1. Why mental content is not like water: reconsidering the reductive claims of teleosemantics
- Author
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Schulte, Peter, University of Zurich, and Schulte, Peter
- Subjects
Philosophy of science ,100 Philosophy ,Existential quantification ,Philosophy ,05 social sciences ,General Social Sciences ,Metaphysics ,Analogy ,06 humanities and the arts ,0603 philosophy, ethics and religion ,10092 Institute of Philosophy ,3300 General Social Sciences ,050105 experimental psychology ,Epistemology ,Philosophy of language ,Character (mathematics) ,060302 philosophy ,A priori and a posteriori ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,1211 Philosophy ,Content (Freudian dream analysis) - Abstract
According to standard teleosemantics, intentional states are selectional states. This claim is put forward not as a conceptual analysis, but as a ‘theoretical reduction’—an a posteriori hypothesis analogous to ‘water = H2O’. Critics have tried to show that this meta-theoretical conception of teleosemantics leads to unacceptable consequences. In this paper, I argue that there is indeed a fundamental problem with the water/H2O analogy, as it is usually construed, and that teleosemanticists should therefore reject it. Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative to the water/H2O model which avoids the fundamental problem, while explaining the a posteriori character of teleosemantics equally well.
- Published
- 2018
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