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The author comments on the article of John Mingers on management science and multimethodology in Great Britain. He asserts that the article of Mingers has emphasized that management science has been dominated by an empiricist philosophy. He argues that Mingers believes that idea that practice is driven by philosophy and theory. An overview of the argument of Minger is offered.

This paper proposes that the pluralistic tent of heterodox economics could be enhanced by accommodating phenomenological inquiry. After an overview of heterodox economics and why phenomenology could be relevant to this project, attention focuses on contributions to phenomenology by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. With this background, the historical evolution of hermeneutics is traced from the historicism of Wilhelm Dilthey to the search for universal truths in the human sciences by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Motivated by the hermeneutic phenomenology of Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, the relationship of phenomenology to critical realism is critically examined. Substantive differences between phenomenological research methods and those used in orthodox economics are identified and used to illustrate how phenomenology could assist some heterodox economists in making substantive contributions that challenge the orthodoxy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"- a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the treatment of ontology offered by critical realism. It addresses much of the material elaborated upon in two editions of this journal. Three main groups of criticisms are made here of the critical realist treatment of open systems. It is argued that critical realism, particularly in the project in economics emanating from Cambridge, UK, tends to define systems in terms of events. This definition is shown to be problematic. The exemplar of a closed system provided by critical realism of the solar system is shown to be flawed in that it is not closed according to the closure conditions identified by critical realism. Second, the negativity of the definitions adopted is problematic for heterodox traditions attempting to build positive programmes. Furthermore, the dualism of the definitions is also inconsistent with Dow's approach, which has ramifications for the coherence of post Keynesianism. Third, the definitions tend to polarize open and closed systems and ignore the degrees of openness evident in reality. The polarization of systems leads to polarized methodology and unsustainable arguments to reject so-called “closed-systems methods.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that a critical realist perspective can contribute to a critique of evidence-based practice, while at the same time not abandoning the idea of evidence altogether. The paper is structured around a number of related themes: the sociopolitics of ‘evidence-based’; epistemological roots and a critical realist critique; the debate in action based on the recent systematic review of personal development planning; and theory to practice gaps. The advocacy of evidence-based practice is currently being used to undermine professional autonomy and to valorise the ‘gold-standard’ of randomised controlled trials. However, the paper proposes that evidence can properly be claimed for critique and emancipatory projects, and that its current discursive location at the core of New Labour thinking is not the only one available. Moreover, thinking from a critical realist perspective liberates the space for theoretically informed work, whereby arguments about method, and in particular randomised controlled trials, do not become a proxy for the open examination of ontological and epistemological assumptions. One of the underlying themes in critical realism is that of critique and emancipation, and evidence properly understood aligned to clear theoretical argumentation is part of this project. Existing models of systematic review fall far short of this aspiration and are of little help to practitioners. As researchers and practitioners we have every reason to maintain a critical stance towards the way evidence is being deployed in debates about policy and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the development of Popper's thinking on propensities from his writings on probability during the 1950s through to his 1990 book, A World of Propensities. It is argued that there are significant commonalities between the views expressed in this (his last) book and the metaphysics and methodological implications of Critical Realism. The paper concludes with some consequences for Popperian falsificationism, situational determinism and Popper's later view that propensities may be interpreted as causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: This paper presents critical realism (CR) as an innovative system for research in tobacco prevention and control. CR argues that underlying mechanisms are considered and explored to ensure effective implementation of any program/policy or intervention. Any intervention or program/policy that is transposed from one country to another or one setting to another is complex. Methods: The research was undertaken and analyzed through a critical ethnography lens using CR as a philosophical underpinning. The study relied upon the following components: original fieldwork in Nigeria including participant observation of smokers, in-depth interviews and focus groups with smokers, and in-depth interviews with health professionals working in the area of tobacco control in Nigeria. Results: Findings from this small ethnographic study in Nigeria, suggest that Critical Realism holds promise for addressing underlying mechanism that links complex influences on smoking. Conclusion: This paper argues that understanding the underlying mechanisms associated with smoking in different societies will enable a platform for effective implementation of tobacco control policies that work in various settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that competency-based training in vocational education and training in Australia is one mechanism through which the working class is denied access to powerful knowledge represented by the academic disciplines. The paper presents a modified Bernsteinian analysis to argue that vocational education and training students need access to disciplinary knowledge using Bernstein's argument that abstract, conceptual knowledge is the means societies use to think 'the unthinkable' and 'the not-yet-thought'. I supplement Bernstein's social argument for democratic access to the disciplines with an epistemic argument that draws on the philosophy of critical realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I accept that just as mainstream economics can be characterized by its insistence upon a deductivist method, so the least contentious, most widely accepted aspects of Post-Keynesianism can be accounted for by its anti-deductivist stance and more specifically by its tacit commitment to something like critical realism. I argue that neo- Ricardian economics, to the extent that it takes closure for granted as a natural and useful starting point for analysis, retains an underlying commitment to deductivism and so is difficult to reconcile with Post- Keynesianism. By providing a criterion for assessing whether neo- Ricardianism belongs within a coherent Post-Keynesianism I also clarify why the nature of this relationship has for so long remained unresolved. Not until it was recognized that coherence within Post-Keynesianism turns upon methodological issues, and essentially involves the abandonment of the deductivist framework, could progress in understanding its relationship with neo-Ricardianism be made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An adequate conceptualization and measurement of unemployment should express the reality of employment. Designing theoretical concepts that adequately express reality requires appropriate methodological foundations. This paper uses critical realism to demonstrate that the deductive method encourages the construction of theoretical concepts in such a way as to reduce the multidimensional, qualitative reality of employment and unemployment to the quantitative, single dimension of variables, whereupon they cease to be adequate expressions of the reality they are designed to investigate. Part-time employment is used to exemplify atypical employment and to illustrate how the latter differs from typical employment in a number of dimensions, most of which are qualitative in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorizing in economics is often associated with some form of individualism. This paper considers the nature of this association in the work of Carl Menger. I adopt this focus not only because of continuing interest in Menger's work, but because recent developments in social theory facilitate a fruitful reevaluation of his general position. I argue that a convincing link between theory and individualism is absent in Menger's work. Moreover, I argue that the various criticisms often made of his work actually relate to the ideas which underlie his individualism rather than, as is usually supposed, those arising from an adherence to a form of Aristotelianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heterodox economics emerged because of dissatisfaction with the high level of abstraction of neoclassical economics and its excessive reliance on mathematical modelling. Instead of ontological and epistemological references to the natural sciences, heterodox economists turn their attention to the social sciences and biology. The article aims to contribute to the discussion of methodology of heterodox economics and original institutionalism in particular. It explores the potential of content analysis for empirically oriented research in heterodox economics. Content analysis is widely used in the social sciences (sociology, linguistics, political sciences, legal studies) to analyze qualitative data (texts, images, videos) but is relatively unknown to heterodox economists. Content analysis takes several forms: qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. It is argued that content analysis is not only compatible with the methodology of heterodox economics through critical realism but has a potential to contribute to its further development. With the help of content analysis, heterodox economists would be better equipped to collect and process qualitative data that prevail in social realms. A content analysis of a sample of articles published in Journal of Economic Issues (N = 763) in 1967–1969 and 2010–2019 informs the discussion of applications of content analysis to heterodox economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents that author's reply to several comments on his article about management science and multimethodology in Great Britain. He asserts that there should be a duality on the relationship between practice and philosophy of operations research to become effective if used in human activity systems. He argues that his paper presents a unified and coherent philosophy drawing on the strengths of the existing paradigms at the same time legitimizing of what practitioners do in practice.

Management science was historically dominated by an empiricist philosophy that saw quantitative modelling and statistical analysis as the only legitimate research method. More recently interpretive or constructivist philosophies have also developed employing a range of non-quantitative methods. This has sometimes led to divisive debates. 'Critical realism' has been proposed as a philosophy of science that can potentially provide a synthesis in recognizing both the value and limitations of these approaches. This paper explores the critical realist critique of quantitative modelling, as exemplified by multivariate statistics, and argues that its grounds must be re-conceptualized within a multi- methodological framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probes into the link between Post Keynesianism and the project of critical realism in economics. Features of Post Keynesian economic writings; Result of an emphasis to uncertainty, historical processes and real choice; Views of economist Sheila C. Dow on the connection between critical realism and Post Keynesianism.

The article focuses on the article written by the management scientist, J. Mingers, 'A classification of the philosophical assumptions of management science methods.' Mingers uses a single philosophical position. To justify this approach Mingers refers back to a previous paper. The paper does not establish that critical realism is the best, optimal or only philosophical position underpinning. Mingers believes that all philosophical assumptions in management science methods are covered by critical realism. But thinking that one philosopher applies equally well to all management science methods is just as naive as thinking that one management science method applies equally well to all management problems.

Richard Langlois supports the contribution of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to Economics, contrasting the following assertions: (i) Original Institutional Economics (OIE) wanted institutions but without theory; (ii) Neoclassical Economics (NE) wants an economic theory without institutions; and (iii) NIE wants both institutions and theory. This article uses the approach of Critical Realism with the aim of counteracting the suggestions of Langlois, who considers the advances of institutionalist schools by contrasting the theoretical (scientific) and anti-theoretical (naive empiricism) institutionalism. Instead of sustaining a criterion of scientificity founded on the assumption of a world composed of isolated and atomized events, Critical Realism treats the real unity of human activity and social structure as a condition of knowledge in the social domain. This implies the adoption of a structured ontology that deals with the opening of social systems, the existence of emerging phenomena, and the rejection of the notion of cause as a constant conjunction of events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years a group of researchers at Cambridge (UK) have (re)introduced conceptions of open and closed systems into economics. In doing so they have employed these categories in ways that, in my assessment, both facilitate a significant critique of current disciplinary practices and also point to more fruitful ways of proceeding. In an issue of this journal, Andrew Mearman has advanced three criticisms of the Cambridge position which, if valid, would seriously undermine this assessment. Below I defend the Cambridge position against Mearman's criticisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the insider/outsider problem in the study of religion and a critical realist interpretation of objectivity to discuss two dialectics present in geography of religion literature: geography of religion versus religious geography, and politics versus poetics. Recent developments in critical realism include a “spiritual turn” in which critical realism as both a metaphilosophy and a method is applied to religious thought. A critical realist understanding of objectivity can effectively address tensions in geography of religion literature by suggesting that the insider/outsider problem is not the most appropriate filter to discriminate between religious geography and geography of religion or the politics and poetics of religion. I suggest that an Eliadian fear of reductionism is not necessary and that epistemic relativism coupled with reflexivity can coexist with an ontological approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a commentary on Sheila Dow's notions of the relations between Post Keynesianism and critical realism. Three types of ontology; Polar opposition of philosopher David Hume and the concept of critical realism; Discussion on the contribution of critical realism to economic theory.

Focuses on the tenets of the Post Keynesian program with regards to the critical realist philosophical ontology. Elements of critical realism in the social realm; Arguments regarding the confluence of Post Keynesian economics and critical realism; Concept of uncertainty.

Argues that critical realism is not necessary to support the nominal features of Post Keynesian economics. Views of economist Tony Lawson on Post Keynesianism; Criticism of the neoclassical economic approach; Implications of economist Paul Davidson's repudiation of neoclassical assumptions about critical realism.

Criticizes the claims of economist Stephen Parsons that critical realism is inconsistent with Post Keynesianism. Concept of nonergodicity; Basis of Parsons' critique of Post Keynesian realism; Views of Parson on the idea of convention.

Discusses the connection between Post Keynesianism, a school of thought in economics, and critical realism, an approach to economics. Feature of critical realism; Argument of economist Thomas Kuhn about a paradigm; Differences between the Cartesian/Euclidean mode of thought and the Babylonian mode of thought.

Advocates of critical realism often refer to the importance of ‘the logic of analogy and metaphor’ for the development of scientific theories. However, critical realists have failed to provide a detailed account of the part that metaphor plays in scientific theorizing. It is argued that such an account reveals that metaphor is integral to science, as understood by critical realists, serving both to provide suggestions of scientific models and a theoretical vocabulary in terms of which scientists can structure and so understand their subject matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the application of British philosopher Roy Bhashkar's critical realism to educational sociology. As a critical realist Bhaskar is concerned with "emancipatory social practice." It opens with a brief history of recent social epistemological thought in education. Bhaskar who extends his ideas directly and compellingly from the sciences so that they have comparable impact in the social sciences as well. His "critical realism" is an elision of two earlier conceptions, one for science and one for the human sciences. He describes his philosophy of science as "transcendental realism," a variety of scientific realism which sees science as explanatory of a structured, differentiated and changing world. He offers this transcendental realism in direct opposition to an "empirical realist" position: the former sustains the idea of the independent existence and action of the causal structures and things investigated and discovered by science; while the latter's valid subject matter is said to be exhausted by atomistic facts and by their conjunctions.