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Research on Euroscepticism tends to portray parties opposing European integration or criticising the European Union (EU) as a family of Eurosceptic parties (either hard or soft). Recent literature, however, offers empirical evidence on the ambivalence and diversity of the EU critique. What is still unclear are the reasons behind the chameleonic nature of Euroscepticism and the implications that this may have for the EU critique and the changes proposed about EU policy or institutions. The present article addresses this question exploring the role of EU crises to capture the changing nature of Euroscepticism and suggests that it is related to contextual pressures on the political debate around the EU. The paper develops this argument and illustrates it through the analysis of the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, covering the EU crises of the last decade, including the recent period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine invasion. Drawing on a corpus of party manifestos and speeches between 2013 and 2022, this study shows that there are three main frames used by the party to criticise the EU. It also concludes that these frames involve distinct political implications for the EU critique and the alternative proposals presented by the party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses the impact of European Union (EU) funds on corruption in the EU ex-communist countries by following a panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. The panel includes 10 former EU communist countries, over 2007–2019. The key findings reveal that an improvement in the EU funds paid and their rate of absorption can reduce the level of corruption in the long-run in the recipient EU ex-communist countries. This is due to better monitoring of EU funds paid compared with national resources, and a more efficient and fairer channel of EU funds absorption. In parallel with the EU funds, corruption can be controlled in certain conditions by the degree of economic development, size of government, level of democratisation and religiosity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which factors influence bilateral counterterrorism (CT) cooperation between EU Member States? Although scholars have studied European CT, the question still needs to be answered. This paper addresses the issue by introducing a new theoretical framework that combines CT and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature. As citizens' threat perception increases, governments are pressed to act. Overall, centrist cabinets tend to rely more on cooperation agreements; likewise, pushed by threat perception, left-wing executives also recourse to international cooperation. I tested this framework on a newly collected dataset, which comprehends bilateral CT agreements signed among EU Members from 2002 to 2017. As such, this paper fosters studies on EU CT, focusing on a less debated issue: bilateral cooperation between EU Member States. The results support the initial hypotheses, disclosing a robust influence of threat perception and cabinet ideology on the number of bilateral CT agreements signed. Furthermore, they show that the perception of the threat is more influential on cooperation than the actual impact of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, scholarship on postfunctionalism in European integration has drawn attention to how processes of Europeanisation are not restricted to policymakers, but exist equally (if not more significantly) in the quotidian. The 2016–2020 Brexit process and debates on the relationship between national identity and 'Europeanness' urge a new consideration of how Europeanisation is narrated in everyday discourses. This paper analyses British fictional portrayals of the EEC and EU and posits a new theoretical framework of 'Imperial Gothic 2.0'. Pre-2016 representations of the EU were entirely dystopian. But post-2016, Brex-Lit fiction has reversed this trend and the EU now appears as a flawless utopia. Early twentieth-century 'Imperial Gothic' saw popular fiction defined by themes of British decline and oppression by foreign powers; a century later, Brex-Lit has resurrected these themes by narrating Britain in terminal decline, reflecting cultural anxieties, a reversal of Self and Other, and a loss of identities. This 'Imperial Gothic 2.0' reveals anxieties which reflect and influence political action, and reveals the extent to which imaginations and narratives of the EU have transformed from depictions of a distant, technocratic entity used for comedy or conspiracy, into a site of intense emotional affiliation, nostalgia, anticipation, and regret. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Europeanisation of football at the level of governance (due to for example the effects of the Bosman ruling and the formation of the UEFA Champions League) – influenced the identities of football fans? This paper explores how such structural Europeanisation in football is influencing identifications among fans. Based on an analysis of articulations in selected online message boards, we distil the positioning of fans towards 'Europe' in football, and the factors which shape it. We control for three main avenues of impact: the club level, the league level, and the societal context. Our inquiry is based on a set of paired comparisons of fan scenes for football clubs in four different European countries. Results show that the factor carrying the most explanatory power is the club's participation in European-level competition. Although this broadly confirms a 'contact hypothesis' – according to which the more fans are exposed to cross-border contacts, the less relevance they attribute to aspects of national belonging – significant variations of how frequent exposure to European-level competition translates into more Europeanised perceptions do exist. For European identity studies, the work corroborates that a lifeworld arena such as football can foster Europeanised identifications, albeit not in a uniform manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of growing nationalisms and Euroscepticism, this paper develops the original concept of 'Everyday Europeanhood' on a theoretical level, building on related concepts, such as Skey and Antonsich's 'Everyday Nationhood', Billig's 'Banal Nationalism', Anderson's 'Imagined Communities' and Beck's 'Cosmopolitan Vision'. It applies the concept to the European Universities Initiative (EUI), seen as a tool to promote European identity, based on a common sense of belonging conveyed through everyday practice, among students and staff in European University Alliances. It is argued that, in the light of previous top-down European initiatives designed to symbolically reinforce a sense of shared European identity, the EUI seems more in phase with bottom-up 'everyday' processes of identity development. Taking the European University Alliance 'FORTHEM' as an example, core features, aspects, actions and outputs achieved so far within this alliance are categorised in the light of four dimensions of 'Everyday Europeanhood': 'Talking Europe', 'Choosing Europe', 'Performing Europe' and 'Consuming Europe'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-border regions are often deemed laboratories for initiatives to increase Europeanization. Our paper examines the German-speaking Community of Belgium in the Euregio Maas-Rhine to assess the relevance of everyday cross-border activities to the perception that living in a border region presents a unique opportunity to feel and think as a European. Departing from the assumptions of both Deutsch's transaction theory and Allport's contact hypothesis, we analyze Eurobarometer data (population-level surveys) and use data from focus groups with regional MPs. Results from quantitative data analysis suggest that perceptions of life in cross-border regions are positively influenced by frequent cross-border movement (functional dimension) as well as general trust in other people (emotional dimension). Our qualitative data from focus groups support the findings from the quantitative analysis and demonstrate further that it is not merely the quantity but the quality of contacts that contribute to a gradual 'growing together'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate on domestic politicisation of EU issues by suggesting hitherto overlooked explanation of (non)politicisation. This paper uses Czechia as an intriguing case in which the mainstream explanations of a low level of domestic politicisation of EU issues do not apply. The Czech case illustrates that, first, even in the context of high public Euroscepticism, EU issues do not necessarily become politicised, particularly so when the public does not consider them to be important. Second, high politicisation does not occur when there is a path dependency of a mismatch between positions of political parties and significant parts of their electorates on EU issues. Finally, the rise of catch-all populist parties prevents a high level of politicisation of EU issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent spread of Euroscepticism has largely been limited to criticism of the actions, inefficiencies, or credibility of EU institutions, while the issue of leaving or not joining the EU is still out of focus for the vast majority of the European population. With the exception of the United Kingdom, which withdrew from the EU, Serbia is the only country where the majority of the population does not want to join the bloc. This paper is dedicated to researching the causes of this phenomenon and measuring their impact on the current additional increase in resistance to the EU among the population of Serbia. This paper presents the results of a survey organised by the authors in Serbia in 2020. MANOVA and the Generalised Linear Model (GLM) were used to analyse the impact of different demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as the influence of the national attachment of respondents to their attitude towards EU membership. The results showed that Euroscepticism was on the rise due to a weakening expectation of economic benefits of EU membership and a strengthening of national attachment, including concerns over the loss of national sovereignty, under increased EU pressure on Serbia to give up disputed Kosovo territories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union is often seen as a bulwark of progressive values, including LGBTI rights. By restricting such rights, politicians thus appear to reject the EU's fundamental principles. This paper argues, however, that anti-gender politics is often a surprisingly pro-European phenomenon. Many of its practitioners rebuff accusations of Euroskepticism. For them, rights restrictions are less an attempt to reject European integration than to redirect its trajectory. They aim to reconnect the EU with Europe's civilizational roots. The paper illustrates this argument by analyzing the discourse actors have used to justify anti-gender policies in three countries: Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of enduring crisis phenomena, quantitative evidence of the renewed salience of socio-economic agendas advanced by radical right populist parties calls for more qualitative research work and in-depth case studies. The present paper aims to contribute to filling this gap through a cultural political economy (CPE) investigation of the Italian League (Lega) party that foregrounds its socio-economic positioning by reconstructing the party's 'economic imaginary'. The suggested synergy between CPE and a critical discourse analysis of the League's practical argumentation in the 2013 and 2018 electoral manifestos points to a composite economic imaginary that prioritizes: 1) production (vs financialization); 2) support of internal demand; 3) lowering of fiscal pressure; 4) protectionism and 5) welfare. The analysis shows how, under Salvini's leadership, the party's practical argumentation in EU matters has become constitutive of its overall political strategy and so exacerbated the claims at the core of the respective economic imaginary. In this vein, the League's Euroscepticism has also polarized the relationship between the party's socio-economic and socio-cultural stance, thus urging to go beyond the focus on economic imaginaries and sketch out a CPE research agenda on the League's more encompassing struggle for hegemony in the Italian political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper follows the perspective of recent political communication studies approaching the online public sphere as a new platform for the political expression of citizens. Based on an explorative, in-depth analysis of user-generated content related to mainstream media coverage of the immigration crisis, with a specific focus on representations of the role of the EU in the crisis, it aims to discover how recent political trends in Europe are reflected in the online political expression of Eurosceptic citizens of a post-socialist Central European country, the Czech Republic. Relating the analysed data to current knowledge of the links between populism, illiberalism and Euroscepticism, and reflecting the post-socialist specifics of this relationship, it suggests that ressentiment may explain the representation of the EU as a traitor to the Europeans in the civic online discourse in times of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does political nostalgia influence voting? Although nostalgic voters have been often mentioned as central to the rise of populism in the West, scholars have rarely shown empirically how nostalgia influences electoral choice. In this paper, I use survey data from 2009 and 2016 to investigate the extent and electoral impact of Soviet nostalgia in the context of democratizing Moldova. First, the paper reveals and explains why political nostalgia is distributed unevenly across Moldova's territory with certain regions and ethnocultural groups embracing romanticized views of the Communist past more often than others. Second, the paper demonstrates that nostalgic orientations toward the past and cultural factors rather than perceptions of economic conditions structure party choice in post-Soviet Moldova. The paper also identifies the discursive similarities between varieties of Western populism, Euroscepticism, illiberal worldviews, and the nostalgic appeals of the Moldovan Left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Support for EU membership has long been an important topic of study. Individual-level research shows that winners of globalisation, including the higher educated, express greater EU support as they profit from economic and cultural conditions resulting from European integration. Recent context-focused work suggests that individuals in 'left-behind' places are less supportive of EU integration because of their home regions' weaker long-term economic conditions. This paper brings these two research strands into conversation with each other by examining how the relationship between EU support and individual-level education is contingent on subnational economic conditions. Using harmonised Eurobarometer data from almost 750,000 respondents spanning 2004–2019, combined with subnational economic data from 201 European regions, we find no evidence that subnational economic conditions influence the relationship between EU support and respondents' education level. At the same time, when cross-sectionally comparing long-term differences between regions, we find that EU support is positively related to regional GDP per capita (though unrelated to regional unemployment), among both the higher and lower educated, and especially in the post-Great Recession period. Longitudinally, EU support is positively related to declining regional unemployment, both among the higher and lower educated, but not to increasing regional GDP per capita. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the historic role of Britain's major public service broadcaster, the BBC, in reporting the European Union. To do this it combines a content analysis of two datasets of BBC broadcast and online coverage from 2007 and 2012 with a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with former and current senior BBC editors and journalists. The research finds that BBC coverage in the pre-referendum period was closely tied to major events – such as summits – and elite party conflict. These patterns in coverage were primarily a consequence of the lack of traditional news values inherent in most EU stories and the impact of the wider political and media landscape. The consequence of these patterns in coverage was to present audiences with a restricted, negative and largely conflictual picture of Britain's relationship with the EU which is likely to have fuelled rather than inhibited the growth of Euroscepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Euroscepticism is frequently presented as a key ideological feature of far right parties, however, this definition masks important variations between them. This paper argues that far right positions on Europe are characterized by long-standing ambivalence rather than straightforward opposition. While far right parties frequently oppose the EU, ideological flexibility, the malleability of European integration and the protean nature of Europe also lead them to display support towards certain aspects of it and towards Europe as a civilization. The argument is illustrated through a qualitative analysis of the party literature of the Movimento Sociale Italiano and the Front National. The analysis shows that these parties conceived of Europe as an identity, a space of liberty, an endangered heritage and a construction where national interests must be defended. In each theme, they offered ambivalent readings of Europe, oscillating between opposition and support depending on how Europe and the EU were defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until very recently, Spain has been an exception to the rise of the far right in the rest of Europe. However, Vox won a sizeable number of seats in the 2019 April national elections, followed by more than doubling them in the November 2019 ones. Following its victory, plenty of journalistic articles have attempted to categorise the party, ranging from Francoist or fascist to populist or conservative. This paper, departing from the ideational approach to populism, analyses the written and spoken production of the party, using both computerised content and discourse analysis to clarify and identify its ideological stance, including what relationship, if any, has with fascism or Franco's ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses data from six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), between 2004 and 2016, to examine attitudes towards European integration across countries. Using both individual responses and country-level variables, we analyse factors influencing Euroscepticism; how these factors are changing over time; and whether they may signal a latent potential for Brexit-like outcomes in different countries. Controlling for a unique combination of demographic, political and macroeconomic factors, we find individuals with higher levels of income and education, and those with more left-leaning political views to be more supportive of European integration, while those who are older and right-leaning to be less supportive. Using predicted values from our empirical analysis, we find median voters' attitudes diverging across European countries over time, with an increasing number of countries moving closer to the threshold values observed among voters in the United Kingdom in 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vital political opposition is one of the cornerstones of democracy, yet we know surprisingly little about the conditions that shape it. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of parliamentary opposition in European Union (EU) politics in five countries: Denmark; Germany; Ireland; Sweden; and the United Kingdom. Based on an extensive hand-coded data set of 7,520 statements made by members of parliament (MPs) during both plenary sessions and deliberations during European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings, we examine how institutions and party characteristics shape two types of oppositional behaviour: the expression of critique and the presentation of alternatives. We find that both factors are important for understanding to what extent, and how, opposition is voiced in national parliaments. Oversight institutions' strength and a party's degree of Euroscepticism jointly function as significant determinants of the likelihood that MPs will express opposition in the form of critique. However, when it comes to the likelihood of offering alternatives, oversight institutions' strength fails to explain variations in the share of alternatives, while degree of Euroscepticism remains a significant predictor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present findings of a research project focusing on the tensions between the idea of 'Europe' and that of the 'nation' as well as on perceptions of national and popular sovereignty in times of crisis. We start from the assumption that in the context of the recent crisis, EU politics have become 'normal politics,' generating political passions, polarization, and a deeper Eurosceptic mood. Working on the emblematic case of Greece, we focus on two critical moments (referendum 2015 and Prespa Agreement 2018) so as to address the question of how the idea of 'Europe' was politicized and reconceptualized in its competitive symbiosis with perception(s) of the 'nation'. Drawing on discourse analysis and ethnographic research, we maintain that European identity, in this critical juncture, was not deconstructed but rather remodelled in constant tension with national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper commences with some general observations on Poland's kin-state policy followed by an analysis of that element of kin-state policy concerned with the Polish minority in Germany. The paper argues that the recent invigoration of kin-state politics cannot be viewed in isolation from wider global political trends. Rather it contends that this increased concern with the fate of claimed ethnic kin is part of a wider trend towards the privileging of identity politics. It is further argued that in turn this impulse is located within the growth of populism, the celebration of parochialism, anti-globalisation sentiment and Euroscepticism, all of which have been fuelled by the financial crash of 2007/2008. The paper concludes by pointing to a paradox between the pursuit of policies that seek to prioritise ethnic identification with a kin-state and the commitment of member-states of the European Union to ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leadership studies research reveals that political leaders' beliefs affect their political and policymaking behaviour, especially in times of crisis. Moreover, the level of flexibility of these beliefs influences the likelihood that groups of leaders come to collective decisions. Insight into when and why political leaders do, in fact, change their beliefs is sorely lacking. This paper uses fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to examine the antecedents of belief changes among 12 European leaders, all working in the realm of economic policy. Its findings reveal how increases in unemployment and unsustainable debt, as well as different government ideologies and increases in Euroscepticism lead to economic belief changes. In so doing, this paper begins to open the 'black box' of when, why, and under what conditions leaders change their beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reassesses the construction, delivery and significance of the Bruges speech by Margaret Thatcher in 1988. Widely seen as a critical moment in the shift towards the legitimising of Euroscepticism, this paper exploits newly released archival material to analyse the internal dialogue between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and her advisors as they constructed the speech. The paper then analyses how the speech was delivered and argues that it represents a classic example of what is known as epideictic or display rhetoric. This involves constructing a rhetorical choice between the Delors vision of a future Europe based on further intervention, integration and interdependence, and her alternative vision of a market based and deregulated Europe, based on preserving national independence and defending British national sovereignty. By reassessing the construction and delivery of the Bruges speech in this way, we can consider the significance of the speech by assessing the reactions that it provoked. Through this process we identify how and why an essentially anti-federalist speech became viewed as an anti-European speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of utilitarian, political, and cultural/identity-based factors of Euroscepticism on a nationwide representative sample of ethnic Georgians. Hierarchical multiple logistic regression showed that for ethnic Georgians, utilitarian factors are the strongest predictors of support for the EU integration, followed by cultural/identity and political variables, supporting the rational choice theory. These predictors are, in turn, anteceded by popular perceptions of the EU in Georgia. Mediation analysis revealed that the perception of the EU as a source of peace and security precedes the hope for an increase in national security with its support (political predictor). Likewise, the perception of the EU as a champion of economic development antecedes the hope for reduced poverty in Georgia (utilitarian predictor). On the other hand, the perception of the EU as a threat to national traditions does not predict Euroscepticism. We elaborate on this result through an examination of the current political atmosphere of Georgia, where we determine that fears of losing national traditions are outweighed by fears of economic and political insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mantra of 'take back control' has become a staple of eurosceptics across the European Union. At the centre of the slogan's message is a call to arms against the (perceived) challenge that EU membership represents for national sovereignty. In this paper, we theorize that supranational decisions taken by the European Court of Justice can increase 'polity scepticism' – increased opposition to the EU and decreased satisfaction with national democracy – by cueing citizens regarding the effects of EU integration on the perception of diluted sovereignty. Empirically, we leverage quasi-experimental evidence to support our theory, establishing that ECJ rulings have a significant causal effect on euroscepticism and dissatisfaction with democracy. The implications of our findings suggest that EU institutions seeking to ensure compliance with the rule of law and EU norms should proceed with caution. Interventionist action may backfire by increasing scrutiny of the EU's legitimacy and undermining polity support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries with populist radical right governments are the exception rather than the rule. This paper uses the Australian case of Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON) and the UK case of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) – and its effective successor, the Brexit Party – to help explain a puzzle: how do populist radical right parties in the absence of any likely route to winning office or even holding legislative influence achieve policy payoffs? Tracing the political factors that have driven policy influence in these two cases reveals that an entrepreneurial leader with agenda-setting influence can have policy impact, despite disadvantageous structural conditions, through the following: leveraging electoral influence over both social democratic and mainstream right parties; gaining credibility through sub-national elections; and achieving (or threatening to achieve) defections from centre-right parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When national interests are threatened by an international political crisis, there is often a 'rally around the flag' effect among both the public and the political elite, interpreted as a patriotic response to an external threat. Brexit represented a significant threat both to the Irish economy and to the constitutional settlement on the island of Ireland. In contrast to other international crises that have been studied in relation to the rally effect, a supranational body (the EU) was acting on behalf of the threatened state (Ireland) in the negotiations. This paper examines how Brexit affected Irish party positions on EU affairs in the Republic of Ireland and asks if there was a 'rally around the EU flag' at the elite level. Using automated content analysis of parliamentary debates in Ireland between 2014–2019, the results show that there was indeed a significant and sustained pro-EU rally among most Irish parties. The findings also show that the rally effect differs depending on whether the party has a nationalist or internationalist orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical Left Parties (RLPs) and Radical Right Parties (RRPs) parties have adopted similar platforms over EU economic integration, rejecting further budgetary/economic authority transfers towards the EU. During the Euro crisis, EU-led management of the recession, constraining budgetary independency, may have worsened public concerns over the loss of state sovereignty on economic prerogatives. Although RLPs and RRPs have conveyed to voters anti-EU budgetary messages, we do not know if the electors have responded to this cueing activity. Thus, this paper seeks to understand whether, during the Euro crisis, voters supported the RLPs and RRPs due to anti-EU budgetary positions or not in Western Europe. On the one hand, we show that voters have electorally rewarded RRPs on the anti-EU budgetary issues, profiling themselves as Euro-rejectionists. On the other hand, we found that voters have not significantly matched RLP anti-EU budgetary stances, perhaps expressing favourable orientations towards the EU inter-state solidarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are lesbian, gay and bisexual voters in Western Europe europhile globalists or eurosceptic nativists? The recently established 'sexuality gap' between lavender voters and heterosexuals in Western Europe shows that LGBs are more likely to support left-leaning parties and identify ideologically with the left than their heterosexual peers. We know very little, however, about how this gap plays out in the multidimensional space in Europe where cultural concerns like immigration and EU integration are increasingly important. In this paper, I use cumulative data from the European Social Survey to investigate the impact of LGB status on support for EU integration and immigration. The results show, in line with theoretical expectations regarding the socializing effect of the LGB experience in encouraging support for social liberalism, that lavender voters in Western Europe are significantly more pro-integrationist and pro-immigration than comparable heterosexuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the link between recent EU crises and the development of party-based Euroscepticism across Europe. It draws on data from expert surveys with qualitative data to outline the way in which we can empirically see the link between the impacts of the crises in European states, and how far, and in what ways, Euroscepticism has been mobilized by political parties in those states. It identifies four main frames through which the EU is contested in European states which focus on: economic factors, immigration, democracy/sovereignty and national factors. It also shows that there has been a clear difference between the impacts of the different crises. While the Eurozone crisis had a particularly powerful effect in the party systems of those countries most affected by the bailout packages and the migration crisis had a particularly strong effect on party politics in the post-communist states of central Europe, Brexit has had a very limited impact on national party politics, although this may change in the longer-term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the effect of national partisanship and Euroscepticism on individuals’ causal responsibility attribution in European multilevel democracies. It is particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 European Election Studies, results show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer period. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Eurosceptic turnabout which has taken place in the CEE constitutes one of the most significant factors weakening the cohesion of the EU. In this group, Poland is the key element in view of its size and the status of the 'poster boy' of Europeanization acquired in the previous years. This paper analyses the major trends in the European policy of the Polish governments in the long-term period of 1990–2018 on the basis of standardized data (addresses by the Polish ministers of foreign affairs) and a quantitative analysis. These data also shed light on the essence of changes taking place in Poland's EU policy. What appeared to be important was both the change in the country's status after joining the EU, which limits the pressure of the EU (conditionality), and the arrival in power of populist, Eurosceptic parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some regions in Europe that have been heavily supported by the European Union's Cohesion Policy have recently opted for parties with a strong Eurosceptic orientation. The results at the ballot box have been put forward as evidence that Cohesion Policy is ineffective for tackling the rising, European-wide wave of discontent. However, the evidence to support this view is scarce and often contradictory. This paper analyses the link between Cohesion Policy and the vote for Eurosceptic parties. It uses the share of votes cast for Eurosceptic parties in more than 63,000 electoral districts in national legislative elections in the EU-28 to assess whether Cohesion Policy investment since the year 2000 has made a difference for the electoral support for parties opposed to European integration. The results indicate that Cohesion Policy investment is linked to a lower anti-EU vote. This result is robust to employing different econometric approaches, to considering the variety of European development funds, to different periods of investment, to different policy domains, to shifts in the unit of analysis and to different levels of opposition by parties to the European project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of various crises, the European Union (EU) witnessed the rise of Eurosceptic and/or populist parties in its member states. However, the link between Euroscepticism and populism remains under-theorized, and the East-Central European (ECE) region is still surprisingly under-studied. This paper aims to fill these gaps by studying the development of Eurosceptic populist narratives in Hungary and Poland. Connecting the literature on Euroscepticism and the ideational approach to populism, it is shown through Orbán's and Kaczyński's discourses how (1) the EU is equated with 'the corrupt elite' that stands in conflict with 'the pure people', the Hungarians and Poles, and (2) how the EU is claimed to act against the notion of popular sovereignty. While the article highlights differences between the Eurosceptic populist narratives of the two party leaders, a politically driven 'anti-imperialist' theme prevails in both cases, which differentiates them from their Western-European counterparts as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's involvement in the European Union has long provoked controversy among Europe's elites. Recently, in the context of the so-called 'migrant crisis', coupled with the mainstreaming of Islamophobia and rising Euroscepticism, the issue of Turkey has acquired renewed significance. While many scholars have linked hostility towards Turkey with the desired construction of a supra-national European identity, few have noted the role it plays in the discourse of parties that explicitly reject the EU. Adopting a mixed-methods approach to Critical Discourse Studies, this paper investigates the contemporary construction of Turkey as a dangerous 'other' by far-right parties in the United Kingdom (UKIP) and France (FN/RN). Drawing on theories of Orientalism, Islamophobia and civilisationism, it exposes the apparent contradiction in the strongly Eurosceptic positions adopted by these parties, while simultaneously rejecting Turkish involvement based on its supposed 'non-Europeanness'. They thus become defenders of Europe while simultaneously undermining the supra-national EU project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there exists a large body of literature investigating the European Union’s intervention in the western Balkans, and in particular the influence of so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’, rarely is the western Balkans’ own fatigue towards the EU given serious consideration. This paper examines domestic views about Europe, arguing that aspiring new EU member states have been experiencing various forms of Euroscepticism due to a number of socio-economic, cultural and political factors. The growth of Euroscepticism has helped Russia to play a more assertive and influential role in the region. However, as this paper argues, Euroscepticism is not a rejection of the European perspective and the search for alternatives, but rather a critique of the actual methods, timing and impact of the integration process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper seeks to apply the relevance of Euroscepticism literature to the study of radical left party outlooks on European integration and by doing so: (1) outlines general patterns of opposition to European integration, by 11 radical left parties that are housed in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group of the European Parliament, in the 1990s and beyond; (2) assesses the congruence between the outlooks of these parties or the lack thereof; and (3) illuminates the factors conditioning these outlooks by addressing the ideology-strategy debate. To this end, the paper employs two, widely referenced and historically relevant, analytical frameworks of party-based Euroscepticism (by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, and by Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde), and applies them to the radical left as a whole and its various sub-sets, as identified by the literature so far. The analysis leads to the following three findings. First, a moderating approach can be observed on average, thus leading to an increase in overall congruence. Second, congruence increases slightly, as we move towards a more specific typology but overall no systematic congruence is to be found in the radical left as a whole or most of its sub-sets, in the period examined. Third, while ideology carries causal weight, strategy appears more prominent as a conditioning factor of outlooks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The euro and the European Central Bank (ECB) are inextricably linked at the institutional level, yet public opinion diverges: support for the euro remained high even at the height of the crisis while trust in the ECB saw a steep decline. How can we explain divergences between support for the euro and trust in the ECB? The present paper seeks to complement the existing literature by developing a unified analytical framework of public support for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and introducing a novel typology of euro and ECB sceptics and supporters. Empirical findings show that support for the euro is predominantly value-based, whereas perceived performance matters comparatively more for trust in the ECB. They suggest that value-based support has been critical during the crisis in ensuring continued public support for EMU despite perceptions of underperformance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of Euroscepticism on regional cross-border cooperation between Germany and Denmark. It demonstrates that Euroscepticism, while absent from local mainstream politicians, had already caused civic unrest in the 1997 attempts to construct a return to history Euro-region Schleswig. It resulted in a re-scaling of the Euro-Region to Region and Schleswig to "Sønderjylland/Schleswig", omitting any reference to Europe, European identity or a commitment to a closer European union in the relevant agreements. Border controls, on the agenda in 2011 and again since 2015, have demonstrated the institutional weakness of cross-border politics when faced with determined initiatives from the national center. Furthermore, the Eurosceptic Danish People's Party had its best results in the border precincts both at the latest European and Danish national elections. Euroscepticism, even though difficult to measure on a regional level, seems to have been an ever present underneath current despite a political rhetoric of successful cooperation and cross-border reconciliation. The Danish-German case's development might be more distinct, but nonetheless representative for European border (and cross-border) regions. While European metropolises develop into thriving cosmopolitan post-nation state societies, this is not necessary the case at Europe's borders, where categorization and bordering remain common social practices by the large majority of national borderlanders with only a small portion of transnational borderlanders or 'regionauts' getting involved in border crossing social practices on a larger scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a context of rising economic nationalism and Euroscepticism, the value added of a supranational Cohesion Policy of the European Union is constantly under scrutiny. In parallel, a growing body of empirical evidence uncovers a significant heterogeneity of national and regional impacts. This editorial argues that member states should take full responsibility and ownership of Cohesion Policy and its impacts, regaining a substantive role between Brussels and the regions. Strong national leadership and coordination will allow 'weak' regions (in terms of institutional quality and governance) to gain momentum, better reconciling 'unity with (national and regional) diversity'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European integration of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was supposed to bring democratic consolidation in the region. Post-accession, however, we have been witnessing democratic regression in a number of cases. Thus, an interesting question has risen as a result of this puzzling outcome. This paper attempts to provide an institutional argument for the post-accession divergent patterns of CEE by tying post-accession performance to political competition during the pre-accession process. Using the effective number of parliamentary parties, this article argues that the pre-accession process of the Eastern enlargement was more conducive to democratic consolidation under those democracies with a higher number of effective parties. Additionally, the paper shows that more fragmented party systems exhibited higher levels of party-based euroskepticism. The dual nature of the argument suggests that the more fragmented and euroskeptic a party system during the pre-accession process, the higher the likelihood of democratic consolidation in the post-accession period. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cognitive mobilisation thesis suggests that increasing knowledge on the European Union (EU) would lead to increased support for the institution. We test this with a strategic case whereby we provide information on the EU's subsidiarity principle to the citizenry of a small member state and examine whether it mitigates negative EU attitudes. In an original, pre-registered, population-based survey experiment conducted with members of a panel representative of the Dutch population, respondents were assigned randomly to a control group or a treatment: a professionally produced information video mimicking EU communications. Along with estimating the overall treatment effects, based on extant literature we assess whether these effects are moderated by the respondents' prior EU knowledge and level of populist attitudes. Consistent with the information deficit theory, we find that information provision decreases negative attitudes among the least knowledgeable. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of Euroscepticism has shifted the structure of political conflict in the European Parliament (EP) towards an increasingly dominant pro-/anti-EU divide. Focusing on the hard case of EU enlargement, this article examines changes in MEPs' discursive and voting patterns over the past two EP mandates. It combines two original datasets containing MEP statements during plenary debates and subsequent roll-call votes to examine the polarisation, cohesion, and consistency of legislative behaviour across different European Political Groups. The findings show that soft Eurosceptics drive a deepening of the pro-/anti-EU divide by radicalising in both discourse and vote to join hard Eurosceptics in their firm rejection of further enlargement. Pro-European MEPs, in contrast, show discursive accommodation of Eurosceptic concerns, with a growing inconsistency between sceptical discourse and continued vote-based support for enlargement-related initiatives. A case study of Turkey illustrates these two mechanisms. The findings shed light on the changing dynamics of political competition in the EP and the impact of rising Euroscepticism upon MEPs' legislative behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has become increasingly politicized not only at the bottom, due to polarized debates, divided electorates, declining mainstream parties, and rising Euroskeptic populism; or from the bottom up, as national politics permeates member-state leaders' positions in the Council. It has also emerged purely at the top, in the increasingly politically charged dynamics of interaction within and among EU actors. Such politicization involves struggles for power and influence that are ideational as much as institutional and coercive. Current theorists of EU integration, because of their tendency to focus on only one or another EU actor have overlooked the EU's politicized dynamics, even though their accounts, taken together, provide ample evidence of it. The article shows that the EU has gone from what was once metaphorically described with the catchphrase of 'politics without policy' at the national level to 'politics against policy' in more contentious areas, whereas at the EU level it has moved from 'policy without politics' to 'politics with policy'. The paper illustrates with the cases of the Council and the Commission in the Eurozone crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Euroscepticism has been a persistent part of the European integration process over the last several decades (Usherwood and Startin [2013]. Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51, 1–16). Scholars have proposed various theories to explain resistance to integration by drawing upon economic, political and cultural theories. In this paper, I ask whether Euroscepticism is a by-product of rural–urban divisions, which influences one's perception of the economy, one's trust of transnational politics and one's cultural identity. However, geographical variables have never been tested in the presence of these more well-established Euroscepticism predictors. Here, I use the European Social Survey to compare the predictive power of economic, political, cultural and geographical variables on two forms of Euroscepticism: trust in European Parliament and the belief that integration has gone too far. Multilevel mixed-effects regression models demonstrate that trust in the European Parliament is indeed higher in big cities, but overall, place of residence is not a strong predictor of Euroscepticism. Among other theories, I find that cultural variables are more meaningful than economics or politics. I finally conclude with a discussion of the EU's future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2014 was the year for restricting EU nationals' access to benefits in the UK, with a series of measures introduced since 1 January. This paper assesses each measure's compatibility with EU law, examining the legal texts and the accompanying guidance, which may lead to infringements by administrative decision makers. The paper then analyses the cumulative programme of reforms, and identifies three societal concerns. First, the programme represents a departure from EU Treaty principles. Second, the effects of the new measures are felt by all EU migrants, not just the ‘economically inactive’, since they are subject to extra tests and delays, face amplified xenoscepticism, and are placed in a more precarious position, with greater risks attendant upon loss of work. Third, the measures represent a pure form of an individualist ideology, potentially lowering our resistance to child poverty and destitution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For a long time, Italy has been traditionally described as one of the strongest pro-European countries. Italians' general discontent for domestic politicians and institutions seemed initially to amplify these sentiments, indicating in the European Union (EU) the solution to the atavist deficiencies of the Italian political system. Since the beginning of the 2000s, support for Europe, especially at the mass level, started to decrease. This situation became more evident when the effects of the world financial and economic crisis invaded the political debate. The first aim of this special issue is to understand and explain the new counter-trend in Italian sceptic sentiments towards the EU. In particular, this issue presents six different papers focusing on: Italian public support for the EU, the image of Europe in the national press, the Euroscepticism of radical right parties and movements, the relationship between attitudes towards Europe and voting turnout, and the effects of two crucial issues – corruption and immigration – on attitudes towards European institutions. The studies presented confirm the importance of considering the context of each member-state and each national scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is a notable correlation between Eurosceptic and populist political actors, discourses and agendas across Europe. Since 2015, the ongoing conflict between Poland and the European Commission concerning the rule of law has brought European integration to the centre of Polish politics. The main focus of this article is on the relationship and interaction between populism and Euroscepticism, as analysed through the example of Polish political parties. To this end, the article investigates the different forms of EU contestation by Polish populist right-wing parties and assesses the extent to which these are expressed through populist discourse. We find a strong correlation between populist and Eurosceptic attitudes of Polish political parties. With the growing number of populist parties entering the mainstream and 'uncivil society' actors transforming into political parties, the anti-elitist discourse generates a need to locate the 'corrupted elites' outside of the national power structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special issue recalls the alarm raised in EU capitals and Brussels after the UK's in-out referendum delivered a Leave vote in June 2016. The fear was of a domino effect and the further fragmentation of an already divided EU. Seven years later, it is clear that there was rapid attrition of Eurosceptic triumphalism, and the EU-27 showed remarkable unity. This required a sustained collective effort to contain a membership crisis and maintain the EU polity. Yet, the issue contributors challenge the notion that the alarm was unfounded and explain why this counter-factual did not materialise, even though potential for future membership crises of different sorts was revealed. Theoretically, this supports an understanding of the EU as a polity that is fragile, yet able to assert porous borders, exercise authority over a diverse membership, and mobilise a modicum of loyalty when the entire integration regime is under threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit was perceived as a Pandora's box moment by both Eurosceptic and pro-integration parties in the EU, as they expected it would embolden Euroscepticism by providing a paradigm to be followed. This article explores the initial reactions of nine Populist Radical Right parties to Brexit and how they evolved in tandem with the unfolding of negotiations. It also discusses possible reasons for the differentiation in the responses of those parties, from triumphant to moderated reactions. The empirical basis is a dataset that contains the public communications of these parties on Twitter between 2015 and 2020. The results show that although there was initial differentiation with some parties calling for referenda in their own countries, by 2017 every party's communication on Brexit drastically decreased, and by the time the UK left the EU (January 2020), calls for secession had disappeared from their discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]