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The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the impact of exchange rate changes on the trade balance of China and its major trading partners. In the past, many studies have been focussed on the linear effect of exchange rate change, but in this paper, a non-linear Autoregressive Distribution Lag (NARDL) model is proposed. Empirical results show that there are nonlinear and asymmetric effects on the trade balance of exchange rate. In particular, the effect of exchange rate appreciation on Sino-US trade balance is more significant than that of depreciation. A genuine devaluation of the domestic currency would improve the balance of the domestic trade. However, the opposite effect is found in the case of Sino-Japan and the Euro, and the depreciation of the currency will make the trade balance worse. These results provide a solid basis for understanding the relation of exchange rate variation and trade balance. In terms of economic reality, it is also a useful reference for adjusting exchange rate and commercial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes this shift in the relationship between China and the United States, focusing in particular on the role of American corporations in shaping US geopolitical strategies with regard to China. Once aggressive promoters of economic integration with China, these firms now defend policies designed to block the growth of Chinese firms in Western markets and protect America's lead in critical emerging technologies. The current tension between the US and China, we argue, reflects, in part, a dispute for control over technical progress in these key areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines what kind of political, institutional arrangements and the behavior of political actors under these arrangements become the stabilizing or destabilizing factors of a country's diplomatic balancing between the United States and China. Specifically, I describe the domestic politics of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore in terms of their responses to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoted by the Xi Jinping administration. The analysis reveals the following points. First, in all of these countries, the growing presence of China has increased the number of stakeholders in policymaking toward China, and domestic politics regarding policymaking toward China have become more contentious. Second, as a result, each country faces the risk of internalizing its foreign policy toward China, especially on issues related to sovereignty and domestic corruption, thereby destabilizing previously balanced diplomacy between the United States and China. Third, in dealing with such risks, countries with winner-takes-all presidential systems (e.g., South Korea and Indonesia) face difficulties in controlling the internalization of diplomacy, while countries with institutional frameworks that can control destabilizing factors, such as public opinion and corruption (e.g., Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore) are characterized by the relative ease with which they can maintain balanced diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper clarifies the association between the Sino-U.S. bilateral relation (BR) and Bitcoin price (BCP) by applying the bootstrap full- and sub-sample Granger causality tests. It reveals that BR has positive and negative effects on BCP. The negative impact points out that Bitcoin is viewed as a tool to avoid uncertainties caused by the deterioration of BR, also proving that the strained relation between China and the U.S. can stimulate the Bitcoin market. However, this opinion is not held under a positive impact, the main explanation is that the burst of bubble weakens its ability to hedge risks. The above conclusion is not consistent with the theoretical model, underlining that the Bitcoin market is boosted by the deterioration of BR. Conversely, there is a negative influence from BCP to BR, meaning that the relationship between China and the U.S. can be reflected by the Bitcoin market. Under the complex and volatile international situation, investors can benefit from this investigation to compensate for the losses and keep their wealth. Also, it helps the related authorities to create a stable investment environment and promote friendly bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Korean Peninsula is perceived by both the United States (US) and China as the region where they could cooperate despite other disputed problems. The Four-Party Talks were proposed amid a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and the Six-Party Talks were convened during the controversies over the subsequent Iraq War in early 2000s. The author argues whether this "Ad-hoc Concert" still survives as an analytic framework for examining Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula, notwithstanding the new dimension of collective security as a result of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)'s nuclear issues with respect to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). This paper first examines the Chinese initiatives in the nuclear crisis in 2016–17; it makes an assessment of the developments of the triangulated US–China–DPRK relationship after Chairman Kim Jongun referred to the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in early 2018. In the successive Summit meetings that Kim Jongun held with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)'s President Moon Jaein, and US President Donald Trump, the declaration to end the Korean War dominated those in the triangulated relations. This paper also reviews the controversies related to that declaration and their implication for Sino–US relations. Those implications will provide the basis for an analysis of Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula following a speech delivered by US Vice-President Mike Pence in October 2018 that was widely seen as a declaration of a "new cold war" between the US and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we build on Robert Jervis' concept of strategic triangles, relations between three states where from the point of view of each state the others are pivotal for its security or foreign policy behavior in a given region. We argue that triangles are important in influencing state behavior in the areas of balance of power, deterrence, arms races and status competition, and consider how these dimensions might interact. In this context, this article examines the US–India–China triangle, while also addressing to a lesser extent how other related triangles interlink with it, taking into account how China's rise and increasing economic interdependence impact these relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The remarkable economic rise of China and the recent turmoil in US financial markets inevitably raises questions about the respective fortunes of both countries. This paper assess the relative standing of the US and China by placing their relationship in historical context. It is suggested that China's accession to the WTO marked the highpoint of US influence and ascendancy. Since then, China's position has been steadily improving, something that the recent emergence of its first sovereign wealth fund and its subsequent role in bailing out distressed US financial institutions has dramatically highlighted. If China's form of 'state capitalism' continues to become more influential it will have major consequences for not only the US, but for the extant geopolitical order more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India's rise as a means of balancing against China's ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States' pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China's official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime's official media outlets would speak of China–India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia–India–China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China's security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and military power, there has been increasing consideration of its role in shaping US–India relations over the last two decades. However, this article, considering the period 1949–1979, shows that American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China shaped the US–India relationship even during the Cold War. In doing so, the article seeks not just to bring China back into the story of past US–India relations, but also shed light on the China–India–US triangle of today and of tomorrow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article questions the credibility of the biological warfare (BW) hoax theory of scientist Milton Leitenberg. It discusses reasons for doubting Leitenberg's theory that the claim of BW use leveled against the U.S. by North Korea and China during the Korean War has been a hoax. It examines the refusal by the U.S. to recognize evidence disputing Leitenberg's hoax thesis, as well as the impact of his thesis on scholarship and U.S. foreign policy.

This article discusses the implications of the development of ASAT technologies by India from an Australian perspective. It sets these developments within the context of the future of US engagement in the Pacific in the next 30 years, and especially the way in which China and the US manage their relationship as the relative strength of the former grows and the latter declines. How India responds to and seeks to influence these shifting forces will be determined largely by how India perceives and seeks to assert its place in the region. Australia's approach to space is changing, with 2009 considered to have been a tipping point. Some description of this changing context is provided as background to and rationale for the article's conclusion, which is that the development of ASAT capabilities by India is considered a natural technology progression and a somewhat less important factor in India's emergence as a regional power with the capacity to participate in and influence grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and some other nuclear-armed countries have become concerned about the development and deployment of U.S. conventional global strike systems that may permit damage limitation operations against the nuclear forces of adversaries. This article argues that a counterforce strike is more likely to target tactical nuclear forces than intercontinental ballistic missiles and provides an analysis of the probability that U.S. conventional strikes might destroy China's theater nuclear forces which include DF-3A, DF-4, DF-21, DF-31 missiles, Type 094 nuclear submarines, and nuclear-capable H-6 bombers. The results indicate that China's strategy of building robust underground facilities may effectively protect its nuclear forces from preemptive strikes making it unlikely that a U.S. conventional strike could destroy a meaningful part of China's theater nuclear forces. This study also assesses the potential capabilities of future conventional prompt global strike systems, points out problems with the strategy of damage limitation, and proposes that the United States consider improving strategic stability in its relationship with China rather than threatening a preemptive strike. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The future of the dollar depends partly on China and the US being able to effectively manage the tensions arising from the large bilateral trade imbalance and the build-up of foreign exchange reserves by China. We argue that these tensions are unlikely to change over the medium term. While tensions can be managed, the possibilities for miscalculations and policy errors are significant given the complex, and sometimes inconsistent, interests of both countries' policy-makers. In fact, China faces its own form of a 'trilemma' and the ability of the US to exercise its monetary power by shifting the burden of adjustment onto China is uncertain. Given this, and volatile international financial markets, miscalculations which might result in a collapse in the value of the dollar affecting its role as an international currency become a real possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]