1. Finding the Strong Nash Equilibrium: Computation, Existence and Characterization for Markov Games
- Author
-
Alexander S. Poznyak and Julio B. Clempner
- Subjects
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,021103 operations research ,Control and Optimization ,Markov chain ,Applied Mathematics ,0211 other engineering and technologies ,Pareto principle ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,Markov process ,010103 numerical & computational mathematics ,02 engineering and technology ,Management Science and Operations Research ,01 natural sciences ,Convexity ,Tikhonov regularization ,symbols.namesake ,Strong Nash equilibrium ,symbols ,Ergodic theory ,0101 mathematics ,Game theory ,Mathematical economics ,Mathematics - Abstract
This paper suggests a procedure to construct the Pareto frontier and efficiently computes the strong Nash equilibrium for a class of time-discrete ergodic controllable Markov chain games. The procedure finds the strong Nash equilibrium, using the Newton optimization method presenting a potential advantage for ill-conditioned problems. We formulate the solution of the problem based on the Lagrange principle, adding a Tikhonov’s regularization parameter for ensuring both the strict convexity of the Pareto frontier and the existence of a unique strong Nash equilibrium. Then, any welfare optimum arises as a strong Nash equilibrium of the game. We prove the existence and characterization of the strong Nash equilibrium, which is one of the main results of this paper. The method is validated theoretically and illustrated with an application example.
- Published
- 2020
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