Search

Neither money supply trends nor other relevant indicators suggest that the target of price stability is under threat in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, it is questionable whether output and employment will soon experience a strong and self-sustaining upturn. In such a situation cuts in central bank rates are called for as a support measure to underpin economic growth.

Given the serious crisis in Asia and evidence of its spreading to other developing and transition countries, the attempt by German economic policymakers to achieve faster economic growth and higher employment almost exclusively by means of successes on export markets appears likely to fail sooner than had been expected by the DIW5. The significance of domestic demand has been systematically underestimated in recent years. With the help of extremely low pay settlements, the D-Mark was devalued in real terms; this promoted exports, but at the same time led to growth losses in private consumption and investment that more than offset the gains in exports. On top of this German fiscal policy—as documented in the following report in this issue—has weakened domestic demand and investment activity. This strategy might have worked if a symmetrically oriented monetary policy had reacted to the deflationary trend inherent in pay settlements and the fiscal-policy stance by swiftly and significantly reducing interest rates. This did not happen. It was therefore inevitable that the crisis in sales markets made its full effects felt on economic growth. More seriously still, if cost deflation in Germany is not brought to an end in the coming year by a return to productivity-oriented wage settlements, it will pose a major threat to the European Monetary Union.6 If Germany pursues a beggar-thyneighbour policy in a Europe without exchange rates, this can only result in deflation and a downward economic spiral.7