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Between 2017 and 2020 a comprehensive review of the framework of investigatory scrutiny committees in the House of Lords was undertaken. This process led to a far-reaching set of recommendations and reforms. Although carefully couched in the language of evolutionary change, this article argues that these reforms possess a transformational dynamic that is difficult to deny. The challenge, however, is likely to emerge from the existence of a largely hidden disjuncture between the accountability ambitions embedded within this reform agenda and the institutional, constitutional and political matrixes within which the 'new' committee system in the Lords is expected to operate. A three-dimensional lens emphasising inter-, intra-, and extra-institutional dimensions is utilised to expose and dissect the existence of potential disjuncture and, through this, offers a 'review of the review' informed by broader literatures on legislative organisation and policy analysis that will be of interest to both practitioners and scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of arm's-length bodies to deliver certain services, to regulate certain sectors or to assume responsibility for particularly salient political issues is neither new in historical terms or a feature unique to the UK in comparative terms. What is particularly distinctive, however, is the Coalition Government's attempts since 2010 to reduce the number of ‘quangos’ while also strengthening the capacity of the core executive and sponsor departments to control and co-ordinate this dense and fragmented sphere of delegated governance. Drawing upon the findings of the first research project to analyse the current Public Bodies Reform Agenda, this article provides an account of the ‘filling-in’ of the ‘hollowing out’. It argues that when viewed through a historical lens, the Coalition Government has adopted a distinctive approach to ‘the quango problem’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For centuries, the capacity of British ministers to appoint individuals to positions on the boards of agencies, boards and commissions was viewed as little more than one element of the ‘spoils of war’ in a highly majoritarian polity. This article examines how the politics of patronage has evolved in recent decades and argues that it is possible to identify a silent revolution that has gradually but consistently constrained the reach and discretion enjoyed by ministers in deploying their patronage powers. What is particularly distinctive about British political history since 2007 is the introduction of a far-reaching ladder of legislative scrutiny that ranges from informal pre-appointment hearings, at one end of the ladder, to a statutory veto over the minister's preferred candidate, at the other. However, this ‘outlawing of the spoils’ has evolved in a typically British way with reforms being implemented on an ad hoc and incremental basis, that is, frequently without any advance consultation or planning but rather dependent on non-formal, informal and discretionary elements to counter problems as they arise. The result is a complex and frequently overlapping mixture of regulatory and scrutiny processes that arguably offer little in terms of principled underpinning or constitutional logic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the role, powers and future of independent European agencies as an aspect of the current debate surrounding European governance. It argues that the design and implementation of independent agencies in the EU should not be seen as a construct of apolitical administrative engineering or integration but should be interpreted as a central component of political debates regarding the future constitutional structure of the EU vis-à-vis member states. In order to demonstrate the validity of this argument, the article reflects upon five themes (growth, co-ordination, accountability, depoliticization and power) which have arisen as central issues in relation to delegated governance at the national level. These themes are analysed in order to assess the main lessons that could usefully be considered during this critical period of constitutional reflection and design for the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]