connection was not observed to be with the social psychology in India. There were divides and differences in the explanation of the same issues and the theoretical and methodological stance of these different disciplines created a further gap in coming up with the meaningful construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories about relationships impact the ways in which we imagine that teachers and students can or should interact. These theories often involve either individualistic or relational assumptions. A contrast has been made between theories that assume that the individual is primary, and the relationship secondary, and those that assume that the relationship is primary and the individual secondary. Roughly mapping on to these assumptions are the implications that educational relationships either ought to facilitate autonomy or community, emancipation or socialization. I argue that educational contexts occupy a liminal space at the boundaries of multiple contexts, and so have limited ability to either emancipate or socialize students relative to these contexts. However, the very liminality of the educational space allows for a unique view and exploration of these contexts using autonomy and community as means rather than ends of education. Learning, described here as re-co-gnition, is facilitated as students move away from and then return to the liminal (relational), and teachers and students view again together (recognize) the boundaries of these various contexts as they intersect at the school. Implications for teaching in this liminal space are explored for recognizing relationships between student and teacher, childhood and adulthood, home and the "outside world," and boundaries within and between disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, we notice an increasing support for mechanism-based social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms were often closely linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions by, e.g., Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski, seem to be loosening that link and develop a more sophisticated account. In this paper, we review the impact of the social mechanisms approach on methodological individualism and draw conclusions regarding the individualism/holism debate, severing the link between the social mechanisms approach and individualism. Four steps will be taken: (a) there are more than two levels of social explanation; (b) levels of explanation are perspectival, neither absolute, nor unique; (c) seeking microfoundations has value, but so has seeking macrofoundations; (d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. In conclusion, the answer to the title question is that the social mechanisms approach does not strengthen the case for methodological individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper critically engages with some of the normative arguments in Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson's book Unfit for the Future. In particular, it scrutinizes the authors' argument in denial of a moral right to privacy as well as their political proposal to alter humankind's moral psychology in order to avert climate change, terrorism and to redress global injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversy over moral bioenhancement has fallen into a stalemate between advocates and critics. We wish to overcome this stalemate by addressing some of the key challenges any moral enhancement project has to meet. In particular, we shall argue that current proposals are unpersuasive as they, first, fail to diagnose the often complex causes of contemporary moral maladies and, second, are premised on methodological individualism. Focusing on brains and minds neglects social and environmental factors. Solving the mega-problems of today very likely requires more than transforming individual brains, it requires structural and higher-level changes. By itself, moral bioenhancement is thus insufficient for solving these problems. Moreover, we outline some of the yet unresolved problems of (democratic) legitimacy a mandatory state-run bioenhancement project faces and show why they cannot be defused through analogies with moral education. Finally, normatively less worrisome means of enhancing morality, such as psychotherapies affording self-exploration, are already available. Moral bioenhancement may thus not even be necessary for solving today's mega problems. The overemphasis on speculative future technological fixes may cloud the view on possibilities to tackle pressing problems instantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common use of systems thinking (ST) is for guiding our practices of systems making (SM). One style of ST for SM centers on making designs with deterministic rules, as in the hard sciences, for guiding engineered applications. Another style mimics natural development, with a process by stepwise learning and improvisation to produce evolving designs; examples including architectural design, scientific research, and the practice of action research (AR). All these use exploratory pathfinding to search for better ways to work with reality, and this is the main subject of the paper. Both deterministic and adaptive ST for SM are widely found in differing roles, each having capabilities the other lacks. I start with simple models, such as step-wise improvisation for adapting recipes when making dinner. Another example is Robert Rosen's model for how scientific and other cultures learn to work with nature, by turning attention back and forth between nature and theory for creating their cultural language. A review of the modern history of the systems sciences, as practices of ST for SM, then further broadens the view and context. That leads to introducing a new paradigm of natural systems thinking (NST), using commitments to critical awareness, emancipation, and methodological pluralism for working with natural systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considerable focus on what reasons methodological holists may advance in support of their position. We believe it is useful to approach the other direction and ask what considerations methodological individualists may in fact offer in favor of their view about explanation. This is the background for the question we pursue in this paper: Why be a methodological individualist? We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two forms of methodological individualism: a form that says that individualist explanations are always better than holist accounts and a form that says that providing intervening individualist mechanisms always makes for better explanations than purely holist ones. Next, we consider four lines of reasoning in support of methodological individualism: arguments from causation, from explanatory depth, from agency, and from normativity. We argue that none of them offer convincing reasons in support of the two explanatory versions of individualism we consider. While there may well be occasions in which individualists' favorite explanations are superior, we find no reason to think this always must be the case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to compare ‘the ethical value positioning’ of students of Business and Management studies from India and Germany. A complete enumerative survey was conducted for management students using the Ethical Positioning Questionnaire (EPQ) of Forsyth (1980). There were 134 respondents from India and 57 from Germany. The objective was to confer the differences in ethical positioning of students of two economically and culturally diverse nations. By the end of the research, it was constituted that both German and Indian students demonstrate a high degree of Idealism and Relativism and can be qualified as situationists. Exploratory analysis of the responses resulted in extraction of four factors (values): Non-Violence, Individualism, Non-Consequential, and Situational value. Within the analysis, Indian students displayed a higher preference for Individualism compared to their German counterparts. This study contributes to the literature in cross-cultural ethical value positioning of young managers. This study also opens a window for future research in the factors such as educational qualification, closed social groupings, and background of the students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Joseph A. Schumpeter is classified as a pioneer of evolutionary economics in a wide sense and of entrepreneurship and innovation management in a narrower sense, Schumpeter is less known for his contributions in the area of scientific methodology and history of science. The paper deals with methodological premises in Schumpeter’s scientific positioning. In 1908, in his Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Schumpeter developed and pioneered his methodological individualism which is very much acknowledged. However, comparing these early positions with methodological writings in his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows that he has not really shifted from methodological individualism to an institutional perspective that addresses the academic interplay and sees economic action rooted in historical predispositions, paths and social constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are three main foundations of Public Choice theory: methodological individualism, behavioral symmetry, and “politics as exchange.” The first two are represented in nearly all work that identifies as “Public Choice,” but politics as exchange is often forgotten or de-emphasized. This paper—adapted from a lecture given on the occasion of the 30th year after Buchanan’s Nobel Prize—fleshes out Buchanan’s theory of politics as exchange, using four notions that are uniquely central to his thought: philosophical anarchism, ethical neutrality, subjectivism, and the “relatively absolute absolutes.” A central tension in Buchanan’s work is identified, in which he seems simultaneously to argue both that nearly anything agreed to by a group could be enforced within the group as a contract, and that there are certain types of rules and arrangements, generated by decentralized processes, that serve human needs better than state action. It is argued that it is a mistake to try to reconcile this tension, and that both parts of the argument are important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I apply Hayek’s distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism to methodological individualism. Hayek traced ‘false’ individualism to Cartesian rationalism; Hayek’s rejection of Mises’ praxeology was due to its rationalist underpinnings. The first half of this paper identifies praxeology’s foundational philosophical concepts, emphasising their Cartesian nature, and illustrates how together they constitute a case for methodological individualism: intuition and deduction; reductionism; judgement; dualism. In the second half of this paper, I draw upon philosophy and cognitive science to articulate ‘Hayekian’ (N.B. not Hayek’s) alternatives to these Cartesian concepts. The Hayekian alternative allows a ‘gestalt switch’ from the individual- to the system-level perspective. I therefore suggest that methodological individualism is both true and false: true, in that economic phenomena are grounded in the actions of individuals; false, in that certain problems might be reconceived/discovered at the system-level. I finish by suggesting three avenues of research at system-level: optimisation; stigmergy; computational complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between feminism and metaphysics has historically been strained. Metaphysics has until recently remained dismissive of feminist insights, and many feminist philosophers have been deeply skeptical about any value that metaphysics might have when thinking about advancing gender justice. Nevertheless, feminist philosophers have in recent years increasingly taken up explicitly metaphysical investigations. Such feminist investigations have expanded the scope of metaphysics in holding that metaphysical tools can help advance debates on topics outside of traditional metaphysical inquiry (e.g. the nature of gender, sex, or sexuality). Moreover, feminist philosophers typically bring new methodological insights to bear on traditional ways of doing philosophy. Feminist metaphysicians have also recently begun interrogating the methods of metaphysics and they have raised questions about what metaphysics as a discipline is in the business of doing. In discussing such methodological issues, Elizabeth Barnes has recently argued that some prevalent conceptions of metaphysics rule out feminist metaphysics from the start and render it impossible. This is bad news for self-proclaimed feminist metaphysicians in suggesting that they are mistaken about the metaphysical status of their work. With this worry in mind, the paper asks: how does feminist metaphysics fare relative to 'mainstream' metaphysics? More specifically, it explores how feminist and 'mainstream' debates intersect, on what grounds do they come apart (if at all), and whether feminist metaphysics qualifies as metaphysics 'proper'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We survey a variety of possible explications of the term 'Individual Risk.' These in turn are based on a variety of interpretations of 'Probability,' including classical, enumerative, frequency, formal, metaphysical, personal, propensity, chance and logical conceptions of probability, which we review and compare. We distinguish between 'groupist' and 'individualist' understandings of probability, and explore both 'group to individual' and 'individual to group' approaches to characterising individual risk. Although in the end that concept remains subtle and elusive, some pragmatic suggestions for progress are made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many contemporary accounts of social belief are committed to the view that social beliefs can only be held by a plurality of individuals. Gilbert (in Schmitt (ed.) Socializing metaphysics, 2003) characterizes 'joint commitments' as the 'social atoms' of social belief and other forms of social intentionality, and Tuomela (in The philosophy of sociality: The shared point of view, 2007) maintains that social belief and other forms of social intentionality are bound by a 'collectivity condition.' Such theorists thus rule out the possibility of solitary social belief, that is, a social belief held by an individual that is not socially shared by members of a social group. Such theorists also reject Searle's account of social intentionality as being too individualistic, but I argue that the same kind of solitary social intentions that can arise on Searle's account can also arise on the accounts offered by Gilbert and Tuomela (and Michael Bratman). This is a consequence of the fact that neither Gilbert nor Tuomela hold that social intentionality is a supra-individual form of intentionality that is different in kind from the intentionality of individuals who comprise and constitute plural subjects and social groups. I also argue for the possibility of solitary social belief by providing a characterization of social beliefs that is independent of their relation to collective action, and provide two illustrative real-life examples. While no doubt rare, the reality of solitary social beliefs is a consequence of the dynamical nature of social beliefs, namely their orientation to the represented, or, in the case of solitary social beliefs, misrepresented beliefs of members of a social group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies demonstrated that subjective well-being is associated with goal value and perceived progress but their validity is affected by methodological biases. Moreover, a few have analysed the influence of short-term goals. We aimed to analyse how the levels of and changes in short-term goals progress and value influence subsequent levels of and changes in subjective well-being. This study adopted a three-wave longitudinal design with one-month intervals. Four hundred nine participants (186 males; age 19-71) reported their subjective well-being and their two most important goals and rated each over time in terms of value and progress. A latent difference score model revealed that levels and increases in goal progress positively influenced subsequent levels of subjective well-being. Goal value increases led to decreases in negative affect. These findings provide insights on the promotion of subjective well-being. Given the importance of goal progress in promoting subjective well-being, we propose the implementation of goal-setting programmes that are aimed at fostering successful goal pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon's argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond to a weaker version of the argument for the claim that we should revise our notion of determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess Gordon Tullock's work on revolutions and dictatorship using a common analytical framework that captures the dynamics of mutually reinforcing perceptions within a potentially rebelling subgroup of a population. We can reconstruct all of Tullock's central findings but we also find him failing to consider revolutions as an unintended result of individual action in certain low-cost situations. That notwithstanding, one central implication of Tullock's analysis remains intact, namely that no relation can consistently be constructed between the degree of deprivation of a population on the one hand and the probability of an enforced regime change in a public uprising, at least not within the limits of methodological individualism. Hence, whoever aims at strictly inferring macro results from micro behavior must still find Tullock's work on autocracies and revolutions path-breaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For society to effectively manage climate change impacts, the need to adapt must be recognized. At the same time there is a disconnect between knowledge and action on climate change. The salience of adaptation to climate change may be a precondition for action, but this issue has so far been neglected in the adaptation literature. This indicates a missing link between perception, values and world-views, on one side, and policy formation on the other. The article analyses how actors in three occupational groups in a natural resource dependent community in northern Norway perceive and respond to changes in weather and resource conditions, as well as projections for future climate. The results indicate that the need to adapt is perceived differently, if at all, amongst different actors. By drawing on concepts from governance literatures and cultural theory of risks (CTR), the paper seeks to explain this divergence in perceptions and responses amongst different actors, which can help policy-makers understand when and why autonomous actors are willing to adapt. We find that adaptation to climate change cannot readily be expected among actors who fit the individualist category of CTR, who do not directly utilize scientific knowledge when in their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the linkages between culture, emotions and behavioural tendencies in unsuccessful intercultural business negotiations. A set of novel research hypotheses are developed. They are tested using a negotiation scenario analysis involving 106 Finnish and 114 Indian study participants. Three key findings emerge from the statistical tests conducted. First, new empirical evidence suggesting that qualitatively different emotions (dejection vs. agitation) are experienced after a failed intercultural business negotiation by individualists and collectivists is provided. Second, the existence of the relationship between perspective-taking ability and emotional volatility in the context of failed intercultural business negotiation involving individualists and collectivists is revealed. Third, partial support is found for the idea that different types of negative emotions can lead to the same behavioural tendency (approach) among individualists and collectivists when intercultural business negotiation fails. The paper concludes by outlining a set of theoretical and managerial implications and suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joseph A. Schumpeter and Ludwig von Mises were both Austrian-born economists, both were students of Böhm-Bawerk and von Wieser, yet whether they both may be classified as 'Austrian economists' is a controversial issue. This paper takes a closer look at the mixture of commonalities and disagreements in their writings that have given rise to the ambivalent assessments of their 'Austrian' credentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several contributions have been devoted to a comparison between the works of Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek, both of them rooted in the Austrian tradition but they generally concerned specific aspects of their respective global contributions as, for instance, monetary theory, business cycles economic evolution or price theory. These partial comparisons may explain why some confusion is today prevailing concerning the similarities and differences between Hayekian and Schumpeterian approaches. In this paper, we adopt a different approach and try to find the basic theoretical and methodological elements which explain the fundamental compatibility of incompatibility between Hayek's and Schumpeter's respective intellectual projects. Specific aspects will not be, however, underestimated or neglected in this contribution but they will not be considered independently from these basic elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a personal account of my relationship with James M. Buchanan, his significance for my academic career and the influence of his work on my own research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1964 James Buchanan famously asked 'What Should Economists Do?' He argued that economists should focus their intellectual attention on exchange and the institutions within which exchange takes place. This paper reflects on Buchanan's message and looks at the development of that argument, and its implications in the wake of post-socialist political economy on the one hand, and the post-financial crisis of 2008 on the other. Following Buchanan, the paper argues that classical liberal political economists must embrace the intellectual and practical challenges of the day, and bring a robust theory of political economy to bear on questions of justice, questions of freedom and responsibility, and questions concerning the invisible hand and the appropriate institutional framework which results in peaceful social cooperation and productive specialization in a society of free and responsible individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the multiple methodologies used in educational research and proposes a model that includes all of them as contributing to understanding educational contexts and research from multiple perspectives. The model, based on integral theory (Wilber in a theory of everything. Shambhala, Boston, ) values all forms of research as true, but partial. Consideration of objective (exterior) forms of research and data and subjective (interior) forms of research and data are further divided into individual and collective domains. Taking this categorization system one step further reveals eight indigenous perspectives that form a framework for considering research methodologies. Each perspective has unique questions, data sources, methods and quality criteria designed to reveal what is 'true' from that view. As science educators who guide our students' research, this framework offers a useful guide to explain differences in types of research, the purpose and validity of each. It allows professional science educators to appreciate multiple forms of research while maintaining rigorous quality criteria. Use of this framework can also help avoid problems of imposing quality criteria of one methodology on research data and questions gathered using another methodology. This model is explored using the second author's dissertation research. Finally a decision chart is provided to use with those who are starting inquiries to guide their thinking and choice of appropriate methodologies to use when conducting research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers how the integral theory model of Nancy Davis and Laurie Callihan might be enacted using a different qualitative methodology, in this case the narrative methodology. The focus of narrative research is shown to be on 'what meaning is being made' rather than 'what is happening here' (quadrant 2 rather than quadrant 1). It is suggested that in using the integral theory model, a qualitative research project focuses primarily on one quadrant and is enhanced by approaches suggested in the other quadrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, Professor Pagano views human relations as generally '(...) influenced by the prevailing features of the goods (private, public and positional) that have characterized production in different stages of the history.' In my comment, I focus on the distinction between human and non-human productive factors. Because of their obvious relationship, some of the considerations that follow from such a distinction are already-explicitly or otherwise-in the target article's argument; those that are not, especially with regard to the cultural determinant of value, could be easily integrated into it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this article is the use of experience made within the literature of the 'new' economical discipline of experience economy. By combining a methodological individualism with a causal and dehumanising picture of the process of experience, this discipline conceives economic interactions as acts of autonomy. These acts, it is claimed, are part of economical instrumental reason restructuring itself by using experiences as tools in convincing consumers that they are free to pursue their respective paths of lives. Described through the use of positioning theory, however, this turns out to be a result of an effort of equipping consumers with a new economic norm of forced positioning disguised as deliberate self-positioning . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored how people perceive the causes of poverty. Literature revealed that there are three broad theoretical explanations of perceptions of the causes of poverty, namely individualistic explanations, where blame is placed squarely on the poor themselves; structural explanations, where poverty is blamed on external social and economic forces; and fatalistic explanations, which attribute poverty to factors such as bad luck or illness. To examine South Africans perceptions according to these dimensions secondary analysis was employed on one of the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) national representative client surveys. Approximately 3,498 respondents across South Africa were surveyed between 18 April and 30 May 2006. The bivariate analysis revealed that South Africans in general attribute poverty to structural over individualistic and fatalistic dimensions of poverty. Ordinary least square regressions revealed that these perceptions of poverty interacted with a host of socio-demographic and economic variables such as race and peoples' lived experiences of poverty. In this regard, all three ordinary least square regressions showed that lived poverty had a significant impact in predicting respectively structural, individualistic and fatalistic perceptions of the causes of poverty. The second regression predicted individualistic perceptions and showed that being white was the most significant predictor. The third regression predicted fatalistic perceptions and established that being coloured was the most significant predictor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we trust robots? Responding to the literature on trust and e-trust, this paper asks if the question of trust is applicable to robots, discusses different approaches to trust, and analyses some preconditions for trust. In the course of the paper a phenomenological-social approach to trust is articulated, which provides a way of thinking about trust that puts less emphasis on individual choice and control than the contractarian-individualist approach. In addition, the argument is made that while robots are neither human nor mere tools, we have sufficient functional, agency-based, appearance-based, social-relational, and existential criteria left to evaluate trust in robots. It is also argued that such evaluations must be sensitive to cultural differences, which impact on how we interpret the criteria and how we think of trust in robots. Finally, it is suggested that when it comes to shaping conditions under which humans can trust robots, fine-tuning human expectations and robotic appearances is advisable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]