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AbstractThe first climate action stocktake cycle under the Paris Agreement was completed in 2023 to assess global progress on mitigation, adaptation, and climate finance goals. State-driven action needs to be complemented by sectoral efforts, and this paper builds on the first Tourism Stocktake undertaken in 2023 that examined climate action in the tourism sector. First, an expert elicitation survey was conducted to validate and deepen the findings from the stocktaking activity. Second, an analysis of the Stocktake’s 40 metrics was undertaken against six criteria of indicator quality. The expert survey revealed a sector still in the early stages of implementing its climate response, with a consensus that 2030 tourism emission reduction targets would not be achieved. Tourism policy and investment were deemed inconsistent with climate ambitions, and current adaptation is insufficient for projected climate change, so that future impacts will restrict tourism development in some destinations. Analysis of the metrics exposed significant data gaps and a core set of 13 robust metrics to measure change over the next stocktaking cycle is identified. The paper concludes with recommendations to advance sector capabilities and collaboration to monitor progress on climate action for an updated Tourism Stocktake in 2026. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last two decades have seen an increase in climate financing channelled to the Global South from multiple sources, putting a spotlight on climate finance coordination challenges in recipient countries. However, the climate finance coordination debate has largely been centred at climate finance provision at the global level. Emerging literature has called on recipient countries to establish effective climate finance coordination mechanisms. Yet, the calls have not clarified what accounts for an effective coordination mechanism. This paper addresses the gap by analyzing stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination in Kenya. Kenya has instituted a legal and institutional framework to guide climate finance coordination, but challenges of coordination persist. Using the political economy framework, the paper analyzes political economy factors influencing stakeholder perceptions and climate change policy implementation to identify political contestations that need to be reconciled. Data is drawn from relevant literature, 29 key informant interviews and 4 focus group discussions at the national level in Nairobi and at the sub-national level in Turkana County. Deductive thematic analysis is adopted for coding and analyzing data. Results indicate that different ideologies, interests, incentives, politics, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of an effective climate finance coordination mechanism and climate policy implementation. The operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund are the most contested. The paper calls on policy actors to reconcile political issues of contention for recipient countries to institute coordination mechanisms that gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from stakeholders. Underlying political economy factors including different ideologies, interests, politics, incentives, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination as well as climate change policy implementation. The consequential political contestations need to be reconciled; otherwise, the established coordination mechanism is less likely to gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from climate change stakeholders. This calls for meaningful and extensive stakeholder engagements and consensus building to minimize contention, particularly over the operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund in Kenya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine how youth voices and meaningful action that emerge from deliberative practices are shaped, legitimised, and constrained by national and international policy landscapes. Our paper situates itself within the policy nexus of (i) the UK Government’s Sustainability Strategy in England (2022), and (ii) at the international level by the Berlin Declaration on Education for Sustainable Development (2021), where principles of participation, engagement, intergenerational justice, and learning are paramount. We explore the ground-level challenges for youth-led and community action centred on intergenerational justice, local partnerships and national and international policy. Our paper examines the first Nottingham Youth Climate Assembly and outlines the interventions implemented by the authors and the community groups that we worked alongside. We then consider the successes and challenges in conducting local-level deliberative democratic processes, before discussing the role of youth voices within action for climate change. Finally, we offer suggestions for improving future interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women and youth support climate policies to a larger extent than their counterparts, and they are underrepresented in formal politics. This paper explores whether descriptively underrepresented groups also are substantively underrepresented on climate issues. I study issue congruence between the public and elected representatives on climate policies in Norway and find high levels of overall congruence. However, representatives are less congruent with women and youth than they are with men and older age groups, linking descriptive and substantive representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarly work on sustainability transitions has highlighted the importance of the development of norms against fossil fuels, or Anti-Fossil Fuel Norms (AFFNs), for climate mitigation. However, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms and conditions by which such norms are developed and secured for successful sustainability transitions. This paper contributes to addressing this, through analysing the case of the Republic of Ireland, probing the emergence of norms against fossil fuels and notably against natural gas (also referred to here as 'fossil gas'). Whilst Ireland is considered an overall laggard on climate action, in recent years the country has witnessed several ground-breaking supply-side moves against fossil fuels. Drawing on in-depth original research interviews and analysis of key political sources, including parliamentary debates and policy documents, the paper finds evidence of norms against fossil gas emerging in the Irish case. The analysis contributes insights into the iterative development of AFFNs at the domestic level, the role of environmental movements, and broader lessons for the development of a just transition away from fossil gas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of strategic visions based on concepts like climate-neutrality, net-zero emissions and energy efficiency is important to align action and build momentum. The agency of transition actors requires clear definitions and explanations of visions, enabling operationalization for action, monitoring and measuring of results. This paper develops a maturity scale for climate-related strategic visions among local governments. Further, the maturity of Swedish municipalities' climate-related strategic visions is reviewed. The results show that out of Sweden's 290 municipalities, 256 shows overall low maturity in their strategic visions, not supporting their local, regional and national system actors sufficiently. Furthermore, results from workshops indicate that the roles, mandate and process for working with municipal strategic visions are not clear. There is an ambiguity around visions that is hindering aligned action and progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can ambitious climate policies in the European Green Deal succeed when faced with rising societal divisions between Europeans? This paper undertakes an empirical analysis using data from the European Social Survey to see whether the divisions between cosmopolitan and communitarian Europeans evident in other policy fields like migration are also found in relation to climate and energy. The results show that political ideology is most important determinant of individual attitudes, and that differences in attitudes between Eastern and Western Europe may be explained by energy security and economic development issues. The EU has maintained an ambitious policy since the mid-2010s, and with the Green Deal appears to be framing climate ambition in ways that the data suggests may reduce communitarian opposition, but not the differences between EU Member States resulting from security concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do cross-country differences in climate policy influence bank lending? This paper focusses on the period 2007–2017 and uses syndicated loan-level data to examine if the stringency of home-country climate policies increases cross-border bank lending. Loan fixed effects allow us to disentangle loan demand from supply and to control for unobserved and observed loan and firm characteristics. I find evidence that a strict home-country climate policy is associated with an increase in banks' cross-border loan shares. This suggests that the transition to a low-carbon economy might be threatened if global coordination between governments is not enforced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a conceptual framework for climate policy engagement that is focused on building the social conditions conducive to support for climate policy. Despite the ongoing scientific and social cases being made for climate action, social divisions remain in some contexts such as Australia and the United States. The success of climate policies depend in part on the general social support base for that solution, with public polarisation acting as a barrier. Dominant communication models have tended to rely on one-way strategically focused communication to exert influence with the aim of shifting one's attitudes. However, there is a need to extend such approaches to go beyond strategic messaging and instead establish the social conditions necessary for policy support. Drawing on diverse literature and framing theory, a new engagement model for climate policy is proposed which centres around a goal of relationship-building between actors to facilitate productive discussion on climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most governments aim for net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050, but none know fully how to get there. The papers in this special issue examine the role of climate governance for climate action, addressing three research questions: a) what characterizes enduring climate governance, b) which factors drive climate governance developments, and c) how can these be sustained within the polity? In this introductory article, we present three ideal-typical models of climate governance that provide answers to these questions. The models are, respectively, the market failure, the socio-technological transition, and the public support models. Political science, as a discipline, is ideally suited to contribute to the further development of the public support model, which bears much promise for sustaining the climate and energy transition. The models and the special issue's contributions highlight two concepts as crucial regarding climate governance: complexity and consensus. These concepts can be mutually constitutive: policy packages addressing the complexity of the climate question, including its (heterogenous) societal dimensions, will have a greater chance of being more efficacious and less contested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tackling climate change has provided a key focus for the creation of what the editors of this special issue have termed 'environmental intangibles.' This paper focuses on the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS), a climate policy that revolves around the issuance and trading of environmental intangibles called emissions allowances. Set up in the mid-2000s, the cap and trade system has experienced many complications. We propose here to explore a particularly contentious issue: the allocation of free allowances. We will see that deciding on allocation rules leads to vivid debates about whether energy-intensive industries in Europe, such as the manufacturing of cement, can remain competitive in the global economy if climate policy is unilaterally enforced. These debates are focused on a phenomenon referred to as the risk of carbon leakage due to loss of competitiveness. Drawing on an empirical enquiry into the workings of policy-making, the paper examines the ways, in which this risk is framed and questioned through lobbying and evidential work. We suggest that the threat to competitiveness posed by the EUETS can neither be established, nor dismissed; a form of under-determination is maintained and carbon leakage as a never-quite-tangible possibility becomes a battleground for protecting European industry over the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions from aviation are expected to grow. With evidence that the International Civil Aviation Organization's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation is an inadequate mitigation mechanism, there is interest in upscaling the sector's climate-related policies. This paper reviews potential aviation emissions mitigation policies against the background of emerging complexities, such as the large share of radiative forcing not covered under any policy agreement, as well as highly skewed demand distributions. In total, 30 voluntary, market-based and regulatory "transition policies" are identified and evaluated with regard to their potential to reduce emissions from air passenger transport and to initiate the transition to new fuels and propulsion technologies. The paper also discusses the potential public acceptance of differing policies. It concludes that the removal of fossil fuel and related subsidies represents a priority, supported by policy mixes comprising levies (CO2, frequent fliers, premium classes) and a feed-in quota for definitively established sustainable aviation fuels. To reduce flight emissions is feasible in principle, but will require policy initiatives at the national level or at the level of regional jurisdictions such as the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has long pursued relatively ambitious climate and energy policies, often against the backdrop of what has been termed the EU 'polycrisis'. This paper introduces a special issue which seeks to develop a better understanding of why, how and with which consequences the polycrisis and EU climate and energy governance have influenced each other. It draws on a novel framework of five broad crisis trends underlying the polycrisis. Most of the contributions suggest that EU climate and energy governance have advanced significantly despite, and sometimes even because of, the crisis trends. The countervailing effects of the trends and the effectiveness of actors' strategies to advance EU policy against opponents go a long way to explaining this puzzling finding. As the EU seeks to fully decarbonise itself by 2050, interactions with the crisis trends are likely to intensify in ways which future research could fruitfully investigate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between tourism and climate change is reciprocal. The effects of climate change on tourism are undeniable. However, tourism and climate change are complex and cross-cutting phenomena that enter policy agendas at different moments and with different discourses. This paper analyses the coherence between the policy domains of climate and tourism at the formulation stage of the policy process, focusing on national and regional government levels and the key touristic offer in Spain - that of sun, sea and sand. The proposed method analyses three dimensions within policy documents: frame significance, policy scope and connotation. Results reveal the imbalance between the two policy domains; the lack of concrete actions and stable mechanisms for achieving greater coherence; and the different conceptions of the issue. The paper considers the causal relationships between tourism and climate change, the consequences of mutual impacts, and the temporal dimension of problem framing. This research brings together three fields of knowledge - tourism, climate change and public policies - and suggests enhancing coherence between tourism and climate policies in order to address the sustainability of tourism destinations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low carbon transition pathways entail diverse uncertainties and risks in the underlying environmental, social, political, economic and technological factors. Inadequate information about such risks could affect the achievement of climate change mitigation targets negatively. This paper provides a novel experiment in which quantitative tools and stakeholder engagement are combined in order to identify the barriers between stakeholders and scientists concerning climate change mitigation aspects. Technological risks are captured by simulating different low carbon scenarios with limited technology options. Stakeholders are asked about their preferences on technology options regarding a low carbon future. After providing them with the simulation results, they are asked again in order to see whether those initial preferences had changed. Results prove the necessity for better communication between modelers and stakeholders. Closing the gaps between both communities is essential to remove barriers for more ambitious action against climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the emerging debate on 'harder soft governance,' the relationship between hard and soft elements has not been fully explored. This paper addresses this gap by looking at the changing nature of policy monitoring, a quintessentially soft governance mechanism. It focuses on climate change, a dynamic site of policy expansion and experimentation in which the EU has historically been an international frontrunner. This paper finds that a range of 'harder' elements have been added to the EU's climate policy monitoring over time, including more explicit legal provisions, greater external publicity, and more concrete links to other policy processes. These changes have emerged from politically sensitive negotiations between many actors, principally the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Environment Agency (who together have generally favoured greater hardening), and Member States (some of whom preferred softer governance) in the context of changing international opportunities and constraints. Moving forward, this paper highlights the need for more research on the efficacy of policy monitoring, especially with respect to the EU's significantly more ambitious long-term decarbonisation targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate policy is expected to consider the current state of science. As populist radical right parties (PRRP) become elected members of parliaments, they have a greater influence on integration processes between science and politics. The aim of the paper is to show that instead of generally rejecting climate science, PRRPs appeal to 'alternative expertise' and politicize scientific knowledge. With our empirical analysis of public hearings, plenary meetings and press statements discussing Germany's Climate Package between 2018 and 2020, we show that the AfD uses expertise that suits their political interests very selectively and arbitrarily supporting either scientific outsider positions or positions that only pretend to be scientific. We argue that populist strategies weaken trust in scientific expertise by undermining democratic institutions for knowledge integration in climate governance. Therefore, a clear separation between research and politics together with transparent and formal scientific knowledge integration processes are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faith-based actors (FBAs) are increasingly active in climate policy, and a growing literature focuses on how specific faith characteristics (theological and organizational) might shape climate action. This paper examines an under-researched dimension of their action. Using the example of Christian FBAs in Scotland, we examine their distinctive role as "climate intermediaries" – "go-betweens" between policymakers and their policy targets. We construct a framework of three core intermediary capabilities – representation, mobilization, aggregation – and examine strategies adopted to implement those capabilities. Using documentary data we identify FBA involvement in domestic and global climate policy, examining how certain Christian FBAs seek to shape government policy, but also aim to change the actions and behaviours of their congregations and members. While FBA action has not alone shaped climate policy or agreements, we find their linkage role is distinct and multi-directional. First, by mediating "downwards", FBAs mobilize action on global climate concerns within their own congregations. By converting parishioners' religious concern into global action, these FBAs link the local to the global, but also the spiritual to the practical. FBAs also operate "upwards" to successfully aggregate specific theological knowledge, and translate it into a powerful, general moral imperative for climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement's nationally driven structure puts the spotlight on financing strategies at the national level. The role of national funding vehicles in mobilizing climate finance, however, has not received extensive attention. This paper remedies this gap by introducing a novel dataset of national climate funds established in developing countries. The database creates an inventory of national financing vehicles and tracks their major attributes, including scope, legal form, and the host, among others. We show that 39 countries have established national climate funds. These funds seek to access and mobilize finance from various sources, domestic and international. Most of these funds have broad mandates to tackle climate change, while a smaller share has a more targeted, sectoral focus. Funding sources vary from taxes to international aid. The funds offer a limited range of financial instruments, primarily awarding grants. The funds also differ in how integrated they are with overarching climate plans and strategies. We also find that most developing countries use existing budget lines to target finance towards climate change objectives. Only five countries track public expenditure on the basis of dedicated budget codes. This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical basis to pursue questions regarding the role and effectiveness of national climate funds. For policymakers, the limited range of instruments at the disposal of many of these national climate funds also suggests a need to ensure that the national climate funds have the design features they need to support the implementation of national policy goals. Key policy insights Systematic data on public climate finance are scarce. Most governments do not use climate change codes to track their expenditures related to climate change. Policymakers should adopt practices that will help instil transparency in public expenditure on climate change. Policymakers have to revisit the design features of national climate funds such as legal form and areas of operation as the wider operating context changes. Funds accredited with multilateral climate funds are underutilized by fund contributors. The Green Climate Fund's direct access modality offers one major avenue to foster synergies between national climate funds and multilateral climate funds. Policymakers have the opportunity to harvest lessons from existing funds and calibrate climate policies accordingly, especially as countries contemplate setting revenue-generating carbon prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an analytical framework to examine the application of performance management by city governments in the context of their policy response to climate change. Case studies of Copenhagen, Stockholm and Tokyo city governments highlight their performance-based climate policies. The findings have both theoretical and practical implications. The conclusions extend current research on issues associated with adopting performance management to climate change responses at the municipal level. The paper also provides guidance for city governments as they consider governance arrangements when responding to climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following recent international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, governments around the world are considering various emissions abatement strategies - with electricity sectors required to play a key role. Cap-and-trade schemes and carbon taxes are among the most frequently implemented and discussed policy approaches. However, these schemes can have negative economic impacts due to energy price increases, as well as their interactions with pre-existing taxes. An alternative approach, known as an emissions-intensity scheme (EIS), can mitigate the extent of these negative economic consequences. Rather than setting an absolute cap on emissions, an EIS targets the emissions intensities of individual generators by establishing a sector-wide emissions-intensity baseline. The current paper investigates the influence of EIS policy parameters on total emissions, electricity prices, and net scheme revenue. A simulation-based approach is adopted, utilizing a direct current optimal power flow (DC OPF) modelling framework. In doing so, the complementary roles of the emissions price and emissions-intensity baseline are illustrated. Data from the simulation based analysis are then used to demonstrate how, for some systems, an EIS may be calibrated to deliver emissions abatement without increasing electricity prices, and at no cost to the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In 2009, the Government of India asked all Indian states and Union Territories to prepare State Action Plans on Climate Change, making it one of the largest efforts at sub-national climate planning globally. Through an examination of state climate plans in five Indian states, the paper explores the implications of sub-national climate measures by examining two questions: First, how do state action plans on climate change link with India’s national and international climate efforts in the context of multi-level governance of climate change? Second, do these plans serve as laboratories of experimentation in addressing climate change? Through an empirically driven inductive analysis, the paper argues that because state climate plans, at least in the initial stages, followed a centrally driven, and sometimes ambiguous agenda, their scope and room to experiment was circumscribed. While they did initiate a process and a conversation, the scope and impact of the plans was limited because they tended to follow conventional bureaucratic planning processes and were limited by a central mandate. The plan process did create some space for local innovation, particularly by enterprising bureaucrats, but this was limited by both restricted space and time for innovation. As a result, the plans made only initial steps toward bringing climate-resilient sustainability to the forefront of state development planning. There is however scope for improvement as states and stakeholders begin examining the plans with a view to implement recommendations, finance projects and even consider fresh iterations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Climate Change Commission (CCC) has a mandate to provide independent, expert advice to the New Zealand Government to enhance the clarity and stability of climate change policies. This institutional innovation has occasionally been rationalised as a form of expert rule, especially by analogy with central banks. In reality, however, the CCC only has advisory powers, so lacks the practical authority to enforce rules or operate policy instruments. How then might the CCC exert greater influence on the low-emissions transition? One option is to double-down on the model of expert rule – that is, to create exceptions to parliamentary sovereignty and to empower the CCC as a technocratic (or epistocratic) institution that has independence over the means (and ends) of climate change policy. Subsequently, the CCC would have a right not only to be believed, but obeyed. But this is politically improbable and also increases the CCC's susceptibility to trends in political culture and mass media that erode the epistemic privilege of experts. Accordingly, this paper offers reasons for the CCC to deepen its entanglement with democracy, such that its epistemic authority might achieve greater practical authority by informing the ends of popular sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the response by the Australian political–military establishment to climate change through the lens of securitization theory. The research used mixed content analysis techniques to systematically examine more than 1500 speech-acts, policies and doctrinal articles between 2003 and 2013. It argues that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was not a climate securitizing actor and that its response to climate change was mediated by the political partisanship surrounding broader national policy debates on climate change. The politicization of climate change made it increasingly difficult for the ADF to publicly adopt meaningful climate policies. It subsequently crafted a strategy that minimized any investment (resource or reputational) lest a change of government rendered them invalid or it drew unwanted criticism. At the very heart of this finding exists the challenge of an avowedlyapoliticalinstitution responding to what emerged in the Australian context as a politically partisan security issue. The more serious indictment concerned how national security policy (in the context of climate change as a security issue) became hostage to the politics of climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper analyses how new information shapes public perception of a controversially discussed technology over time. The test case analysed in this paper is solar radiation management (SRM), a potentially risky, environmental engineering technology, which aims to fight climate change by the injection of sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere. Using panel survey data, we show that most respondents initially show strong negative emotions towards SRM and reject the technology. However, public perception is not stable over time as emotions cool off and acceptance increases. The increase in acceptance is greater, the longer the cooling-off period between two surveys. Furthermore, we show that the cooling-off effect is more pronounced for more impulsive respondents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overall objective of this paper is to develop strategies on how renewable energy technology could be used to abate climate change impacts in Africa. While assessing the potential impacts of climate change in Africa, the paper asserts that renewable energy is capable of overcoming the challenges of energy access in Africa as a result of the abundance of land, water and feedstocks. It reiterates the fact that the fossil-fuel-dependent industrialisation pathway is not sustainable. The paper develops a model for African countries based on the concept of a latecomer strategy, which could be used to catch up with advanced countries in the manufacturing and diffusion of clean energy technologies. The paper concludes that renewable energy technology is not just another option for the continent but the only option. More importantly, the adoption of the strategy will enable African countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and contribute to a cleaner atmosphere in their cities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper builds on Freudenburg's concept of "privileged accounts" and Hajer's work on the discourse of environmental policy by analyzing the debate over coal-fired power in the United States before and after the 2016 presidential election. A mixed-methods analysis of qualitative interviews with federal energy policy actors shows that anti-regulation narratives were central to the discourse. Results highlight shifts in pro-coal narratives as members and supporters of the coal industry adapted their discursive strategies to align with political and market transitions: whereas respondents used varied narratives during the pre-election period, the core arguments in the post-election period revolved around a more cohesive set of narratives about legal opposition to regulations and the importance of coal as a source of affordable, reliable energy. Additionally, the themes of climate denial and coal jobs—documented as dominant in previous research—were relatively rare and remained peripheral to the central discourse coalitions identified in this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a growing focus on uncertainty as a distinct concept in the risk literature. This paper is concerned with how those involved in the design and implementation of climate change policy conceptualize risk and uncertainty. Based on interviews with policy and industry elites in Australia, China and the UK, it finds that participants did not distinguish between "risk" and "uncertainty" in their conceptualization of climate threats. For the majority of them, politics was the most significant source of risk and uncertainty in climate policy, but delegation of otherwise political decisions to the market was seen as the best solution. The conclusion suggests that the conceptual distinction between risk and uncertainty is less important, for policy and industry elites, than the need to develop mechanisms that account for both persistent scientific uncertainties as well as interpretive and moral ambiguities in climate policy design and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tourism is an important economic sector in the Global South. It is however vulnerable to the risks and variations associated with global climate change. The paper qualitatively investigates how issues surrounding uncertainty in the climate change discourse have influenced policy makers' response to climate change in Botswana's tourism sector. The analysis of the empirical data derived from in-depth interviews demonstrates that some policy makers remain skeptical about climate change and its impacts on tourism despite growing evidence from regional scientific research and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Constraints that hamper progress in policy response measures include inadequate knowledge of, and the extent to which, climate science can be trusted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) were proposed as a policy framework that could provide middle ground for meeting both the development and mitigation objectives in developing countries. While South Africa engaged actively with the NAMA terminology in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations, its engagement at the domestic level has been rather lacklustre. This presents an interesting paradox. The paper studies the interplay of international norms embodied in NAMAs with South Africa's domestic policy process. Disengagement and contestation around NAMAs in South Africa is played out at three stages: decision-making stage where the symptoms surrounding this contestation first emerge; policy formulation stage where NAMAs have to not only align with the National Development Plan but also compete with a predilection for domestically familiar terminology of flagships under the national climate policy; and finally the broader agenda-setting stage of policy process, where NAMAs have to prove useful in not only pursuing the developmental state agenda but also in tackling the underlying material factors that represent country's economic dependency on fossil fuels. NAMAs faced combined resistance from ideas and interests in various degrees at all these stages resulting in their disengagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is almost unanimously perceived to be one of the greatest environmental and developmental challenges of this century. Implementing climate change response requires not just huge and prudent utilization of financial resources, but also highly efficient financing institutions and systems especially in developing countries where underlying development issues such as poverty, health, etc. exist. This paper attempts to evaluate the operationalization of the Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) as a climate financing prototype in terms of fund mobilization, nature of projects, equity and inclusion, alignment and mainstreaming. This study was conducted through review of relevant and recent literature on climate change governance and financing, supported with information retrieved from relevant official documents as well as interviews of key persons. Our study found the ICCTF most effective in alignment with national development plans and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It has implemented climate change adaptation programmes with the principles of equity and inclusion of various stakeholders. The ICCTF has however struggled to efficiently mobilize funds owing largely to technical ambiguities especially in its legal and institutional frameworks, it therefore yet to be utilized to its maximum potentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Planning for climate change is now occurring at multiple, sometimes interlocking scales of ecological governance and policy formulation. Within the context of this journal's past calls for fresh work on the 'spatialities of (un)sustainability', particularly around climate action, this paper examines new geographies of local climate policy within six major US metropolitan regions located in six different smart growth states. The methodological assumption of the paper is that these putatively pro-planning states in the USA should provide a particularly fertile legal and policy arena within which metropolitan-scale action might emerge. Focusing empirically on the US Mayors Climate Action Agreement, though, the discussion highlights an uneven local geography of planning for global climate change, with central cities apparently accepting responsibility and, in general, suburban municipalities concomitantly free-riding. Policy and research implications of these metropolitan geographies of (in) action are discussed in light of the extant literature on cities, planning, and the governance of climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we discuss the choice of taxation or regulation of environmental externalities. The subject might appear to be a well-trodden path, but we believe we have a new angle on this well-established question. We think we are being quite realistic when we assume that corrupt practices lurk behind every corner, threatening to derail the good intents of any regulator. With this starting point we compare the result of trying to impose taxation contra regulation in environments where the implementation in both cases will be marred by corrupt practices of under-reporting emissions and bribing inspectors. In a simple and stylized model of these circumstances we show that taxes tend to perform the same or better in the sense that a pollution tax induces greater compliance and lower pollution than does a regulatory standard. We also show that the advantages of a tax are particularly great in countries where the enforcement ability of authorities is weak, which is commonly thought to be the case in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism and its rhetoric are on the rise. Political actors across different ideological camps and parties are employing dispositional blame attribution, emphasizing the non-responsiveness of 'corrupt elites' to the needs of 'good and honest' people. In this paper, we focus on one specific and common area of blame attribution; climate change. In particular, in the United States, a central player in global climate governance, climate change is a very contested issue. The successes of populist candidates in both major US parties suggest that populism could affect citizen support for climate mitigation policies. The often abstract, elite-driven, and technical nature of climate change makes this issue an ideal target for populist critique. Our paper offers an empirical assessment of this claim. First, we test whether populism truly has an independent effect on people's climate attitudes. Second, we assess to what extent frames about elite responsiveness are important heuristics for individuals in their formation of preferences concerning climate policies. To accomplish this goal, we fielded representative US surveys (N = 3000) and collected both observational and experimental data. Results suggest that populist attitudes enhance the effects of partisanship, rather than creating an independent, orthogonal dimension. Populist Democrats support climate policies more than non-populist Democrats do, whereas populist Republicans oppose such policies more than non-populist Republicans do. Additionally, while our experimental results indicate that populist treatments blaming elites for being non-responsive to citizens' preferences do not affect policy support, we also find that reassuring individuals that political elites care about citizens' needs and preferences in relation to climate policy increases support for the latter. Key policy insights Citizens' support is central for implementing ambitious climate policies. Populist attitudes amplify partisanship effects on public opinion about climate policy. Populist discourse per se is not an obstacle to adopting ambitious climate policy in the US. Political entrepreneurs can foster support for climate policies by emphasizing elite responsiveness to citizens' needs and preferences. Populist attacks on established elites are unlikely to derail support for climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines biased incentives for the production and use of climate change research. On this basis, it proposes ways to restructure the science-policy interface to better deal with these biases. Drawing on insights from information economics, we argue that policy-makers and the media have a tendency to pay more attention to extreme results, e.g. because they confirm their ideological position or make a good story. This "adverse selection" of scientific results located at both ends of the distribution of scientific knowledge hence conveys the impression of more uncertainty than there actually is. In addition, this effect may also create "moral hazard" for scientists to engage in research that receives substantial public attention, e.g. by presenting point estimates instead of thoroughly discussing uncertainties and sensitivities of their results. To avoid that the market for public attention turns into a "market for lemons", we recommend that scientists should adopt the logic of assessment-making instead and rely more on meta-studies. We also highlight the importance of providing best-practice guidelines for the treatment of scientific uncertainty, incorporating the communication of uncertainty in university curricula and establishing face-to-face dialogue forums between researchers and policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to analyse how a carbon tax and/or a national Emissions Trading System (ETS) would affect macroeconomic parameters in Turkey. The modelling work is based on three main policy options for the government by 2030, in the context of Turkey's mitigation target under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), that is, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by up to 21% from its Business as Usual (BAU) scenario in 2030: (i) improving the productivity of renewable energy by 1% per annum, a target already included in the INDC, (ii) introducing a new flat rate tax of 15% per ton of CO2 (of a reference carbon price in world markets) imposed on emissions originating from carbon-intensive sectors, and (iii) introducing a new ETS with caps on emission permits. Our base path scenario projects that GHG emissions in 2030 will be much lower than Turkey's BAU trajectory of growth from 430 Mt CO2-eq in 2013 to 1.175 Mt CO2-eq by 2030, implying that the government's commitment is largely redundant. On the other hand, if the official target is assumed to be only a simple reduction percentage in 2030 (by 21%), but based on our more realistic base path, the government's current renewable energy plans will not be sufficient to reach it. Turkey's official INDC is based on over-optimistic assumptions of GDP growth and a highly carbon-intensive development pathway; A carbon tax and/or an ETS would be required to reach the 21% reduction target over a realistic base path scenario for 2030; The policy options considered in this paper have some effects on major sectors' shares in total value-added. Yet the reduction in the shares of agriculture, industry, and transportation does not go beyond 1%, while the service sector seems to benefit from most of the policy options; Overall employment would be affected positively by the renewable energy target, carbon tax, and ETS through the creation of new jobs; Unemployment rates are lower, economic growth is stronger, and households become better off to a larger extent under an ETS than carbon taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models' outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: 'Equilibrium' and 'Non-equilibrium'. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall 'black box' critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere. Key policy insights Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations. The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change. Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies. All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation. A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy, with 2% of the world's emissions and 13% of the European Union's emissions, has adopted a legally binding commitment to reduce its greenhouse gases emissions by 6.5% below 1990 levels by 2008 - 2012. This target will be reached by implementing both domestic policies (80%) and using the Kyoto mechanisms (20%). The success of the mitigation effort will depend on the coordination of policies at the national and local level and on the incentives and rewards given by the central government for the initiatives undertaken by local ones. This paper addresses the question: What climate change policies are being taken at national level and how are they implemented at or complemented by authorities at a local level? What lessons can one learn regarding the vertical interactions between governance levels in the area of climate change? This paper first examines national policy, the division of responsibilities with lower governments, an initiative to reduce emissions at the local level, and initiatives to deal with both adaptation and emission limitation in the highly vulnerable city of Venice. The paper concludes by drawing lessons for the future on the role of local governance on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German Federal Climate Change Act includes binding annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets for the economic sectors energy, industry, buildings, transport, agriculture and waste. For sectors that fail to meet their targets, climate policy measures have to be implemented immediately. However, some sectors may only have achieved their targets thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, while others may have missed their targets because of COVID-19. For policy making, it is therefore important to disentangle the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic from the effects of policy and other drivers on emissions. In this paper, the effects of the pandemic on GHG emissions in Germany in 2020 are estimated at the national level and at the levels of the economic sectors. Counterfactual emissions are estimated here based on autoregressive econometric models, thereby distinguishing between different factors of emissions based on decomposition analysis. The findings at the national level suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic lowered GHG emissions in 2020 in Germany by about 41 Mt CO2-eq (5.15%) compared to counterfactual emissions. Accordingly, about 58% of the reduction in emissions between 2019 and 2020 in Germany may be attributed to the pandemic. The findings at the sectoral level imply that without the COVID-19 pandemic, all sectors with the exception of the transport sector, would have met their emissions target in 2020 as set in the Federal Climate Change Act. The transport sector would have missed its emission target in 2020 without COVID-19, suggesting that existing policies were not strong enough to bend the curve of emissions trends sufficiently down. In contrast, the buildings sector failed to meet its target in 2020 because of COVID-19, prompting immediate climate policy measures in this sector. The COVID-19 pandemic lowered greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Germany in 2020 by 5.5% compared to counterfactual emissions and accounted for about 58% of total estimated reductions between 2019 and 2020. Without COVID-19, all sectors but the transport sector would have met their emissions targets. Climate policy response should take into account the effects of extraordinary events like COVID-19 suppressing GHG emissions based on counterfactual emissions because failure to implement measures early on may turn out to be costly in the medium term once the transitory emissions reductions no longer occur. Counterfactual emissions should be considered prior to crediting emissions surplus or deficit to subsequent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate politics and governance across the globe involve an increasing number of interest groups such as from business and civil society. Against this backdrop, it matters a great deal whether interest group mobilization is able to influence climate policy-making. First, there is an increasing number of climate policy supporters like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and green businesses lobbying in favour of additional climate policies. Second, there is also strong mobilization of groups from energy-intensive and fossil fuel industries lobbying against potentially costly climate policies. In this paper, we investigate the potential effects of these mobilization patterns. More precisely, we ask whether there is any systematic effect of competing interest group mobilization on national climate policy production. To this end, we harness arguments from literatures on interest group mobilization and climate policy-making. Empirically, we exploit a comprehensive global dataset on the adoption of national climate laws and interest group mobilization (over 4,000 organizations) between 1997 and 2016. The results show that the increasing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to national climate policy production. Climate policy opponents are able to weaken this effect, but are hardly able to block new climate laws. The results add to our understanding of climate politics focusing on the role of business organizations and NGOs. This is highly policy relevant for both analysts and practitioners given that the Paris Agreement relies heavily on national policy efforts. The growing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to the adoption of additional climate laws. The positive effect of climate policy supporters is weakened but rarely blocked by climate policy opponents, such as those from the fossil fuel industry. The effect of lobbying over climate policy needs to be assessed in its competitive context, that is by considering how political support and opposition on climate policy interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Designing policy for climate change requires analyses which integrate the interrelationship between the economy and the environment. We argue that, despite their dominance in the economics literature and influence in public discussion and policymaking, the methodology employed by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) rests on flawed foundations, which become particularly relevant in relation to the realities of the immense risks and challenges of climate change, and the radical changes in our economies that a sound and effective response require. We identify a set of critical methodological problems with the IAMs which limit their usefulness and discuss the analytic foundations of an alternative approach that is more capable of providing insights into how best to manage the transition to net-zero emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frequent site energy consumption auditing is a potential strategy to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing buildings. Such a strategy has been practised in Australia for nearly 15 years. This paper documents and analyses the effect of repetitive audits on measured site energy consumption. Using a self-constructed database of over 3500 audited disclosures representing over 800 unique office buildings, empirical models demonstrate that measured site energy consumption declines, on average, over the first five re-certification periods. The results also suggest a market average post-certification equilibrium in Australia of approximately 430 MJ/m2/year (120 kWh/m2/year) within approximately six years, if all else – including green management strategy – is held constant. Since GHG emissions from buildings in Australia are highly correlated with site energy consumption, such a result is comparable with meeting 50-year GHG mitigation targets reliant on the implementation of existing technologies. This suggests that repetitive auditing is a successful approach for motivating owners to invest in existing energy efficiency technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Germany strives to transition its energy supply system toward a high share of renewables, a development accompanied by an increasingly decentralized supply structure. The country’s energy strategy represents an influential top-down mechanism, but the process is also driven from the bottom up. The German federal states (Laender) experiment and innovate, and some explicitly strive to be forerunners in renewable energy policy. Due to different geographic, economic and demographic structures, however, they set different priorities and their strategies are not always aligned with the national strategy. In addressing these issues, this paper explores the advantages and constraints which multi-level governance poses to Germany’s transition towards a renewable energy system. It refers to the academic debate on German federalism and reinforced diffusion of renewable electricity production by horizontal and vertical dynamics in multi-level systems. In focusing on renewable energy policy at the national and subnational level, as well as their interplay, this paper asks whether national and subnational renewable energy policies are aligned hence providing for a multi-level reinforcement of the ongoing energy transition process. It shows that the Energy transition is on the one hand advanced through experimentation at the subnational level of the Laender. It claims that on the other hand the Laender risk increased inefficiencies and macroeconomic cost if they focus on an inwardly directed policy and argues for enhanced coordination efforts. It argues that the mechanisms of cooperative federalism in Germany’s renewable energy policy are inadequate with regard to the implementation of the “German Energiewende”. The present multi-level governance structure does not provide for the necessary integration of national and subnational energy policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Elected politicians and civil servants are key in developing climate policy. The articles in this special issue investigate factors that induce politico-administrative actors to adopt climate policies and dismantle anti-climate policies to advance decarbonisation. Politico-administrative actors have predominantly expanded climate policy and raised policy ambition in recent decades. However, economic crises and weakening public support may cause dismantling of climate policy and hamper policy ambition. Against this backdrop, articles in this special issue also study factors that propel climate policy dismantling. Together, the contributions show that interactions between politico-administrative actors and publics, organised interests, and international organisations shape climate and anti-climate policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how exposure to energy transition and climate policy vulnerability influence popular support for more ambitious climate policy. Moreover, it explores whether this relationship depends on a person's generalized and political trust. Comparing data from surveys in Germany and Switzerland, the findings reveal that perceived exposure to energy transition positively influences climate policy support, while individual climate policy vulnerability decreases it. For individuals with higher levels of trust, exposure helps enhance the positive effect (subjective exposure) or dampen the negative effect (policy vulnerability). These results underscore the importance of incorporating trust and subjective perceptions into climate policy frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Trump was elected as US President and given the opportunity to implement his campaign promise of withdrawing the country from international climate change agreements, it sparked fears of a knock-on effect of non-commitment from other states that could result in the Paris Agreement's dismantlement. This article examines public opinion – which often influences governments' policy decisions – collected in early 2017 in 38 countries on his proposed withdrawal from international climate change agreements. On top of important individual-level predictors, disapproval of his proposal was higher in liberal democracies and countries that depend less on fossil fuels for electricity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across many policy areas, policymakers try to integrate new policy issues into old policy processes. This is challenging. Getting to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions requires radical change across a broad range of societal sectors; thus, climate policy integration is essential. This article develops a new processual perspective on climate policy integration, allowing assessment, classification, and comparison of various stages of integration across policy processes, and over time. The integration process can be shaped by differing institutional logics. In a study of Norwegian agricultural policy, we identify three logics: multifunctional, market failure, and socio-technological transition. These portray differing frames, objectives, instruments, and sector involvement as appropriate ways of linking climate concerns to agricultural policy. We suggest that a shallow integration process is characterized by a sector-specific logic that facilitates discussions of policy frames and goals. In an embedded integration process, multiple logics are mobilized, and a broader range of policy elements are discussed: frames, goals, instruments, and sector involvement in the process. Consistent and contested integration processes are intermediate categories. Climate integration in Norwegian agricultural policy had the hallmarks of a shallow process in 2006–2009 but changed to a contested process in 2016–2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enhancing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is an important exercise to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement also recognizes that support to developing countries in this regard will help them to aim for higher climate ambition. The role of international support programmes in the NDC enhancement process is crucial but is not often covered in scientific research. Consequently, the factors driving a country's decision to apply for NDC-related assistance have also not yet been fully explored. Acknowledging the research gap, this paper framed and tested multiple hypotheses to evaluate the impact of potential factors on the likelihood of a country applying for assistance to enhance its NDCs. For this, a logistic regression method was employed. Data from the two initiatives coordinating the technical and financial assistance worldwide, namely the Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP) and Climate Promise, were reviewed for this purpose. The CAEP program is financially supported by Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. This study identifies the level of socio-economic development and the population's exposure to air pollution as key factors which influence the likelihood of applying for assistance under CAEP and Climate Promise in developing countries. Further, the presence of democratic aspects in the form of governance may also influence this choice. Finally, this study discusses the results and associated policy implications for countries receiving assistance to enhance their NDCs. Developing countries with relatively low socio-economic development are more likely to apply for assistance to enhance their NDCs. The assistance is designed to help them to build capacities to develop and implement future climate policies. Air pollution and climate change issues are interconnected. Exposure to air pollution is a potential indicator that can influence the NDC enhancement process in developing countries. The assistance for enhancing NDCs will lead to NDC targets that are well-informed and are aligned with national and sub-national development priorities with realistic prospects of implementation. Climate vulnerability and net trade do not influence the decision-making process to apply for NDC enhancement assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Climate Agreement is based on pledges from 195 countries to substantially reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) to prevent dangerous climate change. The tourism sector has likewise pledged to reduce its GHG emissions (−70% by 2050); however, current emission trends would result in a tripling in the same timeframe. In order to understand how the sector understands the decarbonisation challenge, 17 senior tourism leaders were interviewed with regard to their perspectives on the risks and opportunities associated with climate change impacts and action. Respondents affirmed that the climate is already changing, fuelled by human activities, including tourism, and that its impacts on society and tourism will be largely negative and devastating in some regions. Opinion was divided regarding mitigation timelines, the compatibility of continued tourism growth with Paris Climate Agreement decarbonisation goals, and the role of technology and governance in reducing emissions. The paper examines leaders' perspectives in terms of "belief systems" that interpret information in decision-making, as well as forms of agnogenesis; this is, the fabrication of uncertainty to justify non-action. Belief systems and agnogenesis are thought to represent important barriers to progress on the decarbonisation of tourism, as they are for the global low-carbon transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]