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The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two Taiwan projects: the National Palace Museum (1965) in Taipei (NPM) and the NPM Southern Branch (NPMSB) in Chiayi (2003). The NPMSB targeted the liberalisation of the NPM from the stained political connotation of Chinese nationalism and constructs anew Taiwan's autonomous national identity. This paper argues that the construction of NPM/NPMSB in Taiwan is a cultural and colonial traumatism of national identity, and a struggle between official Chinese nationalism and rising prior Taiwanese subjectivity in a postcolonial context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China's growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China's increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan's economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan's official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan's financial and service sectors for China's investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China's markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan's trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECFA), signed on in 2010 between China and Taiwan, is the first regional preferential agreement for Taiwan, which is seen as a significant turning point in China-Taiwan relations and a landmark to promote Asia’s overall economic development. This article introduces the ECFA’s aim and discusses its implications for future economic relations between China and Taiwan while reviewing overall and specific statistics data of trades and investment flows. With the fourth anniversary of the enactment of the ECFA, the trade volume seems to increase, but the trends and components shows a further integration in the region, implying the post-ECFA trend sheds light on China and Taiwan’s solid cooperation on production networks of information, communication, and solar panel related products with ASEAN countries, as well as the RMB internationalization opportunity for the future AIIB framework for China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Taiwan has had discriminatory trade and investment policies towards China, severely limiting economic engagement across the Strait. Not having free and open trade with China, one of the largest and most important parts of the East Asian economy, has resulted in Taiwan's underperforming in attracting foreign direct investment, effectively cut Taiwan off from participating fully in East Asian production networks and prevented the deepening of its specialisation in the regional and international economy. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is a watershed in cross-Strait relations and gives Taiwan the opportunity to integrate more fully into the East Asian economy. There is pressure now for Taiwan to pursue preferential trade deals with other countries. This is not the best way forward; rather, Taiwan should pursue a multilateral trade strategy and focus on domestic reforms that will bring larger economic gains, economic diversification and avoid the political risks to the cross-Strait relationship associated with preferential deals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is the first systematic attempt at estimating the size of Taiwanese foreign aid and, thus, the cost of Taiwan's aid diplomacy. It questions the Republic of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou's justification of his 'diplomatic truce' with China as necessitated by an ineffectiveness of his predecessor Chen Shui-bian's costly aid diplomacy. Deriving its evidence from the ROC governmental budgets, local media reports and interviews with Taiwanese officials involved in foreign aid implementation, the article argues that President Chen did not engage in 'generous financial aid' and proposes that this parsimony, rather than futility of aid diplomacy as a strategy to expand Taiwan's international space, should be considered as contributing to Taipei's diplomatic failures from 2000 to 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1990, 19 Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea have been held. The Workshop, attended by Government and military officials in their private capacities as well as by academics mainly from the littoral States of the South China Sea (SCS) and from the non-SCS countries, is a continuing dialogue process that aims to manage potential conflicts by exploring areas of cooperation among the littoral States in the SCS area. It is also the only regional dialogue mechanism dealing specifically with the SCS issues, where scholars and Government officials from Taiwan and China can meet regularly and exchange views. This article reviews and evaluates the SCS Workshop process and discusses Taiwan's participation in the process. In the concluding section, the adoption of the China-Taiwan South-East Asia Network for Education and Training (SEA-NET) joint project at the nineteenth SCS Workshop, a big step regarding Taiwan's participation in the Workshop process, is discussed. And it is suggested that there likely will be more cooperative measures taken by Taipei and Beijing regarding the SCS area in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]