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This paper examines Indonesia's vulnerability to climate change, and her position in the global climate change mitigation effort as a significant emitter with large potential for reducing emissions from forestry. It highlights the scope for Australia and Indonesia—both large emitters, one a developed country and potential buyer of emissions permits, the other a developing country and potential seller of per-mits—to play complementary roles in the global effort. The discussion outlines ways in which the two countries can cooperate with each other and with regional neighbours in mitigation initiatives and climate change adaptation. It suggests that their efforts could serve as a model for cooperation between developed and developing countries. The paper notes that the current global financial crisis is a short-term problem, while climate change has its effects over the long term. The recessionary effect of the financial crisis is not a good reason for delaying climate change mitigation efforts by Indonesia and other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2000 the Australian government declassified thousands of pages of documents concerning the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. Some 68,000 pages of documents were released. About 2,600 pages of diplomatic documents were withheld, along with Cabinet papers, intelligence materials, and Defence Department records. The documents cover only the period from early 1974 to mid-1976 and do not document the Indonesian war and its human costs. What they do document is the process whereby Australia acquiesced in the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Above all, they show that secret briefings by the Indonesians kept the Australian government closely informed of Indonesian intentions and operations at every step. In the light of these secret briefings and related documents, it is clear that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's claim that he wanted to see a "genuine act of self-determination" by the East Timorese is and always was hollow. This was a fig leaf covering his desire to see East Timor incorporated into Indonesia as West Papua had been in the 1960s. Its patina of moral responsibility and legal respectability were his alibi or, as Richard Woolcott put it in late 1974, "escape clause," if and when Indonesian actions led to accusations of Australian complicity with Jakarta. Mr. Whitlam was complicit. The record is clear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an analysis of the 1993 Australian Election Study indicating that the increase in perceptions of threat from Indonesia is primarily held by older Australians, those who hold protectionist trade views and those who are concerned about East Timor. Themes in Australia-Indonesia relations; Themes examined in the Australian Election Study.

This article analyses the Bali Process in the context of Australia's securitised approach to migrant smuggling, and the consequences this has for both the Australia-Indonesia diplomatic relationship and the Bali Process overall. The Bali Process is the premier regional forum for combating migrant smuggling and is well placed to discuss and develop regional cooperation policies on irregular migration within the region. In particular, the Bali Process remains a key domain where Australia and Indonesia can contest and amend the norms and practices around the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. This article traces and analyses the emergence of Australia's bilateral agreements for offshore processing and resettlement between 2011 and 2014, which Australian political elites aligned rhetorically to the Bali Process, but which the authors argue remain in tension with stated Bali Process objectives in terms of rights and protections for asylum-seekers and refugees. This article identifies that Australia's security-driven policies and regional disagreements over humanitarian responsibility remain an ongoing tension within Bali Process states, and provides commentary on the implications of this for future Australian policy relating to regional cooperation on irregular migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores the purported and actual motives of the Australian government's response to West Papuan refugees from 1963 through 1969. Views on Australian refugee policies; Types of border crossers; Relations with Indonesia.

In late 1999, former Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, attacked the Howard government's handling of the East Timor crisis, arguing that John Howard had neglected the most important priority in the management of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. Citing the enormous population imbalance between the two countries, Keating argued that Howard had failed to 'square away' the potential threat arising from Indonesia's population of more than two hundred million people. Keating's invocation of this reason to be fearful seems distinctly at odds with his confidence and pride in Australia's relationship with Indonesia and his own personal closeness to former President Suharto during his period as Prime Minister. But the use of fear to win a political point in debates about Australia-Asia relations or to discipline Australian voters is far from unusual. Indeed, fear has been perhaps the dominant factor in shaping Australia's relations and policies towards Asia and the perceptions of a sceptical community. This article argues that fear is an integral and inescapable element of Australia's relations with Indonesia. However, rather than presenting fear as evidence of flawed diplomacy or as being necessarily irrational, I argue that fear is a constitutive element of relations with Indonesia in much the same way that trust has been an enduring feature of Australian relations with the United States. There have been, of course, many critics of unquestioning Australian alignment with United States' foreign policy and, equally, there have been critics of the various manifestations of Australian policy towards Indonesia over the years. It is not my intention to suggest that Australian attitudes to Indonesia have been without contradictions or that they remained unaffected by changes in Australia, Indonesia and the region more generally. Among politicians on both sides of parliament and among journalists and academics there have been many who have sought to improve what has been a troubled relationship. But despite these efforts, Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are partly constructed in immutable discourses of fear and anxiety. The images and metaphors used to describe Indonesian society and assumptions about 'our' and 'their' national character reflect an enduringly negative view of Indonesia. Moreover, politicians, journalists and academics alike are caught up in this historical web of anxieties and fears. Seemingly routine and benign descriptions of Indonesia's 200 million plus population, its low levels of political and economic development and its status as the world's largest Muslim nation, all play deeply on white Australian fears of Asia even if the authorial intention is to alleviate concerns about Indonesia among Australians. This article explicitly discusses the politics of fear in modern Western societies and explains how domestic anxiety about the policies of multiculturalism and immigration overlap with other concerns about events and peoples external to the Australian nation. Later, I analyse particular images that have been used to describe Indonesia and argue that not only do they have antecedents in colonial depictions of Indonesia but also tend to imply that Australian values and attitudes are superior. Finally, I argue that the key to establishing better relations with Indonesia is not a clearer understanding of 'them', but an ongoing and thoughtful unpacking of the values and fears that constitute 'us'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the dynamics of policy debate and implementation with focus on Australia's policy towards East Timor. Evaluation of the contents of the published document, 'Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976.' Central figures in the making of Australian policy; Australia's preference to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia; Profile of the Australian policy concerning East Timor.

Discusses the relations between Australia and Indonesia. Origins of the East Timor problem; Dispute about Australian policy over East Timor; History of East Timor from 1974 to 1976; Australia's failure to prevent Indonesia's resort to the use of force in its efforts to achieve the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesian territory in late 1975; Implications to the Australian policy-making.

Examines the flaws in the foreign policy of Australia that led to the crisis in East Timor. Need to reappraise the foreign policy of the country; Errors which marked the evolution of Australia's policy action in the months before the deployment of forces in East Timor; Analysis on the arguments advanced by the government in defense of its policy actions.

Focuses on foreign policy in Australia, with emphasis on the country's handling of Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia, in relation to crisis management. Why confrontation is important in Australian foreign policy; Information on foreign policy in Australia; What insured the success of Australia's management in Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia.

Discusses the foreign policy and `security agreement' between Indonesia and Australia. Status of agreement; Significance of policy; Suggestions from the agreement as it relates to Indonesia.