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This paper investigates the aspirations and strategies of self-builders of owner-occupied homes in a facilitated self-build scheme. It draws on a qualitative case-study of the Homeruskwartier in Almere, the Netherlands, one the largest assisted self-build schemes in present-day Europe, which caters to lower- and middle-income households. The study problematizes the notion that self-building necessarily leads to the pursuit of use values over exchange values. This questions the positive benefits attributed to self-building. The aspirations of self-builders are not only framed by social and material conditions, but are also being reframed in the action process. The paper stresses the contingent nature of aspirations and strategies and emphasizes the experimental nature of the self-building process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores whether human proactivity can be considered an expression of free will. The discussion involves two paradigms, which are mutually complementary and encompass psychological proactivity and reactivity. Both paradigms raise the question of linear and non-linear determinism, which inevitably leads to the issue of free will. The analysis attempts to find a compromise between linear and non-linear determinism through the approach of human dialectical complexity (Lebed & Bar-Eli, 2013). This refers to the relationships of two types of complex subsystems within a human: the perceptual-motor dynamic system (PMDS), which is mostly determined by linear impacts and expressed through reactive behavior, and the “free-will” 1 complex system (FCS), which is mostly determined by non-linear redundant determinism and expressed through proactive dynamics. In summary, it is concluded that there cannot be a categorical assertion of the permanent existence of free will in human functioning. The human dialectical complexity expressed by both proactivity and reactivity causes the “floating” presence of free will depending on the prevalence of proactive control factors and the non-linear determination of a living human system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, instead of postulating a theory of action, we should think of a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational paradigm in philosophy towards a co-actional one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of modernity entering its digital stage, theoretical conceptions of the relation between technology and space regard the two as becoming increasingly interlinked. In human geography, such conceptual advances are mainly reflected either in models of globalization as being driven by technological change or in more specific investigations into technologies that have an inherent relation to space and place, such as locative media. The article opens up a geographical perspective on the relation of technology and space by focussing on the micro-level of the everyday use of technology. A framework is proposed that understands the symbolic geographies involved in the everyday interaction with technology as a combination ofnumericcomponents (places and networks coded by numbers),deicticexpressions and graphics (as in egocentric interfaces sensitive to the user’s location) and commontoponyms(established place names). Not only is this model applicable to the example of locative media, it also promises to be transferable to various kinds of complex infrastructure systems (including those for communication and transport) and media technology. The last part of the paper reflects on the apparent renaissance of traditional geographic concepts (such as place, landscape, region or nation state) in the context of digitalized lifeworlds. This can be explained by innovations in interface design enabling both providers and users of technological systems to integrate familiar geographic concepts into interaction language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the conceptual foundations of ergonomics and praxiology and the relations between the two disciplines. The influence of the systemic formulation on the change of approach in ergonomics from the earlier mechanistic approach to work and mutual relations between a working human and a machine is pointed out. Also characterized is praxiological analysis and its consequences for ergonomic design. The last part of the paper raises the issue of the importance of design in a praxiological approach and the role of ergonomics and praxiology in developing modern design culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the “Deep Self model,” according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, then we present cases that it cannot account for. Finally, we discuss how the Deep Self model could be modified to accommodate these new data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, online support groups have become a valuable source of help for individuals in suicidal crisis. Their attractiveness is attributed to features that enhance help-seeking and self-disclosure such as availability, anonymity, and use of written communication. However, online support groups also suffer from limitations and potential risks as agents of suicide prevention. The Israeli Association for Emotional First Aid (ERAN) has developed a practical model that seeks to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of online suicide prevention. The model applies the Action Theory concepts whereby individuals shape their own environment. The present paper presents the model, which is based on an online support group combined with personal chat and a telephonic help line. The online support group is moderated by paraprofessionals who function as both process regulators and support providers. The principles and practice of the model are described, the theoretical rationale is presented, and directions for future research are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews affect control theory's major strengths, the contributions of recent work to its growth, and the most promising avenues for future work. Affect control theory's strengths include (1) the precision of its mathematical statement and empirical base (especially when compared with earlier interpretive sociologies), (2) its ability to link the internal processing that generates social action to the socio-cultural system upon which that action is based, and (3) the generality that allows a parsimonious explanation of a wide range of processes and previous research findings. Recent advances provide (1) new, more accurate impression-change formulas, (2) the expansion of the theory to encompass settings, emotions, and traits, (3) new dictionaries of evaluation, potency and acitivity meanings and (4) tests of the theory using likelihood judgments, verbal scenarios and actual behavior of naive experimental subjects. Further work must include links to cognitive structures that will further delineate definition of situation and behavior selection processes. In addition, integration of affect control theory with new sociological work on the development of shared social knowledge and on institutionalized production systems expand the theory in useful ways. Finally, new work must find innovative and convincing ways to test simulation outcomes using both verbal accounts and behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intentions have been a central subject of research since contemporary philosophy of action emerged in the middle of the twentieth century. For almost that entire period, the approach has been to treat the study of intentions as separate from the study of morality. This essay offers a brief overview of that history and then suggests some ways forward, as exemplified by the essays collected in this volume. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central importance. In this article, I examine the nature of conscious deciding and I argue that Carruthers fails to establish the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Two questions guide this article. First, according to Fischer and Ravizza (jointly and otherwise), what epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are not also requirements for freely performing A? Second, how much progress have they made on this front? The article's main moral is for philosophers who believe that there are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing that are not requirements for freely A-ing because they assume that Fischer (on his own or otherwise) has shown that this is so. In showing that this assumption is false, I reopen an important question for these philosophers: How are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing related to requirements for freely A-ing? This is an interesting question in its own right, of course. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred R. Mele defends a broadly 'Humean' theory of motivation. One common dispute between Humeans and anti-Humeans has to do with whether or not a desire is required to motivate action. For the most part Mele avoids this dispute. He claims that there are reasons to think that beliefs cannot motivate action, but finally allows that it might be that it is a contingent fact that beliefs can motivate action in human beings. Instead Mele argues for the claim that certain kinds of desires - namely action-desires - are 'paradigmatic motivational attitudes', similar in an essential way to intentions, and that beliefs are not. Hence it is a necessary truth that action-desires encompass motivation to act; if beliefs encompass motivation to act, it is not a necessary truth that they do. In this way Mele preserves some of what is intuitively right about the Humean account, while admitting that the arguments normally offered in support of the standard Humean claims are open to objections. I argue that Mele's account is implausible. His argument against the claim that state-desires are essentially motivation-encompassing attitudes is convincing, but the same argument proves that action-desires are not essentially motivation-encompassing either. If this difference between desires and beliefs cannot be maintained, however, then Mele fails to defend any motivationally relevant difference between beliefs and desires. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introductional contribution, (1) model-theoretical backgrounds and directions of the actual approaches in sport injury research are clarified, (2) the resulting criteria and research desiderata are summarized, and (3) conclusions and perspectives for future research are outlined. Emphasis is given to trait and interactional concepts and approaches derived and closely linked to stress research. Considering the process of recovery and the reinjury phenomenon, various aspects are discussed, which have been neglected or have not been integrated in conceptualizations on injury until now. The action-theory perspective is outlined and suggested to build a framework for a more sophisticated approach. Following this model, it is recommended to focus more on process analyses and also to refer to single case studies in future research on sports injuries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outdoor education has typically presented itself as a specific approach to experiential learning. This article proposes that experiential learning can be understood as a process in which learners recognise and develop their action-theory and that the aim of outdoor development programs — whether in mainstream education, corporate training or therapy — is to facilitate this process. After introducing the notion of action-theory, I will present a particular approach to facilitation, which can be understood as a reflection-in-action approach. I conclude by situating this approach in the wider range of facilitation models in the literature on outdoor education and adventure therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]