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Synopsis: Hayek’s cognitive theory, which seeks to describe the operation of a particular order, in fact provides a paradigmatic account of knowledge-generating orders in general. We claim that this paradigm provides a fertile conceptual framework for exploring a variety of problems in economics and social theory. In particular, we shall show that Hayek’s conception of the ‘map’ and the ‘model’, which he uses to explain the operation of the complex adaptive classifying system called ‘mind’, are promising analytical devices with applications extending to social structures of various kinds and complexity. We use Hayek’s notion of the map and model to analyze how different social structures – regarded as classifying systems – work in terms of their input, processing, and output capabilities. The adaptive characteristics of such systems, via communicative routines, multi-level classification, and feedback, form central motifs for our discussion of markets, science, and other social structures. We show that by analyzing the knowledge-generating characteristics of such structures we are also able to gain insights about the circumstances affecting their adaptive properties.

This paper discusses the “knowledge problem” in terms of both the use and generation of knowledge. This is analyzed in the context of Hayek's failure to respond to the “Keynes Challenge”—the claim that markets fail to produce relevant knowledge—by suggesting that in the aftermath of The General Theory he was not well-positioned to address that problem. Ironically, his post-World War II work in cognitive psychology, The Sensory Order, offers a theory of the generation of knowledge which can provide a useful analogy for understanding the generation of market-level knowledge.

Economists approaching the study of science typically assume the applicability of a market analogy, but then base their analysis on the presumption that science constitutes an area of pervasive market failure. Given the interactions that are actually observed to occur between scientists, we suspect that the failure is in the analogy, not in the putative market. In considering how one might better apply the economic way of thinking to the understanding of science as an activity, we suggest that it is necessary to specify exactly how scientific interaction differs from market interaction, and to be clear about how the behavior of interacting scientists might be modeled in terms of the general pursuit of self-interest in a noncatallactic context. Our model of science portrays an institutionalized mode of interaction between scientists involving the publication, use, and citation of scientific papers, and it is in the exploration of the individual incentives thrown up by this arrangement that the interesting empirical implications arise. We give a short exposition of the possible lines of investigation that could be followed based on this approach.

We show that the orderliness of market processes and outcomes, and hence the realization and coordination of individuals' plans, are dependent on the social environment in which individuals function. In specific, when atomicity and stable (social) rules are compromised in the case of Big Players, markets are less orderly despite the fact that individuals are behaving rationally.—The paper provides an account of individual rationality by generating a theory of expectations based on Hayek's cognitive theory. Hayekian expectations are coherent, competitive, and endogenous. This suggests that expectational analysis must take account of the context of constraint—the “environment” or what we call “filtering conditions”—within which individuals function and to which they must adapt. The paper provides a theoretical analysis of expectations at the individual level and shows that the particular behaviors stemming from those expectations require a specification of the rules governing social and market activities.