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Philosophical statements are often suppositions. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz proposes in Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain, 1704, a method of the construction of assertive conditionals occurring between any philosophical suppositions. If we can infer a philosophical statement from any suppositions then the implication between these suppositions and the obtained statement is assertive. In the article, some examples of the application of Leibniz's method are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is all about - firstly - to build a logic of beliefs on the way a posteriori, i.e. observation developed on the principle how, people usually think, what kind of propositions seem about reality and what actually is described by the truth of the judgements under the influences of beliefs. In this situation, we have to depart from customary practice a priori semantics of possible worlds to semantics for models intended. Secondly, we find that in practice, human judgments accept indirectly a logic of thinking at all, which leads us - thirdly - to define this logical system as extension of the intuitionistic logic. And fourth, and finally, our logic of beliefs, empirically generated, proved to be the logic at most of hypothetical and positing beliefs, because the propositions issued on the basis of intuitionistic logic are not assertive judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]